Is ballistic missile defense a Navy mission? If so, the Navy needs to get serious about “really” testing it. This recent test firing from Hawaii—like others—was under ideal conditions.
Every community has what it considers to be its “wheelhouse” capability—that particular thing for which it is rightly famous. For aviators, it is “going downtown.” For submariners, it is being the killer who invisibly waits. For the surface force, surface warriors pride themselves in being the guardians who can reach from the surface to outer space to destroy any airborne threat.
Since last September the Navy has been paying primary attention to issues of seamanship and navigation in the surface fleet. While necessary, this also may be metaphorically understood to be equivalent to concentrating on the base or “physiological” level of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: breathing, food, water, sex, homeostasis, and excretion. It suggests that because the pyramid’s base evidently is compromised, then surely the higher, more complex levels are inescapably in doubt—i.e., if you cannot walk, is it possible for you to do handsprings? One may sensibly ask whether the antisubmarine warfare or antisurface capability of the surface force exists today at the necessary, expected, and presumed levels. More important, is it possible that the surface force can sweep the skies and near space of threat objects if required?
This question regarding air defense is important for several reasons. First, Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), which includes both air-breathing (endo-atmospheric) and ballistic missiles, is increasingly a joint venture. While other, key surface ship-based warfare areas remain largely “Navy,” IAMD is of greatest interest at combatant commander (CoCom) and cross-CoCom levels.1 Further, IAMD has national-level implications and attention, particularly in view of North Korean and Chinese military-related technological advances. Second, the IAMD technologies that do exist in the fleet may not yet be as advanced as is generally thought by both the military in general and the American public. Third, it is not at all clear that the Navy possesses either the ability or the will to question the exact level of capability that does exist fleet-wide. Finally, and with specific regard to the technologies associated with IAMD, capabilities across the board are moving forward with alarming speed—such that it is not clear that the officers and crews of ships can keep pace with this speed.
The smoke is manifest:
• In October 2016, the USS Nitze (DDG-94) failed to either detect or engage the unsophisticated cruise missiles that had been launched at her and her sister ships by Houthi rebels in Yemen.
• Navy ships now regularly deploy with civilian-contracted technicians, primarily formerly enlisted persons, who possess the technical acumen apparently in short supply in today’s enlisted community.
• The last two U.S. ballistic-missile defense (BMD) test shots in the Pacific were failures, one of which was the result of the ship’s company error and one of which was the result of a technological failure.2
• The North Korean ballistic-missile launches have been unchallenged.
Joint and National Interest
As the name implies, Integrated Air and Missile Defense is becoming a team effort, the optimization of which requires the full attention of the various services and assorted commands involved, including the regionally oriented combatant commanders. To continue the Maslow analogy, IAMD is the top of the pyramid. In time, it is hoped that the disparate parts—service techniques, cultures, training, and different technologies—will be bound together to make a cohering whole. Today, we are only on the horizon of that possibility. We may be able to see the mountain top, but to get there we first need to understand where we are and then trace a route to the top.
International law issues and potential long-term political issues aside, many were wondering why the United States did not simply send an Aegis cruiser to engage the next North Korean ballistic missile test shot and thereby put the entire matter to rest. This certainly seems a worthwhile question, but what prevents the discussion from going forward from foment into action is the concern that an engagement would fail. If that were to happen, where would the United States be left then?
The fear is that the Navy’s entire, ship-based BMD capability and capacity might suddenly be viewed as a mere paper tiger. North Korea would be emboldened, as would every other potential threat nation. Industry would stand to lose billions. The competence of entire organizations would be called into question. The Navy would face inquisition by Congress. The statement of Air Force General Lori Robison, Commander of Northern Command, that she has “100 percent confidence” that Northern Command could defeat a ballistic-missile attack from North Korea would be made to appear dangerously false.3
Where Does the United States Stand?
The complexities of technology and the issues of joint integration notwithstanding, it is reasonable to ask if the Navy can send a ship out, take a shot, and make a kill on a ballistic missile today. Certainly the Navy has assembled a much-lauded record of test shots versus ballistic-missile targets over time. Certainly General Robison has been convinced that it can be done.
At right: The John Paul Jones (launching an SM-6 in a live-fire test) is the fleet's only ship that regularly fires Standard missiles against ballistic missile targets. How other Aegis ships would do is unknown.
With regard to these test shots, it must be understood that owing to the great cost associated—as well as the enormous political costs connected to failure—superhuman effort is brought to bear to maximize the possibility of success. Consequently, these events bear almost no connection to real-world fleet operations.4 When these shots fail, as they sometimes do, the entire BMD capability of the Navy is cast into doubt. Whole organizations, both in the Navy’s and the Missile Defense Agency’s acquisition communities, are called into harsh question, which is how industry risks the loss of billions.5
These prospects are so unpalatable that a team of rocket scientists and engineers ensure that the ship and everything connected to the shot, including the test round and the data-links associated, are at the highest possible level of readiness. Not only is the Aegis weapons system (AWS) gone over with a fine-toothed comb, but every supporting element of the ship is brought to fullest readiness, regardless of cost or effort. For example, air conditioning units, used to cool warheads, are meticulously groomed. As for the shoot itself, nothing is left to chance. If the rocket scientists are not actually sitting in place of Navy sailors, they are standing directly behind them. Associated data links, if they are at all involved, are so lightly burdened as to be utterly unrealistic. Months are spent engineering a single SM-3 engagement versus a single threat simulator.
Further, and quite remarkably, there is only one ship in the fleet—the USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53)—that is regularly allowed to fire SM-3 missiles against ballistic-missile targets. Actually, this ship is, by memorandum of understanding, technically under the operational control of the Missile Defense Agency and not the U.S. Navy. It is true that upon rare occasions a ship other than the John Paul Jones fires an SM-3; for example, the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) launched a missile during exercise Formidable Shield in 2017, but much effort is undertaken to ensure success.6
Measuring the Problem
The Aegis weapons system is tough. It was designed by a brilliant team of engineers under the leadership of Rear Admiral Wayne E. Myers, with only one goal in mind: to ensure that the U.S. Navy had the most capable and sophisticated weapons system in the world. Part of the power of the AWS is that it is designed to “degrade gracefully.” Even when things begin to fall apart, the system will still work, whereas other systems will collapse. Even in a highly degraded state, Aegis ships can still fight. While graceful degradation works for most air-breathing threats, it is a non-starter for ballistic-missile threats. On the other hand, the level of readiness required for a BMD engagement is neither understood nor maintained in any fleet ships, with the exception of those very few that are selected to conduct a live, SM-3 shoot. After an SM-3 firing, these units return to their normal fleet operations and readiness degrades.
In short, there is no IAMD “health test” in the fleet. The Navy has no way of knowing which, if any, ships have an AWS that is sufficiently “tuned” to do the job. In the fleet, all BMD missile firings are no more than simulations that test very little in the long and complex chain elemental to a real missile launch.
In the more mundane case of defense against air breathers, the matters are hardly less complex or alarming. While ships still periodically do live missile shots, the targets are no more challenging than those expected by the threats of the 1960s. The last great, challenging target in the inventory was the MQM-8G “Vandal,” and it no longer exists. Virtually all test shots today are “grapes”—that is, easy targets. Still, at least the system is flexed end-to-end in a way completely unavailable for ballistic-missile systems.
Wake Up!
So, what can be done to recover the edge that the Navy evidently still imagines it possesses? It is hoped that the IAMD weapons and tactics instructors being trained and sent to the fleet will have a salutary effect. Unfortunately, these players will not be either sufficiently senior or widely distributed for years to come. In the interim, Navy leadership needs to start with the most difficult of all tasks: take a cold-eyed look in the mirror. If ships cannot navigate the world’s waterways safely, can they be expected to execute more sophisticated tasks, including the wildly complex IAMD? What is the Navy really capable of doing, right now, and how does it ensure that reality matches public expectation?
Along those lines, there are several paths forward that merit attention. First, a real and sophisticated inspection process must be developed and implemented whereby the Navy can determine the health of every AWS regularly. It is true that no such measuring capability exists today. To acquire one will cause the Navy to examine the problem at the required depth, which likely means standing up another organization, which is costly. Such an examination also may expose a yawning chasm of a problem. Finally, the repair of this problem may cost a lot of money. Unfortunately, as it currently stands, there is no doubt that the Navy does not know what it does not know.
Second, in terms of this measuring and demonstration of capability, it is not enough that the AWS in each ship be determined to be up to snuff. The BMD capability of ships needs to be flexed, end-to-end, and this can only be done through live shots. It cannot be that only one ship in the fleet has the experience of shooting an SM-3 against a live target. Today, the Navy is in the process of demilitarizing a number of “dated” SM-3 BLK 1A missiles, according to FY19 Aegis BMD sustainment budget justifications. These missiles should be fired from ships in actual tests. Frankly, they should be fired by every ship that is assigned as a primary mission BMD. This move means ships stationed in Yokosuka and Rota must fire missiles and be tested. This also will be expensive. And it will uncover real and difficult problems. Still, when the call comes, the Navy needs to be confident that its ships can do the job.
Third, it is a mistake to presume that all BMD ships are equal to one another. In fact, there are four AWS programs that possess some BMD baselines: 3.6.X, 4.X, 5.0 CU (Aegis B/L 9.C1), and 5.1 (Aegis B/L 9.C2). Again, these are not equal. It is good news that all Flight IIA Aegis ships under construction are being built with the new 9.C2 (BMD B/L 5.1) program, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson has mandated that existing Aegis ships will not be upgraded beyond the program with which they are already equipped.7 In fact, he waived an opportunity to upgrade the capabilities of the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) in the FY18 Emergency Supplemental budget recently enacted.8
Fourth, it is time to impose a technological moratorium, at least with regard to the buying and installing of “new” technologies in ships. Let the Navy find out where it is. Let it ask where it is going. Let it determine what works in today’s ships with today’s sailors. While shoving more and more into ships may benefit some, there can be little doubt that it only confuses the actual system that has to do the dirty work: ships and sailors. The following is from a near–end of tour combat systems officer in a deployed cruiser: “The technology has leapfrogged our abilities to truly troubleshoot and fix equipment without tech reps, and the Navy’s administrative burdens hinder us from truly knowing or practicing our weapons systems.” Research and development must continue, but a page should be taken from Admiral Meyers’s playbook—build a little and test a lot before putting it harm’s way.
Finally, while it is understood that fixing the surface navy’s ability to do the basics is and will be costly, there are many other competing priorities. The fleet is going to get larger. Each existing Navy ship will be more capable. Nothing can be spared from the unstinting efforts in building the Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine. All this must be accomplished while repairing the damage wrought on existing ships. Moreover, other classes of ships simply are not available to augment the Aegis fleet. The Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class originally was intended to be between 16 and 24 hulls, each equipped with a powerful dual-band radar system and a vertical launch system capable of supporting 80 interceptors. Not only has this class been cut to three hulls, but the radar system has been cut in half, removing the long-range search capability of the S-band radar they originally were to have.9
Does Anyone Care?
There is a problem in all of this discussion. It presumes that the Navy wants to be involved in BMD. At some point in the past, it was discovered that the Aegis SPY-1 radar in cruisers was able to track objects, such as ballistic missiles, if the “aperture” of the radar was opened beyond its normal settings. This began a slide toward the deep involvement of the Navy in BMD that exists today. First, the Navy had that radar. Second, the Navy could bring that radar to bear anywhere in the world, and quickly. Third, the other services were struggling to determine what role they wanted to play and what technologies they could bring. The Navy, with its cruisers, was far ahead, and it soon developed interceptors to meet at least a part of the threat. And, most important, the Missile Defense Agency pays for most of the hardware, so the funds do not come out of the Navy’s top line.
Ballistic-missile defense muddies the lines. There is a powerful and persistent element of the Navy that is fundamentally convinced that the Navy does not defend “dirt”—i.e., land sites. Such a task is the Army’s, which has a number of capable systems. For many senior naval officers, the historic, unchanging purpose of the Navy is sea control or control of the sea lines of communication. Secondarily, the Navy is in the business of on-call, worldwide power projection. One is reminded of President Bill Clinton’s words: “When word of a crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident that the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is: ‘Where’s the nearest carrier?’”10
In the past, CoComs paid little attention to cruisers and destroyers. Today, every single BMD-capable cruiser and destroyer is of keenest interest to every CoCom, which has a job involving BMD. Consequently, in any crisis or likely crisis, ships are stripped from Navy hands and sent afield to watch the skies. “Yet these ships already have a robust task-load with Strike Group duties, performing vital roles of air defense, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Missions such as Naval Surface Fire Support, Maritime Interdiction Operations, and escort duties add to their already full plate.”11 The math is simple: too many missions, too few hulls. Even if the Navy did not pay for the hardware originally, it ends up paying in terms of ship availability for other critical Navy missions.
The Navy hardly can afford this mission set if it still is to do sea control and power projection. Moreover, Aegis Ashore is becoming a problem for the Navy. People have observed Aegis Ashore in Romania and under construction in Poland; they have begun to ask why this nation is not putting Aegis Ashore sites in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York.12 A Navy answer is that it does not defend dirt.
SM-3 will soon hit “Milestone B,” at which point the Missile Defense Agency will no longer pay for SM-3 missiles. At that point, the responsibility will shift to the Navy. At $10 million per unit, even the outdated SM-3 Block 1A is quite expensive.13 From where will the money come to pay this bill? Perhaps the Navy should get out of the BMD business and leave it to the Army.
On the other hand, while the President used to ask where the carriers were, today it is abundantly clear that the question is: “Where are the Aegis BMD ships?” There is no escaping from the entire BMD problem. There are now ballistic-missile threats designed for specific attack of ships at sea, particularly aircraft carriers. And worse is coming. The Chinese are testing the DF-17, a hypersonic glide vehicle type of ballistic missile specifically designed to defeat Aegis.14 Like it or not, the Navy must address the BMD problem.
1. Statement of GEN Lori J. Robinson, U.S. Air Force Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 February 2018.
2. David B. Larter, “Sailor Error Led to Failed U.S. Navy Ballistic Missile Intercept Test,” Defense News, 24 July 2017. Ben Werner, “Pentagon Confirms SM-3 Block IIA Missile Missed Its Target in Test This Week,” USNI News, 1 February 2018.
3. John Grady, “NorthCom Has ‘100 Percent Confidence’ U.S. Can Repel a North Korean Missile Attack,” USNI News, 20 February 2018.
4. Associated Press, “Failed Missile Test off of Kauai Costs $130 Million,” Military Times, 20 February 2018. Mike Stone, “Lack of Real-World Testing Raises Doubts on U.S. Missile Defenses,” Reuters, 9 August 2017.
5. Ronald O’Rourke, “Report to Congress on Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” Congressional Research Service, USNI News, 21 November 2017.
6. Megan Eckstein, “Navy, NATO Forces Conduct Integrated Air and Missile Defense Exercise off Scotland,” USNI News, 16 October 2017.
7. Sam LaGrone, “Navy Again Reduces Scope of Destroyer Modernization, 5 Ships Won’t Receive Any Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrades,” USNI News, 3 March 2015.
8. Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Navy Won’t Upgrade USS Fitzgerald to Baseline 9 Aegis Combat System,” USNI News, 16 October 2017.
9. LCDR Rachael Gosnell, USN, “The Future of the Navy’s Ballistic Missile Defense Program,” master’s thesis, Georgetown University, Security Studies Program, 1 May 2012, 27.
10. Geoffrey Norman, “Where Are the Carriers,” Weekly Standard, 9 August 2013.
11. Gosnell, “The Future of the Navy’s Ballistic Missile Defense Program,” 28.
12. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, “Aegis Ashore,” Making the World a Safer Place, Missile Defense, 7 December 2017.
13. Standard SM-3 Block IA, Deagel.com, 2 March 2018.
14. Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” The Diplomat, 28 December 2017.
Captain Eyer served in seven cruisers, commanding three Aegis cruisers: the USS Thomas S. Gates (CG-51), Shiloh (CG-67), and Chancellorsville (CG-62). As commanding officer of the Shiloh, he fired a SM-3 to a successful intercept during Exercise Stellar Predator.