Operating mine countermeasure UUVs, like the Mark 18 Kingfisher, from amphibious ships, littoral combat ships, or destroyers would provide a more prompt initial response to a mine threat. (U.S. Navy / Jonah Stephanik)
Mine warfare must be a prime warfighting focus of the U.S. Navy and not a niche discipline. The U.S. Navy has never thoughtfully incorporated the asymmetric power of the sea mine into its fleet capabilities. Only after a crisis, when mine countermeasures forces are called to clean up a sea area, does the Navy experience an epiphany regarding the importance of sea mines. Mine warfare should not be an afterthought; it should be a first thought in maritime warfighting.
Today, mines are powerful weapons capable not only of destroying high-value targets but also of altering war plans and contesting sea control through sea denial. U.S. adversaries have large mine stockpiles and the means to deliver them surreptitiously. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has enjoyed the privilege of sailing its ships freely through the global commons. In a world of rising great power competition, the “name of the game” is contesting sea control, and mine warfare can contribute powerful effects. The way forward is integrating mine warfare into the character of the Navy’s main battle fleet.
Mine warfare must be among the first options considered in action against an opposing fleet. The United States employed offensive mining to great effect in closing Haiphong Harbor in Vietnam in 1972, but only after great deliberation at the presidential level and for a specific political purpose. Yet, as history has demonstrated, offensive mining is a powerful sea-denial tool. The ability to offensively deploy sea mines significantly restricts an adversary’s ability to achieve military objectives by denying them freedom of movement. Done precisely and aggressively, and planned at the fleet commander level, well-reasoned, offensive mining denies the use of the sea and has a psychological impact on an adversary’s will to fight.
The ability to deploy mines must be common practice. Aerial delivery platforms include the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress and the Navy’s FA-18 Hornet. The Navy submarine force can deliver mines stealthily. But today’s warships are not designed to deploy mines unless modifications are made to the existing fleet. In the same vein as the distributed lethality concept, making every ship a minelayer creates a problem for an adversary. The surface fleet should be able to sow minefields in chokepoints and the littorals—in large numbers if required.
Similarly, the ability to find mines must be resident throughout the fleet. Locating and neutralizing mines is a time-consuming process, and while current dedicated mine forces are capable, they are few in number. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), such as the Mark 18 Mod 2 Kingfisher, represent significant mine countermeasures force multipliers. These UUVs can scan large areas of the sea bed to find mine-like objects. They currently are employed by explosive ordnance disposal expeditionary mine-countermeasures companies in support of mine-hunting efforts. Distributing this capability throughout the fleet—operating UUVs from amphibious ships, littoral combat ships, or destroyers—would provide a more prompt initial response to a mine threat. Time can be gained building the environmental picture, along with a modicum of self-protection for the fleet, until dedicated mine clearance forces arrive.
Adding physical mine warfare capability, however, is an incomplete solution. The ultimate objective is to make every sailor a “mineman.” This does not entail changing ratings or designators, but instead adjusting the training and education of fleet sailors in mine warfare by increasing knowledge, skills, and understanding, to avoid underestimation of this threat. Continuing to treat mine warfare as a boutique industry will never advance the state of this warfighting. When the Navy is prevented from freely sailing the seas because it missed a chance to sow a minefield or as the result of a mine strike, the world will wonder and the Navy again will play catch-up.