The Navy has made great strides in the past 20 years to modernize and better organize its helicopter force, but there is still much to do to optimize it. Helicopters are indispensable assets and force multipliers—and can be critical components of distributed lethality, if only the Navy will let them. The emphasis in doctrine on carrier-based aviation handicaps the helicopter forces, and the current organizational structure undervalues the expeditionary units and stifles innovation. The Navy should reorganize its rotary-wing aviation forces by deployment model to give the expeditionary helicopter community the tools to develop into the warfighters the Navy needs for the new century.
A House Divided
There are sharp divisions within the Navy helicopter community. Despite the idea that “a Sierra is a Sierra,” there are clear differences in how the expeditionary and carrier elements of the helicopter sea combat (HSC) community operate. At present, the Navy organizes its aircraft by type on each coast. This groups carrier and expeditionary squadrons of the same type together under one commander—who has to deal with different chains of command depending on deployment models. (To a more limited extent, this is true for the maritime strike [HSM] community as well.)
“Expeditionary” squadrons provide helicopter detachments to cruisers, destroyers, and other helicopter-capable non–aircraft carriers, and answer to their type commanders. Carrier squadrons answer to both their type commanders and the carrier air wing commanders. This creates conflicting priorities for operational, training, and tactical considerations within a single community and forces wing commanders to play a balancing game.
It would make greater sense to organize helicopters by function; that is, by their deployment model. Carrier squadrons have the benefit of being able to deploy as one group to a ship or ships. This gives them extra aircraft and instructors, creating opportunity for training missions. In turn, this allows their pilots to complete air combat training continuum events as well as conduct helicopter second-pilot and helicopter aircraft-commander boards as part of naval air training and operating procedures standardization (NATOPS) qualifications.
Expeditionary squadrons, where pilots deploy for up to ten months as part of a detachment far from squadron headquarters, have no such opportunities. Detachments are small, manned strictly based on mission, and have little flexibility to train, leaving personnel no ability to increase their qualifications while deployed. The result is uneven career progression for pilots in the same community during their first sea tour. This can have substantial impact on selection for follow-on orders and advancement, as carrier-squadron pilots generally have more qualifications than peers in expeditionary squadrons.
If It Flies, It Fights—Sort of
The Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC) in Nevada develops tactics that focus primarily on how helicopters in carrier air wings (CVWs) can support strike groups. This serves the CVW squadrons well but does little for expeditionary operations, which becomes clear when expeditionary MH-60S “Sierra” detachments operate as part of an amphibious ready group (ARG). While deployed on the ARG, they must operate together well with the air combat element (ACE) of the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).
Increasingly, the Marine Corps looks to HSC detachment helicopters to augment the abilities of the ACE, something for which HSC aircrews are not prepared. NAWDC has not developed HSC tactics optimized for the needs of the ARG/MEU, because of the focus on carrier operations. There is precedent on the fixed-wing side for joint training with the Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS)-1, but for rotary-wing aircraft, the Navy has yet to explore this potentially rich avenue.
Innovate to Elevate
The entire helicopter force is behind the curve in innovation. The surface community has been making a concerted effort for more than two years to multiply existing ships’ fighting abilities through “distributed lethality,” with increasing success. The Marine Corps likewise is examining ways to tailor its expeditionary forces more flexibly and is considering ways to reconfigure the traditional ACE composition to meet emerging threats.
Meanwhile, it feels as if the helicopter force has spent its innovation capital fulfilling the Navy’s “Helicopter Master Plan.” Forward-firing ordnance is now standard on Sierras and Romeos (MH-60R), giving those aircraft more punch to help defend their ships. Legacy aircraft have retired, and mission sets for each community have expanded, but there has not been a reexamination recently.
Helicopters are not seen as key components of distributed lethality despite their clear potential. Their mobility, payload capacity, and sensor suites should make them natural contributors to the surface force’s strike capabilities. But HSC simply has not taken the time to work with the surface warfare community to develop the “how.” At the 2017 Naval Helicopter Association Gulf Coast Fleet Fly-In, HSC leaders expressed their desire to see the helicopter return to a focus on overwater tactical missions. As 21st century threats multiply, this is the area where helicopters can make the greatest contribution to the Navy.
Form Follows Function
By organizing the wings by function, the Navy would simplify the chain of command and allow for better innovation of the communities. Doing this would link carrier squadrons of HSC Sierras and HSM Romeos into a common wing on each coast, preferably with the two squadrons in the air wing sharing a hangar to forge a close working relationship. Currently, the East Coast squadrons are not even in the same state. HSM squadrons are based at Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, and HSC squadrons at NAS Norfolk.
Romeos are now the only antisubmarine aircraft in the air wing, having replaced SH-60B, SH-60F, and S-3 Viking aircraft. They are slower and shorter-ranged than the Vikings, making carriers more vulnerable as submarines become more capable. Therefore, the HSC community, which does not have an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission set, must learn to work with HSM squadrons to patrol and protect the battlegroup more effectively.
For the expeditionary squadrons, reorganization has the potential to unshackle them, affording the latitude to develop the most effective tactics and procedures for their operating environment. The immediate impact would be on HSC detachments in ARGs. These detachments still operate under the carrier-centric tactics from NAWDC, which hinder their operations in some mission sets.
Marine tactics are fundamentally different than Navy helicopter tactics taught at NAWDC, creating friction between the HSC crews and the ARG. The way in which the Marines conduct personnel recovery—tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel—is more overt and aggressive than how the Navy conducts combat search and rescue. Additionally, the Marines have different methods for close-air support that have benefited from their experience in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past decade and a half. The Marine Corps designed the MAWTS-1 course after Vietnam to better integrate aviation into the Marine Air Ground Task Force model of operations. The Navy should send expeditionary HSC weapons and tactics instructors through the Marine course in addition to the Navy one.
The purpose of the HSC detachment on the ARG is to support the mission of the ARG/MEU. Thus, it makes sense for the Navy pilots to understand and be able to use the tactics the ACE employs. In addition, by teaching MAWTS-1 to the HSC expeditionary community, the Marine Corps will gain greater understanding of the capabilities of Sierras and their crews. Only through this kind of sustained, integrated training can the HSC community build the trust with its counterparts in the ACE that is necessary for combat operations, making the ARG/MEU a more capable and flexible force.
Expeditionary Navy flight crews assigned to ARGs/MEUs should receive Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron training. The Marine Corps conducts many operations—such as personnel recovery—more aggressively than their Navy counterparts. Flight crews and ground personnel should share a common understanding when operating together.
Armed, Unmanned, and Unafraid
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the MQ-8C Fire Scout, will continue to change naval operations, and expeditionary helicopter wings must integrate UAVs into their tactics. Moreso than their carrier counterparts, expeditionary units have to get the most out of every piece of equipment. UAV sensors will be invaluable to ships sailing independently as well as ARGs, because they lack the organic reconnaissance of the CSG. Free from the restrictions of the CVW, the expeditionary wings can push unmanned systems forward.
Littoral Combat Ships
The Romeo and Sierra expeditionary communities must learn to operate effectively with the littoral combat ships (LCS). These ships are supposed to deploy with air detachments of one Fire Scout and either one Romeo or one Sierra. Consequently, both communities need to be prepared to conduct operations with a helicopter from another detachment when two or more LCSs are working together.
NAWDC’s current emphasis on strike group tactics makes this problematic. Current antisurface warfare (ASuW) tactics only envision Romeos and Sierras working together in larger groups. Tactics for strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) emphasize the defense of a high value target or the hunting of small boats. There has been no effort to imagine how expeditionary helicopters could use SCAR to be part of an offensive ASuW mission to supplement the resources of the LCS.
The antisubmarine mission package for the LCS has not entered service yet. Even once it does, there is no guarantee that an ASW-equipped LCS will be operating in a given area, meaning that a single Romeo could potentially be the only available ASW platform there. This makes it imperative that the expeditionary community incorporate Sierras and Fire Scouts into the ASW plan. By combining the expeditionary Romeos and Sierras into wings together and giving them weapon schools devoted to the unique situations that expeditionary detachments face, they can begin to tackle these challenges.
Warshots
The Sierra lacks equipment that could assist with ASW beyond the crew’s eyes and Link-16. It would not be difficult, however, for it to carry an aerial torpedo. Additionally, the Navy needs a replacement for the outdated AGM-119 Penguin, as well as something with greater range and a bigger warhead than the AGM-114 Hellfire II missile, which is not a serious threat to anything larger than a corvette. Ongoing tests of the Raytheon/Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) suggest that it would be an excellent replacement for the Penguin. The NSM would give helicopters an offensive punch that would greatly multiply the firepower of the LCS and the ARG.
At 900 pounds, though, the NSM may be too large in some cases. The British and French are working on a smaller helicopter-launched ASuW weapon. It would make sense for the Navy to join that project as well as work to develop a helicopter capability for the NSM.
While the NSM would be useful for carrier squadrons, it would be especially valuable for expeditionary ones. The growing missile mile gap between the United States and China demands that the United States find more ways to increase offensive capability; and with a 500-pound warhead and a range greater than 150 nautical miles, the NSM is an attractive option. This would give the expeditionary helicopters the ability to go on strike missions as envisioned by Lieutenant Ben Foster in his September 2017 Proceedings article “MH-60S Can Be Today’s PT Boat.”
Rewards Require Risk
Realigning the rotary wings poses some institutional challenges for the Navy. The first is the logistical and fiscal challenge of sorting out the Atlantic Fleet squadrons, as a dozen or so have to change places between Jacksonville and Norfolk to consolidate the new wings. NAWDC, and MAWTS-1 will need to establish new expeditionary weapon schools and create a satisfactory syllabus. NAWDC will have to be open to letting the Marine Corps influence Navy helicopter tactics.
The Bureau of Personnel will need to address how to work this new model into the aviator career progression, but the impact should be limited. Aircrew should be able to serve in an expeditionary squadron at one stage and in a carrier squadron at another. The training syllabi may differ, but they will use the same NATOPS and fleet replacement squadrons; this will provide commonality. This will be an improvement for the expeditionary community, who will no longer be at a qualification disadvantage.
The Navy must be willing to break its organizational paradigms to create a more innovative helicopter force better prepared for the challenges of the new century. “That is how we have always done it,” is not acceptable. The helicopter community must innovate to remain a lethal, adaptable force.
Lieutenant Roscoe is the safety officer on the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3). He formerly was an instructor pilot at HT-18 and served at HSC-28. A 2009 graduate of the University of Michigan with a bachelor of arts in history and political science, he earned a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University in 2017.