Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis’s concept of dynamic force employment envisions the Navy “banking” readiness to decrease predictability, increase maneuver, and systematically increase the Navy’s sea-going presence.1 For the service to do so will require it to leverage new training methods based on empirical evidence. This will allow individuals and units to meet the goal of accelerated readiness more quickly and effectively.
3. More data is available on request from the Electronic Attack Weapon School, NAS Whidbey Island.
4. ADM Phil Davidson, USN, “Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents,” U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 27 October 2017, 18.
5. Davidson, “Comprehensive Review,” 48–49, 54.
6. Davidson, 17–18.
7. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux: 2015), 20–21.
9. Michael Lewis, “Moneyball; the Art of Winning an Unfair Game,” (W.W. Norton: 2013).
10. Ericsson et al, “Making of an Expert.”
11. LT Renato A. DePaolis II, USN, “A High Velocity Learning Approach to Maintain Maritime Superiority,” June 2017, Electronic Attack Weapons School document.
12. F. Gobet, P.C. Lane, S. Croker, P. C. Cheng, G. Jones, I. Oliver, and J. M. Pine, “Chunking mechanisms in human learning,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2007, 5(6), 236–243.
13. The “greenie board” on an aircraft carrier tracks pilots’ landing proficiency as graded by the ship’s landing signal officer.
15. Davidson, “Comprehensive Review,” 17.
16. Hope Hodge Seck, “Navy: Training for Surface Warfare Officers Is Failing Them at Sea,” military.com, 2 November 2017. Seck wrote, “In each of the four mishaps, the qualification of individuals for specific watch stations did not translate to proficiency to safely execute the mission, the report finds. . . . In all four mishaps, there was a gap in watchstander training, their experience, and/or their proficiency, and their ability to conduct the tasks they were assigned to perform.”