Throughout history, the most powerful nations have been those that controlled the seas. Strategically, control of the sea lanes is critical because it allows a state to control the flow of munitions, equipment, soldiers, and food to battle zones. Roughly 97 percent of the goods used by U.S. troops overseas are exported from the United States.1 In addition, U.S. shipyards, munition factories, and many other defense-specific industries rely on the import of raw materials.
Control of the Arctic sea lanes will be important because ships transiting via northern routes could reduce transit times and avoid traditionally dangerous choke points. Traveling from China to Europe via the Arctic, for example, could save up to 12 days when compared to more traditional sea routes.2 Control of the Arctic sea lanes depends on several factors, perhaps none more important that the ability of sovereign vessels to physically navigate the region. In the Arctic, this task falls to Coast Guard icebreakers. But as Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK), a congressman intimately familiar with Arctic issues, has said, “The highways of the Arctic are paved by icebreakers. Russia has superhighways, and we have dirt roads with potholes.”3
Russian Arctic Assets
Russia perceives its Arctic region as a key development driver in the 21st century. A large part of its strategy involves its fleet of icebreakers. Russia currently has 46 icebreakers, with 11 in various stages of production. Of the 46, 29 are owned and operated by the government, and 4 are heavy icebreakers, defined as having greater than 45,000 brake horse power. Of the 11 under construction, 7 are being built by the Russian government and 4 by private industry.4
Russia’s Arctic shipbuilding efforts go beyond ships designed to break ice in support of search-and-rescue operations and to facilitate commerce. They also are building conventional warships with ice-strengthened hulls that would allow them to go where few other surface combatants can.
As of 2016, Russia had awarded a contract for two 374-foot Project 23550 Ice-class patrol ships, which have been likened to a polar “corvette,” meaning they are fast and outfitted with weapons. Russia’s Ministry of Defense claims the ships will have the warfighting capabilities of a Navy surface combatant, as well an icebreaker and tug, and that they have “no analogues in the world.”5 While other Arctic nations--including Norway, Denmark, and Canada--have vessels with similar icebreaking capability no other ships carry the same amount of armament as planned for on the Ice class.
Armament on the Ice class will include a medium-caliber deck gun and two payload bays on the stern capable of carrying containerized missile systems. The ships also will feature a flight deck and hangar for a Ka-27 antisubmarine or utility helicopter.6 The keel of the first of the two vessels, the Ivan Papanin, was laid in April 2017, and both ships are to be operational by 2023–24.7
Construction of the Ice class is only part of Russia’s larger naval strategy and asset procurement plan for the region. Two 574-foot nuclear-powered icebreakers, the most powerful in the world, already have been launched, and a third is under construction. The even larger Leader-class nuclear-powered icebreakers and Project 10570 icebreakers will be capable of escorting ships through sea lanes in the Arctic that otherwise would be inaccessible.
U.S. Arctic Assets
Currently, the United States does not have sufficient naval and Coast Guard assets to operate in the Arctic. Further, Coast Guard officials and others have long warned that the United States does not have the equipment or infrastructure to respond to emergencies, enforce the U.S. exclusive economic zone, or achieve other national objectives in a more heavily traversed Arctic.8
A 2011 study estimated the Coast Guard needs approximately six new icebreakers to meet U.S. demands for polar access.9 The United States currently has two operational icebreakers capable of Arctic engagement. A third, the Polar Sea, suffered an engine casualty in 2010, and the cost of repairs was deemed prohibitive. She now sits in Seattle, Washington, as a “donor” boat whose parts are stripped to support her sister ship, the Polar Star.
In a September 2015 visit to Alaska, then-President Barack Obama noted the need for more assets in the Arctic region and spoke of fast-tracking construction of a new Coast Guard icebreaker.10 The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act allows the military to build a new icebreaker for the Coast Guard, but lawmakers also said they do not want the Department of Defense (DoD) paying for any additional icebreakers once this one is built.11 Fortunately, on 23 April 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the Polar Security Cutter Program awarded a $745.9 million contract for the detail design and construction of the first heavy icebreaker.12 It is expected to enter service in 2024.
Some observers have suggested leasing an icebreaker from another country or one of the commercial ice-capable vessels privately owned in the United States as a short-term solution. A lease seems unlikely, though, as senior Coast Guard leaders have determined significant money would have to be invested in a commercially leased vessel to have it meet military standards. Coast Guard cutters do more than just break ice and need to be equipped to perform additional missions. Other analysts have suggested purchasing a vessel from a Finnish shipbuilder, but policy problems arise with the Jones Act and an “America First” ethos, making construction of a new icebreaker in a U.S. shipyard the most likely path.
DoD’s Arctic Strategy, updated in June 2019, calls for the evolution of Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions in that part of the world. However, the strategy uses projection of power in place of physical presence in the region. DoD has very few niche Arctic capabilities. Some large platforms include Arctic-specific design features, in particular nuclear attack submarines, but no surface combatants are ice-strengthened, so traversing the region on the surface will continue to be untenable for the foreseeable future. This lack of capability also affects the ability to send troop transports into the region, an important capability given how inaccessible the Arctic is over land.
Until the United States appropriates significant funds for the Arctic, Russian will continue to outpace us in the region. The Arctic is still not a national security priority, and soon it will be obvious the United States has waited too long to compete.
Recommendations to Close the Gap
The Coast Guard is focused on the Polar Security Cutter Program and keeping the Polar Star running until the new hulls come online. With Congress’s recent commitment to fund an additional icebreaker, there is reason for optimism that by the early 2020s, the United States will have additional assets in the region. However, Congress must follow through and make a commitment to protecting U.S. interests in the region. As Coast Guard Rear Admiral Melvin Bouboulis has explained, “We understand that some folks think it just it goes and breaks ice, but we’ve purposely changed the name of that program to Polar Security Cutter because it is really the U.S. presence in the Arctic regions and preserving our national interest and security in those areas.”13
While the U.S. government slowly pivots to the Arctic, diplomatic relations with the other Arctic nations should be strengthened. Despite strong rhetoric, Russia has been a cooperative partner in the region, demonstrating the Arctic is an area where nations can work together despite disagreements in other parts of the world. The United States’ continued involvement in Arctic governance bodies and international forums will facilitate these relationships and help keep the Arctic conflict free. Long-term peace and stability, however, will depend on strength in the form of more Arctic-capable Coast Guard and DoD forces.
1. Nonresident Training Courses, “Basic Military Requirements,” ch. 20, “Seapower.”
2. “Russian PM Orders Plan to Increase Northern Sea Route by 20 Percent,” RT.com, 8 June 2015.
3. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Obama to Call for More Icebreakers in Arctic as U.S. Seeks Foothold,” The New York Times, 1 September 2015.
4. USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy, “Major Icebreakers of the World,” U.S. Coast Guard.
5. Tyler Rogowy, “This is Russia’s Warship Built Specifically for Arctic Fighting,” TheDrive.com, 27 March 2017.
6. Rogowy, “This is Russia’s Warship Built Specifically for Arctic Fighting.”
7. “Ivan Papanin (Project 23550) Class Arctic Patrol Vessels,” and Lyle Goldstein, April 2, 2018 “Is Russia’s Planned ‘Combat Icebreaker’ a Serious Threat?” The National Interest, 2 April 2018.
8. Max Cacas, “Coast Guard Prepares as Arctic Heats Up,” Signal Magazine, June 2012.
9. Stew Magnuson, “Sticker Shock: $1 Billion for New Icebreaker,” National Defense Magazine, June 2013.
10. Hirschfeld Davis, “Obama to Call for More Icebreakers.”
11. David Malakoff, “Massive U.S. Defense Bill Includes a Bevy of Research-Related Provisions,” Science Magazine, 14 November 2017.
12. Ronald O’Rourke, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 12 June 2019.
13. Sam LaGrone and Ben Werner, “Coast Guard Renames New Icebreaker Program ‘Polar Security Cutter,’” USNI News, 27 September 2018.