The 21st century sees China rising after a span of relative decline. China is enjoying economic growth and has been taking a firmer stance with regard to claimed territories in the East and South China seas. It also has embarked on modernizing its military, making it a credible force.1 With its growing assertiveness, there is a need to understand how China will act in the future, which likely will be rooted in its historical perspective on international relations and the use of force.
The International System
After centuries of warfare following the decline of the Zhou Dynasty (1045–256 BCE), China learned that unity brings peace and plenty. Thus, the Chinese place strong emphasis on achieving and maintaining unification. Everyone belongs within a single social order led by the Chinese emperor. There are no rules governing interstate relations because there is only one state.
By contrast, Europe developed a pluralistic approach embodied as the Westphalian system, recognizing the equal rights of sovereign states. The Sinocentric world order has the Chinese emperor ruling over the Middle Kingdom, neighboring vassals, tributaries, and even the uncivilized barbarians at the periphery. Sovereign states as defined by the Westphalian system do not exist; there cannot be an equal to the Chinese emperor.
The Chinese emperor rules because he has the Mandate of Heaven, which means he embodies a more perfect virtue than others. If he loses this virtue, he loses the mandate and the right to rule. Thus, virtue and power are inseparable under the Chinese philosophy.2
This is not to say China does not understand the pluralistic Westphalian system. Pre-Qin China (before 221 BCE) saw a multitude of states interacting with each other over an extended period. Pre-Qin thinking on interstate behavior provides some insight on how China may behave in the pluralistic Westphalian system, although it is unlikely to influence China’s emphasis on unification.3
The Use of Force
Sun Tzu, the most famous of China’s ancient military thinkers, stressed the importance of a ruler’s moral influence in war.4 This is embodied in the Mandate of Heaven, and it stresses the importance of legitimacy when considering the use of force.
China consistently has sought to establish a peaceful and secure political environment free of threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.5 Historically, imperial China used force to achieve such a political environment following unification; force was used to punish raiders at the periphery of Chinese civilization, and force was used to coerce states into recognizing China’s suzerainty.6 However, imperial China’s external use of force was limited, as unsuccessful campaigns could be interpreted as losing the mandate and invite overthrow.
Sun Tzu advocates subjugating the enemy without fighting. Instead of military force being an extension of policy, military force usually is used in concert with other political tools to achieve certain objectives. For example, imperial China has used varying degrees of appeasement, military action, and alliances to deal with raiders at its periphery.
Recent History
Since the Chinese Communist Party took over and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China at times has used military force in international dealings.
In October 1950, China intervened in the Korean War, just as U.N. forces were winning against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). The intent was to “establish communist authority, legitimacy, and credibility” by competing with the superpowers and demonstrating Chinese power beyond China itself.7 Despite the high human costs, there were no material gains from this intervention; in fact, the Chinese forces committed were named the Chinese People’s Volunteers to make them unofficial and nonpolitical. However, through this “unofficial” action, China was able to assert its position as the regional power and demonstrate its willingness to intervene in events in the Sinocentric world.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War took place amid border disputes between China and India at a time when India was being courted by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The intent was to punish India for its increasingly aggressive handling of border disputes with China, as well as to reaffirm that “China would resist any superpower involvement—direct or indirect—in any conflict with China.”8 Again, there were no real material gains; China unilaterally withdrew to the line of actual control after the war, ceding Indian territories acquired. However, China was able to show that it would not tolerate external influences in dealings with its neighbors.
In 1979, China launched a massive attack against Vietnam. The intent was to “punish Vietnam, and teach the Vietnamese their proper place in China’s world.”9 Once again, it resulted in no material gains, but China managed to assert itself as the regional power. Vietnam had invaded Cambodia, a traditional Chinese vassal, without sanction from China, and thus committed a direct transgression against the Sinocentric world order. To right the order, China took action to punish Vietnam and show it would not tolerate unilateral action without being consulted.
Implications for the Future
Political legitimacy likely will remain the core of China’s pursuit in the coming years, which it will maintain by holding the moral high ground in the international arena. Instead of seeking hegemony, China likely will work to be seen as virtuous and righteous. Instead of increasing its influence over other states by building its national power, China likely will try to win friends through its superior moral character. Such a strategy is rooted in classical Chinese thought. However, a superior moral character does not preclude the use of force.
Within China, priority is given to unification as a demonstration of political legitimacy, and territorial integrity will remain a priority.10 While China is unlikely to use force to settle territorial disputes, it may be willing to consider a military option should it feel its territorial integrity or world position is being threatened. A strategy of de facto ownership without openly challenging China’s sovereignty over disputed territories may help reduce tensions and avoid escalation.
While China may seem to be adopting the Westphalian worldview of sovereign equality, one must remember that China has a history of “using barbarians to control barbarians.” This outward adoption of a foreign worldview may be a Chinese strategy of using foreign methods to control foreigners.11 Sinocentrism is unlikely to have been dropped. While recognizing the sovereign equality of states, China may be seeking to create a hierarchy in which rights and responsibilities are distributed proportionate to a state’s power.
The Middle Kingdom once again may be seeking to be at the center of all things. While China may not seek to control individual states within the system, it may demand obeisance to Chinese leadership in international forums as a form of passive deference. To maintain political legitimacy, China is unlikely to use force for material gains, but it may use force if its political legitimacy—either territorial integrity or great power status—is threatened.
1. For a brief introduction to China’s military rise in recent years, see Jonathan Holslag, Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise (New York: Routledge: 2010).
2. Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire: China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 236.
3. For a detailed discussion on pre-Qin thinking about interstate behavior, see Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
4. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 64–65.
5. William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 216.
6. For examples of how force was used by imperial China, see Chinese Ways in Warfare, edited by Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
7. Mott and Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture, 113.
8. Mott and Kim, 145, 155.
9. Mott and Kim, 185.
10. Ford, The Mind of Empire, 241–42.
11. This concept of using barbarian ideas to control barbarians can be seen in how the Qing Dynasty, toward its end, tried to use Western international laws to ease the inequality that China was facing. See Ford’s The Mind of Empire, 170–72.