‘Distributed Lethality’
(See T. Rowden, P. Gumataotao, and P. Fanta, pp. 18–23, January 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Phillip E. Pournelle, U.S. Navy—Admirals Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta present a way for the surface-warfare community to step out of the defensive crouch it has been in since World War II and provide the Fleet with the opportunity to be more lethal, relevant, and resilient. For this they should be commended. However, there is a glaring omission. In the vignette contained in their article the hunter-killer surface action group (SAG) would be unable to continue to do its mission for long, particularly against a near-peer competitor. The SAG would quickly run out of ordnance and have to retire from the theater to reload, as we can expect enemy anti-access/area-denial capabilities to render fixed bases unusable. To keep SAGs in the fight, we must provide the ability to reload the vertical-launch cells at sea or austere anchorages in theater. This capability is within our grasp if we choose to pursue it.
The Power of Tradition
When Quality Slips
(See B. Millard, pp. 46–50, and N. Pettigrew, pp. 58–64, January 2015 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel David Bolgiano, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—I was extremely pleased to read two timely and well-written articles on the topic of ethics in the January issue. Lieutenant Commander Millard and Mr. Pettigrew both brilliantly touched on the enduring importance of virtue in our military, but from different perspectives and levels of command. Prospective tactical or operational commanders at any level would be well served by Lieutenant Commander Millard’s sound advice. Her humility and sound self-assessment is a model for all seeking magnanimity within the ranks. Similarly, strategic leaders in the planning and procurement milieu must acknowledge the mistakes and recommendations outlined by Mr. Pettigrew in order to be true stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars, especially in these days of fiscal austerity. Bravo Zulu to both authors!
The Beatings Will Continue Until Morale Improves
(See J. Murphy, p. 14, January 2015 Proceedings)
Commander Peter Gregory, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In any discussion of changes in Navy culture, one needs only to go back to September 1991 and what transpired at the Tailhook Convention. The aftermath of the Tailhook incident contributed to the erosion of the warrior culture that up until that time had molded generations of naval leadership. In the wake of the related effects and fallout, you had the rise of the academic/corporate culture that took root in the officer communities and continues to this day. Military or naval leaders were no longer thought of as warriors of the sea, but process managers. Sailors were no longer considered independent agents or mature members of a fighting force, but a risk to be managed and mitigated.
It was at this point that we had the introduction of a host of corporate cultural initiatives, from the Deming process-improvement model to the Lean Six Sigma means of risk management. Conformity to rigid career patterns took root in the warfare communities, and the badge of honor for many naval officers were MBAs and Fellowships either on the Hill or some K Street think tank. In an ever-rising defense budget post-9/11 all this was both possible and encouraged. As the tide of money recedes and the inherent flaws of trying to make a warfighting organization IBM with big guns, the end results of sailor morale and lack of trust in the system become more apparent.
War as a means of statecraft has not been repealed to the best of my knowledge. At some time in the future the U.S. Navy will be involved in a shooting war with some nasty folks who seek to do us harm. Let us hope that all that time many captains spent on Harvard Yard or treating their sailors as children to be managed does not affect their ability to actually sink the bad guys.
More Maritime Strategists—Now
(See M. Hooper and T. Pham, pp. 24–29, December 2014 Proceedings)
Everett Ratzlaff—Captain Hooper and Commander Pham’s article suggests that only military agencies and personnel are to be considered in regard to either war games or strategy. There are lots of very capable, intelligent, and “out-of-the-box” thinkers out there who are thus not considered or listened to. Even the contract-civilian think tanks prefer ex-military people. They also strongly refute anything “not invented here.”
I understand there are two types of war games—those for exercising the systems and those for training the personnel and units (like readiness war games), but there also need to be some realistic “free play” war games, with skilled enemies who don’t operate with the same American culture and mindset. One only needs to study the world news to find some extremely competent enemies who show up many weaknesses in our war plans. A lot of American civilians would like to contribute to better strategies, and many are surprisingly smart militarily. Why won’t we learn from past mistakes and allow “free thinkers” to join in and contribute to better strategies and realistic learning?
For example, not one single U.S. government agency or group, nor a single think tank, ever came up with the idea that a fully fueled airliner could be a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), and it was never put on the specific-and-special existing NSA list as a possible WMD, prior to 9/11. Yet several million people around the world had been well aware of just such a possibility—for seven years before 9/11! After all, a fully fueled 747 was very plausibly flown into the U.S. Capitol building in Tom Clancy’s 1994 novel Debt of Honor. Not all us civilians are part of the military/civilian gap, and we would like to help with that issue as well, but the military has to open its mind and doors to us also.
‘When to Hazard the Fleet’
(See D. Dolan, pp. 54–59, December 2014 Proceedings)
T. S. Momiyama, U.S. Senior Executive Service (Retired)—With all due respect to Commander Dolan’s assuredly real-life-based naval-aviation knowledge and his academic and literal prowess in strategy, policy, and history, I must disagree with his assertion that the “carrier-in” school of thought (operating carriers inside the Persian Gulf and other layered A2/AD networks) implies that naval leaders are being “Navy-centric at the expense of joint operation.” This view misses the fundamental importance of the U.S. Navy’s ten-plus super carriers and their respective strike groups in the defense of the nation and the maintenance of world peace.
The Navy’s super carriers serve beyond their actual war-winning capabilities; their forward presence convinces any potential enemy nation of the perilous odds of fighting against the the United States. All U.S. services jointly contribute to America’s military supremacy, but the super carriers by their very existence underscore that, in every nation’s perception, without firing a shot.
The current naval strategy of keeping carrier strike groups in the global commons—and reaching into tactical areas only when the national policy and attendant possible war situation call for it—supersedes the “carrier-in” notion of indiscriminately putting the Fleet in harm’s way. The Navy’s ongoing development of counter-A2/AD capability further reduces the “carrier-in” hazard.
In the recent counter-ISIS air strike, the first to arrive at the scene was the carrier air wing. Commander Dolan’s argument for Air Force bombers also falls short, as “the nearest air bases” are getting fewer in the new world of fewer military deployments and coalitions, in the economy-first spirit of “globalization”—war costs, after all. The U.S. carriers are there not necessarily to fight another Midway, but to prevent future major wars.
Island Chains and Naval Classics
(See B. D. Cole, pp. 68–73, November 2014, and R. D. Martinson, pp. 9, 72, January 2015 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Brian Moore, U.S. Coast Guard—Captain Cole’s analysis of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) strategy is spot-on in his final sentence. Beijing does have as its greatest rival its billion-resident, non-party members. Thus the most cogent evaluation of China’s might is against an internal uprising/revolt. The Communist Party maintains its position as national authority by rallying public support in a precarious balance between nationalism and terrifying force. History has shown that nothing builds nationalism like confronting an enemy—real or perceived. Much of Beijing’s propaganda about the South China Sea serves to fabricate a historical claim that can later be touted as “self-defense” or “defending Chinese honor” to justify hostile military action aimed to “reclaim” (actually seize) territory. This serves two purposes: to gain access to extensive resources and to rally the populace behind the party leadership.
Beijing observed Vladimir Putin’s “annexation” of Crimea and is now also observing the impact of world-powers sanctions as well as the collective resolve to maintain this measured response to brute force. These sanctions actually mean potential pain to the European powers and their citizens, should Putin use their common dependence on Russian energy exports as a weapon. But any such pain is far less than would accompany outright hostilities.
China can easily conjure up a few show-of-force moves in the South and East China seas, attacking neighboring nations’ smaller commercial boats or clearing a path for oil-exploration vessels through rivals’ patrol craft using China’s larger warships. Such actions could serve well to sinter the populace behind the party, eclipsing concerns over human-rights abuses, political corruption, and environmental and economic degradation that would otherwise be causes for elevated civil unrest.
China’s longstanding dependence on imported oil and coal was reason enough to justify the buildup of naval capabilities. That the Chinese have not done so already is proof enough that something else is influencing today’s massive spending increases required to legitimize the PLAN. I believe China now has a sufficiently robust and sophisticated industrial base such that, ironically, the party now has to contend with its own military/industrial complex. These powerful internal voices see greater profit potential in selling sophisticated (i.e., much more expensive) naval weapon platforms than they can get from sales to the massive but lightly equipped PLA.
While China’s naval capabilities are undoubtedly growing, Beijing’s aspirations will always be corraled by its own population far more effectively than external powers can do. The world would be wisest not to be drawn into conjured conflicts and instead leverage the soft power of our economies to enforce international norms of conduct. We can best impose those norms by maintaining the principles that have made the non-communist countries so successful, and providing to those living under dictatorial conditions an example of a free, prosperous, and healthier way of life.
The ‘Long War’ Continues
(See N. Friedman, pp. 90–91, November 2014, and C. Olson, p. 8, December 2014 Proceedings)
Bob Gabbert—The basic premise of Dr. Friedman’s column is that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is nothing more than a new manifestation of al Qaeda. That is inaccurate. Al Qaeda has splintered into many groups, and it is no longer “the base” organization that it was many years ago when Osama bin Laden was at the height of his power. And it certainly is not the driving force behind ISIL.
Osama bin Laden changed his tactics long ago. He knew he could no longer threaten the United States directly, so he followed the example of the Taliban. His organization printed its version of the Koran, trained teachers (imams), and then sent them to schools (madrassas) in many countries including France, England, and the United States, to radicalize from within. And at least in France and England, his strategy is working.
As a consequence of the change in direction by bin Laden, many left the organization, because they saw al Qaeda as not radical enough. It’s basically only the Western media and governments that lump all of these various new and different groups into al Qaeda. Unfortunately, Dr Friedman has as well.
Iraq was three very different Islamic groups jammed together by the British Empire, not because it made sense, but because it was easier to govern. It should have come as no surprise to anyone that once the strong ruler (Saddam Hussein) was deposed, the three groups would separate and fight each other. It’s simply a civil war that has waited 95 years to begin.
There are several points that I disagree with in the column, but the one that cannot go unchallenged is: “The Islamic State is a direct threat to the United States.” Dr. Friedman is not alone in believing that statement to be true, but look at the facts. ISIL is unlike other so-called terrorist organizations in the sense that, rather than attacking Western powers, including the United States, it is actively trying to create a state. If it were to be successful, it’s possible that at some point down the road, it might turn its energy toward attacking the United States or other Western countries, but that is certainly not what it’s doing now.
How this idea came about that ISIL is a direct threat to the United States is not easily understood, because there have been no known attempts by ISIL or anyone associated with it to attack the United States or other Western powers. There are threats by French, British, and American citizens who have become radicalized, but that is the result of the long-term strategy of bin Laden mentioned here. One does not become a radical overnight, and bin Laden’s strategy, through the madrassas in poor neighborhoods of America and other countries, is working, and it was working long before anyone ever heard of ISIL.