Keep a Weather Eye on the Arctic

As the Arctic becomes increasingly accessible, economic interest in the region is heightening. Global stakeholders—including the eight Arctic states but also China, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union—are looking northward to secure political influence and regional access to enable economic opportunities and national security. In addition, recent military exercises in the High North by Russia and NATO have sparked concerns of Arctic militarization. 

The United States must update its Arctic policy. Strategists must balance global interests and strategic priorities while supporting continued cooperation and adherence to international laws and norms. The Navy will play an increasingly important role in the High North and should work closely with regional partners to enhance maritime domain awareness, establish an appropriate presence, and fill capability gaps.

Understanding Arctic Strategic Interests

Strategic interests in the Arctic region differ greatly by nation. Russia, for example, has long pursued an Arctic strategy out of necessity. In 1938, British journalist H. P. Smolka remarked on “Russia’s energetic efforts to push open her frozen windows in the North and develop a Polar Empire.”¹ Today, it relies heavily on the Arctic for natural resources, coastal access, and strategic basing. Economically, approximately 10 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product and 20 percent of its exports come from this region; nearly a fifth of its landmass falls within the Arctic Circle.² It also is the largest Arctic nation by population; almost half the region’s four million inhabitants live in Arctic Russia. The country is compelled to take an active stance on the Arctic. 

While the United States has been an Arctic nation since the 1867 Alaska Purchase—and a U.S. firm was the first to establish a successful coal operation on Svalbard—the Arctic today accounts for only a fraction of the U.S. economy or population. The largest U.S. Arctic city, Barrow, Alaska, has just over 4,000 residents.³ Accessing natural resources in the region has proven costly.⁴ The combination of challenging operating conditions, immense logistical requirements, an abundance of shale oil, and the low price of crude oil likely will keep U.S. investment interest limited. 

U.S. strategic interests in the region, however, will not remain static. As diminishing ice and improved technology permit both extraction of natural resources and easier access to remote areas, the Arctic will become increasingly economically viable. The thawing Arctic Ocean will present new opportunities, particularly as inland roads become less stable as permafrost warms. New ports could open isolated communities, and recreational traffic will continue to rise. Commercial shipping activity in support of resource extraction also likely will increase, and international fishing fleets, following migrating species northward, will require close monitoring.⁵ Ensuring the protection of the U.S. exclusive economic zone will become increasingly important. 

There are also enduring U.S. security interests in the Arctic, including early warning systems, freedom of navigation and overflight, collective defense obligations, and presence operations to act as a deterrent and to defend U.S. interests if necessary.

Congressional hearings have highlighted the United States’ limited capacity to operate in the Arctic, but advocates for a more robust U.S. presence also must realize budgetary constraints require prioritization of regions and assets. Trade-offs must be made as Arctic operations require unique skill sets, special vessel construction, and technological advancements. Vessels designed to operate in the Arctic cannot operate as efficiently in more temperate waters; the hostile Arctic environment also makes it more costly to prepare and operate units there. Increasing Arctic operations will be at the expense of operations elsewhere. Indeed, increased U.S. military presence risks initiating an Arctic security dilemma.

Policy Recommendations

In 2013, the Obama administration released the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, followed by an implementation plan listing 36 activities, each assigned to a lead agency. The Department of Homeland Security—namely, the U.S. Coast Guard—was tasked with leading much of the effort. The Department of Defense (DoD) was assigned lead on only one task: to develop a framework of observations and modeling to support forecasting and prediction of sea ice.  

Although an updated DoD Arctic strategy was released in June, as required by the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, there has been no announcement of a new national strategy to align the myriad stakeholders. Strategic guidance should be updated to reflect the evolving strategic landscape and rising geostrategic importance of the region. DoD should be a co-lead with the Department of Homeland Security, with the Navy tasked as the DoD lead agent due to the increased maritime importance of
the region. 

Overall, the United States should remain committed to the strategic objectives identified by Henry Kissinger in his 1971 National Security Decision Memorandum 144, which noted the United States would “support the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment; promote mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and provide for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic.”⁶ However, policy should be expanded to: 

1. Protect essential security interests. 

The United States should have a limited—but capable—security presence in the Arctic, providing deterrence while demonstrating strategic prioritization and recognition of greater global threats. 

Increase appropriate presence. The United States must improve its ability to operate in the Arctic, whether for emergency response or to protect its strategic interests. To do this requires procurement of new icebreakers. While funding has been allocated to begin construction of the first polar security cutter, fiscal constraints demand an examination of options, such as a leasing agreement or public-private partnerships to provide interim capabilities. Canada’s recent acquisition of the CCGS Captain Molly Kool, a medium icebreaker purchased from Norway and converted by Quebec’s Davie shipyard, is a model for an interim icebreaker acquisition. In addition, the United States should increase the sustainable presence of submarines, reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, intelligence collectors, and Coast Guard aircraft and ships. 

Improve operating capabilities through exercises. The United States should increase participation in partner exercises in the Arctic, such as last fall’s Trident Juncture. Doing so builds interoperability with allies as well as familiarity with operating in the unique Arctic environment. 

Increase participation in personnel exchanges. The Navy in particular could benefit significantly from personnel exchanges with Coast Guard units operating in the Arctic and other partners adept at Arctic maritime operations, exposing its officers to critical Arctic skill sets.  

Improve infrastructure and communications capabilities to support an increased regional presence.  This includes continued progress toward a deep-water port, as well as significant investment in navigation aids, satellites, and detection capabilities. Infrastructure improvements are critical to providing presence, conducting freedom of navigation and law enforcement operations, and responding to emergencies and contingencies.

2. Promote mutually beneficial international Arctic cooperation, research, and governance. 

The Arctic has long exhibited a uniquely cooperative spirit. Even during the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union identified mutually beneficial areas in which to cooperate. Thus far, Russia has engaged well in the Arctic Council, demonstrating a commitment to upholding established Arctic norms of cooperative behavior. It is critical to continue to strengthen governance mechanisms and promote cooperation to ensure the region remains peaceful and stable. 

Leverage existing governance mechanisms. The Arctic Council has three legally binding treaties regarding search and rescue, pollution, and scientific cooperation; the United States should continue to contribute to the Council’s agenda. It also should further expand multilateral cooperative response exercises to build trust, strengthen relationships, and develop multilateral protocols to ensure efficient and effective response to emergencies such as search and rescue or oil spill response. 

Improve transparency and confidence-building measures. As activity in the Arctic rises, it is important to reduce the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding. Military exercises and the presence of numerous stakeholders necessitate cooperation to ensure the region remains one of stability and low tension. While the Arctic Council excludes military security issues, it provides an opportunity for stakeholders to discuss important issues. Russia should be encouraged to participate further in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and be included again in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable to increase transparency, build relationships, and conduct confidence-building exercises. These forums are well suited for cooperation on emergency response and maritime domain awareness, both of which are increasingly important as the potential of an emergency at sea or illicit activity rises.

Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is critical to ensure U.S. interests are protected and to give legitimacy to freedom of navigation and freedom of maneuver operations. To preserve U.S. global strategic interests, it is imperative to ensure international law is applied consistently. As the only Arctic state that has not ratified the convention, the United States is at a significant disadvantage when articulating the need to abide by international law—even if standard practice is to adhere to customary international law.

Improve scientific cooperation and research. Constructive engagement with Arctic Council members and observer nations should be strengthened to share scientific data such as weather monitoring, hydrographic surveys, pollution monitoring, and regional observation programs. Understanding the region is critical to ensuring U.S. strategic interests and the global commons are protected. 

3. Protect the fragile Arctic environment and indigenous communities. 

The NOAA Arctic Report Card notes that the “magnitude and pace of the 21st century sea ice decline and surface ocean warming is unprecedented in at least the last 1,500 years and likely much longer.” Arctic tundra is also warming, resulting in decreased permafrost and increased greenness. Thawing permafrost presents significant concerns, ranging from the release of potential toxins such as greenhouse gases, mercury, and bacteria to infrastructure collapse. The warming of the Arctic region is not merely a concern for Arctic states. Sea-level rise, amplification of weather phenomena, shifting currents, and warming seas could all have global consequences. The shifting environment is affecting traditional lifestyles of indigenous communities, eroding hunting grounds and road infrastructure alike. 

Consider expanding federal protected regions. The Trump administration has sought to roll back previous environmental protections, but it remains questionable whether this is necessary. Thus far, economic interest in the U.S. Arctic remains limited due to plentiful resources—that are less costly to extract—elsewhere in the United States. 

Ensure indigenous communities are protected. Additional government funding can be allocated to improving infrastructure for local communities to harden them against the evolving landscape. Port infrastructure should be improved to offer accessibility to communities while also serving as logistics hubs for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets.

Strengthen participation in international and bilateral emergency response exercises. Given the fragile Arctic environment, an incident could be catastrophic for all regional states. The United States should work with Arctic stakeholders to improve Arctic response capabilities for search and rescue, oil spill response, and other crises.

4. Support sustainable economic development. 

The Arctic is becoming increasingly viable for exploitation of natural resources. Arctic and non-Arctic nations alike are looking northward for potential energy and food resources. As these resources become accessible, it will be critical to ensure appropriate protocols are in place to promote responsible development and ensure national security interests are met. 

Balance

The Arctic has immense potential for cooperation; key stakeholders in the region generally have operated in accordance with international norms. But misunderstandings have the potential to spark conflict, and U.S. policymakers and strategic planners must be prepared. Cooperation with regional partners and the broader international community will be important to handle future challenges that may arise. 

The strategic objectives and policy recommendations outlined here provide for a multilayered approach that integrates cooperative prevention, deterrence, and contingency response while leveraging unilateral actions. It is a whole-of-government approach aimed at improving multilateral cooperation to ensure constructive engagement in the region.

Pursuing an Arctic policy that balances realistic assessments of national interests with the projected economic and geostrategic importance of the High North will allow the United States to remain a key Arctic stakeholder while diminishing the risk of igniting a dangerous security race.