Offensive Cyber for the Tactical Maritime Commander
By Lieutenant Commander Brian Evans, U.S. Navy, and Rick Lanchantin
The carrier’s flight deck and hangar bay are awash in activity as preparations are made for a large force strike by the air wing. The objective of the strike is the destruction of a number of inland time-sensitive targets. Intelligence indicates that the flight profile for the strike package passes over a number of enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites evaluated as having been destroyed. However, as preparations continue, indications and warnings suggest that those SAM sites have been repaired and reactivated, or reconstituted by relocation of similar enemy assets from elsewhere. The commander must now make a choice: accept the additional risk from the SAMs and proceed with the mission as planned, or attempt to mitigate the risk.
Under the U.S. Navy’s current paradigm, the SAM sites likely represent an unacceptable risk to the mission and the aviators involved. Mitigating the risk in the current operational environment would likely involve replanning the strike to incorporate the use of electronic-warfare aircraft to jam, neutralize, or destroy the SAM sites. Unfortunately, the delay involved with mission replanning and the use of additional electronic-warfare aircraft introduces different risks to mission success and aviator safety. As a result, the optimal option is to continue the mission as planned while simultaneously mitigating risks to the force. Offensive cyber capabilities may provide this solution.
In this scenario, offensive cyber operators could potentially inject a stream of data to overwhelm enemy SAM systems with a denial-of-service attack, flooding it with false targets. In theory, properly placed malware could disrupt communications or disable power-supply systems as friendly aircraft enter the system’s weapon range. While admittedly additional strikes would be desired to permanently eliminate the SAM threat, offensive cyber action may be sufficient to prevent delaying the strike against a time-sensitive target. Furthermore, the effects created through cyber means could soften the target for a future conventional strike.
Whether these offensive cyber capabilities presently exist within the U.S. arsenal is a matter of speculation. It is clear, however, that very similar capabilities are envisioned for the future. Once they are available, the question that emerges is: How does the tactical commander call for cyber fires or effects?
Cyber Special-Operator Teams
Like the United States, many potential adversaries use weapon and sensor systems designed or modified for the maritime environment. The uniqueness of these systems dictates the development of an organic offensive cyber capability within the Navy. National cyber capabilities designed for strategic objectives will never provide the agile and tailored capabilities required by the tactical maritime commander. Regardless, tactical cyber effects will not become an option for the maritime commander until an effective command-and-control (C2) structure is established.
The foundation of the Navy’s cyber C2 structure should center on multiple small cyber specialoperator teams (CSOTs), which would be trained and designated to deliver effects through cyber means within current Navy mission areas. The total number, composition, and mission areas assigned to CSOTs may vary. However, each team’s assigned mission areas should align with a traditional maritime mission area such as air-defense, sea-control, strike, or maritime-interdiction operations. The alignment of mission areas between traditional-warfare and cyber domains would smooth the integration of cyber operations into planning and facilitate more rapid delivery of effects when the tactical commander calls for cyber fires.
While CSOTs would deliver effects when called on, the teams should also develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and tools for use against adversary systems within their assigned mission area. Despite their differing mission areas, the CSOTs should be colocated to allow operators (depending on their skills and backgrounds) to participate in multiple teams to achieve maximum effect. Similarly, colocation would provide maximum opportunity for collaboration between CSOTs on TTPs and tools.
To further enhance the CSOTs’ ability to support the theater and maritime commander, a planning cell, legal cell, and cyber special-operations coordination center (CSOCC) should be integrated into the command structure for the CSOTs. Activation of the planning cell and CSOCC would not be required at all times. Instead, each could be stood up as required. When activated, the planning cell would develop the operational plans to be executed by the CSOTs. A planning cell would be essential for ensuring coordinated actions by different CSOTs to produce multiple or combined effects within a single operation or to support multiphase operations. It would also coordinate the integration of available joint and national offensive cyber capabilities.
Unlike the planning cell, the legal cell should be active at all times. It should integrate with the planning cell and CSOCC to provide legal expertise during operational planning and execution and throughout the delivery of real-time effects. As a result, legal cell manning must be restricted to a select set of Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps officers thoroughly trained and educated on the application of the Laws of Armed Conflict, rules of engagement, and rules on the use of force within cyberspace. The legal cell should also support requests for information from the JAG officers assigned to the tactical maritime commander’s staff. When an operational plan is complete, the role of the CSOCC should be the coordination of the specified CSOT actions, according to the developed plan, to achieve the desired effects. While the CSOCC would be responsible for executing planned cyber operations, it could also be stood up to support periods of significant operations. During these periods, the CSOCC would work to coordinate CSOT activities for time-sensitive surge capability and delivery of real-time effects. For time-sensitive or real-time requirements, the CSOCC would also provide an interface for leveraging joint and national capabilities.
Forward Cyber Controller Cadre
In addition to CSOTs, the Navy should also train a cadre of forward cyber controllers (FCCs), which would be integrated into the CSOT command organization and deploy as required during periods of heightened tensions or significant operational events. When deployed, the FCCs would integrate into the maritime commander’s staff and perform a function akin to a forward air controller: calling for fires. Request for cyber fires would be from the FCC to the CSOCC, which would then coordinate the activities of one or multiple CSOTs to achieve the desired effect. The FCCs that were not deployed would man the planning cell and CSOCC as required. FCCs should also receive regular training from each of the CSOTs on capability and TTP updates to ensure they can support the tactical maritime commander to the greatest extent possible.
In addition to calling for fires, the FCC should integrate into the operational-planning process. Participating in the process would ensure that the tactical commander has a full range of options available and that cyber operations meld seamlessly with operations in other warfare domains. A comprehensive understanding of the operational plan and its objectives would also assist the FCC in communicating the desired effects to the planning cell for the cyber special-operator teams. Effectively integrating into the tactical commander’s planning process, while simultaneously supporting the cyber operations planning process, requires the FCC to be tactically proficient across both traditional- and cyber-warfare domains. The ability to deliver offensive cyber capability at the tactical level will rest largely on the FCC cadre’s ability to effectively bridge warfare domains.
Offensive cyber capabilities are maturing at a rapid pace. While delivery of tactical effects through cyber may not be a reality yet, the capability is not far away. Without a developed C2 structure for tactical cyber operations, the Navy will likely find itself at a disadvantage. This C2 structure could take multiple forms. However, the structure proposed here would optimize delivery of warfighting effects. To this end, the Navy should establish teams of cyber special operators and train a cadre of FCCs as soon as possible. Establishing CSOTs would also facilitate accelerated development of an offensive tactical cyber capability, enabling the Navy to potentially outpace its adversaries. Taking these steps would ensure that the Navy is driving the development of tactical cyber capabilities and fully prepared to capitalize on the warfighting advantages they will provide.
Lieutenant Commander Evans is an information dominance warfare officer and a member of the information professional community. He currently serves as Deputy Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N2/N6).
Mr. Lanchantin is a recognized authority on information assurance and cybersecurity. He currently works for the chief knowledge officer in the office of the Chief Information Officer, Office of Naval Intelligence
A Zero-Sum Game
By Lieutenant Jeff Vandenengel, U.S. Navy
The nuclear Navy has a history of safe and professional service, yet its demands on the submarine community are growing at a pace that stifles tactical training. Fighting for the time and effort of wardrooms and crews is a zero-sum game due to their already heavy workload. If the Navy wants to be at peak combat readiness, it must reexamine the requirements and stakes associated with nuclear inspections.
One of the greatest challenges faced by any peacetime military force is continual readiness for war, and the submarine fleet is currently not well prepared. Submarine schooling, training, operations, and examinations are either nuclear or tactical, and warfighting issues are too often put on the back burner in the interests of the nuclear program. This reduces wartime readiness, something the Navy has experienced several times throughout its history.
Peacetime Languishing
When the War of 1812 commenced, the extremely powerful Royal Navy went to battle with the weak U.S. Navy, which was primarily made up of frigates and a fleet of gunboats that Thomas Jefferson erroneously believed would be effective at coastal defense.1 The British captured countless American merchant vessels abroad and imposed a blockade, but the U.S. Navy overcame its peacetime decay with the help of privateers, resourceful leaders such as Isaac Hull, Stephen Decatur, and Oliver Hazard Perry, and the revolutionary frigates designed by Joshua Humphreys.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, the U.S. Navy again found itself out of fighting shape. Many of its ships were mothballed, and it lagged behind the navies of England and France in terms of adopting steam power and new gunnery technology.2 However, an impressive shipbuilding program coupled with the South’s lack of any real naval warfighting ability gave the Union the time it needed to succeed.
The most famous example of the U.S. Navy’s slow start in war was the first 6 to 12 months of World War II—especially for the submarine fleet. Due to financial constraints, very few crews had experience with the Mark 14 torpedo, a weapon that proved to be ineffective and oftentimes dangerous to the vessel that fired it.3 Numerous submarine captains were relieved due to severe cautiousness, which the Navy had ingrained in them during years of peace. Of course, by the end of 1942 the weapons had been improved, the right people had been promoted, and matériel production helped right the ship and pave the way for victory.
The Nuclear Navy Today
The nuclear Navy has earned a well-deserved reputation for continuous self-improvement, professionalism, and above all, safety. High standards and multiple levels of oversight ensure that motivation stays high. All submarine officers start their naval careers by spending 26 weeks at Nuclear Power School, where the fundamentals are taught in a rigorous graduate-level environment. Students then move on to a nuclear power training unit, where they spend another 26 weeks working at a functioning nuclear plant; again, the course load is heavy, and students must progress through countless oral interviews, practical factors, and examinations, while also being responsible for their shift work.
After attending Submarine Officer Basic School (SOBC), students report to a submarine, where they spend approximately their first six months on board qualifying in the engine room. After about two years on board, they effectively leave the boat for two months to complete the prospective nuclear engineer officer examination (PNEO), another rigorous endeavor that involves numerous interviews with senior officers and engineers. Coupled with frequent training sessions while in the boat, submarine officers grow into good nuclear operators with very strong analytical backgrounds—exactly what is needed to control evolutions and casualties in the engine room. Make no mistake, the nuclear Navy is very good at what it does, between training, safe execution, and professionalism. But when that comes at the cost of wartime readiness, it might be a little too good.
On the tactical side, officers receive much less preparation before reaching the submarine. SOBC is only ten weeks long, and the little time spent there is much less challenging than the 52 weeks of nuclear schooling. Once officers reach their submarine, compared to the ten weeks of intense PNEO study, junior officers will spend just two to three weeks at tactical schools that are much easier to navigate successfully. Most important, warfighting training and drilling often severely lags compared to that of the nuclear side in the ship’s day-to-day operations. The inspections and expectations of outside activities are much easier to meet than nuclear requirements, and the consequences of poor performance are much lighter. Many of the tactical skills of junior officers and senior leadership are a result of self-study and motivation, not due to a system of training and improvement on board.
The easy answer is to make tactical training more stringent. However, the time of submarine officers is already stretched extremely thin, so something has to give. For officers to become better ship drivers, the requirements and training on the nuclear side must be reexamined. It is difficult to argue for the easing of regulations in a program that ensures safety of so many, but we need to remember why we have a warship in the first place.
The nuclear inspections and requirements that all ships face are daunting, and meeting them quickly overwhelms the vast majority of wardrooms. For example, I was responsible for the upkeep of an estimated 3,600 pages of training, qualification, auditing, and maintenance paperwork broken up into 19 binders—and I was no different from many other junior officers. Under the guise of constant self-improvement, several nuclear divisions have audit and surveillance programs in which officers and chiefs review programs and maintenance. While these programs can be effective and important, they often turn into color-coded beasts of paperwork meant to dazzle inspectors with their volume. Unfortunately, little time is left for true reflection, and it can breed an environment in which leaders conduct reviews for the sake of the audit and surveillance program and not because it is their job. More important, virtually every officer on board can explain complex engineering principles, draw diagrams of entire reactor systems, and have conducted countless complex engineering-casualty drills, but few to no simulated attacks on an enemy warship. So much time, energy, and effort is spent on engineering issues that the study, development, and practice with tactical systems and techniques are often treated like afterthoughts.
Incentives Shaping Reality
Much of this is a result of expectations; a poor nuclear inspection can cause commanding officers to lose their jobs and deployment-ready warships to stay tied to the pier. Squadron leadership constantly focuses on nuclear readiness and applies significant pressure between inspections to keep standards high. My submarine crew was reminded several times during a Western Pacific deployment that regardless of how well we operated in theater, it would not be considered a successful six months if we did not do well on the three-day nuclear inspection at the end. Across the fleet, submarine commands understand the differing weight on nuclear and tactical inspections and adjust accordingly. Until a slight easing of nuclear inspections with a corresponding toughening of warfighting expectations occurs, submarine captains will have little incentive to change their ways. Regardless of how long we harp on the importance of ship driving and other concerns in the forward half of the boat, nothing will change until we ease nuclear requirements. With officers and crews strapped as they are, it’s a zero-sum game.
There are several easy fixes, and several more challenging ones that we can make. SOBC and tactical schools need to be more challenging to teach new officers as much as possible in the short period of time available to them. On the ship, “forward” drills need to be better controlled and tougher, something that can be learned from the “nukes” and their excellent preparation and execution. While expensive and not immediately available, more simulators need to be built to give wardrooms practice in a variety of situations, many of which could not be replicated at sea. Another option would be to split the wardrooms into officers who work in the engine room and those who drive the ship, as many other nations do. This would avoid the jack-of-all-trades syndrome and allow excellence in both realms.
The most needed change is a shift from above. The chain of command off the ship, from squadron to the very top, must place a heavier emphasis on tactical inspections while easing the profound paperwork requirements in the nuclear Navy. By shifting expectations, boats will have more time, and more importantly incentive, to train their officers and crews in the arts and sciences of navigation, shiphandling, weapons handling, and combat. In 2013 then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert tasked then-Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, Admiral John M. Richardson, with cutting down administrative tasks in the Navy to put “warfighting first.” Significant progress was made in this effort. As those efforts continue, there is no better place to focus than in the nuclear Navy, where oftentimes well-intentioned but suffocating requirements prevent preparations for the very thing for which the Navy exists: war.
1. Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006), 284.
2. Bruce Catton, The Civil War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 70.
3. Nathan Miller, War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2
Lieutenant Vandenengel completed his division officer tour in the USS Cheyenne (SSN-773) and is now serving at the University of Rochester NROTC unit. He was selected as the 2013 junior officer of the year for Submarine Squadron 7 and is the recipient of the Vice Admiral Behrens Award for graduating at the top of his Nuclear Power School class.
Ensign Wisdom
By Lieutenant Matthew Farrell, U.S. Navy
As this year’s cadre of ensigns gets settled across the surface fleet, many of them are quickly learning just how steep the learning curve and how hectic the operational tempo can be. Between watch, qualifications, personnel issues, and admin, I recall my life as a new division officer jumping from one event to the next, with little time for reflection and conscious self-improvement. And although commissioning source curricula are full of leadership case studies and pearls of wisdom, those lessons are often difficult to apply in academic environments, and they are not always part of at-sea training. So to the 2015 Officer Candidate School, Reserve Officers’ Training Course, and U.S. Naval Academy graduates, as you trudge through the daily division officer grind, take the time to consider the following thoughts from someone not too far-removed from your position.
Ownership. Command your division, and start by taking ownership. If you have never read the classic leadership essay “Damn Exec” by then-Lieutenant Commander Stuart Landersman, find a copy and get reading. If you read the short vignette during your commissioning program, read it again and see if your at-sea experience allows you to understand the lesson from a new perspective. The lesson is simple: Take ownership, and insist on ownership at the lowest possible level. Own your spaces, own your gear, and carry out the command vision set forth by the commanding officer. On more than one occasion, I made the mistake of attributing bad news to someone else: “XO says we have to work on Saturday.” Every time I did that, as Landersman explained 50 years ago, I turned ownership over to someone else, and relinquished some of my authority. Few 22-year-olds are responsible for the maintenance and operation of gear worth hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars. Take advantage of the experience, and as you take ownership, consider . . .
Setting goals. The power of goal setting never occurred to me as a division officer, and I consider this a missed opportunity. Try getting your division involved with personal and professional goals, such as Physical Fitness Assessment scores, inspection grades, education milestones, qualification completion dates, grades on advancement exams, etc. After determining goals, encourage your team to achieve them, and reward hard work in the process. Be careful, however, not to go overboard. Perhaps focus on one or two areas that need improvement and make sure the goals are attainable. If you properly plant this seed, you will find that your division will begin setting its own goals, and your sailors will own the results. Sometimes, though, you and your division will fail. When this happens, remember . . .
Attitude is infectious. Inspections, training certifications, and operational requirements can kill morale, and a division’s collective response to a busy schedule largely depends on the attitudes of the division officer and the chief. I did not realize how important my approach to a particularly long stretch of deployment was until I noticed my sailors feeding off my negativity. This realization was startling, and altered my understanding of a division officer’s role. I went from viewing myself as the lowest guy on the totem pole with little potential to effect change, to viewing myself as a leader with the ability to impact and improve my division. Do not sugarcoat anything (“This won’t be bad at all!”), but approach challenges with positivity and determination (“This could get rough, but let’s do our best and get through it”). Call it cheesy, but if you’re sincere, you may see huge results. And if you believe your attitude does not matter, remember . . .
You are under constant scrutiny. For better or for worse, your sailors will observe and remember everything you do and say. If you’re the division officer who always shows up to quarters with shined boots, your sailors will notice. If you’re the division officer who learns your equipment and gear, you will earn a reputation of professionalism and competence. You may often feel overwhelmed, and you will not be perfect; I was far from it. Your sailors are sharp, and the harder you strive for excellence, the better off you and your division will be. Through this scrutiny, you may find yourself conflicted . . .
Respected or liked? I fell into a pretty easy trap, and many of my peers did the same. Instead of earning respect, I tried to be the guy my sailors liked: relaxing rules that I, the all-knowing ensign, felt were trivial; a preference for leniency over accountability; blindly signing paperwork instead of asking questions; or believing that “taking care of my sailors” meant liberty, liberty, and more liberty. I learned, though, that one cannot please everyone, and that it is better to be respected than liked. Retired U.S. Marine Colonel Arthur Athens, director of the Naval Academy’s Stockdale Center of Ethical Leadership, advocates earning respect through competence (learn your job and stand a good watch), compassion (know and care for your people, and advocate for their professional and personal growth), and courage (do the right thing when no one is looking, and even if there are people who will hold it against you). Otherwise, if you focus too heavily on being liked, you may run into difficulty down the road, such as . . .
Conflicting loyalties. A division officer worth his or her salt spends a good deal of energy getting to know his or her sailors. As a result, division officers understandingly develop strong loyalties to their team. Loyalty is good, but must be properly balanced with loyalty to the command. I can recall one or two instances where I unknowingly presented an “us versus them” mentality, pitting my division against command policies. This can be destructive to a successful ship, which must promote teamwork between all divisions and all ranks. When combined in a division officer who tries to be liked over respected, blind loyalty to a division can be particularly dangerous and corrosive. Many young officers, myself included, get a first taste of this challenging loyalty conflict at Captain’s Mast. While a division officer is an advocate for his or her sailors, he or she must also advocate for the command. If you spend your time trying to be liked, recommending a fair punishment will be extremely difficult. Loyalty to your sailor may induce you to recommend a light punishment. If the CO goes with something stronger, you undermine your authority. Big caveat here: You are authorized to disagree with your captain. Do what you feel is right, just be sure you are considering the big picture. Loyalty conflicts cause heavy heartache for division officers. Add this to the mile-high stack of Personnel Qualification Standards you still need to tackle, and all the evals due to the XO next week, and the division officer doldrums will weigh you down. Take a breath and . . .
Take a tactical pause. Avoid getting so focused on the present that you forget about taking care of yourself. Go for a run, hit the weights, or go on a hiking trip. Read something for fun, and then read something about your profession (Six Frigates by Ian Toll, or Neptune’s Inferno by James Hornfischer come to mind). Take a look at what the Navy has to offer two, three, or four years down the road. Post-division officer shore tour options are fantastic: The Olmstead Scholarship, the USNA LEAD program, Naval Postgraduate School, Office of Legislative Affairs . . . comb through the Naval Personnel Command website and know what is available. The better and more informed your life outside the ship, the better your life will be between the lifelines. And remember that bit about being under constant scrutiny? Your sailors will see you take the time for yourself, and they will do the same. And as long as their work gets done, this is a win-win.
This is a short list, but all of these nuggets are pieces of advice I wish I had considered as a division officer. I often look back at things I could have improved, or opportunities I may have missed. As you continue paving your way through sea duty, think about the tidbits of advice you have received along the way. Use that advice and challenge yourself to be better, setting the example for those around you (above, below, and across the chain of command) to improve as well. Three last things: Trust your chief and include him or her in your development process; have fun with your job—do not forget to laugh, sometimes even at yourself; and most important, take pride in what you do—the traditions, the history, and the camaraderie. You are part of a noble profession, so make the best of it. Good luck!
Lieutenant Farrell is the combat systems officer on LCS Crew 204. Previous tours include four years on board the USS Milius (DDG-69) and two years as a company officer at the U.S. Naval Academy.