The U.S. Navy’s newest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is in the fleet restoring the number of carriers to the mandated number of 11. The aircraft carrier force has been below the minimum of 11 required by law since December 2012 when the Enterprise (CVN-65) was decommissioned. But there is a long test program required by the Department of Defense that prevents the Gerald R. Ford from deploying until 2022.
This year’s National Defense Authorization Act permits the Secretary of Defense to waive the requirement for shock testing the Gerald R. Ford. Eliminating the shock test can move its deployment up by a year or more. But leaders of the Senate Armed Services Committee urge the Secretary to shock test the new carrier.
A shock test is a series of underwater detonations of a specified charge that are put closer and closer to the ship.
In 1987, the Congress passed the Live Fire Test Law that requires all weapons systems to be subjected to a live-fire test. The Navy proposed to substitute shock tests for live-fire tests because people have to man a ship for proper operation while aircraft, tanks, trucks and armored personnel vehicles can be unmanned when live- fire tested. Further, to obtain realistic shock performance data, Navy developed the means to test critical ship components at “heavy shock levels” on unmanned barges that can damage the components without harming people. Congress accepted this logic and allowed shock tests to replace live-fire testing of ships.
For surface ships that operated since the Live Fire Act became law, the table below shows the classes built, what ship of the class was shocked, and when.
Class | Type | Ship of the Class | When |
O.H. Perry (FFG-7) | Escort Frigate | 1st, O.H. Perry (FFG-7) | 1978 |
Newport (LST-1179) | Landing Ship Tanks | 9th, Tuscaloosa (LST-1187) | 1978 |
Virginia (CGN-37) | Nuclear Cruiser | 4th, Arkansas (CGN-41) | 1982 |
Forrestal (CV-59) | Non-Nuclear Carrier | 8th, John F. Kennedy (CV-67) | 1984 |
Ticonderoga (CG-47) | Aegis Cruiser | 2nd, Yorktown (CG-48) | 1984 |
| Aegis Cruiser (VLS) | 5th, Thomas Gates (CG-51) | 1989 |
Nimitz (CVN-68) | Nuclear Carrier | 4th, Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) | 1986 |
Avenger (MCM-1) | Mine Counter Measure | 1st, Avenger (MCM-1) | 1988 |
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) | Aegis DDG Flight I | 3rd, John P. Jones (DDG-53) | 1994 |
| Aegis DDG Flight IIA | 3rd, W. S. Churchill (DDG-81) | 2001 |
San Antonio (LPD-17) | Amphibious Ship | 3rd, Mesa Verde (LPD-19) | 2012 |
Independence (LCS-2) | Littoral Combat Ship | 3rd, Jackson (LCS-6) | 2016 |
The history of shipbuilding shows that the design of the first ship of the class goes through many changes during the construction that are made to decrease construction costs as well as fixing flaws in the design. Further, because some classes are built at a second yard, the design does not stabilize until after construction of the second ship. So, to shock test the right ship with a stable design, the Navy winds up shock testing the 3rd or 4th ship of the class. For most classes, the first one or two ships of the class are not shocked and have gone on to serve ably without incident including the first three ships of the Nimitz (CVN-68) class.
Indeed, one of the prime lessons learned from shock testing of the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), the 4th ship of the Nimitz class, was failure of antennae structural support on the island. That drove a new structural support for the antennae that was incorporated during the initial construction of the last two carriers of the Nimitz class, and during various repair periods for the other carriers of the class.
Subjecting the island to shock is an important aspect of the shock test for an aircraft carrier. Precisely for that reason, the shock test should be done on the second Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, the John F. Kennedy (CVN-79). Why? Because of the one-of-a-kind development of the Ford’s Dual Band Radar (DBR). Originally selected for synergies with the DDG-1000 program that was to be a 30-ship class, the Dual Band Radar was later scaled back on the DDG-1000 for affordability reasons, leaving only one set for the new carrier program.
The DBR will be replaced by the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR). It “should” fit easily inside the envelope of the DBR’s, which “should” require no changes to the island. But given the track record of radar development for the Gerald R. Ford, this change should not be underestimated. EASR is expected to be the main radar for the rest of the class that may last 100 years. That radar is the one that should be shock tested for the class, not the DBR, which makes the second new carrier the right ship to shock.
Shock tests are expensive and require extraordinary efforts to protect the marine environment. Presently they are done off the coast of Florida when the migration of sea turtles and marine mammals are at a minimum in hurricane country where those storms can delay a test for months.
The Gerald R. Ford has come through a long and arduous development that cost twice as much and twice as long as originally predicted. Let’s not waste that investment in treasure and time by shocking the wrong ship with the one-of-a-kind radar.
The world situation is not improving. Nuclear-capable North Korea has launched ballistic missiles that threaten the United States. Russia, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, has come back nastier than ever. And Iran continues to promote terrorism in the Middle East while building a nuclear capability. The United States needs its carriers forward deployed more than ever.
Wait to shock the John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) and get the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) deployed as soon as possible.
Captain Manvel was an engineering duty officer specializing in aircraft carriers. He served in the engineering departments of three, and was chief engineer of the USS America (CV-66) during Operation Desert Storm. He also helped supervise construction of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), leading the initial preparations during construction for her shock trial. He later led the development of the maintenance strategy for the Nimitz class and then the initial development of the Gerald R. Ford class.
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