The U.S. Navy has done more with less for far too long. Studies suggest that our fleet needs at least 308 ships to meet mission requirements, yet we have witnessed a dwindling hull count. Budget constraints coupled with extended conflicts have resulted in deferred maintenance and extended deployments, transforming our fleet into the proverbial horse that has been ridden hard and put away wet.
The current administration has declared an admirable goal of a 355-ship Navy. While every sailor would pull mid-watch to see such a fleet materialize, it isn't going to happen. Even if our Commander-in-Chief managed to serve two terms, which would possibly provide time enough to secure funding, the shipbuilding base cannot build that many warships before another administration is elected and modifies the plan.
But that does not mean the Department of Defense should not increase the number of ships while it can, making adjustments to the Navy to make it more efficient and effective. Five ways to make the Navy leaner and meaner are:
1. Build Light Aircraft Carriers
Today’s supercarriers are the world's most advanced and fearsome ships to ever hit the water. Yet the new Ford-class carriers cost more than $10 billion each, more than the GDP of 50 nations. That price tag limits the Navy to around 12 carriers. Regardless of how sophisticated these supercarriers become, they never will master being in two places at once. Bottom line: the Navy needs more flattops.
Many geopolitical situations require the presence of a supercarrier, but more often than not the United States sends one to a regional conflict that could make do with a smaller show of force. Such brush fires are a perfect fit for a light aircraft carrier.
While there may be the temptation to build a mini Ford-class carrier (minus the angle deck), that would require new plans, testing, and more. A better idea is to build additional America-class LHAs that are earmarked for fixed-wing operations. Such a light carrier displaces slightly less than half that of a supercarrier and could carry up to 20 F-35B Lightening II aircraft. This would have been more ideal for the Kosovo campaign, patrolling the Persian Gulf, and keeping an eye on enemies other than Russia or China. With a price tag of $3 billion each, the Navy can commission three light carriers for the price of one Ford-class carrier.
2. Stop Building the LCS
Despite its attractive price tag and promise of being a mission-module Swiss Army knife, the littoral combat ship (LCS) has failed. While the up-gunned version that Navy leadership wants to call a frigate is better than the original concept, it is time to call a dog a dog.
The LCS’s original configuration cannot fight its way out of a wet paper bag, and its survivability is questionable in a shooting war. The Navy only can achieve distributed lethality if all of the components have lethality to distribute. Provided the Navy launches any of the improved “frigate” versions of the LCS, before leadership gains some perspective on what a warship is, the LCSs that remain in the fleet should be assigned patrol duties in the Mediterranean or antipiracy missions. The original flight needs to be sold to navies that need low-end missions, even if it means taking a hit on fleet numbers.
3. Build Legend-Class Frigates
After the LCS debacle, the Navy understands that it needs large numbers of real frigates. The shortsightedness in building the LCS while retiring all the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates has left the Navy in a difficult position.
No frigate will ever be perfect or fill the role of an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer, but the answer to the frigate quandary is at sea. The Navy needs to swallow its pride and admit that the Coast Guard got it right with the Legend-class national security cutters while we got whatever the hell the LCS is. The Legend cutters were built with space for expansion in mind, and there is room to turn the design into a formidable frigate. While the ship would need to be equipped with Tomahawks and long-range antiship missiles to be a force multiplier, keeping its antiair capability limited to Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSMs) would give it the means to protect itself while keeping costs under control. Area antiair and ballistic missile defense would remain assigned to the Aegis cruiser and destroyers.
Commissioning 50 Legend-class FFGs would provide a significant boost to fleet numbers and the Navy's ability to meet global commitments without running crews ragged. The design is proven; all the Navy would need to do is engineer and implement specific weapons and systems.
4. Decommission the Command Ships
At a time when every hull counts, there is no room for ships that bring nothing to the fight. If a ship cannot deliver land-attack munitions, provide area defense, land marines, or provide supplies, it has no place in the fleet.
The USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) and USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) are the two oldest ships in the fleet, and a ship bristling with communications will sink no one. Given our military's extensive satellite communications network and that radio waves travel at the speed of light, the Navy no longer needs a dedicated command ship.
Both ships have a combined crew of more than 1,200 sailors, enough to man a nearly four DDGs. The LCCs’ associated operating budgets (and the enormous cost of maintaining ships built in the late 1960s) would be better diverted to new-construction combatants. Having served on one of these bloated beasts, I can tell you that prying these ships from the hands of Navy brass will not be easy, but in the end, the Navy would be better and more capable.
5. Bring Back the S-3 Vikings
Talk of bolstering the Navy spurred discussions of bringing back several Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63), and a few squadrons of S-3 Vikings. Of the three, resurrecting the S-3 makes sense. Many naval professionals believe the aircraft were retired before their time, and airframe tests confirm that the S-3s have thousands of flight hours remaining. Currently, there are 87 candidates in storage, just waiting for the call to duty.
After the Vikings were put out to pasture, in-flight refueling for the fleet fell to the buddy stores system for the F/A-18 Hornets. Currently, during operations, 20 percent of Hornets on an aircraft carrier are relegated to aerial refueling. Turning a sophisticated fighter into a flying gas station is not a good use of airframe hours. The S-3s carry more fuel, have longer range, and exist. The best solution to relieve the Hornets from gas can duty is the forthcoming MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueling drone. It is coming, but if the F-35 is any indicator of how long it will take actually to see it on a flight deck, bringing back the Vikings is a good solution for filling the gap until the Stingrays are operational.
While it would be nice to produce as many high-end ships and aircraft as we desire, fiscal resources are limited and present challenges. To put a fleet to sea that is capable of meeting our national security goals, the Navy has to get every last ounce of warfighting capability from its current assets and procure future warships with a critical eye. The thinking that retired the S-3s and FFG-7s too early and then imagined the LCS as a worthy warship must be replaced with a warrior's mentality. The nation’s enemies are watching.
Master Chief Lohr served 24 years in the U.S. Navy as a Fire Controlman working on various surface-to-air and cruise missile systems. He served on board the USS Waddell (DDG-24), USS Hoel (DDG-13), USS Wadsworth (FFG-9), and USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19). He also spent 4 years on loan to the German Navy as part of the Personnel Exchange Program.