Treat LGBT Sailors Fairly
(See N. H. R. Heaton, p. 12, October 2016 Proceedings)
Rob Jacques, former lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve—As a gay man myself and a naval officer during the Vietnam Era, I want to respond to Aviation Ordnanceman Airman (AOA) Heaton’s contribution. If AOA Heaton chooses to wear jewelry, avant-garde clothing, and make-up that complements his skin tone, he may do so when off duty or on leave. While on duty (on board ship, should he go to sea) he must wear an authorized uniform and groom himself according to regulations that eliminate differences and distractions from a combat environment. In the violent, bloody hell that’s a ship in battle, AOA Heaton would not want a medic tending him to be even momentarily confused by finding an ear-stud in the pulpy cavity where his ear once was, nor would he want that medic wondering about the source, toxicity, and chemistry of a skin-tone-complementing substance that’s seeping into a shrapnel hole in his face.
AOA Heaton can be as feminine or as masculine as his biology has wired him to be. But he volunteered to become a sailor-warrior, and other sailor-warriors depend on him to conform to protocols that over the centuries have saved lives and won battles. His civilian countrymen correctly honor him for the sacrifices he made when he chose the U.S. Navy as his profession, and he is right on target when he says there should be no differences in the treatment of men and women in the armed forces, whether they are straight or gay, beyond differences imposed by their qualifications and abilities. AOA Heaton needs to work on being the leader his fellow sailors turn to for an example of selfless dedication to the unit’s mission and let his attention to personal fashion slide a bit. There’s a time and place for both, and LGBT issues have nothing to do with it.
It Takes a Few Good Men
(See W. B. Johnson and D. Smith, pp. 54-58, September 2016 Proceedings)
Commander Matthew C. Tritle, U.S. Navy—“Reluctant male syndrome.” Really? A syndrome? A syndrome is defined as a disease or disorder that involves a particular group of signs and symptoms. In what peer-reviewed journal of psychology or psychiatry can one find this syndrome systematically explored?
When women seek the company of women it is considered a plus, a bonding and supportive instinct. When men seek the company of men it is, according to the article, “persistent gender bias.” If a man listens to how his father taught him to treat women he is following a “manscript.” If a woman were to espouse an idea that is now defined as a “manscript,” is it still a “manscript” or does it become something else?
It is appropriate to analyze and discuss where it is we all can improve our leadership, management, and mentoring abilities. But to pathologize an entire mind-set or system of beliefs is to tread down the path of marginalizing those who differ from you simply so you can dismiss their worldview. And it uses the supposedly sterile and respectable world of medicine to do so. Doing that, one does not have to make an argument and face the tough challenges one must face when trying to get disparate perspectives and motivations moving in the same direction. Just say that the other side is “not well” and enact a treatment plan. That is not innovative; it is intellectually lazy.
I look forward to the day when we talk about seniors and subordinates, period, and minimize extraneous chatter. In the meantime, if one thinks leaders are failing to mentor their junior personnel, men or women, then call them out for being poor leaders. But don’t call them sick.
These Men Are Our Warriors
(See B. Scales, pp. 66-67, September 2016; F. De Los Rios, p. 83, October 2016 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Bryan Hart, U.S. Navy, commanding officer, USS Hurricane (PC-3)—I was consumed by Major General Scales’ passion and well thought out assertions on how small is the percentage of service members “who do the dirty business of intimate killing.” That is, until I reached the last two sentences stating “these men are our warriors” and “others serving in uniform are not.” Front-line service members who boldly confront “intimate killing” in the world’s most austere environments arguably deserve more from their elected officials and the acquisition industry. I was fortunate to spend one year serving alongside soldiers who would qualify as “warriors” under General Scales’ criteria while deployed to Iraq as an electronic warfare officer, embedded with the Army to assist in countering radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs). I would never look one of these warriors in the eye, or those with similar résumés, and compare myself to them.
While the title of “major general” is arguably synonymous with well-qualified credentials to discuss who is serving in the most difficult trenches, my 13 years of naval experience—including now serving on what some would consider our nation’s maritime front lines in the Arabian Gulf for nearly two years—likely encompasses some relative credential to opine about who is, and is not, a warrior. The list of sailors I have served alongside is long and extraordinarily humbling. The sailors who toil in our Navy’s most dangerous and challenging propulsion plants, in 120-degree heat, in industrial noise environments unabated by hearing protection, and who quickly would lay their weary bodies over a flammable liquid leak that may be lurking around the corner of any hellish turbine to prevent imminent danger are warriors.
The average sailor also will endure a greater level of sacrifice and hardship than the other 99 percent of their American counterparts. They will miss birthdays, anniversaries, childbirths, weddings, critical days in the growth of their children, and deaths. And sometimes, their personal sacrifice will result in divorce, debt, or, sadly, suicide. I suppose these men and women are not warriors despite risking their marriages, financial stability, family life, and lives only to allow a warship to travel a few knots faster, a missile to be more accurate, or a radar to have improved fidelity, which may ultimately be the difference between life or death, since they have not participated in intimate killing.
I am very fortunate for the exposure and education I have received through the Navy. One critical tenet of this is that to avoid abdicating credibility when communicating to an audience, an author should descend from his pulpit and present an argument in a holistic manner, to include an aversion to making carte blanche statements about groups with which he has not had the privilege of serving.
Lieutenant Carlos Rosende, U.S. Navy, serving on a guided-missile destroyer in the Pacific—In the featured excerpt from his book, retired Army Major General Scales writes that .02 percent of the U.S. population, roughly 4 percent of the armed forces, have been subjected to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that this small fraction of our military is not receiving the funding and attention required for it to succeed in the field. It is certainly hoped that if General Scales’ assertions are true, corrective action is being taken. Certainly, ground forces engaged in combat should be the focus of our leadership’s attention and receive the financial support needed to successfully execute their mission.
Unfortunately, after making this critically important point, General Scales departs from this topic and makes a series of assertions against the Air Force and Navy that are inaccurate and shortsighted. He asserts that the Air Force and Navy have served little purpose since World War II, offering the examples of the Korean War, Vietnam War, and War on Terrorism as evidence that the enemy has, in his words, “ceded us those domains where we are dominant.” He singles out the submarine as a platform that did not make significant contributions in these wars.
The conflicts cited were land wars in which naval power could play only a supporting role, and the latter two were largely counterinsurgencies—in none of them did our adversary even have the choice of challenging us at sea. (Afghanistan is landlocked, after all.) It is important to distinguish these kinds of conflicts from the conventional regional or global wars that occur between developed nation-states, which are the types of conflicts for which our Air Force and Navy are designed. It is true that the United States has not been engaged in a major war against another developed country since World War II, but this is exactly because our military—particularly our Navy and Air Force—has remained so overwhelmingly dominant. General Scales’ own words—the “enemy has ceded us those domains”—define the concept of deterrence, thus proving the value of the same high-end, high-cost platforms he denounces.
The later portions of General Scales’ excerpt seem to suggest that the platforms and people not of immediate use in the current conflict are less important. The higher-end platforms—even the most basic and least capable of them—have reached such a level of sophistication and complexity that they and the men and women who crew them cannot simply be called into being like the state militias of 1791. Yes, a Zumwalt-class destroyer or a B-21 may not be of immediate value to a squad in Afghanistan, but they are of immediate value in deterring or shaping the policies of China and Russia. Should a nation-state directly challenge U.S. interests—as China appears to be doing—such platforms are critical. Building a conventional military cannot be left until the need is glaring—by then, it is too late.
Perhaps the least productive and most shockingly inflammatory statement in the entire piece is the author’s closing line. If General Scales defines “warrior” as one who actually experienced combat, the statement is accurate. But one suspects that he is again assailing members of the Navy and Air Force for not shedding the same amount of blood (recently) as their Army and Marine Corps brethren. Thank God the United States has not been subject to a conventional war between developed nations since 1945, but General Scales can be assured that should one occur—and anyone who follows events in the Asia-Pacific knows that the threat is certainly there—hundreds of thousands of airmen and sailors are standing by with their aircraft and ships—and yes, submarines, too—to fight as generations of sailors and airmen have before them.
Build Strategic Fast Attack Submarines
(See S. J. Ilteris, pp. 22-25, October 2016 Proceedings)
Rethink the Triad
(See F. W. Lacroix, pp. 48-53, September 2016; T. A. Dames, p. 84, October 2016 Proceedings)
The Honorable Fanklin Miller, Principal, The Scowcroft Group—I commend Commander Ilteris and Rear Admiral Lacroix for their concern regarding the nation’s nuclear deterrent. Their articles, however, betray a misunderstanding of the role of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
Commander Ilteris begins by viewing the Ohio SSBN Replacement Program (ORP) as a threat, stating, “if forced to fund [ORP] the Navy will not have the money for ten years to build [the general purpose ships] it needs.” This argument ignores two facts. First, the Navy has no missions that are divorced from that of carrying out the national military strategy. Second, as Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said on 26 September 2016: “America’s nuclear deterrent is the backbone of our security and the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense.” Secretary Carter then doubled down on this point: “In a broader operational level and on a more day-to-day basis, [our nuclear deterrent] enable[s] American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to accomplish their conventional missions around the world.” This is particularly true given the increased emphasis Russia, China, and North Korea are placing on modernizing their nuclear forces.
Commander Ilteris further exposes a flawed understanding of deterrence strategy and strategic capabilities by advancing three incorrect assertions.
First, “the nuclear Triad, born of inter-service rivalry, is unnecessary and unaffordable.” While it is historically accurate to note that the Triad derived from bureaucratic competition, the three-legged deterrent force has been recognized for decades by civilian and military leaders and planners as providing an exceptionally stable deterrent posture. The three force elements’ offsetting strengths, technologies, and vulnerabilities create a deterrent that is flexible, survivable, and cost-effective. Born in the 1960s, the force was modernized in the Reagan administration and should have been (but wasn’t) modernized again in the George W. Bush administration. Modernization is now becoming critical as elements of all three legs begin to approach end-of-life and mission obsolescence issues. That said, operating and maintaining the entire force today consumes 3 percent of the annual DoD budget. When the modernization program is in full swing from the mid-2020s through the mid-2030s, the cost will rise only to another 4 percent of the DoD budget. Seven percent of the DoD budget to offset the only existential threat we face as a nation into the 2080s is a bargain.
Second, “to reduce the cost of sustaining the U.S. sea-based deterrent the United States should abandon the Trident II/D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in favor of developing a new SLBM on the scale of the Trident I/C-4 missile.” The Trident II missile system has an unparalleled record, with 161 successful launches. The D-5’s accuracy enables it to hold at risk even the most hardened assets of value to potential enemy leaderships. Its long range creates vast patrol areas in which our SSBNs exploit their stealth to hide successfully from our adversaries’ increasingly sophisticated antisubmarine sensors. Beginning a program to build an entirely new missile will be extraordinarily costly. Sizing the new missile to C-4 diameter will decrease its range, thereby shrinking patrol area. Since the sea-based deterrent program currently assumes continued use of D-5 fire control systems, procedures, training, etc., all of these would have to be changed—incurring additional cost. Finally, the new missile will not be operationally deployable by the time existing Ohio-class boats will need to be retired, opening a deterrent gap. Simply put, it is a terrible idea.
Finally, “the new smaller SLBM should be deployed on new-construction Virginia SSNs, carried in Virginia Payload Module (VPM) tubes.” Proceedings readers know that SSBN operations differ substantially from those of attack submarines. SSBNs are designed to disappear and hide in the ocean deeps. They rely on stealth, not speed, to remain undetected and survivable. SSNs are designed to go anywhere, anytime, including into dangerous places. Speed is important; reducing speed because of the weight of deployed SLBMs is orthogonal to mission success. More to the point, hazarding strategic missiles that constitute the bedrock of U.S. national security by carrying them into some of the places SSNs may travel would be a foolhardy hazarding of those missiles. Patrol areas for each type of submarine also are very different. Finally, the design changes necessary to convert a Virginia VPM submarine to carry SLBMs would be substantial.
Rear Admiral Lacroix offers a more strategic argument. While acknowledging that Russia and China are transforming their nuclear doctrine and nuclear forces in new and dangerous ways, he then attacks the Triad concept, and, in questioning its effectiveness against 21st-century threats, calls for reducing spending for nuclear modernization in favor of increased spending on defense against attacks by cyber, in space, and by nuclear terrorists. This approach involves several fundamental errors.
First, it assumes implicitly that the nuclear deterrent was once an all-purpose deterrent and that it is no longer effective in that role. The nuclear deterrent was never, is not now, and never will be an all-purpose deterrent. It is designed to deter existential threats: nuclear blackmail or coercion and nuclear or massive conventional attack against us or our treaty allies. Other threats require other strategies and other weapons.
Second, Admiral Lacroix states that Russia and China today “bear little resemblance to the adversary we had in mind when we developed the theory of deterrence.” While those countries have changed from the Cold War era, their governments are dominated by individuals who remain hostile to the post-World War II rules-based international order. Russia and China remain nuclear armed states, and it remains a vital U.S. security requirement to maintain a credible, survivable nuclear deterrent against each. Successful deterrence requires the United States to determine those assets potential enemy leaderships value. The United States must maintain the capability to hold those assets at risk and to demonstrate to potential enemies that the United States has the will to respond successfully if attacked, in so doing causing our enemies to lose more than they might hope to gain through aggression.
Capability plus will equals deterrence. Deterring the Russian, Chinese, or North Korean leaderships from attacking us or our allies requires us to demonstrate the same capability and will as we did during the Cold War. With respect to deterring nuclear or major conventional attack, this requires a modernized Triad as a foundational capability. With respect to attacks in space or in the cyber realm, new retaliatory capabilities and new thinking are needed: response in kind and in the same battlespace may or may not be an effective deterrent in cyberspace or outer space. If the Russian or Chinese leaders depend on their cyber or space systems equally or more than we depend on ours, response in kind may work; if they depend on those assets less than we depend on ours, cross-domain deterrence may be needed. But the ability to deter nuclear or massive conventional attack has not changed since the end of the Cold War.
Admiral Lacroix cites the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as authoritative in setting forth U.S. nuclear deterrent requirements. The 2010 NPR (and President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, which set the tone for the NPR) assumed a far more benign international environment than we face today. Indeed, the administration’s 2012-13 relook at NPR 2010’s conclusions also envisioned a less dangerous world than the one we live in today, replete as it is with Russian and Chinese nuclear modernizations of strategic and substrategic forces, Khrushchev-like threats of nuclear attack emanating from senior Russian leaders, Chinese assertions of sovereignty over the South China Sea, “snap exercises” of Russian nuclear forces, Russian INF Treaty violations, Chinese construction of island fortresses, and continued North Korean nuclear and missile tests, to say nothing of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and sponsorship of insurrection in Ukraine’s Donbass region. The next administration’s review of its nuclear deterrent policies will not mirror NPR 2010.
Admiral Lacroix also asserts that the locations of our Triad assets are increasingly known to our enemies (raising the specter of preemption) and suggests that our nuclear command-and-control system is vulnerable to cyber attack. With respect to the former, apart from the location of Minuteman silos (whose known location on U.S. soil itself supports the certainty of U.S. response to attack), it is a huge stretch to suggest that at-sea SSBNs or bombers once flushed are at risk of surprise attack. With respect to the command-and-control system, “never say never” and “always be vigilant,” but his statement is not supportable today.
Finally, Admiral Lacroix asserts the United States has a “first strike” option. That is false. “First strike” means a strategy that contemplates a preemptive disarming attack. While our policy states we could use nuclear weapons first to respond to massive conventional attack (a “first use option”), this refers to causing the enemy to halt its aggression—not to a suicidal attempt at disarming his nuclear forces. Furthermore, if a potential enemy leadership values its military forces and its ability to exercise control, then those valued assets are important targets for deterrent purposes; this absolutely does not translate into a first-strike policy.
Russia, China, and North Korea have rejected the Prague Agenda and are modernizing their nuclear forces and increasing the role those forces play in their respective national security policies. U.S. and allied security requires the modernization of the Triad, including construction and deployment of 12 Columbia SSBNs. There are no safe or cheap shortcuts.
The Navy Undervalues the Liberal Arts
(See J. Hebel, p. 48, October 2016 Proceedings)
Commander Kenneth J. Marra, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Midshipman Hebel makes arguments for the value of the liberal arts–educated officer. These arguments have been bandied about for decades and continue to generate passionate responses on both sides. The question is simple: Is there merit in producing an officer corps where all majors are valued equally? Can an English major survive Nuclear Power School? Can an Arabic studies major learn to fly the advanced fighter? Can a mechanical engineer get through SEAL training?
The answers to all these questions is: Of course they can, and they have, because they possess the right attitude and application. So, why steer individuals to preferred courses of study? The Navy is high tech, the reasoning goes, so to have technically competent officers, the Navy should point them in that direction, especially when our education system tends to undervalue STEM—science, technology, engineering, and math.
Fair enough, but why did this history major get sent to the engineering department of a cruiser on his first tour and later to Naval Postgraduate School for the antisubmarine warfare curriculum? Because the Navy knows its officers can learn the intricacies of complex subjects with a solid foundation of thought, inquiry, and knowledge—aspects that a good college education cultivates. Admittedly, I struggled at first, but I did complete underwater acoustics, electrical engineering, advanced physics, oceanography, and operations analysis courses to earn my masters of science degree.
If the Naval Academy places more emphasis on STEM than liberal arts, so too I fear may NROTC, which had considered, in a cost-saving plan, a three-tier system of scholarship benefits—engineering, science, and liberal arts, with greater scholarship money given to STEM students. Fortunately, the Navy seems to have shelved this proposal for now. But this discussion is looming again as pressure continues to commission technically competent officers amid cost constraints. For decades, NROTC has required all students, regardless of major, to take a full year of calculus and calculus-based physics. And most liberal arts schools require up to two years of a foreign language, regardless of major. But, as Midshipman Hebel points out, STEM majors at Annapolis are not required to take a foreign language despite a perceived benefit for many of today’s warfare scenarios.
Universities and colleges that host NROTC units, such as the College of the Holy Cross, which recently celebrated the 75th anniversary of its unit, must be allowed to commission midshipmen with liberal arts degrees without discrimination. During the anniversary dinner at which the Naval Institute’s chief executive officer, retired Navy Vice Admiral Peter Daly, was the keynote speaker, I heard of the many heroic and successful officers produced over its three-quarters of a century, stories that also reside among many other NROTC units. NROTC with its varied course offerings provides a balance to the STEM emphasis at the Naval Academy and should be supported for the type of officers these institutions commission. The Navy needs to resist awarding midshipmen who prefer, or are better suited for, pursuit of a liberal arts major a reduced scholarship benefit. The liberal arts experience should not be undervalued in the officer community regardless of commissioning source.
Baby SWOs Need a ‘RAG’
(See R. W. Connell, pp. 85-86, September 2016 Proceedings)
Captain K. P. Meyers, U.S. Navy, Executive Officer, Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) Command—I read this contribution with some interest and a significant amount of concern. I am keenly interested in the perception of SWOS in the surface community and the rest of the Navy, to include our retired colleagues. I commend Commander Connell for his interest in improving training for our surface warfare officers, but while his insights might have been relevant 20 years ago, they no longer reflect today’s surface warfare community. Rather than provide a critique of those insights, I prefer to present a more positive and balanced view of surface warfare training, outline some of the significant enhancements to this training over the past several years, and address concerns that our current training is not meeting the mark.
First, SWOS is nothing like the days of the “Destroyer School” of the mid-1970s. In the past 13 years, division officer training for new accession ensigns has evolved. Initially a six-month course taught in Newport (SWOS Division Office Course), division officer training then migrated to a computer-based training module known to junior officers as “SWOS in a Box.” That course first sent ensigns to the fleet, where they earned their officer-of-the-deck qualification before returning to SWOS to complete advanced shiphandling and tactics instruction. Today, the Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC) is a nine-week course of instruction that prepares ensigns prior to reporting on board ships.
The BDOC provides our ensigns with the fundamentals of shiphandling, navigation, maintenance procedures, engineering, damage control, and leadership. While at BDOC, students receive 35 hours of shiphandling training in the conning officer virtual environment (COVE) simulator. Admittedly, these ensigns do not leave SWOS as “proficient shiphandlers,” but they certainly understand the basics of controllable and uncontrollable forces and orders to the helm and lee helm, and they have a thorough knowledge of rules of the road.
In addition to BDOC, we have added a five-week Advanced Division Officer Course (ADOC) to build on the initial training of BDOC and the experience of first sea tour officers. ADOC students receive 29 hours of shiphandling training to hone their skills. Once these officers complete their second division officer tours and their first shore tours, they return to SWOS for six months of department head training. Once again, these officers receive shiphandling training in COVE trainers and in our full mission bridge simulators. Shiphandling training continues in the department head, surface commanders (prospective executive officer), prospective commanding officer, and major command courses. This continuum of training at SWOS reinforces shiphandling at every major milestone of a surface warfare officer’s career.
While using training ships for delivering vital skills would be highly effective, these ships would be expensive to operate and maintain, and the time and resources spent would reduce what funding is available for the operational fleet. The use of high-fidelity simulation, as validated by the aviation community, has proved enormously effective in increasing access and the amount of time devoted to shiphandling training while providing a highly realistic learning environment.
Commander Connell’s comment, “SWO JOs have the lowest morale, lowest retention rate, and lowest job satisfaction of any in the Navy’s warfare communities,” is without merit. I cite the former head of surface officer detailing, Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Brad Cooper, who stated, “Today, we enjoy our fifth consecutive year of meeting or exceeding junior-officer retention benchmarks. This year, we are on the cusp of achieving the highest retention among junior officers since the attacks of 9/11.” (Source: January 2016 Proceedings, pp. 42-48)
In fact, at the most recent ship selection at the Naval Academy, officers who had desired SWO as their first choice found that the potential ship billets were gone before they were able to select! Our problem—and it is truly a great one to have—is that our officers are making the choice to stay in in record numbers, and we find ourselves overloaded with talent.
The surface warfare community has made enormous strides over the past 23 years since Commander Connell left active duty. The restored continuum of training now produces surface warfare officers who readily can meet the growing challenges of our modern Navy, not just in the area of shiphandling, but in every mission area assigned to the surface force.
Read to Lead
(See T. Clarity, pp. 70-71, September 2016 Proceedings)
EDITOR’S NOTE: We introduced confusion in how we presented General James Mattis’s quotes extolling the virtues of reading for the modern American military officer. The author of the blog that first published the general’s messages was Dr. Jill S. Russell, Teaching Fellow, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. While it might seem a minor detail, significant forethought and work went into General Mattis’s quotes being included on the Strife blog. Dr. Russell received the emails; she corresponded with the general at the time; she saved those emails; she found a suitable publication platform for them; and she worked with the general to produce the blog essay with his blessing.
The Fat Man Sang...But the DOJ and Media Keep Playing
(See K. Eyer, p. 16 July; T. Corboy, pp. 87-88, September 2016 Proceedings)
Midshipman M. A. Clark, U.S. Navy, Brigade Honor Secretary, U.S. Naval Academy—It was with concern that we read Mr. Corboy’s letter dismissing the culture of honor at the U.S. Naval Academy and his association of our system with the “Fat Leonard” scandal. We agree that “the differentiation between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ is not a tough concept.” Indeed, our system is built to reinforce this basic truth, not teach midshipmen “what can I get away with,” as he claims.
The introduction of the remediation process that Mr. Corboy decries makes the occurrence of a scandal of the “Fat Leonard” magnitude less, not more, likely in the future. Since the Armitage and Nolan reviews following the 1992 electrical engineering scandal, reporting of honor offenses at the Naval Academy has grown by more than 25 percent, and the conviction rate by midshipmen boards for all accusations has risen from 41 percent in academic year 1993 to close to 80 percent. This would not have been possible without the introduction of a robust system of remediation. Far from being a “soft option,” remediation makes character flaws more likely to be detected before a midshipman reaches the fleet. We firmly believe this is a positive development in our Honor System.
Build Trust Early
(See S. Wilson, p. 14, September 2016 Proceedings)
Phil Erickson—Thinking back to relationships between my enlisted status and both senior enlisted and officers, I cannot recall any major conflicting views where I felt I wasn’t being treated fairly or respected for my input. (Granted it was a “few” years ago [1958-62] and memories do fade.) Anyway, many of my superiors were World War II veterans with experiences in combat that probably gave them an appreciation for those they were leading who were doing their best.
Granted, life is a bit more complicated today. But the basics of expecting excellence from your charges, respecting them, and letting them know you appreciate their efforts go a long way toward job satisfaction. Those not performing to standards need to be counselled fairly and brought along to make sure they are carrying their weight.
I mustered out of the Navy after being offered X-ray school and an assignment to a recruiting job in Fargo, North Dakota. I had other plans. But the reason not to stay was not that I was unhappy with those in charge. At the time of receiving my DD214, I was a hospital corpsman second-class petty officer. Later I continued in the medical field, becoming a registered nurse, joining a local Army Reserve unit because no Naval Reserve units were close by, and retired as an Army captain with 26 years of service.
My active-duty Navy years are remembered fondly to this day.
Why the Milk?
(See W. Galbraith, p. 88, September 2016; J. B. Craven, p. 85, October 2016 Proceedings)
Edward Lortz, Golden Life Member, U.S. Naval Institute—Harvey Milk was influential in the progress to full (or at least almost full) acceptance in the Navy and armed services of the United States of millions of LGBT personnel, almost all of whom served honorably, albeit in the closet, like many of my friends and me. I believe this to be his contribution to the Navy, although not in combat with enemy forces (debatable). I might add that most first-world countries reached this level of integration long before the United States.
To most “millennials” sexuality is a non-issue, and this discussion seems to mostly involve us elders.
Please also note many ships have been named after politicians who contributed nothing to the combat history of the Navy. Many of these “profiles” are “squalid,” except for the sexuality of the “profilee.” Although Mr. Galbraith has every right to express his opinion, and I strongly believe that political correctness has gone way too far, the attitude of Mr. Galbraith and millions of his contemporaries made easier my decision to retire 7,100 miles away from it all. I fought the battle for 50 years. Somebody else needs to do it now.