As far back as history dates, men and women who commanded armies and navies had to be extraordinary individuals, deserving of the responsibility to lead their fellow countrymen into battle and, in many cases, to their deaths. As extraordinary individuals, they have been held to a higher standard than that of an average citizen in both their professional and their personal lives.
The standard is codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)under Article 133, “Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman.” Despite the widely known expectation of ethical piousness, headlines of misconduct committed by military officers scroll across the news ticker at an alarming rate—most cases making local news and some playing out on the national or even international stage.
The Bathsheba Syndrome
After extensive indoctrination and consumption of the proverbial “Kool-Aid,” why do officers, knowing the consequences, gamble with their careers, status, reputations, and potential freedom by engaging in ethical, moral, and even illegal misconduct? One explanation is provided by Dean Ludwig and Clinton Longenecker in their research, “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders.” Ludwig and Longenecker suggest that success is a possible cause for the downfall of many naval leaders.
First, successful tours can lead to an officer’s loss of focus and drive. When officers join the service, they typically are driven to perform and distinguish themselves from their peers. After a few successful tours or even a single outstanding one, however, the drive to “prove yourself” wanes and a level of complacency may develop.
Second, with marked success, an officer establishes a favorable reputation and gains special access to resources, information, and people. With greater access and greater control of resources, information, and people, the officer is provided with power that can be corrupted.
Finally, with greater control and influence, the mind-set takes hold that the officer is above normal standards and can manipulate the outcome of any situation: “I’m not your average naval officer, so it won’t happen to me,” or “I won’t get caught.”
The Curse of 20
Many instances of misconduct are by leaders who believe the rules no longer apply to them. In other cases, however, they are manifestations of the “Curse of 20.”
Twenty is the magic number in the military. Once members have reached 20 years of active-duty service, they essentially are guaranteed a significant retirement package. Indeed, at 18 years of service most members enter into an unspoken safe zone where, if they are guilty of misconduct, letting them retire becomes more palatable than adjudication. Moreover, secretarial action or dismissal at a general courts-martial is required for a revocation of retirement benefits (once vested), making it nearly impossible for convening authorities to achieve substantial punitive consequences; the bureaucratic hassle is “not worth the squeeze.”
For the officer who achieves retirement eligibility but is forced to leave the service sooner than anticipated (due to poor performance or suspected misconduct), financial stability will not be a significant issue. Subsequently, the cost-benefit analysis of the ethical risk versus the potential gain drastically changes after crossing the retirement eligibility line.
So how can the service address this attitude of untouchability? Stephen Messenger presented a possible solution in his article “Ethical Liability: Holding Senior Military Leaders Accountable for Their Ethical Failures.” The service should reevaluate the retirement package, Messenger suggests:
It is time that the military leverages retirement benefits to hold leaders at all levels accountable. An offense that would cause a service member to be discharged at seventeen years must have the same impact on one with thirty years of service: loss of retirement benefits. There is no mystical line crossed at twenty years that relieves one of being held accountable. In fact they should be held more accountable to set the standard for those coming behind them.
By holding senior leaders accountable via their retirement, the service would increase the risk involved with making questionable ethical decisions and deter the “outside the rules” mind-set.
Procedural Constraints
When dealing with officer misconduct, typically the first general/flag officer in the chain of command will decide how to proceed. If the evidence is solid and the suspected misconduct warrants, a commander can refer charges to a courts-martial for adjudication, which carries the possibility of generating a federal criminal record and adverse characterization at separation, as well as time in the brig.
In contrast, if the evidence is compelling but is not a “slam dunk” case, or witnesses are unavailable/uncooperative, a commander may decide that administrative processes are more appropriate. While this will not generate a criminal record or result in brig time, the loss of benefits associated with an adverse characterization of service at separation or retirement at a lesser grade may seem more palatable to commanders—and provide some semblance of justice.
The sufficiency of the evidence, however, is only one factor. In addition to the public affairs nightmare of most officer misconduct cases, adjudicating alleged violations of ethical and criminal behavior is an embarrassing and unrelenting procedural process for the chain of command. Service members are afforded due process under the law. Because of the level at which they have to be approved (secretarial), officer misconduct cases typically include lengthy and extensive investigations—more so than enlisted misconduct cases.
Officer misconduct investigations rarely are disposed of quickly. While each case drags on, the officer continues to enjoy all the benefits, pay, and respect due to his or her rank and grade. As time passes, the determination of the commander to “see justice done” fades and the desire to “get the offender out of my unit” begins to set in, making the option to endorse a request for retirement more attractive.
Good for the Goose, Good for the Gander
The way commanders dispose of officer misconduct cases among the varying grades within the officer corps also is an issue of equity. An O-1/O-2 who commits low-level misconduct is all but guaranteed not to promote and be pushed out at the earliest opportunity, with little to nothing to show for his or her service. For an O-5/O-6, the result usually is separation from service sooner than expected, a retirement check, and an equally if not higher-paying civilian job.
Regardless of the infraction, the operational security and morality considerations between the two officers usually are the same. In fact, one could argue that the service-discrediting factor increases with rank since the public (and subordinate members of the service) expect a colonel/commander to have more maturity than a lieutenant to make appropriate decisions. U.S. taxpayers should not have to pay the benefits of an officer who has departed from the ethical standards of military service because it was easier for the institution to “force” or “allow” a retirement than to adjudicate the misconduct.
As part of an officer’s request for retirement in lieu of further processing, a forfeiture of all associated retirement benefits or an agreement to be retired at a lower rank should be negotiated. In addition, proven violations of the UCMJ should carry the possibility of a determination of ineligibility for all or some retirement benefits, regardless of disposition or adjudication at a criminal or administrative proceeding—despite the officers’ “retirement eligible” status. With one change to policy (to include the necessary legislative action required), the service could have an additional deterrent to unethical and immoral activities. What greater cause for restraint for senior and midlevel officers than to have their entire retirements hang in the balance of their moral or ethical dilemmas, regardless of time in service?
To be clear, this should not be the same policy for enlisted members. Officers are expected to achieve and maintain a higher level of decorum, and throughout their careers they are compensated at higher rates and provided special privileges not afforded to enlisted members. The consequences of their misconduct should carry an equivalent higher cost.
To be accountable and do what is right, despite ethical temptation, is at the core of what it means to be a leader in the military. The retirement rolls should not be sanctuary for those who commit misconduct.