Non-Nuclear Submarines? Choose Fuel Cells
(See J. Minnehan, pp. 60–61, June 2019)
Allow me to jump on the bandwagon with Ensign Minnehan.
From a special operations point of view, the advantages of air-independent propulsion are considerable. The improved stealth, maneuverability, shallow water navigation, and bottoming capabilities would greatly enhance clandestine insertion capabilities and would increase the operational reach of the Navy. In the gray zone below armed conflict, this capability would provide more and better options to challenge adversaries. The fact that this capability is available at less than one-fifth the cost and with a crew one-quarter the size of a Virginia-class is an unmistakable—and should be irresistible—bargain.
—John (Jack) Nash, strategy officer, Naval Special Warfare Command
Blockade the First Island Chain
(See M. Conners, p. 13, June 2019)
Is the South China Sea geostrategically critical because China relies on sea lines of communication there? Yes and no, mostly no. Granted, chokepoints such as Malacca and Lombok would facilitate a distant naval oil blockade, but China-bound tankers and merchantmen could avoid the South China Sea altogether. More important, South China Sea chokepoints are only one factor among several that would affect the prospects for blockade success.
Other factors include:
- How quickly China could reduce demand for imports
- Whether land neighbors such as Russia would cooperate with a U.S. blockade or instead enable Chinese trade
- The capacity of overland-trade-enabling infrastructure (railroads, pipelines, etc.) and how quickly China and others could build more such infrastructure
- The size of Chinese energy (and other critical materials) stockpiles
Most important, blockades take time to work. Thus, success of a U.S. blockade depends on the willingness of the American people (and other peoples all over the world) to suffer enormous economic disruption as a result of a U.S.-Chinese dispute likely borne of a local (East Asian) conflict, compared to China’s willingness and ability to cope.
For an illuminating discussion of these issues, see Gabriel Collins’ “A Maritime Oil Blockade against China” in the Spring 2018 Naval War College Review.
— Marshall Hoyler
The South China Sea Needs a ‘COIN’ Toss
(See H. Stires, pp. 16–21, May 2019)
The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia in the present tense is not made up of civilians. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reorganized four of its traditional maritime militias into a single, unified one and inducted it into the PLA as a military service in April 2017.
This may be confusing for many in the United States—including in the Navy—but it is much more likely that the general policy is we do not want to have multiple incidents while we are trying to negotiate agreements. Also, I don’t think Vietnamese, Philippine, or other nation’s interests are too high a priority for the United States. But the gist of Mr. Stires’ argument is germane—we do not have a large presence or the ability to respond to the huge number of assets the People’s Republic has in the area on a one-to-one basis. And acting officially is best done with “proof”—and proof may be impractical to gather unless we are present at the right moment.
—Lawrence Sid Trevathan
The June Proceedings
I found this issue to be more stimulating than most for two reasons:
First, the Capstone winners’ articles plus Midshipman Rielage’s article on concentrating the fleet for wartime readiness. Though I don’t personally agree with all points made, the papers are good, and my impression is the authors do not care a lot about whether their seniors are likely to agree with their views. I particularly tuned in to Ensign Johnston’s article on SWO culture at the Naval Academy, even 60 years after my time there.
Second, “DARE Redux: Risks Rewarded, Jerks Jettisoned,” by Steve Cohen. The thesis of the DARE challenge is itself a great source of encouragement for those skeptical of military leadership’s appetite for the examination of tough issues.
Personally, I wish for more careful consideration of not only those willing to take risks themselves, but also those willing to offer ideas and alternatives that deviate from the accepted way of doing things. We don’t need people who are routinely contrarians (jerks?) or Monday-morning quarterbacks, and rewards and promotions will always be a matter of opinion. But in the competitive leadership quality environment that we enjoy, we need to save some space for those who are willing to step off the expected road to success.
—RADM William Houley, USN (Ret.)
The June issue is one of the best I have read in my 18 years as a member. The “junior voices” were particularly in step with the mission of offering new insights that—while perhaps not likely to be fully endorsed by our leaders—should certainly give them pause for reflection.
—CAPT Mark Stange, USNR (Ret.)
Automation Will Change Sea Power
(See J. Arquilla and P. Denning, pp. 32–36, June 2019)
The Navy Needs AI: It’s Just Not Certain Why
(See G. Galdorisi, pp. 28–32, May 2019)
Professors Arquilla and Denning emphasize the need for vigorous, swift adoption of artificial intelligence. In chapter 12 of Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, (3rd ed., Naval Institute Press, 2018) Rear Admiral Bob Girrier and I complement their observations, but from the operator’s point of view.
We agree with their conclusion that AI’s greatest value ensues from human-machine collaboration. The best chess and Go competitors turn out to be highly skilled humans teamed with “well-trained” AI programs. Together, they generally beat either expert humans or artificial intelligence programs acting alone.
Modern technology can make a robotic tank, but the AI program cannot anticipate everything. An experienced operator in the tank can respond to surprises and will probably beat either a tank that relies solely on the swift action AI provides or a tank manned by human operators the old-fashioned way. In addition, questions still exist regarding neural network reliability and fragility for military applications.
Captain Galdorisi seems unaware of the successes achieved in two research centers and several academic departments at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). NPS has developed and deployed increasingly robotic unmanned aerial systems and is deeply invested in big-data applications and machine learning.
Nevertheless, I want to emphasize the need first to establish the ends to which automated systems will be applied by the Navy-Marine Corps team, specifically for sea control, sea denial, or power projection, and tailored to different geographies and specific enemies. AI systems can then be developed to play a variety of roles in support of the strategic ends.
Our new president, retired Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau, has emphasized “digital competency” in recruiting and training for naval operations. She implies the need for fast action and immediate application. NPS educates junior officers for information warfare and artificial intelligence so they will graduate with the flexibility of mind to anticipate the future as a competition.
Arquilla and Denning emphasize swarm attacks; aerial swarms are already being deployed, and unmanned undersea and surface systems are on the way.
I urge Proceedings readers to attend to the Arquilla-Denning essay, especially for the developers’ point of view, including swift exploitation of what is happening now in the commercial world of computer and cyber technology. But readers should also reflect on the best ways to exploit AI, including the future of swarms and counter-swarms of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems for combat operations.
—CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Ret.), Dean Emeritus, Naval Postgraduate School
Organize Combat Logistics for the High-End Fight
(See P. Pagano, pp. 40–43, May 2019)
There is a historical analogy to today’s shortage of replenishment ships assigned to the Combat Logistics Force.
In the mid-1930s the Navy faced the same funding problems we have today as it attempted to rebuild the fleet. Although the CNO at the time was concerned about the Navy’s need for auxiliaries, the General Board (an advisory body reporting to the Secretary of the Navy) recommended against building any new auxiliaries, fearing the funds for such ships would be diverted from the construction of combatants. Fortunately for the Navy, an important figure within the U.S. Maritime Commission—Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, USN (Ret.), the former head of the Bureau of Construction and Repair—convinced Congress to subsidize the construction of commercial tankers having National Defense Features: increased speed (to keep up with the fleet), gun foundations, and magazine spaces. This resulted in the construction of ten Cimarron-class oilers initially built for the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
These fleet oilers proved a godsend for the Navy. They were acquired by the Navy just before the start of hostilities and quickly converted for naval use. Without the availability of these fast tankers—they accompanied every major carrier task force operation in the first six months of the war—it is unlikely that the U.S. carriers would have been able to conduct the wide-ranging raids that ultimately led to the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway.
One would hope that the shortage of high-end logistic support ships identified by Captain Pagano is corrected before the Navy finds itself ill-equipped to fight a major sea war far from U.S. shores.
—Thomas Wildenberg
Division Officers Can Learn from Captain Aubrey
(See B. Cordial, pp. 152–54, May 2019)
I enthusiastically second and support Lieutenant Cordial’s reflection on “Lucky Jack” Aubrey’s leadership skills.
Aubrey’s ability to lead and inspire his crew was heavily influenced by his time before the mast. In events only described in retrospect, he was disrated for cause from an unruly midshipman to a common sailor, spending six months as a seaman before being reappointed midshipman. Aubrey manages many incidents based on an understanding, formed during that period, of how his crew lived, slept, ate, and survived both in combat and in the normal daily routine of onboard life.
How many midshipmen today could come back from being demoted for sneaking a romantic partner on board and rise back to command? How much of Aubrey’s success did O’Brian attribute to mistakes and indiscretions, as those gave him an intimate understanding of how to inspire discipline and know when to look the other way? Aubrey understood when to stop a conversation before he heard something that he already knew, and how to tolerate without sacrificing his goals.
Aubrey’s path was not a steady upward climb, but erratic. We meet him as a lieutenant and leave him an admiral, and in the 20 books one can hardly open to a random page without learning something about the sea, about leadership, about devotion to country, about sacrifice and hardship—about life at sea when “admiral’s intent” could have been a captain’s only instructions for mission durations often measured in years.
On page 175 of my edition of The Far Side of the World, in a scene starting with his ship’s daily gunnery practice: “The fouler the weather the better the exercise, said Jack, since you could never be sure of coming up with an enemy on a smooth and placid sea, and it was as well to learn how to heave your five hundredweight a man against the slope of the wildly-heaving deck long before the knack was needed. . . . His idea of a crack ship was one with a strong, highly-skilled crew that could out-manoeuvre and then outshoot the opponent, a taut but happy ship, an efficient man-of-war—in short, a ship that was likely to win at reasonable odds.”
It may be that leadership lessons based on fictional characters lack an element of proof, but how many leaders in the real world make the consistent character traits Patrick O’Brian described work? Empathy with the lives of those who serve, resilience in the face of personal adversity while adhering to core values, demonstrated devotion to the crew, enthusiasm for each day, and the ability to communicate organizational norms, mores, and goals clearly seem to be qualities that create success for any team. The best fiction gives insight into reality, and I have yet to find anyone better than O’Brian. I am delighted to see Jack Aubrey’s name presented in your forum by a serving officer.
—Michael H. Bartlett
Go Straight at ’Em!
(See G. Scarbro, pp. 22–26, May 2019)
Lieutenant Commander Scarbro’s discussion on minimizing unnecessary reporting reminded me of a nurse manager I know. Her CEO demanded a monthly report, which she duly produced. However, just to test him, every so often she’d include an “eye-opener”—usually some details about Dr. X and Nurse Y having an affair. If the CEO didn’t react, she’d skip the next month’s report. Eventually, he’d get around to asking about the missing report. Her reply: “Well, you obviously didn’t read last month’s.” My friend eventually became chief nurse executive at a large hospital. One of her first acts: to eliminate the 30-page monthly reports her subordinates had been submitting for years.
—John O’Neill
The recommendation that flag officers in future naval exercises be “painted white”—declared casualties and removed from the exercise till its conclusion—reflects not just history but has parallels in fiction as well.
While “the admiral’s flagship has been destroyed” is a common trope in sci-fi as a plot device—allowing lower ranking main characters to heroically take charge—the fleet training scenario recommended in the article actually occurs in the first chapters of the first book of David Weber’s “Honor Harrington” science fiction series.
In On Basilisk Station, Harrington is given the seemingly impossible task in upcoming war games of using a powerful, yet suicidally close-range, experimental weapon specially refitted to her light-cruiser HMS Fearless to “destroy” the superdreadnought flagship of the aggressor squadron. With good planning and surprise, she and her crew succeed, making good their escape to boot. The “dead” admiral helplessly watches the defenders inflict significant casualties upon the aggressors during the command confusion that results.
Weber actually modeled his female protagonist on Lord Nelson. Perhaps—in keeping with the World War II example of the development of the combat information center—the Navy could once again take inspiration from science fiction.
—Benjamin J. Turon
Implicit Bias Affects Military Justice
(See S. Calfee, pp. 48–53, April 2019)
Though I did encounter a few outright bigots over a 26-year career, most of the bias I encountered was based upon ignorance, inexperience, and sometimes an outlook: “I will not coddle you because you are a minority. I will treat you as I would anyone else.” There was also an occasional tendency to kick an infraction upstairs to avoid real or perceived social drama.
No, I cannot state that people of color, in or out of uniform, have always received a good deal in my beloved country. However, I do believe that Captain Calfee errs in employing a single study for his overall brief. Single source is not a good approach, particularly for such an important topic.
He also errs in stating that a nonjudicial punishment proceeding can provide “a guilty finding.” The nonjudicial nature of Article 15 events makes that impossible.
In the final paragraph, the author also conflates discipline with punishment. These are not the same. Punishment results when a failure of discipline has occurred, as the late Captain John V. Noel, whom I had the pleasure of assisting, pointed out in many editions of the Division Officer’s Guide.
Still, well done, captain.
—CAPT Raymond J. Brown, USCG (Ret.)
Bring Back the CVLs
(See G. Heinemann, pp. 64–65, June 2019)
Ensign Heinemann presents an interesting capstone article arguing for the return of the light aircraft carrier (CVL) to the fleet in support of distributed lethality. While it is true that distributing strike capability across multiple platforms can reduce the risk of losing a single highly capable platform, it is also the case that the latter tends to be better protected, reducing risk substantially.
Retired Captain Talbot Manvel has written that an aircraft carrier must be able to simultaneously and independently execute three missions: surveillance, battlespace dominance, and strike capability. A sufficiently high sortie generation rate (SGR) is necessary to meet all these needs. A smaller carrier will have a lower SGR due to its smaller air wing, deck, and need for more frequent replenishment away from the line. It should be noted that replenishment would include not only fuel, which might be extended with more-efficient propulsion technology, but also ordnance and stores, as a smaller ship will have less capacity both for its own and escort ships’ stores. RAND estimates the SGR for an America-derived CVL might be only 33 percent that of a traditional carrier strike group (CSG).
These factors suggest that the best course of action may well be to develop better methods to defend the CSG, and to manage personnel to keep it and other combatants at sea as long as possible in a future war.
For the historical examples cited, it is also worth noting that the construction and deployment of the CVEs and CVLs during World War II was driven by the mission demands of an active conflict, which in turn justified the commitment of significant resources to support the war effort. However, the Essex-class fleet carriers eventually outnumbered their light counterparts by a nearly 2:1 margin, suggesting that it was recognized that a more capable full-size carrier was preferable to its light counterpart for the available technology of the day.
Nevertheless, it is still crucial to discuss and debate alternatives, should the demands of tomorrow’s conflict justify an alternative approach.
—Victor J. Sussman
Independence-class CVLs were not “light aircraft carriers,” at least not according to the Navy’s official center for historical knowledge. The correct description of a CVL in the U.S. Navy was “small aircraft carrier,” as noted in the Naval Historical Center’s old two-page entry for “CVL—Small Aircraft Carrier” and Naval History and Heritage Command’s updated two-page entry for “U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers.” “Light aircraft carrier” seems to be one of those erroneous terms—like “patrol torpedo boat” for a U.S. Navy PT boat—that somehow caught on for one reason or another (perhaps because the “L” in CL was for “light” cruiser so it must mean the same thing in CVL, right?) and was repeated so often and so widely to the point that now almost no one remembers the true information.
After specifically noting all the Independence-class CVLs were converted from Cleveland-class light cruisers already under construction, his later wording appears to indicate, absent any amplifying information, other CVEs were also built from existing merchant ship hulls. In fact, the Casablanca-class and Commencement Bay–class CVEs, numbering nearly half the total produced by the United States, were built from the keel up as aircraft carriers.
The assertion that “[o]f the 151 aircraft carriers built for the Navy during the Second World War, 122 were CVEs” might mislead readers. Without quibbling over the definition of “built” (i.e., does he mean commissioned and fully operational or just physically complete, ready to be turned over to the Navy? The difference would change his numbers slightly), in reality 38 of them were transferred to the Royal Navy for the duration and were never expected to serve in the U.S. Navy.
—Lt. Col. Elliott Stoffregen III, USAF