Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Cannot Go Unchecked Either

[Editor’s note: This article is the second of a two-part series on Russian and Chinese ambitions in the Arctic by the same author. See “China’s Activities in the Polar Regions Cannot Go Unchecked” for the first.] 

Climate change is altering not only the physical landscape of the Arctic but the geopolitical landscape as well. The shrinking northern ice cap is opening more navigable Arctic waters, potentially changing global trade flows; providing access to the massive suspected hydrocarbon reserves and mineral deposits and possibly upsetting future global energy markets; and accelerating the militarization of the polar region, perhaps starting a destabilizing arms race. None of this is lost on Moscow. For the past decade, Russia has quietly and incrementally increased its Arctic claims and militarized the Arctic region to protect its strategic interests despite economic challenges.^[1]  

Of particular interest to Russia is the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a waterway of great importance for Russian national efforts to maintain global relevance. Moscow regards the waterway as territorial waters and has taken substantive steps in recent years to protect it as such. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed in the St. Petersburg (Russia) Times on 9 April 2019, “This is our national transport artery. . . . That is obvious. It is like traffic rules. If you go to another country and drive, you abide by their rules.” 

Since 2013, Russia has spent billions of dollars building or upgrading seven military bases along the route, deploying advanced radar and missile systems capable of safeguarding its growing interests. These Arctic bases provide Moscow overlapping coverage of the entire coastline and adjacent waters along the strategic waterway. Last year, Russia’s Northern Fleet conducted its largest military exercise in more than a decade. And Moscow recently announced the establishment of the Northern Fleet Complex for Radio-Electronic Warfare in the Murmansk region to complement the Russian Far East Complex in the Kamchatka region.^[2] Both complexes are equipped with the latest electronic warfare equipment designed to selectively degrade and deny communications at ranges of up to 5,000 nautical miles, or the entire Arctic region. 

More troubling is the recent announcement of a new set of Russian rules governing the passage of foreign ships along the NSR.^[3] All foreign naval combatants desiring to transit the strategic waterway must now notify the Russian navy 45 days in advance and have a Russian marine pilot on board during the transit. Foreign submarines are required to transit only on the surface. And if there is a probability that the foreign vessel is poorly maintained or may pollute the waterway, Moscow can deny passage. Altogether, the message is clear: Russia governs the Arctic.^[4]

Commercial traffic in the region is light today, but it is increasing steadily. Ships from 20 different countries navigated the NSR last year, carrying some 20 million tons of cargo. While small in comparison to other global shipping routes, the number has doubled since 2017 and is expected to quadruple by 2025.^[5] At present, the Arctic has just three ice-free months per year, but the latest oceanographic modeling forecasts steady increases in the coming years. 

In anticipation of more navigable waters and ensuing increased shipping, Russia has increased its administrative control of the strategic waterway, including giving Rosatom—the state-owned nuclear-power conglomerate—a monopoly over operating icebreakers along the route, effectively letting Rosatom manage access to the NSR.^[6] Russia has launched a new nuclear-powered icebreaker, part of an ambitious program to renew and expand its icebreaker fleet to improve its ability to tap the Arctic’s commercial potential. The ship, named the Ural, is one of a trio that when completed will be the largest and most powerful icebreakers in the world.^[7] Moscow also continues to build its legal case to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for another 500,000 square nautical miles of the Arctic based on Russian-claimed underwater ridges.^[8]

China is a wildcard in Russia’s Arctic ambitions and strategic calculus. Beijing’s increased interest (and activities) in the Arctic and developing strategic cooperation with Moscow—however selective and uneven—could be an asset as well as a potential liability for Russia. Beijing has had observer status on the Arctic Council since 2013; maintains a research station in Norway; and is the biggest foreign shareholder in Russia’s Arctic liquefied natural gas projects, which will rely on NSR shipments for exports.^[9] Last year, China published an Arctic policy paper explicitly linking the NSR to the Belt and Road Initiative, naming it the “Polar Silk Road.” Beijing brazenly proclaimed its strategic intent to partake in the activities of a “near-Arctic state”—developing Arctic shipping routes; seeking and extracting oil, gas, mineral, and other material resources; using and conserving fisheries; and promoting Arctic tourism.^[10] The audacious move alarmed Moscow and elevated its already heightened wariness of Beijing’s strategic intent in the high northern latitudes.

U.S. Policy Options

What should Washington do about Moscow’s attempt to dominate the Arctic? Some of the policy recommendations that follow were cited in the recently promulgated Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (June 2019).

1. Update the 2009 Arctic Region Policy and 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region to reflect the more competitive and muscular 2017 National Security and 2018 National Defense Strategies. The latest Arctic Strategy is a good interim step, identifying a desired end-state for the Arctic as a “secure and stable region in which U.S. national security interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges.”^[11] The report updated the 2016 Strategy to Protect U.S. National Security Interests in the Arctic Region by reiterating emerging threats, highlighting persistent military shortfalls, proposing ways and means for the military to support national Arctic objectives, and more important, underscoring again the U.S. legal and diplomatic positions that Arctic waters, including the NSR and Northwest Passage, are international waters and not internal waterways as claimed by Russia and Canada, respectively. 

All in all, the new policy and strategy must be synchronized and balanced to counter Russia across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains; and to coordinate all interagency activities in a government-wide approach to protect U.S. national interests. 

2. Increase U.S. presence in the Arctic to challenge Russia’s dominance and growing influence. Inactivity yields the strategic high ground and initiative to Moscow. Early steps have been promising: the 2018 deployment above the Arctic Circle by the Harry S. Truman Strike Group; stationing of more fighter aircraft in Alaska; expanding partnerships with Nordic militaries; deploying Marines to Norway for extreme cold weather training; and upgrading sensors along the Aleutian Islands. But much more is needed to improve the posture of U.S. forces — permanent basing, maritime presence, and contingency operations.^[12] General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, has noted that the “Arctic is the first line of defense.”^[13]

3. Do not comply with Russia’s new set of rules governing the passage of foreign ships along the NSR. Compliance only legitimizes the excessive maritime claim underpinning the unlawful rules.  

4. Conduct freedom of navigation operations to challenge Russia’s excessive maritime claims in the Arctic. Secretary of Navy Richard Spencer recently said, “If the possibility exists to go all the way around the [Northwest Passage], I’d actually give that a shot. It’s freedom of navigation. If we can do it, we’ll do it.”^[14] 

5. Collaborate with Nordic allies and partners to establish more bases now to prepare for the eventual opening of the Transpolar Sea Route later. The new route will change the global trade flows, and the United States must be ready to adjust to the new economic reality. 

6. Invest more in Arctic capabilities, infrastructure, and icebreakers—especially within the Coast Guard and Navy—to enable increased and enhanced U.S. operations to preserve the enduring national interests there. Increase maritime capabilities and capacities to enforce domestic laws and regulations, safeguard maritime interests, and uphold the rule of law and global norms in coordination with the Navy.

7. Work with the other Arctic states (Russia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland) to exercise shared polar governance over the strategic high ground. Support the extant Arctic Council framework for observers (non-arctic states, intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, and nongovernmental organizations), but make clear that the council does not recognize the term “near-Arctic state” or associated expansive legal assertions. Reach a consensus on climate change to deny Moscow and Beijing an opening to put a wedge between Washington and the other Arctic Council members.^[15] 

8. Call out Russian wayward behavior when warranted. During a recent Arctic Council meeting in Finland, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo expressed concern over Moscow’s cumulative misbehavior and aggression in the region.^[16] Continue to do so, or else Russia will keep trying to alter the status quo, openly and covertly. 

9. Find opportunities to leverage the mutual distrust between Moscow and Beijing. Put a wedge between the two near-peer competitors and prevent the formation of any strategic alliance in the Arctic. 

10. Take note of Moscow’s actions in the Arctic as a possible harbinger of things to come in the South China Sea. Just like Russia, China is building up its military capabilities and capacities and increasing its military presence and operations in the strategic waterway to incrementally exert control over the air and water spaces and eventually impose its will on its neighbors and the international community. In other words, slowly change the facts on the ground and ultimately present the region and the world with a fait accompli. 

At the end of the day, asserting dominance in the Arctic is another way for Russia to maintain global relevance (national security), promote and advance Russian nationalism (national pride), control new natural resources (economic prosperity), and keep alive its aspiration to again become a superpower and recapture its former glory (the “Russian Dream”). The West won the Cold War, and if Washington wants to preserve the hard-won victory, it cannot back down and cede the strategic high ground to Moscow now or in the future. Otherwise, the United States may have to contend with possibly two future competing “superpowers.”