Russia’s war in Ukraine continues and even escalates. As this conflcit overturns the entire structure of world politics it poses new military challenges to the United States, its allies, and its partners that we and they are ill-equipped to meet. This war’s consequences for the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean require serious and immediate attention, because the naval and other contingencies unleashed by Moscow generate a broad range of new opportunities for Russia while challenging Western navies and interests.
A Strategic Theater
Russia’s deliberate war-making strategy all around the Black Sea to expand its influence and territory began in 1992. Its interventions in the Moldovan, Georgian, and Nagorno-Karabakh ethnic wars, its anti-terrorist campaigns in the North Caucasus, and its 2008 war with Georgia in many ways foretold the current war in Ukriane. Now the occupation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine represent a direct assault on a sovereign European state and the entire European order. Beyond Ukraine, since May 2014 Russia has flown 50 reconnaissance flights near Baltic borders threatening those states. Russian forces based inside Russia and in Ukraine have attacked international civilian and Ukrainian military aircraft and other targets, and they train and supply anti-Kievan forces.
Furthermore, Moscow preplanned this war as it did in previous cases. U.S. analyst Reuben Johnson wrote that planning for this and a potential Moldovan operation started in 2006. Johnson wrote then:
Moscow has the political and covert action means to create in the Crimea the very type of situations against which Putin is offering to “protect” Ukraine if the Russian Fleet’s presence is extended. Thus far such means have been shown to include inflammatory visits and speeches by Russian Duma deputies in the Crimea, challenges to Ukraine’s control of Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait, the fanning of anti-NATO—in fact anti-American—protests by Russian groups in connection with planned military exercises and artificial Russian-Tatar tensions on the peninsula.1
Furthermore, Russian intelligence, military, economic, informational, ideological, and other forms of penetration of the Crimea to nullify Ukraine’s de facto if not de jure sovereignty there, along with warnings concerning Crimea’s future, have been long apparent. Russia also augmented its capabilities for covert and overt subversion by instituting a substantial program giving soldiers and officers in the Transnistrian “army” (which occupies part of Moldova) Russian military-service passports and rotating them through elite Russian officer-training courses at Solnechegorsk. As one intelligence officer in a post-Soviet republic explained:
You do not try to cover up a training program of this size unless you are someday planning on using these people to overthrow or otherwise take control of a sovereign government. The facility at Solnechegorsk is used by Russia to train numerous non-Russian military personnel openly and legally for peacekeeping and other joint operations. If then, in parallel, you are training officers from these disputed regions— officers that are pretending to be Russian personnel and carrying bogus paperwork—then it does not take an emormous leap of faith to assume that Moscow is up to no good on this one.2
Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow Center, confirmed that Moscow began contingency planning for Ukraine in 2008. Similarly, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili in 2009 told Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow that then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would incite disturbances in Crimea, graciously offer to take over Crimea to solve the problems, and thus teach other post-Soviet states a lesson. Putin also admitted that Russia began planning for the Georgian war, using separatists, in 2006. Meanwhile, Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov prefigured Russian strategy in a published and publicly discussed 2013 speech to the Academy of Military Sciences.
Ukrainian sources report that during the current war, Moscow widened the runway at the airport in Tiraspol, the “capital” of its rump Transnistrian republic, so heavier forces could land there, stationed 2000 Spetsnaz forces in Transnistria, and planned “humanitarian-intervention” exercises there to create and then exploit a pretext for entering Ukraine from Transnistria. Since Odessa is only 50 miles from Transnistria, that operation would have bisected Ukraine and captured the city.3 As Odessa is Ukraine’s last remaining port, its seizure would fatally cripple Ukraine’s military capabilities and give Russian forces a direct land bridge to the Balkans. These threats show the urgent need to station allied forces in the Black Sea and Balkans to thwart Russian efforts to capture Odessa and then menace the Balkans. These threats also comport with Russia’s earlier initiatives in the Balkans, e.g., its request to Serbia for a base at Nis from which to conduct “humanitarian operations” and Russian interest in a naval base or berth at Bar in Montenegro.4 Thus beyond Ukraine, Russia threatens all of Eastern Europe.
The deliberate use of war to close the Black Sea while making it a springboard for future Russian power projection, if not territorial expansion, also transcends Ukraine, as these Balkan examples show. Neither does Moscow confine its ambition for bases to the Balkans. Its actions bespeak a clear intention to gain entry for naval forces into the Mediterranean from the Adriatic and Black seas along with extending Russian borders and influence. Coinciding with the current war, on 26 February 2014 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced progress in talks with eight governments to establish a global network of airbases to extend the reach of Russia’s long-range maritime and strategic-aviation assets and thus increase Russia’s global military presence. Shoigu stated, “We are working actively with the Seychelles, Singapore, Algeria, Cyprus, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and even in some other countries. We are in talks and close to a result.” Shoigu cited Russia’s need for refueling bases near the equator and that “It is imperative that our navy has the opportunities for replenishment.”5 And in May 2014, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov announced that Russia was negotiating to establish support facilities in unspecified Middle Eastern countries, although one can guess that Syria, Cyprus, and Egypt are the most likely ones. These moves show why Russia’s domination of the Black Sea is critical for power projection into the Mediterranean and Middle East. Thus the visible threats around the Black Sea comprise parts of a larger anti-American and anti-NATO ambition—in which naval forces and contingencies play a significant role.
Russian Pennants on the Black Sea
By annexing Crimea, Russia gained a large if substandard naval infrastructure and is determined to improve it, project naval power outward, and threaten all of Eastern Europe. Previously Moscow planned to upgrade the Black Sea Fleet and its new permanent Mediterranean Squadron by rotating ships among its various fleets. As part of its overall modernization plan, it planned to add six new frigates and six new submarines, a French-built Mistral-class amphibious-assault ship and helicopter carrier (since canceled), and other smaller vessels. Now Moscow has signaled its determination to modernize and expand this fleet’s capabilities, forces, and power-projection role. In April 2014 Putin directed the government and Defense Ministry to formulate a development program for the Black Sea Fleet.6 Simultaneously, Russian defense analysts suggested deploying bombers in Crimea to intensify active monitoring of U.S. and NATO naval presence there, including U.S. destroyers that allegedly directly threaten the functioning of Russian’s strategic nuclear forces. And those flights are now occurring as NATO conducts exercises and monitors the Black Sea situation.
Upon seizing Crimea, Russia commandeered more than 30 usable Ukrainian ships and many air assets. Russia has also expanded its strategic aviation-patrol routes above the Black Sea, while its Su-24 Fighters practice strikes against “imaginary detachments” of enemy warships together with “surface strike groups and shore-based naval missile units.”7 Clearly Moscow is building a classic Russian combined-arms air and naval defense network to threaten and interdict foreign fleets in the Black Sea. Shoigu announced that Russia would spend $2.4 billion on the Black Sea Fleet by 2020, and outfit it with next-generation warships and submarines, air-defense systems, and marine (“naval infantry” in Russian) regiments in 2014–15 (a process that is still under way). In July 2014, Admiral Alexander Vitko, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, told his forces that “Today, we have started forming a powerful Black Sea Fleet with an absolutely different level of air service, coastal missiles, and artillery troops and marines,” thus laying the foundation for a stronger fleet in the future.8 Similarly, Rear Admiral Anatoly Dolgov, head of the Southern Military District Staff’s naval department, cited an increased development program of 90 billion rubles (approximately $2.75 billion) until 2020 to deploy new naval and coastal units in Crimea and restore formerly reduced ones. All told, about 30 new ships will be added. These new forces comprise a coastal-defense brigade, an artillery regiment, new naval-aviation aircraft, and reinforcement of the fourth air-defense command and reconnaissance units.
Other sources already reported that Moscow would also deploy modernized SU-27SM, MiG-29, and Su-25M ground/air attack fighters, ASW helicopters, the Il-38N, Ka-27, and Ka-28M enhanced helicopters, Ka-52K attack helicopters, and the new Su-30M naval-aviation fighter. By 2016 a regiment of TU-22M3 long-range bombers will deploy at the Gvardeiskoye airfield. These aircraft are platforms for supersonic long-range antiship cruise missiles to support the Mediterranean Squadron and establish an added “deterrence potential” in Southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Ground forces will be reconstituted, redesigned, and given Bastion-P long-range mobile antiship systems armed with Oniks supersonic antiship cruise missiles for the seaward defense of Crimea. Moscow also claims that no modern air-defense systems can stop these antiship or anti-air missiles, and that it will rapidly develop as much of the Crimean shore as possible for its naval infrastructure and bases.9
This modernization program and the war in Ukraine yield profoundly significant consequences and potential threats, especially given Russia’s aforementioned ambitions for European and Middle Eastern security.
Amphibious Ambitions
Now that Moscow’s military presence is no longer constrained by former legal agreements with the Ukrainian side, it can fully utilize the geostrategic potential of Crimea by implementing a broad spectrum of mutually reinforcing instruments. The Iskander surface-to-surface tactical ballistic missile (either in conventional or nuclear form), for example, with a 248-mile operational range, could cover the entire southern part of Ukraine (including important industrial cities such as Odessa, Krivyi Rih, and Dniepropetrovsk), a large part of Moldova, the entire Romanian coastline, and a significant part of the Turkish Black Sea coast. The surface-to-surface systems can be further complemented by long-range anti-aircraft and antiship missiles providing full capability to strike ground targets, interdict maritime traffic, and impose no-fly zones.
If Moscow can add its new rapid-reaction units (airborne, special operations, and others) as an effective means for the commander-in-chief to conduct not only classic operations but also antiterrorist counterinsurgency missions, it will have a formidable strike force for the entire Black Sea zone. In 2013 these troops and the naval infantry (the forces that led the Crimean phase) practiced tasks in coordination with large landing ships of the Russian navy (evidently implying amphibious operations).
It becomes clear how vital the Mistral-class vessels—originally to be supplied by France, but now France has pulled out of the deal—were to Moscow’s plans in the Black Sea and other regions. The heavy emphasis on amphibious landing and counter-landing operations in Russian military literature and exercises show how important the Mistral’s capabilities are for Moscow. As the Naval Postgraduate School’s Mikhail Tsypkin observes:
A Mistral-class ship is a potent asset for operations in the post-Soviet space, enabling Russia to carry out amphibious landings and serving as an instrument of psychological pressure: This ship is large, and with its ability to project power on land, any small country would feel threatened if such a Russian ship, carrying naval infantry, tanks, and helicopters appears in its vicinity during a crisis in relations with Russia. Moreover, it could do something the Russian politicians craved in vain during the Kosovo war: send a visible signal of Russia’s strong displeasure with NATO and of its ability and willingness to help its friends.10
With the Mistral, Moscow could conduct an unimpeded heliborne assault over the coastal cliffs of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov in southeastern Ukraine, ousting the Ukrainian ground forces defending that vital area. Russia has launched several probes from the Crimea into Ukraine and apparently laid mines in the Sea of Azov to interdict Ukrainian or other navies. Therefore, the Mistral would be an invaluable combat and command/control/communications asset in amphibious-landing operations in the region.
A Mistral’s helicopters also could serve as a powerful antisubmarine-warfare (ASW) asset in the Baltic or Black Seas. Given Moscow’s takeover of Crimean energy installations and fields, we can expect Moscow to place antisubmarine sensors in Crimea to protect energy installations as part of an ASW network as it has done in the Baltic. Russian military drills in the Baltic apparently focus on deterring hostile attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline and its infrastructure, and the navy has announced that it will deploy if necessary to defend against terrorist attacks in the Baltic. Similar ASW exercises and deployments can be expected in the Black Sea as well. The Mistral would possess equal value in roles ranging from noncombatant-evacuation operations to Russian gunboat diplomacy, many examples of which we have seen in Syria and Cyprus.
Thus, despite the serious problems afflicting its naval procurement, Russia is proceeding to develop capabilities to sequester the Baltic and the Black seas behind its air, air-defense, naval, cyber, and nuclear defenses and deter enemies from entering those seas to try to counter the offensive capabilities that Russia is developing. Clearly such military intimidation of local states and deterrence of NATO are part of the overall political strategy to revise the European status quo and neutralize the post-Soviet states’ effective sovereignty.
Today Ukraine, Tomorrow . . .
Moscow now dominates the Black Sea. Indeed, naval cooperation through the Turkish-led Black Sea Naval Force (BlackSeaFor) program has essentially collapsed as Moscow effectively blocked Kiev’s efforts to eject Russia from BlackSeaFor for aggression. Meanwhile, although Turkey retains a formidable navy, it is not a salient Russian concern. Despite many points of friction with Russia, Turkey remains heavily dependent on Russian energy. One analyst characterized Turkish policies in the Ukraine crisis as buck-passing, avoidance, and tacit acceptance of Russian dominance while others cite Turkey’s deep-rooted historical fear of Russia.11 Therefore, while Turkey is procuring new fast missile ships, it will not challenge Russia. Turkey will also likely continue to maintain a duopoly with Russia in the Black Sea, limiting military warships’ presence there under the Montreux Treaty to avoid provoking Russia (though NATO ships have been let in).
Ankara and Moscow still harbor great skepticism about Washington’s role here. Doing so creates an enduring regional imbalance and inhibits realization of other littoral states’ security even though they view U.S. and NATO naval power as indispensable components of that security. We can probably expect greater Russian economic and diplomatic, if not direct military, pressure on Turkey to “Finlandize” it and further erode its Western connections after this war, even if it may be expressed more subtly.
This crisis has underscored the threats to the Balkan states from a combination of Russian military pressure, energy leverage, use of Russian money to corrupt public institutions and the media, intelligence penetration, cyber strikes, and exploitation of ethnic rivalries. The artful combination of all these asymmetric pressures typifies Russian strategy regarding the Balkans. Balkan leaders realize that their security has deteriorated due to the Ukrainian war. George Major, head of Romania’s Intelligence Service, outlined numerous threats, some naval: Apart from actual invasion, they include illegal immigration, refugee waves, cross-border organized crime, information aggression, arms trafficking, economic and energy boycotts, espionage and terrorism, and overall regional instability.12 Romanian President Traian Basescu and Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev both highlighted the need for an intensified NATO response: Montenegrin membership in NATO, increased defense spending, energy interconnectivity, NATO’s technological modernization, and defense of energy security as a NATO mission. All this requires much greater U.S. and NATO attention to naval strategy and scenarios in the Black Sea and could foster an intensification of U.S.-Romanian strategic and naval ties in these waters.
Washington and NATO must rethink naval and overall security in and around the Black Sea, especially as Ukraine and the Balkan states openly depend on NATO and Washington for their security. Naval threats (and threats of combined forces using naval or naval-based instruments of power) abound, but cooperation is declining due to European disunity. Russia’s ambitions to hold back the West and reassert its empire also include the Middle East, as Russia has no compelling strategic interest in regional stability there. As historian Niall Ferguson observed, “Russia, thanks to its own extensive energy reserves, is the only power that has no vested interest in stability in the Middle East.”13 And in regard to the Black Sea zone, Eastern European/Eurasian political analyst Susan Stewart wrote:
Russia is more than willing to tolerate instability and economic weakness in the neighboring countries, assuming they are accompanied by an increase in Russian influence. In fact, Russia consciously contributes to the rising instability and deterioration of the economic situation in some, if not all, of these countries.14
Buttressing Russia’s support for international destabilization is a continuing willingness to start wars and demand a global network of bases whose sole purpose is to thwart the United States and undermine regional order in many areas. Can our naval and military leaders meet these challenges in time? If they cannot, Ukraine will not be an aberration but a prelude to many other far-reaching threats, the suppression of which will only become more difficult and costly, not less.
1. Reuben F. Johnson, “The Expansion Process Has Begun,” The Weekly Standard, 10 October 2006, www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/766wlyuo.asp.
2. Ibid.
3. Conversations with Ostap Kryvdyk, Washington, DC, 19 June 2014.
4. Aleksey Nikolsky, “The Syrian Crisis as a Catalyst for Naval Presence,” Moscow Defense Brief, http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2014/item1/article2/.
5. Bruce Jones, “Russia Searches for Strategic Airbase Partner,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 March 2014, www.janes.com/article/34916/russia-searches-for-strategic-airbase-partners.
6. Adam Klus, “The New Strategic Reality in the Black Sea,” New Eastern Europe, 22 April 2014, www.newesterneurope.eu. Joshua Kucera, “Putin Signals Black Sea Fleet Expansion Plans,” Eurasia Insight, 27 April 2014, www.eurasianet.org.
7. Reported on Interfax-AVN Online (in Russian), 4 June 2014, www.militarynews.ru/.
8. “Russia Boosts Black Sea Fleet in Crimea,” PressTV.com, 23 July 2014, www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/07/23/372478/russia-beefs-up-black-sea-fleet-in-crimea/.
9. Yaroslav Vyatkin, “Fortress Crimea: Rebirth of Full-Fledged Black Sea Fleet Begins,” Vzglyad Online (in Russian), 28 March 2014, www.vz.ru/society/2014/3/28/679484.html.
10. Mikhail Tsypkin, “The Challenge of Understanding the Russian Navy,” in Stephen Blank and Richard Weitz, eds., The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 348–49.
11. Zvi Magen and Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Russian-Turkish Relations: Contemporary Dilemmas of Past Empires,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 16, no. 2 (July 2013), 65. Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey Fears Russia Too Much to Intervene in Syria,” The Atlantic, 6 May 2013, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/turkey-fears-russia-too-much-to-intervene-in-syria/275571/.
12. Dan Andronic and Catalin Antohe, “Interview with Romanian Intelligence Head George Major,” EVZ (in Romanian), 22 July 2014, www.evz.ro/.
13. Ferguson quoted in Gordon G. Chang, “How China and Russia Threaten the World,” Commentary, June 2007, 29.
14. Susan Stewart, “The EU, Russia and a Less Common Neighbourhood,” SWP Comments, January 2014, 2–3.
Dr. Blank, a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, is a former professor of Russian national-security studies at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. He has written more than 1,000 articles and monographs, and written or edited 15 books, on Soviet/Russian, U.S., Asian, and European military and foreign policies. His latest work, Light From the East: Russia’s Quest for Great Power Status in Asia, is forthcoming from Ashgate Publishers.