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A member of Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team Miami drives a shallow-water craft through floodwater caused by Hurricane Florence
The Coast Guard must empower junior petty officers with the larger vision and mission of the organization, as they are charged with maintaining the trust of U.S. citizens. Petty Officer Second Class Miguel Torres conducts search-and-rescue operations in North Carolina following Hurricane Florence.
U.S. Coast Guard (Trevor Liburn)

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Strategic Crows Are Linchpins

By Lieutenant Commander Neal A. Corbin, U.S. Coast Guard
June 2019
Proceedings
Vol. 145/6/1,396
Leadership Forum
View Issue
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Junior petty officers—operating in isolated conditions requiring fast-paced leadership—are the linchpins on which the U.S. Coast Guard revolves. They often face some of the most difficult decisions of anyone in the organization. The first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, insisted on sound professionalism and exemplary conduct because he knew if revenue cutter crews searched vessels in an overbearing fashion, such actions would sap public support in a free state. He reminded maritime leaders to “always keep in mind that their countrymen are free men and as such are impatient of everything that bears the least mark of dominating spirit. [You] will therefore . . . refrain from whatever has the semblance of haughtiness, rudeness, or insult.”1

For the Coast Guard to function effectively against emerging threats, its junior personnel—strategic crows starting at the entry-level E-4—must be empowered with the larger vision and mission of the organization.2

Burden On Strategic Crows

The Coast Guard’s strategic crows are akin to the Marine Corps’ strategic corporals, defined by then-Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak in his 1999 Marine Corps Gazette article.3 Krulak postulated that by 2020, 80 percent of the world’s inhabitants would be living in crowded coastal cities. These areas would flare with regional, ethnic, and religious tensions, resulting in an increasingly asymmetric warfare environment and generating the possibility that the U.S. military would have to engage in what he called a “three-block war”:

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day . . . all within three city blocks.4

Coast Guard junior petty officers often find themselves in a similar environment performing disparate roles, such as a small-boat coxswain pursuing narco-terrorists in the eastern Pacific Ocean; a helicopter rescue swimmer being lowered into the flooded urban area of Houston; or a boarding officer inspecting a recreational or commercial vessel for federal safety compliance. Around the world, combating human smuggling, interdicting narco-trafficking, and responding to major natural disasters are among the most complex environments military members face.5

These complex environments challenge our most junior noncommissioned officers to make decisions with incomplete information, with consequences that can have a significant impact on politics and public opinion. As General Krulak explained, “The inescapable lessons of . . . recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level.”6 Modern nations evaluate members of their armed forces for “professional, thoughtful and effectual but restrained behaviors that do credit to their flag.”7

Junior leaders must hold themselves to the highest standards of professional behavior, as the eye of public scrutiny is always on them. As the Coast Guard enforces laws, it must be mindful of the watchful eyes of U.S. citizens whose Constitution it has sworn to protect and defend. The decision-making burden placed on the junior petty officer—the strategic crow—is heavy.

Impact of Strategic Crows

As former Marine Rye Barcott points out in the Harvard Business Review, “While militaries function through chains of command, most units have decentralized leadership that places enormous amounts of responsibility in the hands of young men and women.”8 Significant events in Coast Guard history have shown the need to develop noncommissioned officers and make them leaders.

The post-1915 consolidation of the Revenue Cutter Service and U.S. Life Saving Service established the U.S. Coast Guard as the nation’s fifth armed service. Former civilian members of the U.S. Life Saving Service found themselves part of a military organization. The district superintendents became regular commissioned officers. The station keepers became warrant or specialized officers. The surfmen became enlisted men with the leading surfmen established as “petty officers”—the leadership figures in charge of small-boat operations without significant oversight. The following three events provide a few examples of the importance petty officers as strategic crows.

In the spring of 1927, the Mississippi River and its tributaries flooded to an extent never before recorded. The Coast Guard dispatched 128 vessels and small boats and 674 people who went on to save or remove “from perilous positions to places of safety” 43,853 persons.9 This action was the largest life-saving operation undertaken by the Coast Guard in its history and was accomplished by the most junior service members using small boats in a flood-stricken area with decentralized command and control.

On 18 February 1952, a horrific nor’easter split two 500-foot T2 tankers—the Pendleton and the Fort Mercer—in half off the coast of Massachusetts. The motion picture The Finest Hours showcased the duties and challenges of the Coast Guard motor lifeboat MLB-36500 coxswain and crew in their task to rescue the crew of the Pendleton. MLB-36500, under the command of Petty Officer Bernard C. Webber, faced impossible odds. Yet, Petty Officer Webber and his crew of four rescued 32 members of the Pendleton crew in harsh environmental conditions. Using sound leadership principles, Webber completed the mission with resounding success and established the importance of junior-level leaders in achieving the strategic goals of the organization.10

On 4 October 1980, the cruise ship SS Prinsendam caught fire in the Gulf of Alaska, setting off one of the largest peacetime open-ocean maritime rescue operations in history. Four Pelican HH-3Fs, along with an Air Force Jolly Green Giant HH-3E and two Canadian Labrador HH-46A helicopters, responded.11 In conjunction with aviation support, the Coast Guard cutters Boutwell (WHEC-719), Mellon (WHEC-717), and Woodrush (WLB-407), along with the supertanker Williamsburg, deployed to the scene.

Two images of the rescue of the crew of the SS Pendleton by the U.S. Coast Guard
Petty Officer Bernard C. Webber and his crew of four rescued 32 members of the Pendleton crew in harsh conditions after the ship split in two during a storm.
U.S. Coast Guard

The Williamsburg provided a holding area for passengers who had been awakened in the middle of the night, as well as two helicopter pads for the H-3s to land and ferry the passengers and crewmembers to safety. In all, 329 passengers and 190 crewmembers were saved. Key to the operation were the actions of the junior petty officers operating small boats off the cutter and the flight mechanics on the Coast Guard helicopters operating the rescue hoists, which made possible a rescue of this magnitude.12

Developing Strategic Crows

Often operating far from higher command, the junior petty officer enjoys “a clear mandate for on-scene initiative, but also bears an immense responsibility for the well-being and conduct of the members who serve below them.”13 The Coast Guard demands that “the linchpin for this capable response system is the training, readiness, knowledge, and experience—in sum, the proficiency—of the on-scene mission commander.”14 Since the on-scene mission often is left to the junior petty officer who must make critical decisions, training these young leaders is essential.

We must evaluate our junior petty officer training framework to ensure we are equipping young leaders to act as strategic crows. Coast Guard Publication 1, Doctrine of the United States Coast Guard, lays out how the vision and mission of the organization are essential in framing a leadership construct for junior petty officers. All Coast Guardsmen are leaders as defined by organizational doctrine within Publication 1 and must act independently of direct supervision when required: “The commander cannot be physically present everywhere in the unit, but his or her leadership must be. Leaders hold themselves and their subordinates accountable for following the required standards in all things.” Every Coast Guardsman must understand the guiding principles that define the environment and constraints that necessitate the strategic crow, and the general principles by which he or she must operate.

While basic military training indoctrinates members with the core values of the organization, local leaders must recognize the need for their junior members to continue developing. Because the decisions by the most junior members can have political and strategic consequences, the service must create opportunities for junior petty officers to grow and practice the principles by which the Coast Guard functions while exercising effective risk management and disciplined initiative.

The concept of self-leadership must be emphasized at the junior level starting in the training pipeline. Leadership expert Sebastian Salicru defines self-leadership as “the capability to achieve direction and motivation to positively influence your own performance.”15 Salicru further combines leadership development strategies with various self-development tenets, which include:

  1. Build and maintain high self-esteem.
  2. Identify and apply your strengths.
  3. Focus on developing inspiration, creativity, and energy.
  4. Build character.
  5. Always act ethically and with integrity.
  6. Build your own psychological capital.16

Before you can effectively lead, you need to develop yourself personally and master your ability to interact professionally. While pipeline Coast Guard training must give petty officers the tools to complete their jobs, the commanding officer must understand the requirement to empower junior leaders within the larger organization.

The Coast Guard’s geographic distribution allows rapid response to many different events. Civil missions require it to have far greater day-to-day interaction with the U.S. public than the other branches of the armed forces. This tactical-level empowerment requires junior petty officers have varsity-level communication skills. Developing these skills must be built into training and emphasized and developed throughout their early assignments. Junior petty officers must focus on the fact that the actions and words of their teams speak directly to citizens about the Coast Guard’s professionalism. They are charged with maintaining the trust of the U.S. public and respect for the broad law enforcement powers they are given.

While these are just a few ideas, further study is needed to ensure the Coast Guard strengthens its training and development programs to continue building high-caliber strategic crows to face the immense and unforeseen future challenges. Only then will they be equipped to live up to our motto, Semper Paratus—Always Ready.

1. Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 340.

2. “Crow” is the nickname for rank insignia worn by petty officers of the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy.

3. GEN Charles C. Krulak, USMC, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War,” Marine Corps Gazette 83, no. 1 (January 1999): 18–21.

4. GEN Charles C. Krulak, National Press Club speech in Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, 139–41.

5. David W. Lowell, “Creating Strategic Corporals? Preparing Soldiers for Future Conflict,” Australian Defense Force Journal, no. 201 (2017): 88–97.

6. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal,” 90.

7. Lowell, “Creating Strategic Corporals?” 88.

8. Rye Barcott, “The Strategic Corporal,” Harvard Business Review.

9. U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Publication 1, Doctrine of the United States Coast Guard (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 43.

10. Michael J. Tougias and Casey Sherman, The Finest Hours, The True Story of a Heroic Sea Rescue (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2014).

11. Barrett Thomas Beard, A History of U.S. Coast Guard Helicopters: Wonderful Flying Machines (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).

12. Beard, A History of U.S. Coast Guard Helicopters.

13. National Defense University, The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer: Backbone of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013).

14. VADM John P. Currier, USCG, “Risk Management for the Proficient Operator,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 8 (August 2013): 18–21.

15. Sebastian Salicru, Leadership Results; How to Create Adaptive Leaders and High-Performing Organizations for an Uncertain World (Hoboken, NJ:  Wiley, 2017).

16. Salicru, Leadership Results.

Lieutenant Commander Neal A. Corbin, U.S. Coast Guard

Lieutenant Commander Corbin, a career helicopter pilot, is currently assigned to U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. He served on board the USCGC Dependable (WMEC-626) prior to being designated a naval aviator in May 2008. He is a 2004 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and holds master’s degrees from the U.S. Naval War College and the University of North Dakota.

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