On 15 September 2017, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved new sanctions against North Korea, including an authorization for maritime interdiction operations (MIO). Security Council Resolution 2375 applies pressure on North Korea by permitting the inspection of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) vessels suspected of violating international law. The sanctions do not authorize use of force to stop those vessels, a condition China and Russia insisted on to prevent either from vetoing the resolution.
During the period 1991–2003, the Navy became quite proficient in MIO while enforcing U.N. sanctions against Iraq, conducting more than 3,000 boardings before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Though MIO off North Korea certainly will have similarities to those in the Arabian Gulf, great differences also will present challenges that must be overcome.
Iraq needs to move its most valuable cargo, oil, by sea. North Korea, on the other hand, does not have an oil-based economy (it depends on coal) and has friendly neighbors with land routes that offer transportation alternatives. Iraq has 36 miles of coastline and one main waterway to access the Gulf. North Korea claims more than 600 miles of straight baseline coast and has scores of ports and waterways, every one of which must be monitored 24/7 to be successful. The level of effort and number of vessels required will be at least an order of magnitude greater than U.S. operations in the Arabian Gulf.
China and Russia both maintain strategic relationships with North Korea and likely will turn a blind eye to evasion of sanctions. The Arabian Gulf is a confined waterway, approximately 600 miles end to end, and all maritime traffic has to pass through the narrow Strait of Hormuz. One of the most difficult challenges there was stopping vessels that tried to avoid interdiction by sailing through Iranian territorial waters. North Korea’s ports and waterways connect directly to “safe-harbor” Chinese and Russian territorial waters, which extend for thousands of miles in either direction and lead directly to open ocean. With summertime melting of Arctic ice increasing, a ship could depart a North Korean port and travel through the Russian Northern Sea Route all the way to Norway—the first such transit without an icebreaker occurred in August 2017.
Developing interoperability and complementary rules of engagement among the 16 navies enforcing UNSC resolutions took many years in the Gulf. While the Navy continues to work with other naval services routinely, starting MIO operations with a new coalition of navies adds a significant layer of complexity. This will take time, and DPRK shipping doubtless will exploit any cracks in the coalition’s capabilities until they are made seamless.
Near Iraq, a robust all-force effort included the U.S. Navy (with ships, small boats, and both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft), Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Air Force. It took more than a decade to arrive at this level of sophistication. A similarly dedicated force will be required to interdict North Korean vessels and escort any suspect vessels diverted. When MIO forces are reassigned to support other national tasking temporarily, illicit operations will no doubt sneak through.
Some notable advocates for maritime interdiction have called for more serious methods such as a total blockade, which under international law is an act of war. President John F. Kennedy worked around this during the Cuban Missile Crisis by calling it a “quarantine.” In any case, call it “sanctions,” “quarantine,” or “blockade,” the United States’ approach should be measured and calculated. Resources and training requirements must be studied to take into account additional challenges not faced in the Arabian Gulf.
Commander Capen was a surface warfare officer. He deployed to the Arabian Gulf three times prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom and conducted MIO during each of them. At the peak of MIO success in 1998, he served on the staff of the sea combat commander, when hundreds of vessels were queried, intercepted, boarded, and diverted in a single deployment.
See also “The United States Should Not Punch First in Korea,” USNI Proceedings Today, September 2017.