Some of the greatest intelligence achievements during the Cold War came from deep, penetrating knowledge of our adversary. The United States’ in-depth studies of the Soviet Union were so pervasive they became known as Sovietology. The Department of Defense (DOD) was focused on understanding all aspects of Soviet capability. Increases in maritime strength, massive shipbuilding efforts, and advances in technology made the Soviet Navy a challenger to U.S. naval supremacy and were the impetus for decades of study on Soviet maritime strategy.1
The Soviets’ space activities were of such concern that the United States dedicated the full-spectrum of intelligence to uncovering their secret manned space launch facilities and conducted a 21-year search for a Soviet deep-space signal.2 Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Soviet Analysis, created in 1981, became the largest branch in the intelligence directorate and was dedicated to developing an in-depth understanding of Soviet military strength and intentions.3 In his remarks to the Conference on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union: 1947-1991, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin contended U.S. policy requirements demanded a level of understanding that extended even to specific industries, resulting in analysis of Soviet timber and canned goods production.4
In 1983, Congress established the Title VIII Grant Program—to be administered by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research—providing a significant source of funding for Soviet research and advanced Russian-language training. Across the federal government and among U.S. academic institutions, study of the Soviet Union flourished. Collectively, these programs served to “intellectually mobilize” some of the finest U.S. scholars to develop a deep and comprehensive knowledge of our most significant adversary in the 20th century.5
Knowledge Is Advantage
During the Cold War, “knowing” our enemy yielded in-depth intelligence and understanding and provided a military advantage not easily replicated in the absence of such insight. As Charles King elaborates, “the rise of the United States as a global power was the product of more than merely economic and military advantages. Where the country was truly hegemonic was in its unmatched knowledge of the hidden interior of other nations: their languages and cultures, their histories and political systems, their local economies and human geographies.”6
In 2013, the Title VIII program was suspended just weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and relations between the United States and Russia reached a new post-Cold War low. By most accounts, Russia’s annexation of Crimea caught the intelligence community off guard. Dr. Paul D. Miller, one of only a few academics to forecast such Russian behavior, argued it was entirely predictable based on Russian actions in the Republic of Georgia in 2008. He further notes, “Russian officials have been fairly clear about their intent to balance against the United States, oppose unipolarity, and revive Russia’s hegemony over its near-abroad, none of which are consistent with U.S. interests.”7
One wonders whether these warning signs would have gone unnoticed had programs comparable to Title VIII been sustainably resourced. Without a cadre of subject-matter experts in multiple government agencies and nongovernmental institutions, we simply are not able to anticipate adequately Moscow’s actions. The U.S. government has devalued the investment in profound knowledge, not just of Russia and the former Soviet Republics, but of all international and area studies across the board. This shift in emphasis and monetary support has limited the United States’ ability to know its adversaries. Government leaders should consider the opportunity costs a lack of research and academic study have had—and will continue to have—on the ability to predict state and nonstate actors’ behavior. Today’s U.S. Navy needs enhanced knowledge of its adversaries. In “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson points to critical technological advantages to maintain our razor-thin superiority over near-peer competitors and calls for increased analysis on specific issues and problems.8 As the lesson of the Cold War instructs us, however, detailed and temporal understanding of patterns is not developed by obtaining data; it is produced by analyzing data. It is imperative to invest in intellectual expertise. As studies of Sovietology demonstrate, deep, penetrating knowledge of the adversary is obtainable, and the comparative advantages of gaining and maintaining this knowledge can have important, measurable effects.
Invest in Training
With even limited support the Navy can facilitate greater training opportunities to develop core disciplines and critical competencies, including area studies and advanced language training. Using a standard one-in-three rotation schedule, it is possible to promote an improved level of training in specific disciplines, competencies, and subjects. Naval officers currently can apply for training in support of joint education requirements and specific leadership courses, but they have limited opportunities to obtain technical training. Given the need to develop increased expertise in areas where knowledge gaps exist, promoting a one-in-three rotation for specialized training is vital. More technical training would be better. Specialized training is an investment in the future, where returns are found in the development of a highly proficient and innovative force. A 2015 RAND study, which examined DOD options for advanced cyber training by analyzing similarities with defense language training, found closely aligning mission requirements and workforce priorities increases training efficacy.9 The study also suggests service return on investment would benefit from policies that advance career paths and aid retention.10 The military’s generalized personnel system is not well-suited to the development of deep subject-matter expertise, and cyber warriors frequently leave for higher-paying industry jobs.
Develop a Specialized Career Path
The Navy should modernize its military personnel system to support career options that would help retain critical skills and expertise. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 standardized personnel practices across the services and created predictable officer career paths that required promotion to stay in service. Multiple studies have advocated changes to DOPMA to keep pace with the civilian sector, particularly in the area of technology. As early as 1990, a RAND Corporation study found military personnel management needed greater flexibility to meet the needs of a smaller, more skillful, and specialized force.11 Despite these findings, the current system still devalues specialists—those key experts, such as foreign area officers, cyber analysts, and cryptologists—the Navy needs to analyze and understand tomorrow’s threats. As outlined in a 2015 Defense One article, the combined effects of “everyone must command” and “up-or-out” promotion systems, forcing members to promote or separate, create a force that is always moving to the next assignment.12 While that system has proved capable of providing a broad scope of general experiences to future leaders, it limits the development of deep subject-matter expertise and results in a continuous loss of expert knowledge in critical jobs.13 In 2017, the Bipartisan Policy Center recommended DOD modernize its personnel policies and replace “up-or-out” with clear performance standards to facilitate a “perform-to-stay” system.14 While DOD wrestles with ways to stem the loss of talent resulting from antiquated promotion regulations, the Navy should consider increasing its investment in a non-command career track that supports specialization as a career option. The Information Warfare Community (IWC) needs a targeted career option to access, build, and retain critical skills and abilities. One option is to expand the Navy’s limited duty officer (LDO) and chief warrant officer (CWO) programs, which include IWC designators. The primary focus of these communities is to retain skilled enlisted technical specialists by offering continued service in another rank structure. The Navy could enhance recruitment for these programs and focus on specialists in key disciplines supporting current and future warfighting technologies, foreign area studies, and cyber requirements. The existing precept of the LDO community, however, is to be the primary manpower source for technical billets not best suited for traditional officer career paths.15 Beyond the LDO and CWO program, the Navy could embrace a technical or specialized career track for commissioned officers in critical areas as an imperative for the cutting-edge maritime force of tomorrow. The ability for naval officers to promote and continue to serve in technical specialties provides an immediate way to retain expertise and build long-term capability in areas where gaps exist.
Increase Skilled Accessions
If the Navy can facilitate a potential career path, it also should consider increasing skilled accessions. There is some indication the service is considering such a possibility. In June 2016, Navy Times reported the service was considering increasing its technical skills with a direct-hiring plan to access civilian experts at more senior ranks, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and offensive cyber capability; plans to augment its ranks with direct accessions at the E-7 and 0-6 level are under consideration.16 This policy also is taken from the Navy’s history. During World War II, the service brought skilled construction workers on board to build the facilities necessary to support the war effort.17 Notably, increases in skilled accessions have occurred in eras of military expansion, but funding is a limiting factor. Given the demand signal for increasingly specialized skills and abilities, the Navy should look at narrow areas for implementation.
Invest in the Navy Reserve
The reserve component has become more operational during the past 15 years of war deployments. In many instances, reservists are filling more deployed billets than their active counterparts. The IWC continues to be a high demand/low-density community, and the mobilization requirements for these skills and abilities have not diminished. Naval Information Force Reserve mobilization requirements reached a three-year high in 2016.18 Reservists filled approximately 78 percent of the IWC total force warfighting requirements that year.19 Despite Navy reservists’ proven wartime mission support, investments in their training and professional development are still limited, even minimal. After initial warfare qualification, reserve officers in the IWC are mandated to complete only a two-week leadership training every five years. Although joint professional military education is encouraged, there are limited quotas for reservists for all in-residence school opportunities. There also are few opportunities for technical professional training, even in areas such as cyber network applications and advanced language training. Providing training to warfare-qualified reserve officers would require less investment than training the total force, and the dividends could be significant. Reservists are more likely to stay in service than their active-duty counterparts, as their retirement is a point-based system, which increases with completion of qualifying years. Navy reservists also are more likely to “homestead” in the same duty location and provide longer-term support. Under the current military personnel system, these attributes often are viewed negatively in terms of promotion, but they provide an excellent foundation for assessing the effects of increased investment in specialized training. Likewise, the Navy could test accession programs for technical skills found in the civilian sector by recruiting for the reserve component. The Army is seeking reservists and guard members with expertise in specialized areas such as digital forensics, crypto-analysis, and code writing—skills that reside primarily outside the military. The Navy could follow suit.20 The Bipartisan Policy Center confirmed what reservists have long understood: the reserve component is better positioned to contribute immediately in specialized areas by leveraging reservists’ civilian skills.21 The Navy should seize this advantage and support policy options that retain separating active service members with critical skills and increase flexibility by offering multiple ways in which highly skilled reserve citizen-sailors can support technical missions and requirements. Naval Information Force Reserve sailors and officers are positioned perfectly to support long-term research and in-depth analysis to build products with significant shelf lives. In the Washington, DC, region alone, 22 Naval Information Force Reserve units support a wide variety of IWC commands, missions, and technical lines of effort. By leveraging the talent and skill sets of its members—many of whom are employed in the intelligence community—the Navy could go a long way toward rebuilding niche areas of critical expertise. To maintain maritime superiority, history demonstrates the need to develop deep understanding of adversaries. The Navy has lost the edge in this effort and needs to revisit ways to increase its body of knowledge. In support of the CNO’s “Design” and efforts to strengthen our Navy team for the future, the service must advance its knowledge base by developing and providing specialized training, accessing and retaining technical experts, forging a career path for specialization, and investing in the Navy Reserve.
1. Chief of Naval Operations, “Understanding Naval Developments” (1991): 1, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a248966.pdf.
2. The National Security Archive, “U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Space Program,” 4 February 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB501/.
3. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Changing Nature of CIA Analysis in the Post-Soviet World,” 9 March 2001, www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2001/ddci_speech_03092001.html.
4. Ibid.
5. David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1.
6. Charles King, “The Decline of International Studies: Why Flying Blind Is Dangerous,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2015).
7. Paul D. Miller, “How Dangerous Is the World? Part II,” Foreign Policy, 16 December 2011.
8. Chief of Naval Operations, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” (2016), 1-8.
9. Jennifer Li and Lindsay Daugherty, “Training Cyber Warriors: What Can be Learned from Defense Language Training?” (2015), 62. www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR476/RAND_RR476.pdf.
10. Ibid., 56.
11. Bernard Rostker, et al., The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective (Washington, DC: RAND, 1990), 6, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/1993/R4246.pdf.
12. LGEN David Barno, USA (Ret.), “Can the U.S. Military Win Wars If It Keeps Losing Talented Officers?” 6 November 2015, www.defenseone.com/business/2015/11/can-us-military-win-wars-if-it-keeps-losing-talented-officers/123441/.
13. Ibid.
14. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Building a F.A.S.T. Force: A Flexible Personnel System for a Modern Military Recommendations from the Task Force on Defense Personnel,” (2017), 60, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/building-a-fast-force/.
15. “LDO/CWO Community Management webpage,” Navy Personnel Command. www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/officer/communitymanagers/active/ldo_cwo/Pages/default.aspx.
16. Mark Faram. “Navy Forges Ahead with Plan to Hire Civilians for Chief, Captain,” Navy Times, 19 June 2016.
17. Ibid.
18. “Naval Information Force Reserve FY16 Annual Report,” (2016): 23. https://private.navyreserve.navy.mil/CNIRC/KnowledgeSharing/CIDCRC_KNOWLEDGE_LIBRARY/ANNUAL_REPORTS/FY16_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf
19. Ibid.
20. Department of the Army, “Military Seeks Civilians with High-Tech Skills to Counter ISIS,” Army Times, 15 April 2017.
21. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Building a F.A.S.T. Force”, 60.