rfighting admirals also were serious and life-long students of history. Admiral Stephen B. Luce wrote that knowledge of military and naval history shows us what errors have been committed in war and how they might be avoided.1 Alfred Thayer Mahan contended that “history by itself is better than formulated principles by themselves. . . . It is the story of practical experience. . . . Master your principles, and then ram them home with the illustrations which History furnishes.”2
History in general provides a wide and deep perspective on past events. It teaches us to be wary of broad generalizations and quick solutions.3 It demonstrates how easy it is to make mistakes and how far-reaching those mistakes can be.4 Historical events are an integral part of the complex and highly dynamic interrelationship between the humans and machines of war. Although it does not, and cannot, predict the future, history can help us not to repeat the errors of our predecessors.
The Perils of Neglect
Neglect or ignorance of history by naval officers, and flag officers in particular, has had adverse effects on preparations for war, development of doctrine, and performance in combat. Some major navies—including the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy—tended to neglect the study of naval history and the art of war during the long periods of relative peace and lack of peer competitors. A consistent lead in the invention and application of new naval technologies reinforced their already strong bias toward materiel and its paramount importance.
Prior to 1914, for example, it was widely believed in the Royal Navy that strategy and history had nothing to do with each other, and that study of history could be deferred until officers reached flag rank.5 Captain K. G. B. Dewar, a leading navy reformer, charged that the Royal Navy was deficient in the study of strategy, tactics, and war as a whole. He wrote in 1913 that, with the exception of Philip Colomb’s Naval Warfare, the officers of the greatest navy in the world had produced no work in the previous 30 years of any distinctive merit. This sterility might have been the result of the inexorable demands of routine, but Dewar suggests it also might have been due to an “absolute inability to think in terms of war on the part of minds constantly distracted by the study of mechanism and minutiae of naval routine.”6
The U.S. Navy similarly neglected study of naval history and the art of war. The U.S. Naval War College was founded in 1884 and by the mid 1890s had secured its existence, yet some officers still questioned the value of studying the art of war. “We can sail our ships, fire our guns accurately, we can keep correct positions in the line of battle. There is nothing else of consequence,” one unnamed high U.S. Navy officer reportedly observed.7
The situation improved in the interwar years. The curriculum at the Naval War College included study of many naval wars and battles, notably Trafalgar, the Crimean War, U.S. Civil War, Spanish-American War, Russo-Japanese War, and World War I. In the postwar era, however, an increased focus on materiel led to a dominance of the technocrats and hard science.
The importance of the liberal arts, including history, in educating future naval leaders often is given a short shrift. There is a widely held belief in the Navy that history is irrelevant to the problems it faces today. The consequences of such neglect will be similar, if not worse, than the poor performance of the Royal Navy in World War I.
Enduring Lessons
Proponents of the paramount importance of materiel believe naval technologies change everything in tactics and history is largely irrelevant. Yet new technologies do not change the nature of war. For example, individual initiative, a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent, and consolidating tactical success through quick and sustained pursuit of the remnants of enemy forces are timeless.
Many naval commanders have failed to seal their victories by unrelenting pursuit of the enemy. In 1744, Admiral Thomas Matthews abandoned pursuit in the battle of Toulon during the War for Austrian Succession for another objective; French Admiral Anne Hilarion de Tourville failed to pursue defeated English Admiral Arthur Herbert’s squadron in the battle of Beachy Head in July 1690; and Alexander Hood did not finish off the French squadron in the battle off the Isle de Groix near Lorient in June 1795.8 In the 1916 battle of Jutland, the British Grand Fleet achieved operational success, but tactical victory belonged to the numerically inferior and better led and trained German High Seas Fleet. Admiral John Jellicoe did not pursue the German battle fleet because he believed he would encounter U-boats or mines.9
Tactical lessons from naval history also demonstrate the importance of the mission command, as exemplified by Admirals Horatio Nelson, Heihachiro Togo, and Reinhard Scheer. Nelson trained his captains to work together as a team and to seize opportunities without waiting for orders. He blended their wills into one, while leaving to each freedom of action within their particular spheres.10 For example, prior to both the battles of the Nile in 1798 and of Trafalgar in 1805, Nelson called all his captains and admirals to a round table discussion on board his flagship, where he explained in detail his intent in the forthcoming battle. He was well served by his subordinates and achieved two great victories.11 Japanese Admiral Togo won his great victory in the battle of Tsushima in May 1904 because he applied mission command.12 Likewise, in the battle of Jutland, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, commander-in-chief of the High Seas Fleet, applied mission command by allowing subordinate commanders to exercise initiative within the scope of the higher commander’s intent. Scheer issued only general instructions and left his subordinates to carry them out according to circumstances.13 The opposing officers of the Royal Navy were not educated and trained that way and were reluctant to communicate information to Jellicoe and act on their initiative when they had the chance to engage the enemy. The British ships’ captains failed to keep their squadron commanders informed.14 Jellicoe exercised close and personal control over the movements of the whole battle fleet without imparting any general intent to his numerous squadrons and flotillas.15
Naval history also shows how critical highly trained forces—from flag officers to seamen—are to success. A naval force can be larger and excellently equipped but still be ineffective because of training deficiencies and unsound doctrine. For example, in the 1866 battle of Lissa, a numerically stronger Italian squadron suffered a decisive defeat at the hand of a smaller, less technically advanced but better led and trained Austrian squadron. The Italians had forgotten that the true strength of their fleet resided not in the excellence of weapons alone but also in the training and quality of their personnel. The Italian fleet lacked organization, discipline, and sea training. Its crews were raw and unskilled in gunnery and its officers were inexperienced.16
Until the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Japanese had superbly trained and combat-hardened carrier pilots.17 The loss of four fast carriers and many of their pilots in that battle, however, led to steady reduction in pilot quality and combat effectiveness. By June 1944, in the battle of the Philippine Sea, the experience and skills of the Japanese commanders and pilots were greatly reduced. Most carrier commanders had only two or three months’ experience, and in one carrier division no pilot had more than 100 hours of flying experience.18
In contrast, a pilot in the U.S. Navy had two years of training and 300 hours of flying time before qualifying to fly from a carrier. The U.S. Navy also had a much more effective method of training: after Midway, it took out its best pilots to train new pilots. The Japanese, on the other hand, kept their best pilots in frontline units until they were gradually lost through attrition in combat.19
Study of military and naval history shows the importance of an educated officers corps, flag officers in particular. It provides timeless lessons on the role and importance of leadership at all levels of command. This knowledge is acquired by reading not only accounts of the past wars but also the biographies and memoirs of great captains.20
History Applied
The study of naval history is useless if the knowledge gleaned cannot be applied in practice. In-depth analysis of past wars at sea should lead to the development of a naval theory that shows the relative importance of and relationships among various elements of naval warfare and its patterns. Theoretical concepts should be based on commonalities identified in historical examples, and theory, in turn, should provide a major input to the development of naval doctrine.
In general, the less combat experience a navy has, the more important it is that its officers be educated on the art of war at sea as a substitute.21 The lack of personal experience makes it critical to learn from the experiences of others. Although it cannot replace combat experience, the study of naval history is the only means available to prepare an officer for war in peacetime. War games, field trips, and exercises are excellent tools for improving the quality of one’s operational and tactical training, but only the study of naval and military history can provide insights into all aspects of warfare.22
Study of naval and military history can provide a better understanding of the navy as an instrument of policy, the interplay between domestic and foreign policy, and the role and importance of naval and military forces in times of war.23 It can help an officer understand the reasoning behind some famous admirals’ decisions, the sources of their difficulties, and how they balanced advantages and disadvantages in a given situation.
The biographies and autobiographies of famous admirals show how often they used the experiences of others in resolving the problems they faced. For example, Admiral Edward Vernon in advocating formation of a western squadron in 1745 referred to the practice of the Queen Anne’s wars. During the Crimean War, Captain B. J. Sullivan opposed forcing the entrance of the Russian naval base at Kronstadt by quoting the experiences of Admiral James Suamarez in the 1801 battle of the Bay of Algeciras and Admiral Horatio Nelson in the siege of Calvi and battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife. There is a certain permanence of tenets, such as methods of forcing entrance into a defended harbor or strait, in how sea command is exercised.24
One might argue that many military commanders waged war successfully without being well studied in the art of war. In many cases, however, victories were achieved despite the poor performance of the admirals because the opponents were even worse. For example, more than once Britain was successful through the weakness of its enemies rather than by its own disciplined strength. Not all of its wars were skillfully conducted, as the American War of Independence and the Crimean War illustrate.25
The most successful military commanders, including Napoleon I and Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke Sr., were well known as students of history. “Wage an offensive war—as did Alexander, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene and Frederick the Great. Read and reread again the history of their eighty-eight campaigns. Model yourself upon them; in this way only can you become a great leader and penetrate the secret of the art,” advised Napoleon.26 He also observed that “tactics, maneuvers, the science of the engineer officer and of the artillery officer; these can be learned in textbooks; but the knowledge of grand tactics [operational art today] is acquired only through experience and by the historical study of the campaigns of great captains.”27 Moltke said that to make a rational decision, “we should develop freely, practically, artistically, the mind and the will, with the help of a previous military culture resulting either from the study of history or from one’s own experiences.”28
Some of the greatest naval leaders also were great students of history. U.S. Navy Admirals Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, Raymond A. Spruance, and R.K. Turner were well known for their comprehensive knowledge of naval history. King studied both naval and military history. He was especially impressed with Mahan’s Type of Naval Officers, containing essays of famous British admirals in the 18th century. Among his heroes were Admirals Maarten Tromp, Pierre André de Suffren, John Jarvis, Horatio Nelson, and David Farragut. He read not only Mahan but also books on Napoleon I and the American Civil War. Moreover, he was one of the rare naval officers who studied land warfare.29
Admiral Nimitz noted that the largest impact on his wartime command was the 11 months he spent as a student at the Naval War College in 1922-1923. He immersed himself in reading naval/military history, strategy and tactics, and biographies and took part in war games where the main potential enemy was always Japan. His student thesis was on the battle of Jutland. With E. B. Potter he coauthored the highly acclaimed Sea Power: A Naval History in 1960.30
Admiral Spruance acquired a solid knowledge of naval history during his years as a student and an instructor at the Naval War College. Spruance was highly interested in the art of naval warfare and gained a reputation within the Navy as a thinker. As an instructor and head of the Operations Department, he lectured on sea power, naval history, and employment of large naval forces in the struggle for sea control. Admiral R. K. Turner, who also was an instructor in the Operations Department, was well known as an author and lecturer on strategy, operations, and tactics. Turner was a firm believer that carrier and amphibious warfare would be dominant in a future war—a view contrary to the conventional wisdom on the supremacy of the battleships.31
Recommendations
The U.S. Navy as a whole neglects the study of naval and military history. This is a serious problem that must be addressed. The core curriculum at the U.S. Naval Academy, Officer Candidate School, and NROTC units should be expanded to cover naval and military history—from the ancient era to the present day—and the Naval Academy and Officer Candidate School should offer far more electives related to naval and military history than they do today. The Navy also should educate its enlisted personnel in both U.S. and general naval history.
Far more important, however, is the self-education of future flag officers. Like their predecessors of World War II, they should be students of history. The better educated naval commanders are, the better they understand the big picture and the better they will perform in combat (provided they also possess the essential qualities of character, professional knowledge, and leadership). The U.S. Navy needs to radically change its views on the importance and use of naval history; otherwise, the result will be an uneducated force incapable of understanding and applying the art of war at sea.
History and the Naval Arts
Study of naval history teaches the importance of the three components of naval art (strategy, operations, and tactics).
Strategy: By studying history one learns that naval strategy cannot be developed without regard to the larger framework provided by military strategy and national strategy and policy. Ends, means, and ways must be in consonance with each other; victories at sea are essentially useless unless guided by a sound and coherent national policy and strategy.
Operations: Because very few military commanders have experience commanding large forces, the best way to educate them to think operationally is through study of the successes and failures of great military leaders. Poor performance at the operational level can lead to tactical defeats, which, in turn, may have strategic consequences. For example, the Japanese Combined Fleet suffered a decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway in June 1942 because of a flawed operational plan, despite the overwhelming Japanese superiority in forces. The superiority of one’s forces can be squandered when operational thinking on the part of commanders is lacking.
Tactics: History shows that a naval tactical action should not be fought unless it is part of the operational framework and contributes directly to accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives. At Leyte Gulf, Admiral William F. Halsey, commander, U.S. Third Fleet, won a tactical victory in the Battle of Cape Engano over a much smaller Japanese carrier force, but that victory almost led to the failure of the entire supporting major naval operation—providing distant cover and support to the Allied forces in Leyte Gulf. Because Halsey’s pursuit of the Japanese Northern Force left the San Bernadino Strait unguarded, only Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s sudden decision to leave the scene of action when his force was on the verge of defeating the U.S. forces in the Battle off Samar saved the Allies from an ignominious defeat.
1. Stephen B. Luce, “Naval Strategy,” lecture delivered, summer course 1902, July 17, Box 1901-14, Record Group (RGT) 14, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 4.
2. Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy. Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), 17
3. William E. Simons, “The Study of History and the Military Leader,” Military Affairs 26, no. 1 (Spring 1962), 25.
4. Herbert W. Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength and Other Essays (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928), 289.
5. A.C. Dewar, “War Thought and Naval War,” The Naval Review 42, no. 2 (May 1954) [reprint of article in The Naval Review 1, no. 1 (February 1913)], 143.
6. Dewar, “War and Naval Thought,” 146.
7. Henry C. Taylor, “The Study of War,” North American Review 162, no. 471 (February 1896), 186.
8. Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength, and Other Essays, 290.
9. K.G.B. Dewar, “Battle of Jutland. A Prologue,” The Naval Review 47, no. 4 (October 1959), 405.
10. Dewar, “Battle of Jutland,” 401.
11. “The Importance of the Study of Naval History,” The Naval Review 28, no. 2 (May 1939), 217.
12. “The Importance of the Study of Naval History,” 217.
13. Vice Admiral Kenneth G.B. Dewar, letter to the editor, “Naval Command and Administration,” The Naval Review 40, no. 1 (February 1952), 109.
14. Review of the book Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 3: Jutland and After, in The Naval Review 54, No. 3 (July 1966), 263.
15. K.G.B. Dewar, letter to the editor, “Naval Command and Administration,” The Naval Review 40, no. 1 (February 1952), 109.
16. Steven B. Luce, “Naval Warfare under Modern Conditions,” North American Review 162, no. 470 (January 1896), 71.
17. Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, Miracle at Midway (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1983), 130.
18. Barrett Tillman, Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II (New York: New American Library/Caliber, 2005), 103; and Ministry of Defence (NAVY), War with Japan, vol. 4, The South-East Asia Operations and Central Pacific Advance (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995), 131.
19. COMINCH, Estimates of Japanese Air Strength 5 Jan 1942–31 Dec 1945, entry A1 9020, SRMN-045, container 15, SRMN 040 thru 047, RG 457, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, United States Navy Relating to Cryptology 1918–1950, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 5.
20. Paul M. Robinett, “History and the Military Profession,” Military Review (May 1954), 21.
21. Max Kemmerich, Gedanken uber die eigene Kriegsgeschichtliche Weiterbildung der Officziere nach Verlassen der Kriegsakademie, May 1939 RH 16/v. 95 Bundesarchiv/Militararchiv (BA/MA), Freiberg, i.Br., 3.
22. Friedrich von Cochenhausen, “Wie betreibt der Anfaenger am zweckmassigsten Kriegsgeschichte?” Militaerwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, Nr. 9-10, 1931, 857.
23. Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength and Other Essays, 271.
24. Herbert W. Richmond, “The Place of History in Naval Education,” The Naval Review 8, no. 1 (February 1920), 6.
25. Richmond, “The Place of History in Naval Education,” 5.
26. Cited in Taylor, “The Study of War,” 186.
27. Taylor, “The Study of War,” 186.
28. Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength, and Other Essays, 262.
29. Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power. A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 34-35.
30. Elmer B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 466.
31. Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior. A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 81.
Dr. Vego is the R. K. Turner Professor of Operational Art at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.