Proponents of new technologies often make assertions, with little or no proof, regarding the capabilities of a novel weapon. (This was also the case in the past after the advent of the mine, the torpedo, aircraft, and missiles.) Such technological determinism is still prevalent in many Western navies—the U.S. Navy included. However, there is usually a gap between the assumed potential of a new technology and its real capability. Furthermore, if a given capability is technically feasible, it does not always mean it is operationally useful in combat.1
Vocal advocates of information warfare, for example, repeatedly assert the critical importance of “information dominance.” However, many do not seem to recognize that the key prerequisite for making quick and sound decisions is not superior technology itself, but the people—the commanders and their staffs—operating it. Though intangible, elements related to the human factor such as professional education, leadership, morale/discipline, unit cohesion, willingness to fight, soundness of doctrine, and the state of combat training and readiness are incredibly important. It may be tempting to focus on the technological side of naval warfare during peacetime, but advanced technology alone is insufficient to secure victory against a resourceful enemy.
A Misguided Focus
The importance of the human factor in naval warfare has often been ignored. For most U.S. Navy officers in the late 1880s, for example, war was merely a type of managerial exercise, a mathematical equation, or an engineering principle, so studying it was not a priority.2 Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan lamented the fact that naval officers were not the only ones guilty of “this exclusive devotion to the mechanical matters.” He pointed out that not even “the subtlest and most comprehensive mind” on the planet could devise “a machine to meet the innumerable incidents of sea and naval war.”3
Before 1914, rapid technological advances led to the ascendancy of the so-called “matériel school” over the “historical school” in most of the major navies of the day, essentially giving short shrift to maritime strategy.4 The Royal Navy’s officers had limited knowledge of tactics and strategy during that increasingly technology-driven era. There was no staff or war college for the study of these subjects, nor much encouragement for young officers to learn them by reading naval history.5 But even tactics dealt with relatively minor issues such as fleet tactical evolutions, while combat arms and combined-arms tactics were neglected. No real effort was made to work out the problem of how to use the battle force in a major engagement. Most of the strategic games at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, were based on the notion that naval warfare was nothing more than a “gladiatorial contest” between opposing fleets. Although close blockade was played in these games, there were no dissenting views about its utility.6
Between 1919 and 1939, the majority of U.S. admirals and their civilian counterparts were matériel-oriented. The lessons of naval history were forgotten. Battleships were considered the backbone of one’s naval power, so tactical doctrine envisaged using carriers to sink or disable enemy carriers, while carrier-based aircraft would be used as gun spotters for the battle line, which would then engage the Japanese battle fleet in a Jutland-like decisive battle.7
Likewise, during this period the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) were too narrowly and tactically focused. The Royal Navy wanted battleships to have a central, decisive role.8 Similarly, the IJN was still focused on fighting a decisive battle à la the Russo-Japanese War’s Battle of Tsushima in 1905.9 This preoccupation guided the IJN’s tactical doctrine and ship designs.10
Leadership and Combat Training
Leadership is one of the most critical and complex aspects of warfare. Often a decisive factor in combat, it can ensure success even if an enemy boasts more fighters.11 Militaries that value leadership and warfighting have historically outperformed their opponents who failed to do so. For example, the German army performed superbly in both world wars because its leadership decided to focus on the critical and decisive importance of warfighting, which enhanced combat power and compensated for inferiority in matériel.12 The Germans emphasized the need to exercise initiative at all levels of command, issue clear and unambiguous orders, and avoid predictable patterns of action. The German style of mission command emphasized mutual trust and willingness to assume responsibility.13 They also demanded that their commanders have genuine concern for the welfare of their men and for preserving their combat effectiveness.14
During the Pacific war, the excellent qualities of U.S. naval leadership as demonstrated by admirals Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, Raymond A. Spruance, William F. “Bull” Halsey Jr., Marc A. Mitscher, R. K. Turner, and others ultimately accounted for victories over the IJN. A navy that ignores the importance of leadership at all levels does not perform well in combat, as the Italian Navy at Lissa in 1866, the Spanish Navy in 1898, and the Imperial Russian Navy in 1904–05 demonstrated.
Doctrine and training, which affect motivation for combat, can influence each other in many ways.15 A force can be larger in size and better armed and equipped, but be ineffective if it has severe deficiencies in training, which can stem from unsound doctrine. History further elucidates the importance of thorough and realistic combat training.
In the interwar years, the IJN emphasized the intensity and quality of training because it was unhappy with the results of the Washington Naval Conference in 1922, which limited it to 60 percent of the U.S. Navy’s numerical strength. The IJN’s solution was to focus on combat training and designing larger and more powerfully armed surface combatants. Reportedly, Admiral Heihachirō Tōgō said that the Japanese had to abide with the terms of the Washington Naval Conference but “. . . even if there is a limitation in quantity, training is unlimited.”16
After 1927 all the successive commanders-in-chief of the IJN’s Combined Fleet assumed that Japan would fight a war with the United States.17 All maneuvers and exercises were conducted under conditions expected in combat. As a result, the skills and warfighting capabilities of the IJN improved greatly.18 The ten-month annual training cycle was usually completed in April, followed by two months of respite for the crews. During that time the ships only made a short cruise along the east coast of China. The IJN conducted training in remote waters to make its exercises more difficult to observe by other navies.19 In contrast, the U.S. Navy conducted training in the relatively cool climate off Seattle, Washington, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, in the summer and in the warm conditions off California and Cuba in the winter months.20 Furthermore, it took extreme care to avoid casualties and any resulting negative publicity.21
From 1927 until the outbreak of war in 1941, the entire Combined Fleet underwent rigorous night training, despite dangerous conditions.22 In 1934 Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu took over the command of the Combined Fleet and emphasized training in severe weather conditions. (Keep in mind that Japanese waters have eight times as many stormy days as U.S. waters—even on ordinary days, the waters off Japan are seldom calm.23) Thus the Combined Fleet renewed its focus on night fighting so it could cripple the enemy battle line before a decisive daylight encounter.24 Japan’s rigorous naval training paid off: The Combined Fleet proved itself as a highly trained combat force during the first months of war in the Pacific.
Submarines generally have elite and highly trained crews, and the extremely high performance of the German U-boats in both world wars was largely due to high training standards. For example, after the first U-boat flotilla was created in 1935, Admiral Karl Dönitz insisted on rigorous training for the crews, so commanders and their submariners were thoroughly drilled on all aspects of potential combat scenarios.25 The six-month training schedule was divided into graduated periods. Dönitz claimed that in 1935, each U-boat had to carry out 66 surface attacks before it was allowed to practice firing torpedoes.26
Training is largely conducted during peacetime, which makes it difficult to ascertain a service’s shortcomings and take timely corrective action before the opening of hostilities. For example, the U.S. Navy entered the Pacific war in December 1941 with poor torpedo tactics and inadequate proficiency in night fighting. These deficiencies were not corrected until well into the war and were the main reason for a series of defeats and high losses in the struggle for control of the surface in the Solomons in 1942–43.27 Also, the U.S. Navy’s training was not uniformly high; surface forces were not as well trained as naval aviators.28
Until the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Japanese had superbly trained and combat-hardened carrier pilots.29 However, the loss of four fast carriers in that battle with many of their pilots led to a steady reduction in their quality and combat effectiveness. By June 1944, when the Battle of the Philippine Sea was fought, the quality of training, experience, and skills of the Japanese commanders and pilots of the fast carrier forces were greatly reduced. Most of the Japanese carrier pilots only had three to six months of training.30
In contrast, a pilot in the U.S. Navy had two years of training and 300 hours of flying time before he was fit to fly from a carrier. Most of the U.S. carrier pilots were combat veterans.31 The Navy also had a much more effective method of training for its pilots. After the battle of Midway, the U.S. Navy took its best pilots out of combat to train new ones. In contrast, the Japanese kept their best aviators in frontline units until they were gradually lost due to attrition in combat, meaning that their replacements were never fully trained.
A Strong Offensive
The will to fight is a combination of morale and discipline, small-unit cohesion, and training, tempered by the warfighting environment. At any level of command, one of a commander’s principal tasks is to strengthen morale while mitigating the adverse effects of the environment.32 The motivation to fight relies on many elements. Rank and file must perceive the higher authority as legitimate, otherwise it is highly unlikely that their motivation for combat will be very high.33 Ideally, the will to fight should be maintained regardless of losses.
One of the great examples of the will to fight despite great odds is the Battle off Samar on 25 October 1944, in which the U.S. pilots of Task Unit 77.4.3. (“Taffy 3”) and accompanying destroyers faced Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s much more powerful First Diversionary Attack Force. The American losses were heavy; two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort sunk; 1,130 men killed, 913 wounded.34 Their valiant sacrifices were not in vain, however. The Americans’ tenacious attacks caused a great deal of confusion among the Japanese, who believed that they faced U.S. fast carriers, not escort carriers, which were weaker and more vulnerable. This in part led Kurita to stop pursuing Taffy 3, turn north, and pass through the San Bernardino Strait. This decision foiled the Japanese plan to attack Allied forces at Leyte Gulf.
At the highest level, the offensive spirit that permeates a navy as a whole exemplifies the will to fight. This means that an entire navy must possess the same aggressive spirit to seize and hold the initiative. To do so in the early phases of hostility at sea, the stronger opponent should try to destroy a major part of the enemy’s forces in a surprise attack. To retain control, forces must stay on the offensive, as it not only ensures freedom of action but also enhances the morale of one’s forces while depressing the enemy’s. Initiative depends largely on the leadership exercised throughout the chain of command, and failing to follow up on a victory often has the most decisive influence on the results of a war’s outcome—on land or at sea.35 Likewise, a weaker navy cannot successfully deny control of the sea unless it is offensively minded.
Both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy are well known for their offensive-mindedness. The former IJN had a firm focus on offensive warfare. Navies lacking an offensive spirit tend to perform poorly even if they have a much larger force. For example, in the Crimean War (1853–56), the Russians were extremely passive in the Baltic despite their numerical superiority. They had a fleet of 27 ships-of-the-line with smaller craft, including 50 to 60 gunboats, while the British squadron consisted of only nine steamships-of-the-line and six sailing ships-of-the-line. Yet the British roamed freely while the Russian ships remained passive in their harbors.36
In another example, the inactivity of the Italian Navy in the winter of 1915–16 allowed the Austrians to take the initiative with their smaller force. The Austro-Hungarian fleet not only weakened the Italian fleet but also immobilized a force considerably superior to itself. Indeed, at one point the Italian heavy ships were not allowed to leave their bases.37 Also, the Soviet Navy’s surface combatants remained passive and did not interfere with the German convoys evacuating their troops and civilians in the Baltic in the fall of 1944 and the winter/spring of 1945.38
What History Means for the Present
With these lessons in mind, today’s U.S. Navy must have a firm and unwavering focus on leadership and warfighting. It must pay greater attention when selecting potential warriors for promotion to a higher rank; the enemy cannot be outfought without being outthought. This will require the highest quality of flag officers and their staffs, and they cannot be properly trained if they lack comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the art of war. Thus, the U.S. Navy should send its most promising officers to be educated at the Naval War College and other service schools. It should change its policy of not sending the best officers to be educators over the course of their careers.
The focus on warfighting should be steady and intensive—not just a phrase or buzzword. The amount and variety of war games should be increased significantly, and organized and conducted by all fleets and major tactical units. For naval officers to have more time for self-education and combat training, the administrative burden and noncombat-related mandatory training should be drastically reduced.
One major problem in the U.S. military is the pervasiveness of zero-error tolerance. Mission command is meaningless if it is not accompanied with the delegation of authority to subordinates and granting them sufficient freedom of action in both times of peace and war. In the ten years prior to 2012, the U.S. Navy fired some 150 commanding officers from their posts.39 From January 2012 through February 2014, 48 COs were relieved from their duties.40 The majority of cases involved inappropriate behavior, personal misconduct, driving under the influence of alcohol, fraternization with subordinates, misuse of government funds, and mishandling of classified documents. In other cases, reasons for dismissal involved mishaps with ships at sea or in port. Without knowing the details of each case, one cannot know whether some of the COs were dismissed without taking fully into account their service records. It is possible that the zero-error tolerance policy was applied in the extreme and effectively terminated the careers of some highly capable or even brilliant future warfighters. One has to wonder whether admirals such as King, Nimitz, and Spruance would have been able to reach the rank of a flag officer in the U.S. Navy in such a climate.
The U.S. Navy is well known for the high standard of training of its seagoing forces. Despite political pressure to do so, these standards should never be reduced. As the lessons from history show, poorly trained navies suffer fatal consequences in combat. The human element is the most important aspect of warfare, and war at sea is no exception. Matériel represents the means, not the ends, in naval warfare. The U.S. Navy should not delude itself that advanced technologies alone are sufficient to win a war against a strong and resourceful opponent. To prevail, U.S. flag officers and their staffs must think and act operationally rather than tactically, and command forces that are well educated and trained.
1. Barry D. Watts, Doctrine, Technology, and War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Air & Space Doctrinal Symposium, 30 April–1 May 1996), 19.
2. Donald D. Chipman, “Mahan’s Classical View and the Profession of Arms,” Air University Review, March/April 1986, www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/mar-apr/chipman.html, 1.
3. Ibid., 2.
4. Otto Groos, Seekriegslehren im Lichte des Weltkrieges. Ein Buch fuer den Seemann, Soldaten und Staatsmann (Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), 3.
5. Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. I: The Road to War, 1904–1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 7.
6. Ibid., 400-01.
7. Roland A. Bowling, The Negative Influence of Mahan on the Protection of Shipping in Wartime: The Convoy Controversy in the Twentieth Century (PhD thesis, University of Maine, 1980), 308–11.
8. Edward N. Lutwak, “The Operational Level of War,” International Security, Winter 1980/81, 62.
9. Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 163.
10. Toshiyuki Yokoi, “Thoughts on Japan’s Naval Defeat,” in David C. Evans, ed., The Japanese Navy in World War II. In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd ed., 1986), 502.
11. Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol. 1; translated by Karl von Donat (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914), 90.
12. Omar N. Bradley, “On Leadership,” in Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, The Challenge of Military Leadership (London: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers; published under the auspices of the U.S. Army War College Foundation, 1989), 3.
13. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 164–65.
14. Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds., “German Analysis of U.S. Field Service Regulations,” in On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 282.
15. Dirk W. Oetting, Motivation und Gefechtswert. Vom Verhalten des Soldaten im Kriege (Frankfurt, a. M/Bonn: Report Verlag, 1988), 185.
16. Sankichi Takahashi, “Unlimited Training,” http://evols.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10524/32483/2-Volume4.pdf?sequence=1, 12.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 13.
19. Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931–April 1942 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), 25.
20. Samuel E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1963), 334.
21. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 25.
22. Takahashi, “Unlimited Training,” 13.
23. Shigeru Fukudome, “The Air Battle off Taiwan,” in David C. Evans, ed., The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd ed., 1986), 340–41. Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 334.
24. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 273, 275.
25. Karl Dönitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 13.
26. Ibid.
27. Samuel E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 334.
28. Ibid.
29. Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, Miracle At Midway (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1983), 130.
30. Barrett Tillman, Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II (New York: New American Library, Caliber, 2005), 103. SRMN-045, COMINCH File, “Estimates of Japanese Air Strength 5 Jan 1942–31 Dec 1945,” Container 15, SRMN 040 thru 047, Entry # A1 9020 United States Navy Relating to Cryptology 1918–1950, RG-457 National Security Agency/Central Security Service, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 3.
31. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. XIII: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), 235.
32. John M. Spiszer, “Leadership and Combat Motivation: The Critical Task,” Military Review, vol. 3, no. 3 (May/June 1999), 66.
33. William L. Hauser, “The Will to Fight,” in Sam Sarkesian, ed., Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (Beverly Hills, CA/London: SAGE, 1980), 188–89.
34. Samuel E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 463.?
35. Russell Grenfell, The Art of the Admiral (London: Faber & Faber, 1937), 183.
36. David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966), 104.
37. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 332.
38. Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets As Naval Opponents 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 43, 45.
39. Wyatt Olson, “Do fired Navy COs suffer from ‘Bathsheba Syndrome?’” Stars and Stripes, 14 March 2012, www.stripes.com/news/do-firdd-navy-cos-suffer-from-bathsheba-syndrome-l.l
40. Matthew M. Burke, “Fired Navy skippers often stay in service,” Stars and Stripes, 7 December 2014, www.stripes.com/news/fired-navy-skippers-often-stay-in-service-1.317935.
Dr. Vego is Professor of Operations, Joint Military Operations Department, at the Naval War College.