Intelligence Is Not Warfare!
(See W. Bray, pp. 24-27, December Proceedings)
Lieutenant Raymond Dennis, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Kenny Caswell, U.S. Navy—Captain Bray offers pretensions that he views as plaguing the information warfare community (IWC). His assertions are correct: The IWC is not equal to the other warfare communities, and intelligence is not warfare. Furthermore, his article and the October 2014 Proceedings article “Masters and Jacks,” by Captain Henry Stephenson, underscore the strange condition that exists throughout the IWC.
In the fleet, IWC leaders seem to understand what the community has accomplished and hopes to achieve; the masses—those working within the community—are unsure. Can the majority of mid-grade officers and senior enlisted professionals explain the IWC’s three pillars and how they relate to the Navy’s mission? Unlikely. Do shipmates and joint partners believe the nation is better defended because a group of specialties merged? Not quite. This disconnect is dangerous to any organization—particularly one focused on warfighting. It is hard to make headway when plain-language purpose and direction are a mystery to so many.
At this point, the IWC remains heavy on hat and low on cattle. The IWC’s “hat”—its administrative structure and warfare device—expanded cross-specialty collaboration and put emphasis on skill generalization. Meanwhile, it lacks the “cattle”—the operational platforms and the private sector’s broad innovative technical expertise—to deliver the intended “operational advantage.” Perhaps the Navy’s definition, according to which information warfare provides an operational advantage, is part of the issue. In the literal sense, the IWC is incapable of meeting the term that defines its name.
To the U.S. Navy, information warfare is the operational advantage gained by integrating the service’s “informational functions, capabilities, resources, and people.” Consider naval intelligence. Captain Bray stated, “Intelligence is not warfare. Still, intelligence is critical to warfare.” Truer words were never written. Intelligence can provide a decision-making advantage for warfare commanders; intelligence does not alone—without operational effects—create an operational advantage. The insistence that all-things IWC make for information warfare or provide an operational advantage is misguided, and the premise is inaccurate.
The IWC should continue to serve as an administrative hierarchy (focused on man, train, and equip functions) but retool its purpose and information warfare definition to meet realistic expectations. The community stands a greater chance of long-term success if it focuses on the traditional type command functions, leaving the search for operational advantage to Navy and joint force commanders who are responsible for operations.
Organizational theory expert Bo Hedberg (1944–2012) wrote: “Members come and go and leadership changes, but organizations’ memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time.”
If the IWC continues on a course to create operational advantage and promote generalization, it risks cultivating technically and tactically deficient behaviors and degrading the values ingrained within its specialties. In other words, the community may be eroding the very foundation on which it stands: specialists working in unique fields for a stronger Navy.
Captain Vince Augelli, U.S. Navy, N6 (Information Systems) for Commander, Task Force 70/Carrier Strike Group 5—I view Captain Bray’s article in two lights. First, he comes across as hostile to information warfare as a whole. Pretension #1, a consideration of whether information warfare is equal in importance to traditional warfare communities, is irrelevant to the larger question: Should information be considered its own warfare area? Instead, Captain Bray poses a misleading question: “Will information warfare alone ever compel complete capitulation by the enemy?” By that criterion, air warfare would not have been recognized as a legitimate warfare area before the 1999 NATO bombing campaign resulted in Yugoslav forces’ withdrawal from Kosovo. Because before then, it was widely held that air power required accompanying ground forces to force a conclusion.
Captain Bray makes a sound argument with Pretension #2 for the independence of intelligence from all warfare areas, including information warfare. He partly makes this point by emphasizing that surveillance and reconnaissance serve intelligence. I appreciate his illustration of the C4ISR acronym as being misleading in terms of considering all seven components—command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—to be equivalent. Such clumsy amalgamations (best evidenced by the inconsistent use of C4I and C5I) cloud the nature of this critical field.
Finally, Captain Bray is on target with his prescription to categorize cryptologic warfare functions into those that support intelligence and those that overlap with information professionals. Such an effort would better allow naval forces to synergize tactical operations in the electronic and cyber spectrums.
A final objection must go to the editorial decision to use the graphic of the information warfare officer qualification under a prohibited symbol. This image does not match the title of the article (the qualification does not strictly represent “intelligence”), does not correlate to Captain Bray’s arguments, and is disrespectful to the functions that are properly included in the information warfare community.
Life or Death in 250 Milliseconds
(See M. Lippert, pp. 19-22, January Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare—Major Lippert argues for installation of the Automated Airborne Collision Avoidance System (Auto-ACAS) in naval aircraft to minimize the chances of ground collision. He cites several mishaps as the basis for his argument. But those without the need to know cannot review mishap reports, so we can only surmise that Auto-ACAS might well have prevented recent ground collisions. On the other hand there may be, and undoubtedly are, other reasons for those mishaps, as well as for others. In particular, limited flying hours and limited simulator time come to mind. More of both of those not only would serve to reduce mishaps of all sorts, collisions included, but also would hone operational expertise. Perhaps the dollars spent on new systems such as Auto-ACAS would be better spent on flying hours.
A critical touchstone of aviation readiness and safety is cockpit currency. This applies to military aviation, scheduled commercial aviation, and general aviation. As current Navy and Marine Corps flight time diminishes, the number of mishaps will rise, and in military aviation the readiness to carry out a mission will decrease. In years past, minimum fight hours per month for each pilot were established and funded accordingly. Today, some pilots in active squadrons, most often during the turnaround cycle, log as few as seven hours a month. This is barely as much time as that required of “proficiency pilots” in years past. The shortage of flying hour funding undoubtedly is a major factor in mishaps, albeit not always identified as such.
Simulators might make up for this shortfall, but they are in woefully short supply, especially for use by tactical aviation units.
It’s not only a shortage of flying hours and simulators, however. Inadequate funding for spares and rework also have an impact. Some strike-fighter squadrons on turnarounds between cruises average only 3 of 12 assigned aircrafts “up,” meaning in a flying status, on any given day.
While this may not have been reflected in recent mishap rates, it is certain that it soon will be. The indicators are there. Marines recently have experienced an increase in Class C mishaps, and the Navy certainly will follow. So will an increase in Class B and A mishaps. Added to all this is a seldom-discussed byproduct of insufficient flying hours: retention. To preclude an increase in mishaps and improve aircrew retention, something beyond introducing new systems must be done.
First, consider what has prompted this precarious situation. The most obvious cause centers on funding by the Congress. Congress finds it hard to find dollars for Operations and Maintenance—OMN (N for Navy Department)—for the Navy and Marine Corps and similar needs of the Air Force and Army. It is obvious that dollars for hardware, ships, aircraft, and tanks end up paying for constituents’ jobs. The jobs supported by OMN are fewer and harder for Congress to justify to voters. The Navy Department must convince individual senators and representatives, and then help them sway voters, that OMN is important. Even setting aside the cause for readiness, a concept difficult for many citizens, they will understand that without operating dollars, there will be no need for ships and aircraft, because ships will not get under way and aircraft will not fly.
Major Lippert should be commended for identifying a serious problem and offering a solution. But the one problem he identifies is only the tip of the iceberg. What the Fleet—Navy and Marine Corps—really needs is increased flying hour funding.
Editor’s Note: The Naval Institute Press has just published Vice Admiral Dunn’s Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval Aviation Safety 1950–2000.
DoD Can Close the Civil-Military Divide
(See A. Aliano and N. MacKenzie, pp. 48-52, December 2016 Proceedings)
Captain Alec Fraser, U.S. Navy (Retired), author of Damn the Torpedoes: Applying the Navy’s Leadership Principles to Business (Naval Institute Press, 2016)—From my experience, having had both military and civilian careers, this article is more important than most people realize. The relationship between Americans and their armed forces has been one of the foundations of a successful Constitution. That relationship is changing dramatically the more time passes since implementation of the all-volunteer force in the early 1970s.
The authors are insightful to note that the civil-military divide is widening; I would add, dangerously so. In addition to the points they make, J. D. Vance’s (author of the bestselling Hillbilly Elegy) New York Times opinion page comment, “How Trump Won the Troops,” on 26 November 2016 defines the widening gap even more up close and personal. He notes that many Americans “see our Middle East wars as political issues to understand and debate, not as the signal moment in the lives of the people they care most about.” His book is a bestseller because he shows how personal and family connections are so critical to life. Those to whom the wars are personal heavily supported President Donald Trump.
In addition to gap statistics that Aliano and MacKenzie present, such as the fact that 80 percent of those who serve come from military families, Vance and others add more statistics: most military recruits come from the South and rural areas; children with high test scores from lower income families are more likely to enlist than those from higher income families; cultural elites and higher income parents encourage their children to do anything but enlist; most military families live in California, Virginia, Georgia, and Texas. The gap is very much becoming a geographic, cultural, and demographic divide.
Another example is the Army–Navy game. While it has for years reminded Americans of their bonds of common sacrifice and shared experiences, the game now holds fading interest in younger generations. There is no common bond of understanding. There are no personal connections.
By ending the draft, we Americans have opted out of war and created the divide. Until Iraq, when the nation went to war, all Americans went to war. Now life on the homefront proceeds unaffected. There has developed a “we-shop-while-they-fight” mentality. Not one golf tee time was affected by the 9/11 attack or combat in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Aliano and MacKenzie list some excellent actions that DoD could take to close the gap. I think we need additional significant actions outside DoD. Andrew Bacevich, in the September/October 2016 Foreign Affairs article titled “Ending the Endless War,” proposes two actions worthy of much further discussion in Proceedings and other forums.
To allow all Americans to share in the sacrifice and interest in going to war, create a special tax to pay for the expense of war. When Americans pay taxes, they pay attention. So far we have pushed paying for our current wars into the future. A war tax would bring wars up close and personal.
Close the gap by decreasing the size of the active-duty forces, and vastly increase the size of the reserves by reinstituting a draft. But this draft would be different. It would have no deferrals or exemptions. It would deliberately draw from a mirror of American society in terms of race, gender, ethnicity, region, income, and class. Active-duty forces would handle conflicts up to a large-scale war such as that in Iraq. Something of that size would require calling up the reserves. This would incentivize Americans to pay attention to how Washington deploys its forces.
Plenty of Blame to Go Around
Captain David Calvin Gogerty, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Husband Kimmel was responsible for the safety and effective employment of the personnel, ships, and aircraft assigned to the Pacific Fleet. He failed this responsibility on 7 December 1941. If the Japanese were to succeed in establishing their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, their largest obstacle probably was the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which would have made our fleet a prime target. After being warned in November 1941 that war with Japan was imminent, Kimmel apparently could not conceive that the fleet in Pearl Harbor could be the target of an air attack by the Japanese Navy. Wargames in previous years had shown that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to air attack. Kimmel should have been aware of the successful attack in November 1940 by British Navy aircraft from HMS Illustrious against an Italian Navy fleet in the harbor of the Taranto Navy Base.
The location of the Japanese fleet had been unknown to the U.S. military for several weeks before 7 December. That day, very few of the available PBY patrol aircraft (33 at Ford Island and 36 at Kaneohe) were on patrol searching for the Japanese fleet. Most of the aircraft were destroyed or badly damaged on the ground in the Japanese attack. Most of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was in port, not at sea evading the danger of a possible attack by Japan or searching for its fleet.
At 0645 on 7 December, the USS Ward (DD-139) sank a Japanese submarine off the coast of Oahu and reported the encounter to higher headquarters at 0653, giving approximately one hour of tactical warning before the Japanese aircraft attacked the military installations in Hawaii. No general alarm was sounded. Battle stations were not manned.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet was not prepared to fight prior to the Japanese attack. It was not scapegoating to hold Kimmel accountable. As retired Navy Captain Craig Felker notes in a book review of two works on Pearl Harbor about Kimmel in the same Proceedings issue, accountability rests only with the commanding officer—in this case, Kimmel.
AI Goes to War!
(See B. D. Sadler, pp. 43-47, December 2016; B.G. Bolgiano, pp. 77-78, January 2017 Proceedings)
Captain James T. Rooney, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Depending on the level of UAV autonomy, what responsibility is delegated to the machine, and what authority and accountability remains with personnel? As UAV autonomy increases, accountability and responsibility may be shared with engineers, programmers, and designers who could now be considered combatants associated with UAV missions and subject to the Law of Armed Conflict. If so, should these personnel share responsibility and accountability with the combatant commander?
The programmers, contractors, and operators are integral parts of the decision-making process, albeit prior to an actual situation requiring a decision. Most doctrine is written with respect to direct engagement with the enemy, and may fall short when decisions are made by mission operators relying solely on programming and technology without human verification. Increases in use and more autonomous UAVs require significant changes in law or clear demonstrations of compliance to respond to challenges from enemies and adversaries determined to limit U.S. use of UAVs. The United States must revise current doctrine and lead an international effort to ensure UAVs comply with just war theory, the Law of Armed Conflict, and any other international policies or rules that could negate their use.
I wrote about the legal issues of UAVs in 2011, and I support and agree with Captain Sadler’s conclusions and recommendations. My question is, after writing and discussing this subject ad nauseam for years, when will the United States make the necessary changes to cover its six?