The space domain requires a force with similar responsibilities and authorities as the Coast Guard.
In the past several months, many commentators (including me) have argued that the U.S. government should consider the Coast Guard as the organizational model for a single agency—a “Space Guard”—governing the burgeoning U.S. space boom.[1]
The difference between a “Space Guard” and a “Space Force” or “Space Corps” is that a Space Guard, like the U.S. Coast Guard, would not only be a national defense agency, it would also optimally be a military, multimission, total-domain agency.[2]
The Coast Guard has the authority, capabilities, and capacity to operate and govern across every conceivable mission need within an entire domain. As a result, the service is America’s ready, relevant, and responsive maritime Swiss Army knife that trades the hard power punch of its Department of Defense (DoD) sister services for increased mission flexibility.
At the dawn of the coming space boom the United States will need all the mission flexibility it can get. This includes an agency that can take a holistic approach to overseeing the U.S. commercial space industry—from launch to orbit to return—in a way that will balance the need to compete for the domain’s huge economic potential against fundamental government interests such as collective safety and protection of the environment (on Earth and in space). A space agency modeled on the Coast Guard with both prevention (regulatory) and response (operational) authorities and capabilities provides the model framework.
As it stands, an enhanced version of the Department of Commerce’s Office of Space Commerce, as envisioned by the House of Representatives in the “American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act” (which has not yet cleared the Senate), would only govern prevention. Similarly, a DoD Space Force or Space Corps favored by the President and some members of the House would be responsible only for defense—a narrow slice of the broader response mission. By contrast, a Space Guard modeled on the Coast Guard would have both.
This combination of prevention and response is important for several reasons. Along with applying a Coast Guard–type totality of mission construct, it would concentrate expertise within one agency and lower regulatory cost burdens on the U.S. private space industry. At the same time, it also would likely enable regulators to increase mission effectiveness, as they could better leverage expertise from a common pool of scarce technical specialists and operators. Currently, space regulators must coordinate across multiple departments and agencies.
Further, the U.S. commercial space industry likely will prefer a single agency regulating and operating commercial space services. This would lower risk and increase safety for spacecraft, especially those in low-earth or geosynchronous orbits. Traditional Coast Guard maritime governance missions would translate well to space. Search and rescue, space domain awareness, and mobility all support mitigation measures such as “space junk” traffic management, aids-to-navigation establishment and maintenance, and, with future changes to international law, active debris removal.
Twenty-first-century space exploitation also includes significant national security equities. Every day, the United States grows more dependent on space-based technology—from communications to geolocation to terrestrial, air, and maritime domain awareness. Thus, the United States also needs an agency that can wield defensive capabilities to mitigate against threats, including those many believe will come from pirates and terrorists operating in the domain. Given the widely accepted international norm that space be used for exclusively peaceful purposes, fulfilling this defensive mission must also occur in a manner less likely to spur an arms race in space. A properly constituted, authorized, and equipped Space Guard, modeled on the Coast Guard, would be less provocative than nesting the defensive mission in DoD.
Several commentators also believe such a Space Guard modeled after the Coast Guard (an operational component of the Department of Homeland Security) should shift to DoD in time of war. Envisioning a total shift is too simplistic, however, because while the Coast Guard has not been shifted in totality to DoD since World War II, Coast Guard personnel and resources have participated in every U.S. armed conflict before and since then. Six Coast Guard patrol boats and specialized boarding and security teams operate today in support of DoD combatant commanders in the Arabian Gulf, and have been for years. While the ability to transfer the service to the Navy in time of war remains an important capability that helps define it, a total transfer today would be exceedingly difficult considering the breadth and depth of the Coast Guard’s nondefense missions and responsibilities. Premising an empowered Space Guard exclusively on the idea of such a transfer would no doubt be similarly difficult.
Thus, a Space Guard would optimally be at all times an armed force (10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4)) and military service (14 U.S.C. § 1), law enforcement agency (14 U.S.C. § 2, § 89), search and rescue organization (14 U.S.C. § 88) and common sense regulatory agency. Effectively executing the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions (6 U.S.C. § 468) requires all of these things. This is also a different construct than how the National Guard operates, which shifts between Title 10 and Title 32 authorities depending upon mission and need.
The Coast Guard’s status as a full-time military service and armed force allows for easy integration with DoD as necessary, helps establish the Coast Guard’s role as a member of the intelligence community, and provides the United States with a comparatively low-threat de-escalatory deployment option. Importantly, it also acts as a conduit between DoD (generally playing offense) and the Department of Homeland Security (generally playing defense) to accomplish important national security objectives. Given all the competing equities in space, it makes sense to employ the Coast Guard model to ensure a Space Force is ready, relevant, and responsive to all challenges posed by the domain and those who would use it.
Reviewing and modifying the Coast Guard authorities in Titles 14 and 46 of the U.S. Code, along with the compiled statutes at large in Title 33, will provide a helpful starting point to generate the authority necessary to create a Space Guard. Indeed, U.S. Air Force Majors Dustin Grant and Matthew Neil, under the guidance of Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the Air Force Air College, have already started doing exactly that in “The Case for Space: A Legislative Framework for an Independent United States Space Force.”[3]A unified Space Guard will not only shield the nation from space-based threats, it will also better protect Americans traveling to, returning from, and operating within space—and space itself.[4]
[1]Michael Sinclair, “The US Needs a ‘Coast Guard For Space’, Semper Paratus Exteriores Spatium,”breakdingdefense.com 21 May 2018. Sandra Erwin, “How about a U.S. Space Guard,” spacenews.com6 June 2018. Jeff Foust, “Space Force? Create a ‘Space Guard, Instead, Some Argue,” spacenews.com 31 May 2018. Anna Gunn-Golkin, “Space Guardians,” thespacereview.com 25 June 2018. Irene Klotz, “Space Force: A Cautionary Tale and an Opportunity,” avaitionweek.com 4 July 2018.
[2]See James C. Bennett, “Proposing a ‘Coast Guard’ for Space,” the newatlantis.com50 (2011). Cynthia A. S. McKinley, “The Guardians of Space,” Aerospace Power Journal 44 (Spring 2000) (dubbing the “Space Guard”).
[3]Dustin Grant and Matthew Neil, “The Case for Space: A Legislative Framework for an Independent United States Space Force,” master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff College Air University, April 2018.
[4]See Coast Guard Publication 1.0 Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard1 (February 2014).
Commander Sinclair is a Coast Guard judge advocate. He serves as the Coast Guard’s legislative counsel, working with Congress, Coast Guard leadership, fellows, program reviewers, program offices, and CGJAG on the legislative agenda for the service.