U.S. friends and allies in Europe face maritime security challenges that were unthinkable just a few years ago. The U.S. Navy has a huge role to play in helping their navies meet the new threats.
Syrian refugees at sea/Shutterstock
In the east and north, Russia’s new assertiveness is expressed to a large degree in the maritime domain, and Moscow is rapidly bolstering its naval capabilities and emplacing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) networks. To the south, the upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East continues, spawning refugee flows into Europe not seen since World War II. These new maritime challenges are serious enough to threaten the European security order and affect core U.S. defense and security interests. Moreover, these threats to stability have emerged at a time of relative weakness for European navies, because European nations have focused their austere defense budgets primarily on ground-centric counterinsurgency and crisis management operations. Europe’s response to today’s maritime challenges is further complicated by the broad range of threats—from increasingly capable state adversaries to failing states generating boatloads of refugees and terrorism.
European navies must reorient themselves to this new operating environment and regain skills and capabilities that have been on the backburner for more than two decades. Deeper cooperation and combined efforts will be needed to retake the advantage. While European nations must be responsible for rebuilding their own sea power, the U.S. Navy could play a pivotal role in catalyzing and shaping a badly needed rejuvenation.
The Russian Challenge
Since the Ukraine crisis began in 2014, Russia has continued to act assertively against U.S. friends, allies, and partners in Europe. Much of the strategic friction between Russia and NATO has occurred at sea, with last year’s close fly-by of the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) in the Baltic by Russian Su-24s only one of many examples.
But such close encounters are only part of Russia’s challenge to European security. Russia also is developing robust A2/AD networks at strategic points that will make it difficult and hazardous for European and U.S. maritime forces to operate in key areas in times of crisis or war.2 To date, Russia has emplaced A2/AD networks in the high north (around Murmansk), in the Baltic Sea region (especially in the Kaliningrad enclave), and in Crimea. It also has installed long-range weapon systems in Syria around its naval facility in Tartus, with implications for the eastern Mediterranean.3 These A2/AD networks are not identical, but broadly speaking consist of long-range air defense, ground-attack, and antiship missiles. In combination (and along with warships, submarines, and aircraft), these systems can hold forward basing at risk, deny effective air operations, and threaten commercial and naval shipping.
Russia’s A2/AD networks are coupled with a significant naval modernization effort, which already has born fruit.4 The Russian submarine fleet has come to life again and now operates at a tempo not seen since the Cold War.5 Over the past two years, several European countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland, have launched antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations in pursuit of suspected Russian submarines in their territorial waters. Russian submarines also have raised concerns around vital transatlantic communications cables.6 Russia’s submarine fleet has demonstrated new capabilities, which until now have been almost the exclusive domain of the U.S. and Royal navies. A Kilo-class submarine, for example, fired Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles against land targets in Syria from the Mediterranean in 2016.7
Russia’s assertiveness, new level of naval activity, and emerging A2/AD networks have been described as an attempt to build “an arc of steel” across Europe, radically changing the maritime security environment in northern and southeast Europe.8 Its growing naval capabilities and assertiveness have highlighted the importance of strategic choke points, such as the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK)Gap, which is once again receiving attention as an area that must be monitored and controlled to maintain the linkage between Europe and the United States.9
Southern Turbulence
The violence and upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East have continued unabated since 2011, with a direct impact on the Mediterranean, which has become the main conduit for massive refugee and migrant flows. In the first six months of 2016 more than 200,000 people crossed the Mediterranean aboard dinghies and other rickety craft, and close to 2,500 lost their lives at sea in 2016.10 There also is real concern that the Mediterranean could serve as the conduit for bringing terror cells, weapons, and equipment into Europe.
Security in the Mediterranean is further complicated by the increasing presence of both Russia and China. Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war included the installation of long-range air defense systems, which could affect U.S. and allied naval and air operations in the region.11 China and Russia conducted a joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean in the summer of 2015, and the Chinese Navy conducted a noncombatant evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya ahead of Operation Odyssey Dawn.12 The addition of significant outside naval powers brings a geo-political dimension to the already turbulent regional security environment.
European Navies in the 21st Century
These emerging threats are a daunting challenge for European navies. Broadly speaking, all have been under fiscal pressure since the end of the Cold War, and many of the fleets are significantly smaller than in previous decades. A few examples paint the picture:
• The Royal Navy surface fleet has dwindled to 19 surface combatants and 7 attack submarines. The United Kingdom also is experiencing a gap in aircraft carriers until the HMS Queen Elizabeth enters service in 2020.13
• The German Navy is down to 16 surface combatants, and only 5 attack submarines.
• France has gone from 35 frigates in 1995 to less than 20 today.14
Overall, European submarines have dwindled from more than 70 boats in 2000 to around 40 in 2016.
New ships and submarines are more capable than their predecessors, but the increased capabilities cannot completely offset the shrinking numbers of platforms. A ship or a submarine can only be in one place at a time, and maintenance, training, and crew needs further reduce operational availability.
European navies also have tended to focus on lower-end maritime security and expeditionary operations in permissive environments over the past two decades, and the operational pattern since the Cold War has been dominated by peacekeeping, counterpiracy, capacity-building, and support to the war on terrorism. That focus is now evident in the skill sets of European navies and their force structures. For example, Denmark gave up its submarine force in 2004 to invest scarce resources in support ships that could be used for expeditionary operations. The Netherlands reduced its fleet of frigates and instead opted for ocean patrol vessels more suited for counterdrug operations in the Caribbean. Post-Cold War exercises, such as BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea, tended to focus on maritime security tasks rather than high-end warfighting.
A few key capabilities have deteriorated especially fast. For example, the number of maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) available to European navies has shrunk considerably. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands abandoned the capability completely over the past decade, while Greece temporarily mothballed its entire fleet of P-3s as a cost-saving measure.15 Other nations have delayed MPA procurement plans or chosen to modernize only a subset of their MPA fleets.16 Mine warfare and mine hunting are other fields that have largely been neglected since the end of the Cold War.
The Role of U.S. Maritime Forces
The U.S. Navy faces its own global challenges, not the least of which is the competitive maritime domain in the Asia-Pacific region. Still, the challenges in Europe are urgent and related to direct and vital U.S. security interests. The U.S. Navy will have to fill several roles in Europe, including bringing high-end capabilities such as long-range strike, electronic warfare, and amphibious warfare, to the region in case of a crisis. Indeed, U.S. efforts to meet the A2/AD challenge in the Pacific are increasingly relevant to the operating environment in Europe as well. But the U.S. Navy can help to catalyze cooperation among its European friends, allies, and partners to achieve closer coordination, better use of scarce defense resources, and sharper warfighting skills and capabilities.17
Through its capabilities, roles, posture, and reputation, the U.S. Navy is uniquely placed to assist the European navies rebuild their capabilities. European navies are some of the most sophisticated and competent in the world, and U.S. naval forces already are engaged in partnership efforts with them—from assisting the Royal Navy with maintaining carrier aviation know-how, to the allied amphibious basing initiative, and leading important exercises such as BALTOPS. But a road map is needed to guide cooperation and capability development to regain high-end warfighting capacities, restore European navies, and build maritime defense and deterrence.
A Road Map for HIgh-end warfighting
The range of efforts needed to restore European naval power is broad and will require cooperation with the United States. Key areas include:
Focus on Antisubmarine Warfare. Russian submarine activity is rising, and the Russian submarine fleet is increasingly capable. European navies must quickly regain ASW skills and invest in capabilities to meet the challenge. The U.S. Navy can support this effort by making ASW training and exercise opportunities available and by exploring the creation of a multinational ASW center of excellence under NATO flag.18 Promising steps already have been made in this regard, through exercises such as BALTOPS 16 and Dynamic Mongoose, but ASW efforts must be expanded.
Close the GIUK Gap. This choke point is once again central, given the Russian goal of gaining access to the Atlantic, where Russian submarines could threaten the connection between Europe and North America. NATO’s northern members (Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Iceland) once again must build a robust network of sensors, platforms, and supporting infrastructure for maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and ASW in and around the gap. The U.S. Navy could play a central role in this effort by bringing high-end capabilities, including P-8s, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and other ISR assets.
Create Regional Maritime Coalitions. A crisis in any region in Europe will likely be met first by the navies of that region, along with the U.S. Navy and perhaps the Royal Navy and French Navy, with other navies joining the effort later under a NATO flag. To prepare for contingencies and enable a concerted response from the outset, European navies should build regional coalitions where training, exercises, capabilities, and command-and-control arrangements could be tailored for specific challenges, conditions, and available forces in each region. Regional efforts would include the High North, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. Navy needs to play a role here, too, as the catalyst for regional cooperation and provider of high-end capabilities.
Enhance European Pooling and Sharing. European navies already are cooperating to build capabilities. Efforts include the European amphibious initiative, Dutch-Belgian mine hunting, and U.K.-French carrier operations. These efforts could be further energized by U.S. Navy support and periodic participation.
Bolster Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Europe’s maritime challenges all require enhanced maritime domain awareness to gain early warning, effectively plan and execute operations, and respond to emerging crises. Enhanced MDA will require not only airborne, shipborne, and shore-based sensors, but also better sharing of information across national agencies and services, NATO, and the European Union. The U.S. Navy could play a role as a capability provider and breaker of log-jams. Something akin to the Maritime Security Initiative in the Pacific could be leveraged in certain parts of Europe to build MDA capabilities and sharing arrangements.
Develop Amphibious Forces in Europe. Amphibious forces would play a key role in reinforcing front-line regions of Europe in the event of a crisis with Russia. Europe must maintain skilled, competent, amphibious forces, which are integrated with U.S. maritime forces.
Write a New NATO Maritime Strategy. NATO established an Alliance Maritime Strategy in 2011, but it was focused on policing tasks (such as counterpiracy and counterterrorism) and expeditionary operations. NATO needs a new strategy to focus its maritime efforts on the enduring high-end challenges. As the largest member of NATO, the United States would play a decisive role in advancing the idea of a new strategy within the Alliance. Indeed, U.S. Navy leaders have endorsed this concept.19
The maritime domain around Europe is contested and turbulent. The current challenges cannot be met effectively without more cooperation and sharing of capabilities. Toward that end, the U.S. Navy has an important role to play as a leader of cooperation and provider of high-end capabilities that are out of reach for most European nations. This role should not be seen as a case of charity. Immediate U.S. national security interests are at stake in Europe, from the future of NATO and the European security order to counterterrorism and the fight against ISIS. Europe has now joined the Asia-Pacific region as a theater for emerging great power competition over the future order of the world. And as in Asia, much of that competition will play out in the maritime domain. Reinvigorated European navies, partnered with U.S. maritime forces, will have a vital role to play in this contest.
1. Guillaume Lasconjarias and Alessandro Marrone, “How to Respond to Anti-Access/Area-Denial? Towards a NATO Counter-A2/AD Strategy,” NATO Defense College, February 2016, 5-8
2.Jonathan Altman, “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 69, No. 1, (Winter 2016),74-76.
3. See, for example, Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy – A Historic Transition, Washington, DC, 2016.
4. Nicholas de Larrinaga, “Russian Submarine Activity Topping Cold War Levels,” Jane’s 360, 2 February, 2016, www.janes.com/article/57650/russian-submarine-activity-topping-cold-war-levels.
5. David Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Ships Near Data Cables Too Close for US Comfort,” New York Times, 25 October 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/.
6. Christopher Cavas, “Russian Submarine Hits Targets in Syria,” Defense News, 9 December 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/12/08/submarine-russia-kalibr-caliber-cruise-missile-syria-kilo/76995346/.
7. Admiral Mark Ferguson, U.S. Navy, “NATO’s Role at Sea,” Public speech at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, 6 October 2015, www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/webcasts/nato-s-role-at-sea-featuring-adm-mark-ferguson.
8. Magnus Nordenman, “Russian Subs are Reheating a Cold War Chokepoint,” Defense One, 4 March, 2016, www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/03/russian-subs-are-reheating-cold-war-chokepoint/126428/.
9. Julie Vitkovskaya, “Deadly Year for Migrants Crossing Mediterranean,” The Washington Post, 23 June 2016, A7.
10. Jonathan Marcus, “Russia’s S-400 Syria Deployment Sends Robust Signal,” BBC, 1 December 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34976537.
11. Ryan Holmes, “Why Are Chinese and Russian Ships Prowling the Mediterranean?” Foreign Policy, 15 May 2015, foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-russia-navy-joint-sea-2015-asia-pivot-blowback/.
12. Alan Lee, “The Sun is Setting on the Royal Navy,” EJ Insights, 21 December 2016, www.ejinsight.com/20151218-the-sun-is-setting-on-the-royal-navy/.
13. Bryan McGrath, “NATO at Sea: Trends in Allied Naval Power,” American Enterprise Institute, September 2013, www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/-national-security-outlook-no3-september-2013_1420494099.pdf.
14. See Magnus Nordenman, “NATO’s Next Consortium: Maritime Patrol Aircraft,” Atlantic Council, June 2016, www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/NATOs_Next_Consortium_web_0506_1.pdf.
15. Commander William Perkins, U.S. Navy, “Is NATO’s MPA Force Prepared for Resurgent Russian Submarine Patrols?” Journal of the JAPCC, (Winter 2015), 29-35.
16. Karl Mueller (ed.), Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, RAND, 2015, 178-180.
18. Eric Schmitt, “Russia Bolsters its Submarine Fleet, and Tensions with US Rise,” New York Times, 20 April 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/europe/russia-bolsters-submarine-fleet-and-tensions-with-us-rise.html?_r=0.
19. Julian Barnes, “Top US Admiral Says NATO Should Rework Maritime Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal Blog, 22 October 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2015/10/22/top-u-s-admiral-says-nato-should-rework-maritime-strategy/.