The Navy has suffered the loss of 17 sailors and tens of millions of dollars in damage to its ships. Training for the Navy’s bridge watchstanding officers obviously is off course. In the 1950s, naval aviation faced similar challenges and conducted a soul-searching review of the assumptions and principles under which its training and maintenance programs had been designed. Perhaps the best known products of this review are the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) manuals, of which it is said every line is written in blood. It is time for the surface navy to undergo a similar review of the assumptions and principles under which bridge watch officers are trained.
An important aspect of many professions, including naval aviation, is the duration and intensity of their apprenticeship periods. Doctors, for example, spend years as interns and residents before they are licensed to practice on their own. Naval aviators spend roughly two years as “apprentices” before reporting to their first operational assignments. During that time, students have no responsibilities other than meeting the required qualifications. The apprenticeship also identifies and “weeds out” those aspirants who have neither the aptitude nor the ability to excel in the profession.
There is no formal apprenticeship period for surface officers. Time for standing the necessary underway watches must be stolen from the numerous administrative tasks and collateral duties assigned to every junior officer on
board ship.
Even more concerning is that there is no progression of skills in surface warfare officer training. Young officers are expected to acquire all the required qualifications essentially simultaneously, thereby becoming the classic jacks of all trades, masters of none.
Why Is It This Way?
Traditionally, naval officers received their training as midshipmen on board ship. Midshipmen aspiring for promotion were required to pass written examinations and, in some cases, oral boards, as well as to earn certificates of competency from their commanding officers. While the quality of the training varied from ship to ship, the midshipmen were learning their profession by direct application, combined with theory taught by the ship’s officers. In the U.S. Navy, this system lasted until the mid-1840s, when the Naval School, now the U.S. Naval Academy, was founded.
The Navy maintained the rank of passed midshipman to distinguish graduates of the Naval Academy who were undergoing a two-year apprenticeship at sea before being commissioned. Even after the rank was abolished by Congress in 1912, officers still were required to serve two years at sea on surface ships following graduation from the Academy.
As near as can be determined, the two-year sea service requirement remained in effect, by either law or custom, until approximately 1942. At that time the need to rapidly expand the Navy resulted in the current system of sending newly commissioned officers directly to initial aviation or submarine training or to the surface fleet to be trained there.
From the 1970s onward, the Navy has tried repeatedly to “fix” the training of its surface officers, but each time, teaching young officers how to become seamen has been sacrificed in favor of skills perceived at the time to be more important.
How Can We Fix It?
To start, the Navy should designate those who direct the movements of naval vessels as naval mariners, like those who fly naval aircraft are designated as naval aviators. Officers who lack the aptitude to become naval mariners should be put on a separate training path to become surface warfare officers. Similar to naval flight officers, who perform vital functions on board aircraft, they would be responsible for the non-mariner/navigational functions on board naval vessels.
The training mnemonic for student naval mariners would be: mariner, navigator, warrior. This clearly sets the priorities for training in the same way aviate, navigate, communicate does for naval aviators. First, become a competent mariner, then a competent navigator. Only when the officer has become competent in those skills should the progression to warrior begin.
The training and requirements for student naval mariners to qualify as mariners and navigators would be similar to those established in law for merchant ship deck officers. The core of the training program would be acquiring the 300 days of seagoing experience and mastery of navigation, seamanship, small boat handling, naval architecture, and Rules of the Road to receive a U.S. Coast Guard license as third mate, any gross tons, any ocean. Time assigned to a ship tied up to a pier, other than for very short periods, would not count as sea time.
Acquiring the required sea time would work for student naval mariners in a fashion similar to the Merchant Marine Academy’s “Sea Year,” that is, students would be assigned to naval ships of various types/classes on a temporary additional duty for training status only while the ship is at sea. If the vessel returns to port for more than a week, they would be transferred to another ship, ideally of another type/class, going to sea. There would be two 150-day at-sea periods with three 90-day periods ashore (before, between, and after at-sea training) for classroom instruction and preparation for the licensing exam.
While some requirements for merchant marine deck officer licenses may not be applicable to shipboard naval officers, the difference is remarkably small. Further, the exam methodology could be adapted to cover areas that are uniquely naval in aspect. This approach would have the further advantage of providing qualified naval officers with an internationally recognized professional license and an established progression of training and qualifications from entry level to command.
Surface navy senior leaders must confront the flawed assumptions and principles on which the current and proposed training programs for bridge watch officers are based and make the hard choices required. The path forward is clear, already established in law and regulation, with proven success.