Naval professionals often express interest in bringing back small, fast surface combatants like the patrol-torpedo (PT) boats of World War II. In 2018 alone, the Naval Institute published three articles on the topic—“Fifty Tons of Fury: Bring Back the Patrol Torpedo Boat” (By Captain Edmund Hernandez, September Proceedings Today); “Bring Back the Patrol Craft” (by Lieutenants Adam Briggs and Joshua Roaf, July Blog post); and “Bolster the Navy’s Patrol Forces,” (by Lieutenant Commander Matthew Dryden, January Proceedings)—as well as a number of letters debating the idea in the Comment & Discussion section of Proceedings.
The original PT boats were created to pose a serious threat to capital ships, yet their real combat effectiveness is unclear.1 The unquestioned success of fleet submarines, by contrast, stemmed from the range, effective sensors, and lethal weapons they could employ against capital ships and survive.2 What Captain Hernandez described would be very similar to the Navy’s existing Mark VI Patrol boat (72 tons, lots of guns) if the boat were equipped with antiship missiles. The boat’s Mk-38 25-mm chain guns can engage combatants such as Somali pirates, but are not a threat to major combatants. The larger Cyclone-class patrol ships are not much more capable; their Griffin missiles have a range of only 8 kilometers.
Many foreign patrol boats and almost any capital ship can outfight these two boats. And if they are intentionally “analog” platforms, disconnected from the network as Hernandez suggests, they can only shoot what they see—the equivalent of procuring fighter planes without radar and only heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles.
To create the best system, get past the question of the hull; start with weapons and sensors and ask what they can do. A good starting place might be, “Can we accomplish anti-surface warfare (ASuW) if we put Super Hornet capabilities onto a patrol boat?”
Incorporating a Link-16-capable joint tactical radio system would give the boat good situational awareness and potentially allow it to serve as a naval integrated fire-control/counter-air (NIFC-CA) platform. A suite of APG-79 radar, forward-looking infrared sensors, and the F/A-18’s ALR-67, ALQ-214, AAR-47, and ALE-47 threat-warning and countermeasures systems would make the boat a survivable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance node. Instead of the Super Hornet’s miniature air-launched decoy, the boat should employ a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) such as the Boeing RQ-21 Blackjack to give it extended sensing for independent operations.
Upgrading the .50-caliber machine guns to use EXACTO precision guided munitions would give the boat sniper-level accuracy out to 1,000 meters. Replacing the Mk-19 grenade launchers with 40-mm laser-guided grenades such as the Pike would push close-combat range to 2,000 meters. Most surface combatants already use the Mk-38 25-mm gun; BAE Systems has demonstrated a Tactical Laser System upgrade to it that would add a directed-energy weapon. By using the UAV to designate targets, this patrol boat would be well equipped to stave off massed fast inshore attack craft threats.
Replacing the classic four torpedoes of the World War II PTs with a four-cell Mk-57 vertical-launch system (VLS) that supports Tomahawk, Standard, Long-Range Antiship, and quad-packed Evolved Seasparrow missiles would make a potent asymmetric ASuW threat. Anti-submarine rocket (ASRoc) torpedoes would also fit. Adversaries would have to assume every ship carried all of these. The boats’ mere presence would alter opponent behavior.
The Mk-57 VLS is normally associated with capital ships. But keep in mind, a Tomahawk is about the same size as a torpedo, and a four-cell module is relatively small (roughly 7’x14’x26’) though fairly heavy (20 tons loaded). But it need not be installed vertically. The VLS is far too large for a Mark VI boat, but it is within reason to imagine four cells on board a 350-ton Cyclone- or Sentinel-sized boat.
This sounds like a daunting amount of weaponry for a patrol boat, yet the pilot of a single-seat F/A-18E can operate 11 weapons stations, numerous sensors, countermeasures, and a gun—all inside a well-integrated 60-foot-long airplane.
Cyclone-class ships were procured at roughly $20 million each; Sentinels cost $65 million today. Adding the F/A-18E/F sensor and defensive systems might boost the cost of the boats to roughly $100 million. A “corvette patrol boat” the size of a Cyclone could be manned similarly, though training requirements would be higher.
With the Cyclone-class’s 2,500-nm range, the corvette patrol boat could be self-deployable even across the central Pacific. Speed is less important if the boat is equipped with a UAV and a Mach-3 missile.3
Consider corvette patrol boats as pickets or silent, distributed weapons platforms for a surface-action, expeditionary strike, or carrier strike group. As NIFC-CA players carrying Evolved Seasparrow and SM-6 Standard missiles, the corvette could launch weapons under E-2 Hawkeye, guided-missile destroyer/cruiser, or F-35 control while complicating enemy targeting. Imagine a division of corvettes independently steaming in a 20-km diamond formation with UAVs out 50 km farther, pulling in the Link-16 tactical picture and cooperating with passing MQ-4C Tritons. Such a division would be capable of everything from interdicting pirates to threatening frigates and land targets with 1,000-lb warheads. Operating from an Expeditionary Mobile Base in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, a squadron could physically patrol from the Ivory Coast to Angola and offer weapon coverage 1,000 miles farther.
Opponents respect integrated, layered defenses and fear offensive capacity. Corvette patrol boats would dramatically affect enemy operations and planning, as well as provide a significant presence while operating independently.
Corvette patrol boats could have a place in the Navy—if they are equipped and trained like floating strike aircraft.
1. Robert J. Bulkley, At Close Quarters: PT Boats in the United States Navy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962); Mark Tempest, “The Solomons Campaign: Torpedo Boats and Littoral Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Blog, 22 September 2009; The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, “Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes,” NAVEXOS P 468, February 1947.
2. Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes Prepared by The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee. NAVEXOS P 468, February 1947.
3. "What price speed? Specific power required for propulsion of vehicles", G. Gabrielli and Th. von Kármán, Mechanical Engineering 72 (1950), #10, pp. 775-781.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL WAUGH served 20 years in the Marine Corps as an AV-8B pilot and acquisition professional. He is a member of the Senior Professional Staff at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). He holds a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy and an MBA in Technology Management from the University of Phoenix.