The Army's New Role in the Pacific Pivot

The development of a modern amphibious doctrine is essential for Army operations in the Pacific.

Despite surging conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the United States remains committed to a reordering of U.S. strategic priorities to the Pacific region.After nearly a decade of conflict in the greater Middle East, President Barack Obama announced the shift in November 2011. Although this “pivot” (also referred to as “rebalance”) largely focuses on increasing U.S. trade with Asia, the policy change has dramatically influenced the strategic direction of U.S. military activities. “Air-Sea Battle” was introduced in 2010 as the new doctrine to guide future military operations in the Pacific theater. Unlike land–centric Air Land Battle and counterinsurgency doctrine, Air-Sea Battle places primacy on aerospace and maritime warfare. Although the Pentagon dropped the controversial Air-Sea Battle name in January, the concept remains in place as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. A new doctrine, with a new name, that will fully reflect the role for U.S. land forces in the Pacfic is to be issued by the end of the year.

While both the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are shrinking to pre-9/11 levels, the Army feels particularly vulnerable with this change in strategy.¹ The relevancy of Army ground forces in the U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) theater may not be obvious since it is largely a maritime environment. However, this is viewing the Pacific theater from a U.S. West Coast–centric vantage point. The area of responsibility (AOR) covers half of the earth’s surface and includes five of the top ten most populous nations with more than 50 percent of the world’s total population. It also includes notable active hot spots and potential flashpoints, all of which require U.S. Army forces in the event of a future crisis.

The Hot Spots

The oldest of these flashpoints is the long-running conflict between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. Although the United States officially recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 and adopted a “one-China policy,” it also maintains a significant responsibility toward the Republic of China pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed in the same year.² The TRA effectively places Taiwan under an umbrella of U.S. military protection. Relations between China and Taiwan have improved dramatically in the past decade. However, the PRC’s military continues to focus a significant amount of its nuclear-capable short- and medium-range ballistic missiles on Taiwan.³

Another active hot spot is the conflict between the two Koreas. Although an armistice officially stopped the fighting on the Korean Peninsula in 1953, the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north remain technically at war, and frequent crises occur. The U.S. military, including the Army, has drawn down its presence in Korea over the past 20 years. The Army in particular has begun slowly modernizing its Korea-based forces.⁴ North Korea continues to commit serious provocations, including artillery fire and missile launches near contested areas and nuclear-weapon tests from 2006–2013, and in March 2013 declared the armistice to be null and void. Any resumption of hostilities on the peninsula could rapidly escalate to involve the entire region.

Unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea present another significant security challenge. The various claims to islands and the resource wealth these represent (oil, gas, and seafood) have led to open conflict. China is looking to enforce a claim that puts the entire area within its territorial waters. This claim conflicts with basic understandings of international maritime law and with basic freedom of navigation.

Freedom of Navigation

A significant focus of the U.S. Pacific pivot has been the issue of freedom of navigation in zones such as the South China Sea. Authorities in Beijing are working on a novel method of physically enforcing their position: land reclamation. The Pentagon estimates the PRC has added nearly 3,000 acres of usable terrain to its outposts in the South China Sea.⁵ With construction in the Fiery Cross Reef, the PLA now has an airstrip big enough for fighters and bombers—among other facilities—in close proximity to a number of disputed areas. Similar territorial disputes exist elsewhere in the PACOM AOR.

In addition, not all potential flashpoints in the PACOM AOR involve the threat of medium- or high-intensity conflict, or even any conflict at all. Piracy and other transnational criminal activity, including terrorism, remain significant threats to U.S. interests and security. The potential for natural disasters in the region also presents the U.S. military with situations to which it must respond, as it has in the past. The Army could be called to provide significant logistical or command-and-control support to such relief operations.

The Pacific theater’s geography presents significant challenges for U.S. Army operations in command and control, transportation, and sustainment. Ground operations of any significant scope require the Army to provide these functions.⁶ The Army has not carried out large-scale amphibious operations since the Korean War. The key terrain where the Army would fight requires the ability to operate from the sea, either from blue water or the littorals.⁷ The development of a modern amphibious doctrine is essential for Army operations in the Pacific. This requirement is imperative and should drive planning and exercises.⁸

The likely topography for Army operations in the Pacific includes archipelagoes and islands. Control of choke points, critical sea lanes, and essential ports is vital for maritime operations. The ability to defend, seize, or control key maritime terrain depends on land bases to support naval operations. While Asia’s Pacific Rim consists of countries with enormous landmasses, potential ground-force actions are most likely to be concentrated along the littoral.⁹ U.S. ground operations in the Pacific probably would be conducted to support decisive operations by naval forces.¹⁰

Amphibious and Airborne Components Needed

Area denial, logistic support, and forcible entry are three mission sets the Army can expect in the Pacific theater. Army ground operations would be distinguished from those of the Marine Corps by the types of capabilities the Army provides the joint-force commander.¹¹ All U.S. military Theater High Altitude Air Defense, battlefield ballistic missile, and major sustaining logistics capabilities are exclusively Army assets. Many probable operational scenarios involve these capabilities. Amphibious training, doctrine generation, and equipment development will require a substantial reinvestment.¹²

Forcible-entry operations in the Pacific would require not only amphibious forces, but a strong airborne component as well. Currently, only the Army possesses this capability in significant quantity beyond the special operations forces components of the various services. The airborne forces should be exercised more often in conjunction with amphibious forces. Stryker and light-infantry Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) also provide a rapid deployment capability that would offer mobility and flexibility to a joint task force commander. Lessons learned would provide potential joint task forces with experience in the complex coordination required to execute such missions over vast distances in time and space.¹³

Additionally, the Army BCTs—particularly light infantry—should be required to train in amphibious operations.¹⁴ This is especially true for elements of the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division, which continues to be U.S. Army Pacific’s main maneuver element. The BCTs of the 25th Infantry Division, as well as elements of the 2nd Infantry Division based in Washington state, would be involved in any significant ground operations in the region. Although the Army and Marines have not conducted large-scale joint amphibious operations since 1950, they have executed a number of large joint exercises.

The Army must conduct deployment and exercises of logistics forces, with specific focus on the unique problems of the Pacific.¹⁴ Just as during World War II, a likely task for Army forces could be expeditionary port and airfield construction. The requirement to build these on austere isolated islands to allow for logistics flow or naval operations throughout the theater would be essential in a medium-intensity conflict. This will drive the further “operationalization” of the theater Army headquarters to become a warfighting organization in addition to the Title 10 supporting element for the geographic combatant commander.¹⁵

Upgrade Amphibious Equipment

Along with the Army’s need to further develop its amphibious capabilities, recapitalization of the service’s amphibious equipment is vital. A strong base from which to build such capability remains with the Army’s 7th Sustainment Brigade, often referred to as the “Army’s Navy,” which operates a variety of watercraft.¹⁶ In addition, it would be prudent to reverse trends that have seen assets such as the joint high speed vessel (JHSV) sent exclusively to the U.S. Navy. The JHSV had been specifically intended to improve Army capability in maritime environments and promote interaction between it and other services with regard to such operations.¹⁷ The Army continues to be a major resource contributor to the program, and Army shipping keep providing a key component of surface movement for the U.S. military. These assets must be further integrated with Marine Corps and Navy rotary-wing assets using various seagoing platforms to support land or maritime operations.¹⁸

Developing and expanding these capabilities within the Army would not be “new” for the service. Though overshadowed in popular imagination by the Marine Corps, the Army has a long history of amphibious operations dating back to World War II. The Army also executed numerous sea landings during the Civil War and various armed interventions in the 19th century.¹⁹ The Army was already investigating the importance of amphibious operations during the interwar period, conducting joint exercises with the Navy and developing its own doctrine.

The Army established the Amphibious Training Center and Engineer Amphibious Command in 1942.²⁰ Army units participated in amphibious operations in both the European and Pacific theaters of operation, including the major combat assaults in North Africa, Italy, and northern France, operations in the Aleutian Islands, and the island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific. To support these operations, the Army activated its own amphibious tractor and amphibious tank units. In some cases, such as the landings on Saipan, these units were even called on to help ferry Marines ashore.²¹ The Army conducted the largest amphibious operations in all theaters during World War II.

Army amphibious capabilities were called upon again in Korea as war erupted on the peninsula in 1950.²² The landings at Inchon in that year, the Army’s last major forcible-entry amphibious operation, involved Army units in support of the main Marine Corps force. The Army also participated in major landings coordinated with the Marine Corps later in the year, with the 7th Infantry Division going ashore at Iwon, while Marine elements went ashore at Wonsan.²³

The Army’s amphibious capabilities declined following the Korean War. However, amphibious doctrine and tables of organization and equipment existed well into the 1970s.²⁴ During the Vietnam War, the Army formed a partnership with the Navy to conduct riverine operations in the Mekong Delta region. The Army’s 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and the Navy’s Task Force 117 formed what became known as the Mobile Riverine Force.²⁵ These Army units were specifically trained and configured for riverine operations.²⁶ The Army also operated a number of transportation watercraft units in Vietnam for logistics support.²⁷

Joint Amphibious Operations Still Important

Although major joint amphibious combat operations have not been conducted since the Korean War or in a maritime environment since Vietnam, their importance has not diminished. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 showed just how complicated joint forcible-entry operations could be against even a very limited force.²⁸ Many of the same challenges arose again during the December 1989 intervention in Panama, which also tested the joint interoperability of airborne and amphibious forces.²⁹ The tanker war during the Iran-Iraq War provided an opportunity for Army aviators to put some of the lessons learned from Grenada into practice. Army aviation units worked with the Navy in the Persian Gulf. Many of these operations were by special operations forces conducting raids from ships.³⁰

The need for amphibious and sea-based aviation remains relevant. The Marine Corps utilized both its amphibious and from-the-sea aviation capabilities to rapidly move forces into Pakistan and onward into Afghanistan in 2001. Army special forces based on board aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean also projected force from the sea during the initial phases of the Afghanistan campaign. Maritime patrolling and protecting of littoral terrain after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 also became a priority, with a mix of Navy, Marine, and Army forces being called on to perform these missions.

Future Army operations in the Pacific theater will require maneuverability and dominance in areas that include significant maritime terrain. The Army must reinvest in those skills, which have remained dormant in the recent past. This will also mean the development of platforms and doctrine. Unfortunately, in a time of great change for the U.S. Army, this must be accomplished against a background of fiscal constraint. Where possible, platform sharing with the Marine Corps should be explored.

Additionally, Army-led large-scale joint forcible-entry exercises should be conducted. These should be multifaceted and include both sea and airborne insertions. Conversely, the Army must seek to participate in large-scale Marine Corps and Navy exercises where appropriate. Substantial military campaigning in the Pacific theater will include significant supporting ground operations. As the nation’s premier land power, the Army will be required to contribute to the Pacific pivot of U.S. strategic and operational interests.

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1. Richard Weitz, “U.S. Army Has a Crucial Role in Asia Pivot,” World Politics Review, 4 December 2012, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12542/global-insights-u-s-army-has-crucial-role-in-asia-pivot.

2. Michael Roberge and Youkyoung Lee, “China-Taiwan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, 11 August 2009, www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/p9223.

3. Lawrence E. Grinter, “Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan,” U.S. Air Force, Counterproliferation Center, Air University, December 2002, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/chinesemilitary.pdf.

4. Paul McLeary, “Modernization Effort Means New, Tested Gear in South Korea,” DefenseNews, 18 August 2012, www.defensenews.com/article/20120818/DEFREG03/ 308180001/Modernization-Effort-Means-New-Tested-Gear-S-Korea.

5. New Asia-Pacific Maritime Strategy, www. Defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_Security_Stategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF

6. Michael Hoffman, “Calculating the Army’s Pacific Future,” DoDBuzz, 26 October 2012, www.dodbuzz.com/2012/10/26/calculating-the-armys-pacific-future/.

7. “Joint Operational Access Concept,” Department of Defense, 17 January 2012, www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.

8. Maj David C. Emmel USMC, “The Development of Amphibious Doctrine,” U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, June 2010, p51, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA524286.

9. Michael J. Green, “Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in Asia and the Pacific,” CSIS p18-20, 13 April 2012, www.csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_green.pdf.

10. CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Ret.), “Naval Operations: A Close Look at the Operational Level of War at Sea,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2012, 33, www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/41083aa4-688e-4132-befa-4021b7dff288/Naval-Operations--A-Close-Look-at-the-Operational-.aspx.

11. Dennis Steele, “The Hooah Guide to the Pacific Landpower,” Army Magazine, April 2013, www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/04/Documents/Hooah Guide _April2013.pdf.

12. CDR W. Jacob, USN, “Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century,” U.S. Army War College, 07 April 2003, 5, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA420207.

13. Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Joint Publication 3-18, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 27 November 2012), www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_18.pdf).

14. Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Forces in Amphibious Operations,” FM 31-12, March 1961, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CGSC/CARL/docrepository/FM33_12.pdf.

15. HQDA, Theater Army Operations, FM 3-93, 15 July 2010, p4-4, http://portal.dean.usma.edu/departments/se/nrcd/PDFs/FM%203-93%20(Final%20Draft,%20Jul%2010).pdf.

16. Seventh Sustainment Brigade, www.eustis.army.mil/7sb/defaulty/html.

17. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “The Army’s Navy: Fast Boats, Long Range Rockets Play in Classified Wargame,” BreakingDefense.com, 15 February 2013, http://breakingdefense.

com/2013/02/the-armys-navy-fast-boats-and-long-range-rockets-play-in-north/.

18. HQDA, Shipboard Operations, FM 1-564, 29 June 1997, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm1_564.pdf.

19. Gary J. Ohls, “Fort Fisher: Amphibious Victory in the American Civil War,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2006, 83, www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a75ee11d-9727-4257-9d6d-e1e9dd50ea89/Fort-Fisher--Amphibious-Victory-in-the-American-Ci.aspx.

20. CAPT Marshall O. Becker, USA, The Amphibious Training Center (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1946), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA954909.

21. COL (Ret) Donald W. Boose Jr., USA (Ret.), Over the Beach: U.S. Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2008), 56.

22. Capt Keith F. Kopets, USMC, “Omar Bradley Was Right…,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 2003, www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/%E2%80%98omar-bradley-was-right-%E2%80%99.

23. Boose, Over the Beach.

24. HQDA, “Army Forces in Amphibious Operations.”

25. MAJ GEN William B. Fulton, USA, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1985), 58–60, www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/riverine/chapter3. htm#b5.

26. Ibid., 93-97.

27. LT GEN Joseph M. Heiser Jr., USA (Ret.), Vietnam Studies: Logistic Support (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1991), 167–175, www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/logistic/chapter6. htm.

28. Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: Grenada (Washington: Joint History Office, 1997), 67, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/urgfury.pdf

29. R. Cody Phillips, Operation Just Cause: The Incursion Into Panama, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2004), 22, www.history.army.mil/brochures/Just%20Cause/ JustCause.pdf.

30. David B. Crist, “Joint Special Operations in Support of Earnest Will,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn–Winter 2001–2002, 15–22, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-29/JFQ-29.pdf.