Let SWOs and Sailors Do Their Jobs
(See R. Brodie, pp. 56–60, February 2019)
Commander Brodie and I were stationed together in Singapore, and we had a number of discussions about the topics in his article, including the need for our sailors to be the absolute best at their jobs.
We are in an era of great power competition, and our strategic competitors are looking to gain a competitive advantage wherever they can, particularly where they see potential vulnerabilities.
While the all-volunteer force remains our greatest asymmetric advantage, the peacetime Navy has set conditions that inadvertently create unnecessary risks and vulnerabilities for operational commanders by overemphasizing collateral duties, community relations, and off-duty education. While these are all good things, great power competition demands that we reset the focus of the fleet where sailors want it and the Navy needs it: in-rate technical expertise.
Our sailors volunteered to serve; they chose the Navy. They selected their desired profession and their rates. The Navy must set the conditions for a lifelong continuum of learning. We must be biased for action and move with a sense of urgency in shifting focus back to rating subject-matter expertise. We must set the conditions where sailors operate as technical masters and equipment casualty reports for at-sea technical assistance become the rare exception.
In conflict, command teams will fight with the crews and equipment they have. Communications may not be ensured—we will not have the luxury to call for distance support, nor can we rely on technical representatives to fly out. We will fight with who and what we have on board.
To move the pendulum in the right direction, the Navy has moved the professional military knowledge section of the Navy-wide enlisted advancement exam to its own standalone test; made changes to the chief, senior chief, and master chief petty officer selection board processes, and has begun integrating “ready, relevant learning” to deliver the right training at the right time in the right way to reduce skill atrophy.
I am intrigued by Commander Brodie’s recommendation to reinvigorate rate training manuals. In the digital age, the possibilities are endless to achieve his vision of a “career-long continuum of learning,” creating, training, and educating true experts in our enlisted profession of arms.
I want sailors preparing as if today were the last day of peace—because it just might be. No one has the market cornered on good ideas. I encourage sailors to engage the chain of command and offer candid feedback and solutions to problems that otherwise will continue to hold our Navy back.
—U.S. Fleet Forces FLTCM Rick O’Rawe, USN
Let’s Restore the Navy Jack
(See J. Holwitt, p. 93, February 2019)
I appreciated Commander Holwitt’s article. He says there’s some doubt that the First Navy Jack—red and white stripes with snake and “Don’t Tread on Me”—was actually used back in 1776. This resonated with the traditionalist in me, as does his call to return to the blue flag with 50 stars, the flag I knew during my career.
Most astounding, however, was that my quick research (yes, I Googled it) showed that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson in mid-February announced the restoration of the traditional jack, just weeks after Commander Holwitt’s article appeared, an indicator of the reach and influence of Proceedings, perhaps. Well done.
Now, why it’s called the Union Jack is another story, worth a bit more research.
— CAPT Thomas M. Keithly, USN (Ret.)
The starred blue jack Commander Holwitt would “restore” has had other uses. Among others, in the mid-19th century it was the President’s flag, flown at the main truck whenever he boarded one of our naval units.
And a word regarding the First Navy Jack: The rattlesnake display echoes the revolutionary fervor and pride of our early days, not a bad thing in these tumultuous times.
—CDR Tyrone G. Martin, USN (Ret.), Golden Life Member
Editor’s Note: Admiral Richardson’s order will go into effect on 4 June, coinciding with the anniversary of the Battle of Midway. At that time, a second tradition will be restored. The First Navy Jack will resume being flown exclusively on the ship (other than the USS Constitution) with the longest total time in active service. That honor will go to the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19), flagship of Seventh Fleet.
Island Forts: Land Forces Have Value in an Air-Sea Battle
(See J. Hanacek, pp. 38–42, February 2019)
As a longtime advocate of land-based antiship missiles, I was gratified to read Lieutenant Hanacek’s article. I advocated for adapting nuclear ground-launched cruise missile equipment to launch the Tomahawk antiship missile (TASM) to bottle up the Soviet Navy. (See “Updating the Shore Battery,” December 1981, pp. 44–47.) That option was overtaken by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which forbade such land-based missiles regardless of mission or warhead. That restriction may soon be removed with the Russian violation of the treaty and the U.S. termination.
We should take advantage of geography to build mobile long-range antiship cruise missiles, suitable not only for the first tier of islands as noted by Lieutenant Hanacek, but also by bases farther from Chinese counterstrike weapons. The shorter range missile systems could assist the targeting for the longer range missiles in addition to their own firepower.
Today’s Tomahawk launcher should probably be designed into International Shipping Organization containers, allowing mobility by many existing vehicle platforms, as well as proliferation of low-cost decoy launchers.
Such longer range mobile systems are difficult to locate and target. Operated by the United States, the Philippines, Malaysia, or even Vietnam, they could negate many Chinese naval advantages, perhaps really turning the South China Sea into the Western Philippine Sea.
—Lt. Col. Michael Rogers, USAF (Ret.)
Captain, Get Some Sleep!
(See J. Cordle, pp. 10–11, February 2019)
Captain Cordle’s excellent article highlights a critical element of operational readiness and warfighting effectiveness. I have vivid memories from my time as a surface warfare junior officer (SWO JO) of trying to sneak a midmorning nap after standing the 0200-0700 watch—and living in fear that the executive officer (XO) would catch me. I was so tired I was useless, but the culture was “Suck it up!” or “Sleep when you’re dead.”
Fast forward to when I commanded the USS Germantown (LSD-42) in 2007. In preparation for a night transit of the Strait of Malacca, the crew rest management plan was a key element of our ORM approach. This included my XO and me. What a change over the course of my 25-year career. I frankly owe much to my amphibious commanders, who were aviators. They taught me several key lessons that weren’t part of my SWO upbringing, including the critical importance of crew rest.
The trend in innovation continues today, with the Naval Postgraduate School–led research Captain Cordle references and projects such as the Naval Supply Systems Command–sponsored Small Business Innovation Research/R&D effort to incorporate best-in-class commercial fitness and digital nutrition tools into a shipboard environment to give sailors access to industry standard resources in a low-comm/no-comm environment. It’s taken some time to change course, but I believe the Navy is headed in the right direction.
—CAPT Steve Vincent, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
On my first ship, there were several times at the end of a patrol when our commanding officer (CO) had passed his physical limits. One time on the mid-watch, I called him about a certain traffic situation, and he was quite incoherent. He answered my report and recommendation with a groggy, “You do a good job and we’ll put you back on watches.” Nonsense.
Happily, in my next four ships, the captains had better professional judgment (yes, I was CO in the last). And all possessed considerable endurance—never to be under- or overestimated.
But there are other questions ship captains and executive officers must consider: What about all the officers of the deck? Are they rested enough? Their stamina levels are not all the same—what have been their levels of activity in recent days?
When I was operations boss and navigator, it was always musical chairs with watch and boarding officers. There were two officers of the deck who were almost beyond fatigue—one was nicknamed “Ironman.” Three others were not. Generally, I took the 0400–0800 watch and let others rotate around me. (It’s always good to be on the bridge before the captain wakes up, even if you see the sun come up and go down, all the time in between, and a good deal thereafter.)
But knowing who was in all respects ready for watchkeeping was terribly important. On one occasion, when a CO reacted strongly to my night watch rotation, he questioned the physical readiness of one who was given to colds and fatigue. I listened, of course, and got the last word in—“Yes, sir.” Ten minutes later, I went back to the cabin and advised the captain that I would stand the watch.
—CAPT Raymond J. Brown, USCG (Ret.)
Mass Punishment Doesn’t Work
(See B. Kerg, pp. 62–65, February 2019)
Major Kerg addresses an age-old problem facing Okinawa-based commanders—how to address misconduct following yet another liberty incident. While I am not a fan of mass punishment, I believe that it does work in its proper time and place.
I was stationed on Okinawa for four and one-half years, the last three as a battalion executive officer and squadron CO. I am well acquainted with living in the “Okinawa fishbowl,” where low-level incidents are heavily scrutinized three and four echelons above. That is the nature of living in a foreign county with heightened sensitivities to the U.S. presence, based on past misconduct, criminal behavior, and politics.
Marines have committed heinous acts such as rape, murder, vehicular hit-and-runs, and breaking and entering. There is no question in my mind that every Marine on Okinawa knows the legal drinking age; many ways to get home safely; who their liberty buddy is; and what to do if they need any help at all.
Regardless of the numbers of liberty briefs, informal discussions, and force preservation boards conducted, I still experienced the dreaded 0200 phone call multiple times.
Following an alcohol-related incident, wing policy required an all-hands squadron recall. In addition, on two different occasions, I ordered the squadron to go dry until we could go a number of weekends without any incident. I was frustrated because I knew the Marines in question did not act alone. Others were present who could have prevented the underage drinking, the fights, or the DUI.
Marines know who in their formations have proclivities for misconduct—that is, who “is a liberty incident waiting to happen.” In fact, the chain of command is responsible for knowing who the liberty risks are and for taking early action.
While one person may have been at fault in a specific misconduct, many others were responsible. Since the message to the squadron was apparently garbled, I would always retransmit it in a loud and clear manner to reset our collective responsibility and disciplinary mind-set to prevent the next liberty incident.
Mass punishment is an effective tool if used judiciously. Boot camp, The Basic School, and the service academies employ it to achieve an end. Nothing keeps substandard performers in line like peer pressure following a good thrash session in the sandpit or field-daying your room for the third time late on a Friday following a long, cold week in the Quantico Highlands, all because a few rooms failed surprise inspection.
However, entry-level training and the operating forces are two different environments, and leaders should recognize when and how to use this leadership tool—or not.
—Lt. Col. J. F. Dobrydney, USMC
Train Navy Officers for Cyber Lethality
(See B. Karpf, pp. 24–27, February 2019)
I read Lieutenant Karpf’s article with great interest.
It is disturbing that the author claims the Navy is throttling the career path of talented officers in the cyber warfare realm because the Navy “lacks a cyber training pipeline for officers.”
I fail to see how he can make such an allegation when the Naval Academy has invested millions of taxpayer dollars in a building currently under construction—Hopper Hall, dedicated to cyber education and housing a program that offers a major in cyber warfare.
The implication is that the Navy must intend to develop a cyber career path for officers from the midshipman level onward. Such stumbling blocks as Lieutenant Karpf refers to may exist at present, but the Naval Academy’s actions suggest on examination that such difficulties are transient, and specialist officers will eventually see their way to an upward career path.
—CAPT Richard Hunter, USCG (Ret.)