The surface Navy has a proud tradition of warfighting excellence—from destroyer action in the Pacific during World War II, supporting the Inchon landing in Korea, to the gun line in the Tonkin Gulf, the Tanker Wars in the Persian Gulf, and the more recent Tomahawk strikes in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. During the past two years, Destroyer Squadron Two and Carrier Air Wing One have been the beneficiaries of some of the Navy’s best training. They were well manned and equipped, and spent almost nine months on a deployment around the world, including six months in the Persian Gulf. Now, looking back on the training and deployment, we can identify the most critical shortcomings of our integrated warfighting team and how we could best improve our combat capability.
Over the past 15 years, the U.S. Department of Defense has focused on fighting two land and two air wars. As a result, our surface Navy must reassess our material warfighting capability and level of knowledge of the maritime-surface domain that gave us the edge for so long. The U.S. Navy has transitioned from a force composed of mission-specific platforms to one reliant on multi-mission platforms and joint integration. The surface Navy has slowly drawn down its arsenal of surface-to-surface weapons and traded them for air-delivered weapons employed by air wings and joint/coalition partners. The modern surface Navy is outgunned and sensor-deficient compared to near-peer competitors and regional navies alike. With carrier air wings spending much of their deployments “over the beach,” our strike groups have lost the corporate knowledge they once used to effectively employ the tactical assets at their disposal against surface targets. To shed light on the direction we need to go, we first need to review our surface-to-surface offensive capability, assess our current level of knowledge in the joint/coalition environment, and formulate some ideas on how to improve the surface warfare community’s tactical relevance in modern maritime warfare.
Current Surface Warfare Capability
The U.S. Navy’s surface fleet is the most funded and well-trained Navy in the world, yet we find ourselves at a tactical disadvantage when toe-to-toe with foreign surface combatants. We often face opponents who have both superior sensor coverage and superior weapon kinematics. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range supersonic missiles that are specifically designed to counter U.S. defensive systems. Our opponents have developed organic, ship-based, over-the-horizon targeting systems and placed a heavy emphasis on offensive and defensive electronic attack.
Most over-the-horizon targeting capabilities have been deferred to aircraft along with the focus on long-range SUW engagements. At a macro level within the carrier strike group (CSG) construct, this shift to aviation-centric employment is sound. CSGs are well integrated (on paper), and the range and speed of our aircraft enable an extended over-the-horizon engagement capability. The payload of one F/A-18 Hornet is practically equivalent to the surface warfare weapons load of one Harpoon-equipped surface combatant. The ratio of Navy surface combatants able to carry and employ the aging and relatively short-range RGM-84D Harpoon missile has dwindled to almost 50 percent. In stark contrast to our allies and enemies, roughly half of the ships in the world’s most powerful fleet do not carry a dedicated antiship missile. The Navy’s Arleigh Burke Flight IIA guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) are equipped with surface-to-surface mode SM-2 missiles. The SM-2 was designed to intercept supersonic air-breathing threats, is limited to line-of-sight engagements, and carries a warhead optimized for downing aircraft as opposed to damaging surface combatants.
Coordinated airborne and surface defense of the aircraft carrier and other high valued units (HVUs) is still a critical mission but a large percentage of our surface fleet does not deploy with an HVU. Flight I DDGs on ballistic-missile-defense patrols routinely get under way independently for entire deployments outside the protection of the strike group. Even DDGs that deploy with the aircraft carrier are frequently tasked for independent missions such as maritime-security, freedom-of-navigation, or counter-piracy operations that take them out of the sensor and weapons umbrella the air wing provides. Surface combatants still need an organic surface-to-surface capability.
Naval aviation has wisely invested in sensors that are organic to the CSG. The MH-60RSeahawk, known as “the Romeo,” is equipped with one of the world’s most advanced surface-search radars, integrated electronic support measures (ESM), Link 16, and automated identification system (AIS). The MH-60R is an indispensable asset for sanitizing the vital area and classification, identification, and engagement area. However, the limited ranges, altitudes, and survivability associated with sensor-laden helicopters diminish their ability to support long-range surface warfare (SUW) missions. The E-2C/D Hawkeye is another organic sensor at the strike groups’ disposal. The radars on both the E-2C and D model are very powerful surface search tools, but cannot provide surface identification. The E-2C incorporates ESM, AIS, and International Broadcast Service-Simplex (IBS-S) information to help aid surface identification. The E-2D is optimized to support air warfare through use of Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air and does not yet incorporate any of these additional features, but will in future upgrades.
Outside of the CSG, inorganic sensors such as Navy maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles and systems (UAV and UAS) offer impressive capabilities. P-3 Orion, E-8C JSTARS, EP-3 Aries, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and now P-8A Poseidon aircraft provide persistent sensor coverage ranging from radar to signals intelligence. These platforms are some of the most capable in the world, but require detailed integration and planning to be used properly. The surface Navy has explored the use of UAVs via the Scan Eagle and Fire Scout programs with some success. There is even more potential with the integration of larger UASs such as the MQ-4C Triton and remotely piloted aircraft like the MQ-9 Reaper. The Triton is the product of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance-Demonstrator program. It can remain airborne for 24 hours with 80 percent effective on-station time, and will incorporate an advanced Maritime Moving Target Indicator radar, ESM, and AIS. The U.S. Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper incorporates a surface-search-capable radar, a weapons payload capable of destroying fast-moving surface targets, and more than nine hours of on-station time. Both systems offer full-motion video via secure Internet protocol networks and will prove to be valuable tools for the surface combatant commander.
Although the surface Navy is working hard to procure railguns, laser weapons, the Griffin missile system, and Harpoon Block II+, it is not likely that the demand signal for integrated air and surface forces will ever go away. The fact is simple: The aviation community brings an enormous capability to maritime surface warfare. Integration is the standard, and we have to learn to employ assets as a team.
Level of Knowledge
The average level of knowledge across the surface warfare and aviation communities regarding the employment of air assets in support of maritime surface missions is insufficient. Although Navy tactical literature frequently speaks to the use of air power in SUW, there doesn’t appear to be any formal training provided to the surface warfare community. Enhancing education regarding air operations in maritime surface warfare (AOMSW) across surface, air and joint environments is critical to mission success. Aviation assets are essential to developing the recognized maritime picture (RMP). They are the only organic over-the-horizon sensors available to the CSG and are typically our most capable and proficient weapon system operators. Unless we fully understand their capability and we train our officers to think of them as our primary sensors and weapon systems, as opposed to “just another SSC asset,” we will not be able to employ them effectively.
The opportunities for the destroyer squadron to fully integrate with the embarked air wing are limited. While disembarked, both ships and aircraft focus on unit-specific training and readiness issues. When embarked, both take a quantity-over-quality approach to training, each trying to meet their individual training objectives, and leaving little time for detailed mission planning, execution and debriefing. In most cases, the composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX) is the best opportunity for the destroyer squadron (DESRON) and air wing to integrate. Unfortunately, COMPTUEX is designed to be a high-level, integrated exercise during which the CSG is paced through scenarios. This is not the time for basic training, and the time provided to effectively debrief is limited due to the nature and logistics of the scenario.
The lack of air-integration training is not limited to surface warfare officers (SWO). Despite dedicating considerable time and energy to training our operations specialists (OS) as air intercept controllers and antisubmarine tactical air controllers, there is no formal training or certification process for the maritime air control (MAC) mission. It’s not enough to just teach MAC communications standards to our OS community. The MAC mission is more than talking on the radio; it is a fully developed tactical command-and-control (C2) function and covers the full breadth of solving the RMP. In this role, the surface community might benefit from a cross-organizational study of the Hawkeye community to determine better methods for employing the Zulu module and combat information center as tactical C2 nodes. The officers in the Hawkeye community are the Navy’s experts and execute the mission more effectively than any other platform, with only four officers available at any given time. Without being able to perform the MAC mission, the surface community will not be able to optimize airborne assets to effectively find, fix, track, and engage the enemy.
Much like the SWO community, aviators are deploying without a basic understanding of surface-combatant capabilities or missions. Generally, aviators don’t know the differences in capability between cruisers and destroyers, or the variants of the standard missile used to augment the fleet air defense mission that they train for so often. In the F/A-18 community, junior aviators do not receive formal training on the composite warfare commander construct. They learn on the job and typically finish their first tour with only a cursory academic knowledge of how an air wing is supposed to integrate within a CSG.
The naval aviation community states that AOMSW is a primary mission set—yet only minimal training is conducted in flight school and in the fleet. The majority of squadron sorties are focused on air-to-air intercepts and air-to-ground weapons, not only based on specific training and readiness requirements, but also due to logistical realities. The Navy as a whole has very limited access to sea-based opposition forces, and the tactical aviation community is afforded only limited integration opportunities with the surface Navy outside of the Fleet Response Training Plan. Even in areas such as Norfolk, Virginia, where DESRON assets are a short drive from air assets at Naval Air Station (NAS) Norfolk and Oceana, integration is mostly limited to air-intercept-controller training for air-to-air missions and is conducted from NAS Oceana, instead of on board a ship with real-world sensors and systems. With the number of other demands in the schedule and limited underway steaming days, DDGs cannot easily go to sea for daily integrated training missions with the air wing. Thus, AOMSW is by default a distant third priority behind air-to-air employment and strike warfare.
The issue also extends beyond the bounds of our service. Due to the expanse of our maritime area of operations in Central Command and Pacific Command, the SUW mission has expanded beyond Navy assets to the joint/coalition community. From the Combined Defense of the Arabian Gulf to the integration of the Long Range Antiship Missile on the B-1B Lancer, the Air Force has established AOMSW as a core competency requirement. It has also taken the lead role in testing SUW weapons, documenting the effects of air-delivered munitions versus the Fast Attack Craft – Fast Inshore Attack Craft threat. Regardless of funding and resources, the Air Force suffers from similar limitations: They are forced to train in a vacuum, with very little coordination with actual Navy forces, surface or air. The fact that the Air Force is training to counter the maritime threat based on a rudimentary knowledge of the environment and with little integration with the surface Navy is a failure on both sides. They bring tremendous capability to the fight, but must be properly integrated to be effective.
The overall lack of knowledge in AOMSW has dangerous compound effects. When most junior officers do not receive adequate training and tactical experience, they become senior officers without the requisite knowledge and tactical expertise to win wars. We have gotten complacent. Our competitors can now present battle problems that, due to their complexity, require the aggregate capabilities of the entire CSG to overcome.
A Way Forward
All is not lost. The Navy is moving in the right direction. As they say, “The first step is identifying that you have a problem.” We have and we are addressing it. We have realigned our warfighting development centers and created the Navy Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC). The surface warfare community has started the surface warfare Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course and a Plans and Tactics Officer course to better educate our junior officers. With the proper syllabus, this training and a renewed focus on tactics could help to address the AOMSW knowledge gap within the Navy.
Naval aviation is integrating its high-fidelity aircraft simulators into the Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE). This will enable air and surface units to conduct integrated and realistic training in a synthetic environment, beyond the limits of the current Fleet Synthetic Training program. NCTE will enable geographically separate entities (i.e., ships based in San Diego and aircraft based at NAS Lemoore, California) to plan, brief, train, and debrief during the inter-deployment phase. It will provide the opportunity to frequently integrate and will allot the surface community the time required to self-assess and improve, outside the confines of compressed underway periods. This system could also allow the Navy to train and integrate with the Air Force.
The Navy is also prioritizing long-range SUW weapons. The long-range antisurface missile is a stealthy, long-range antiship missile developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Lockheed Martin. The missile is being integrated on the B-1B Lancer and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The AGM-84D inventory is also being upgraded to Harpoon BLKII+, which incorporates a modern INS/GPS and Link 16 data-link. It will replace the current AGM-84D inventory and provides enhanced target specificity and survivability over the current weapon.
Despite these developments, we still have a long way to go. But there is a way forward:
Education: Surface warfare officers should put more emphasis on AOMSW as a core competency and encourage the surface community to treat air assets as their primary sensors and weapon systems. The Surface Warfare Weapons and Tactics Instructor is a phenomenal opportunity to provide focused training on RMP development as the key to winning the surface fight. AOMSW tactics and training should focus on RMP development and train as heavily to the left side of the kill-chain (find, fix, track) as they do to the right (engage, assess). In the aviation community, Composite Warfare Concept and SUW training should commence when aircrew report to fleet replacement squadrons. AOMSW should be fully integrated into the training syllabus.
Warfighting Development Centers: The SMWDC and Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center should develop relevant AOMSW and SUW tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Annual and semiannual conferences need to be facilitated and the Navy Warfare Development Command needs to ensure that our Navy TTPs stay up-to-date and relevant, leveraging the WDCs.
Tactical Command and Control: The joint community should institute a formal MAC training and certification process. Consideration should be given to a new Joint Publication for Joint Air Control Standards, to make air intercept controllers and MAC TTPs more common across the joint community. SMWDC should study other C2 organizations and consider best practices used by airborne tactical C2 nodes for surface integration.
Training: We have to prioritize integrated, high-fidelity training (i.e., NCTE). It should be added to the Defense Readiness Reporting System–Navy and occur in the synthetic environment. This will provide the practical experience and the in-depth analysis required to produce a fleet of integrated surface warriors and aviators. Only by conducting frequent and integrated training events will we hone the skills required to execute an operational plan from both sides of the kill chain.
Joint Integration: The surface community must delve into the 5th Fleet Combined Air Operations Plan for the Combined Defense of the Arabian Gulf. This is the most mature joint/coalition standard to date. It should be studied, updated and reworked to promote integration across all theaters of operation. The Navy needs to support Air Force exercises, just as we would like them to support ours. This includes weapons tests as well as live and synthetic training events. They provide excellent opportunities for us to test our own weapon systems, build proficiency, and validate TTPs.
Procurement: To be effective, surface attack weapons have to be cued to the correct target, outside of the range of the target’s own sensors and weapons. The surface community needs better sensors, capable of locating and identifying surface contacts from beyond visual range and through electronic attack. The Navy should continue to develop UAS and improve the capabilities of existing fixed- and rotary-wing sensors (MH-60S, F/A-18E/F, and P-8A). Ultimately the surface Navy will need to field a long-range antiship weapon. As important as the AOMSW mission is, there will be times when independent deployers or surface actions groups will need to fight organically.
As Destroyer Squadron Two and Carrier Air Wing One returned from deployment, we exercised and flexed every capability of our ships and aircraft. We saw the immense capability of our naval and air forces, but we also saw how we could improve. The deployment lessons are the Navy’s opportunity to learn from our warfighting gaps so that the next strike group is even more capable. We can no longer confine our tactical development to what we do organically on board a ship or in an aircraft. We have to integrate our forces and be in control of the entire warfare area. The U.S. military is the largest, most robust fighting force in the world; however, it is the most capable when all of our assets can seamlessly operate together. This should not be forced on us; we should demand it.
Captain Pyle is a career surface warfare officer and is the commodore for Destroyer Squadron Two in Norfolk, Virginia.