“Distributed lethality” (DL) was first outlined in these pages in January 2015 by Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden and Rear Admirals Peter Gumataotao and Peter Fanta. In January 2017, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, elevated the idea to an official Navy concept in the “Surface Force Strategy: A Return to Sea Control.” The concept can be understood as: “If it floats, it fights.”
The Surface Force Strategy describes DL as comprising three tenets: increase the lethality of all warships; distribute offensive capability geographically; and give ships the right mix of resources to persist in a fight. Broadly, the concept speaks to increasing the offensive and defensive capability and capacity of all surface ships. This approach—involving every ship in the fight—may be the only viable path to achieving sea control against a peer competitor in some areas of the world ocean.
To achieve and maintain sea control today, the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers cannot be permanently tied to high-value units (HVUs) in carrier or expeditionary strike groups. There are not enough of them to guard HVUs around the clock and also to range aggressively across the tactical grid. Distributed lethality addresses this by suggesting HVUs must possess robust self-defense capabilities for independent operations, at least for brief periods of time. DL also suggests that all ships, including HVUs, should be capable of offensive operations.
The Marine Corps understands this and is pushing forward to empower expeditionary strike groups. F-35B Lightning II aircraft will operate from the flight decks of amphibious ships, providing tactical benefits to the Navy. Moreover, the Marines are calling for amphibious ships to be armed with Tomahawk land-attack missiles and the new antiship Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
Consider the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock (LPD). Much of the Navy’s ability to land Marines, now and well into the future, resides in these ships. The majority were designed with the capacity to host a vertical launching system (VLS), though they weren’t built with VLS modules installed. With VLS, these ships could carry more Evolved Seasparrow Missiles (ESSMs)—greatly enhancing their self-defense capability—and Tomahawk and NSM. Also, by replacing the existing AN/SPS-48G air-search radar with the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (the next-generation, rotating air-search radar), the San Antonio class would dramatically increase their own air defense capability and their contribution to the force-wide air-defense picture through their already installed Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).
More is possible. With modifications already far along the development road, VLS-equipped amphibious ships could host SM-6 surface-to-air missiles, providing organic, long-range air defense to the expeditionary strike group.
Ultimately, to control the sea, every available ship must be a shooter and every ship’s sensors must contribute to the larger network—integrating the force into a single, dispersed combat management system to achieve the geometric synergies discussed in the DL concept. Further, DL is expected to fit into the larger fleet strategy now known as Distributed Maritime Operations, which is the necessary connective tissue to stitch these up-gunned, widely dispersed ships together into a coherent whole. The future of the amphibious force is clear: It will be a force to enable sea control, while at the same time ensuring that the Navy/Marine Corps team can still “land the landing force.”
Now listen to a recent Proceedings Podcast interview with navalist Bryan McGrath on the topic of arming amphibs:
And for every episode of the Proceedings Podcast go here.