From the Civil War to Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. naval forces have had to contend with mines. No other weapon has presented a greater threat to U.S. domination of the maritime environment.National navies and nationless terrorists will continue to challenge our commercial and military freedom-of-navigation by using these weapons, as well as their poor-man’s cousin, underwater improvised explosive devices. This threat is a direct affront to the core objectives of our maritime forces. As outlined by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, these are: deterrence, forward presence, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, maritime security, power projection, and sea control. It is, therefore, imperative that, to support these missions and maintain unfettered access to the planet’s waterways, U.S. mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities be improved and remain robust.
The last of the Navy’s Avenger-class MCM ships are due to retire in 2024. The 30-year shipbuilding plan submitted to Congress in the early 2000s called for 14 new MCM ships. However, this mandate was canceled in favor of the corvette-sized multi-mission littoral combat ship (LCS) currently joining the Fleet.
When examined from a purely MCM perspective, the problem with the LCS is that the vessel is lacking in several respects, including limited endurance; a metal hull (not a good thing among magnetically influenced mines); mission-specific modules—meaning the LCS is, at any given time and location, either configured or not configured for MCM; and finally sea-handling ability. It is optimistic, if not foolhardy, to maintain that the LCS can handle the MCM mission with effectiveness equal to that of the Avengers they are meant to replace.
When appropriately configured, the LCS will suffice as a littoral MCM platform. However, there will also be a need for a minesweeper-of-the-ocean, a vessel type that can keep up with amphibious or carrier strike groups in any sea-state and that can provide a dedicated forward-deployed MCM capability. This is why it should be a Navy priority to pursue a new mine-countermeasures ship, the MCM(X).
This vessel would be approximately 250 feet long, displace around 1,300 tons, and possess a fiberglass-sheathed wood hull. She would be thin, with a 35-foot beam for fuel efficiency and the ability to keep up with fast strike groups in any sea-state. The MCM(X) would have twin propellers driven by gas turbines during high-speed transit. She would use electric drives during low-speed mine hunting and would have a bow thruster for precise maneuvering and station keeping. Although she would primarily rely on escorts for air defense, the MCM(X) would sport a single close-in weapon system turret for dealing with any leak-through airborne threats and/or small-boat swarm attacks, as well as rail-mounted small arms. The ship’s mine-countermeasures equipment and capabilities would include:
• A dedicated mission-trained crew
• An explosive-ordnance-disposal swimmer team with rigid-hull inflatable boats
• Acoustic and magnetic signature-reduction technology for electrical generation systems and engines
• A large flight deck able to accommodate an MH-60 helicopter equipped with the airborne laser mine-detection system and airborne mine-neutralization system, as well as an MQ-8 Fire Scout vertical-takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle equipped with the new Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis system
• A hull-mounted AN/SQQ-32 variable-depth sonar and cable-controlled SLQ-48 mine-neutralization system
• The ability to launch and recover unmanned mine-countermeasure vehicles such as Kingfish, Knifefish, or the Remote Minehunting System (which consists of the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle and towed AQS-20 sonar).
The U.S. Navy has supercarriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and sleek Tomahawk-spewing cruisers and destroyers. How can the MCM(X) ever hope to compete for attention against these more glorious ships and weapons, let alone the scant funds available in an era of sequestration and limited funds? It can happen if we acknowledge one sobering fact: Since the end of World War II, naval mines have damaged or sunk more U.S. ships than any other type of armament, including aircraft, missiles. terrorist attacks, and torpedoes.
It is only a matter of time before naval mines or an underwater improvised explosive device exacts a further toll in U.S. lood and steel. The LCS is not an oceangoing-dedicated mine-countermeasures ship. Now is the moment when the United States should design and build the MCM(X). Let’s get to it!