Many years ago, as a young noncommissioned officer, I was part of a unit that held a small cache of handheld squad radios obtained from Marine Corps Warfighting Lab urban warrior experiments in the early 1990s. For several months, they sat in the armory in a cardboard box collecting dust. When I inquired as to why the radios were not being issued to the platoons and squads, I was told company leaders did not want them distributed because the Marines would likely use them improperly and their use was not authorized per the company standard operating procedures. In these leaders’ estimation, the one PRC-77 radio allocated for platoon operations was enough, because that was all there was on the table of equipment. In addition, more radios meant increased risk to operational security and possible loss of equipment.
Success Is the Best Agent for Change
I took a calculated risk, discounted my leaders’ narrow view of the value of increased voice communications, and signed for a dozen or so radios. My intent was to practice using them during squad and platoon attacks, which we were training for later that week. Instead of relying solely on hand and arm signals or voice commands, I wanted to use these radios to increase command and control (C2) between my squad and fire-team leaders. Their use was an immediate success.
Over time, we started using them for night patrols and raids to great effect. Radio usage increased as we refined our small-unit tactics, techniques, and procedures, reducing the risk of blue-on-blue fire. We found ways to mitigate the additional risks that increased radio communication brings. In the end, we discovered a small technological change had an exponential effect on our performance in small unit tactics. Risk shifted, but training mitigated it. Over time, company leaders became so impressed with our improved performance changes began to take root. Eventually, using squad radios became commonplace. It was clear our team lethality and combat effectiveness dramatically increased because of a simple technological change. We increased the speed of decision-making during operations with readily available off-the-shelf technology. Company leaders who had been resistant and irrationally afraid of change now strongly supported the radios’ use. This was a powerful lesson for me as a young Marine. Senior leaders often get it wrong for a variety of reasons, and junior ones must take some chances to achieve better results.
The radios were nothing more than dressed-up commercial ones you might find at any Walmart. Though the technology was widely available, we probably would never have increased our small unit effectiveness without breaking with a longstanding operating paradigm.
The democratization of requirements, through individuals, small groups, and lower-level commands, has driven change in the Marine Corps. As a result, the Corps has never been more technologically advanced. But every new improvement has created a new set of bureaucratic problems to contend with—life-cycle sustainment; maintenance; and extreme overreliance on contractor field-service representatives. The tension between force-driven change and bureaucracy brings with it countless challenges. Policies that do not keep pace with technology or changing operating concepts dominate the landscape. Old or outdated perspectives in headquarters or the civilian workforce can use “process” to string along or halt those who strive for innovation. The longstanding idea of centralized planning and decentralized execution does not work at the speed of trust, nor does it meet the needs of Marines efficiently.
Assume More Risk
The Marine Corps should encourage greater risk acceptance. Local commanders and units who assume more operational and tactical risk will have the power to focus on what is most important—defeating the enemy. Top-heavy organizational centralization and resource management mean that only a few senior leaders become gatekeepers of all change. If leaders cannot adapt and learn, and they are supported by risk-averse technocrats, then the whole organization stalls. This aversion has follow-on consequences, conditioning Marines young and old, at all levels, to become risk-averse themselves, making even simple and routine decisions burdensome.
As an organization, the Marines Corps cannot seem to make policy changes quickly enough to improve operational flexibility. U.S. adversaries often operate in the gray zone—conflict with little or no kinetic action— with no care about our rules. They do not wear uniforms, and they seek to hide in plain sight. For example, during a recent expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) training evolution, the idea of conducting disaggregated Marine air-ground task force C2 in civilian population centers—non-traditional training areas—created obstacles. Here is how it eventually went:
“Marines, we are going to conduct multinode C2 operations in support of the Division’s concept of operations [CONOPS]! We are going to rent civilian vans and conduct robust C2 in areas where we blend into the community to test our EABO concept. We will seek to mask our radio signatures by using 4G cellular backbones and multiple transmission systems. We will wear civilian clothes and uniforms to hide in plain sight. We won’t spend more than 30 minutes in any one location. Once we test this concept, we may seek to work this into future CONOPS going forward.”
Everyone in the briefing was motivated and eager—until those who were unwilling to take even small risks allowed institutional fear and “No!” to take over. The discussion went like this:
“We can’t put tactical radios in civilian vehicles!” “Why not?” “We just can’t!” “Says who?” “That’s just the policy, sir.” “What policy? Who is telling us ‘no’?” “Well, no one. We just have never done it before. Even if we could, we can’t carry Type-1 crypto between bases like that!” “How are we going to test and learn the commanding officer’s new operational concept if we can’t move fluidly in the battlespace?” “Also, you need to have encroachment control and concertina wire up if we are going to have classified information anywhere. That is the SOP since I have been here.” “Well, that won’t work if we are to keep our footprint small and operate the way we need to exercise the concept. Also, we need to ‘hide in plain sight.’” “That’s just the policy, and it won’t let us do it.” “But that policy was written 20 years ago!” “Well, it’s not authorized. We don’t have the right legal authorities.”
And so on. In the end, the concept was so watered down we really did not exercise what had been planned. Who wins in these situations? Our adversaries, who are not bound to U.S. rules and are in a better position to exploit the situation in the next conflict.
“Controlism” versus Freedom of Action
Combining “control”—the power to influence or direct people’s behavior—and “ism”—a distinctive doctrine, cause, or theory—yield “controlism,” which is the ideology of top-down control. A good example of this concept is in how the Department of Defense (DoD) constructs network security. Current network security policy decisions leave no room for unconventional thinking, because the driving force in any network security bureaucracy is conformity. Controlism and fear cripple an organization’s ability to adapt and make local adjustments to best employ limited resources. Innovative ideas are therefore viewed skeptically in conformance-obsessed cultures such as the DoD.
But controlism is not a universal prerequisite for success against a living, thinking enemy. Do not misunderstand, control is important for discipline and accountability. Nevertheless, initiative, boldness, and—most important—freedom are equally important. Freedom of action allows commanders to assume risk and act boldly, which spurs innovative behavior. The freedom to bend policy and circumvent existing channels, and conduct in-stride experiments often makes the difference in mission accomplishment. Freedom gives weight to individual and collective ownership, and ownership drives pride in one’s work and passion for achievement.
It is ironic that the Corps will risk Marines on patrol in a bomb-laden poppy field or sniper-populated urban center, yet, as an organization, it fears making policy adjustments that might quickly improve operational flexibility. In a world of information connectivity and technological change, the Marine Corps should champion risk takers and cultivate an ethos that seeks to breed unconventional thinkers who do not accept the status quo when it comes to technological innovation and methods of employment. Local solutions to enterprise problems should be the laboratories of change for an organization that needs to adapt to a changing world.