Outgoing Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has belatedly directed a path for developing the littoral combat ship-to-frigate effort for the highly criticized LCS program. Last February, in response to that criticism and to the Navy’s need for frigate-like ships, he placed a cap on the LCS numbers at 32 hulls or fewer and told the Navy to develop a “small surface combatant” (SSC).
The principal candidates for the SSC—another abomination that will likely become an official ship designation—were: (1) an increased-capability version of the Lockheed Martin LCS Freedom (LCS-1); (2) an increased-capability version of the Austal LCS Independence (LCS-2); (3) development of a new small/light frigate design; (4) an increased-capability version of the Coast Guard’s national security cutter; and (4) adoption of a foreign warship design, especially, the Danish Absalon-class frigate.1
Now, in a 10 December memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary Hagel has thanked the Navy’s leadership for responding thoroughly to his earlier request to “submit to me alternate proposals for a capable small surface combatant that is more lethal and survivable than the current Flight 0+ Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) now in serial production,” and added, “After giving careful thought to . . . [your] options, I approve your plan to procure a small surface combatant (SSC) based on an upgraded Flight 0+ LCS. . . .”
Several systems appear necessary for a new frigate-type warship: upgraded radar, surface-to-air missiles, a larger gun than the current 57-mm Mk-110 gun fitted in the LCS, plus lighter 20-mm or 30-mm weapons; and advanced electronic-countermeasure systems. Beyond those basics, the new frigate possibly would have hull-mounted sonar as well as the capability for towed arrays and of course manned helicopters and unmanned vertical-takeoff vehicles as in the current LCS designs.
In comparison to the mission modules of the current LCS program that are embarked to provide primary combat capabilities, the basic frigate suite should have a built-in antisurface and antisubmarine capability plus an effective air-defense system. The mine-countermeasures (MCM) capability—one of the LCS mission modules—will likely be sacrificed in favor of smaller, specialized mine-warfare ships. Of course, the existing LCS platforms could be employed primarily for MCM when the mine-warfare modules are fully developed and produced.
While a new-design frigate probably would have been the ideal solution to developing a new small surface combatant, the design, approval, funding, and construction of a prototype new frigate would take a decade or more.
The Coast Guard’s Legend-class national security cutters are being constructed by Huntington Ingalls in Pascagoula, Mississippi, with four ships now in service and four more planned. These ships are slightly larger than the LCS designs; they have a top speed of only 28 knots, and, being a traditional frigate-type design they do not have the “garage” space for mission or support containers, which would add to the new frigate’s flexibility. There are several proposals to “up-gun” the cutters to frigate standards based on the ship’s open-architecture configuration.2
The adaptation of a foreign design is not unprecedented: The U.S. Navy’s 12 mine countermeasures ships of the Osprey (MHC-51) class completed from 1993 to 1999 were built to a modified Italian Lerici design. They were not considered successful and all were discarded at an early age, several going to allied or neutral nations.3 Developing an “Americanized” frigate from a foreign design would be considerably more complex than the MHC project because of the U.S. weapon systems, sensors, aviation-handling facilities, and other features that would have to be incorporated in a frigate-type warship. Depending on the “culture” of the nation that designed the ship, in U.S. service extensive changes may be required in berthing and head facilities to accept the requirement for women to serve in U.S. warships.
The more reasonable approach is to up-gun one of the two LCS designs. The original LCS concept was to construct prototypes of the two designs and, after trials, select one for production of 50-plus ships. The Navy selected both designs for series production. With different engines, propulsors, auxiliary machinery, radars, communications gear, and other equipment, the two-design LCS program has required two training programs, two sets of spare parts, prevented easy personnel transfers between classes, etc. Thus, the Navy has ordered 12 ships of each LCS design from Lockheed Martin and Austal with the first few units of both designs now in commission.
The numerous problems found in both designs have been largely corrected in subsequent ships of the respective classes. These included a personnel shortage that has now been mitigated by adding ten enlisted crew members and three or four ensigns to each core crew (originally eight officers and 32 enlisted; see the accompanying table).
However, issues remain with both LCS designs. A recent, comprehensive analysis by the Government Accountability Office states:
. . . important questions remain about how LCS will operate and what capabilities it will provide the Navy. The first operational deployment of an LCS to Singapore gave the Navy an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts operationally. The deployment was limited to only one of the two variants carrying one of three mission packages. In addition, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time operationally as planned. As a result, some key concepts could not be tested. [The Freedom lost 55 mission days during the ten-month deployment because of mechanical problems.] . . . Outstanding weight management and concurrency risks related to buying ships while key concepts and performance are still being tested continue to complicate LCS acquisitions.4
And, following the Freedom’s ten-month deployment to the Western Pacific in 2013, the 7th Fleet evaluation “expressed uncertainty about LCS’s potential capabilities and attributes, or how they would best utilize an LCS in their theater.”5
The LCS program is further problematic because none of the three mission packages (modules) is complete and ready for production. (The packages are antisubmarine, antisurface, and mine countermeasures.)
Logic demands that only one LCS design be selected for transformation to a frigate-like warship as called for by Secretary Hagel. To develop “new” warships based on both LCS designs would exacerbate the costs as well as the logistic, training, and personnel-assignment issues of the current situation. At this writing it appears that Secretary Hagel is calling for the Navy to provide a new SSC acquisition strategy to accompany the upgrades to existing LCS hulls and to support procurement of new ships no later than Fiscal Year 2019, and sooner if possible.
Each of the LCS designs offers advantages; in the opinion of the author these features include:
Freedom
• Steel hull (the Independence has an aluminum hull; the steel hull of the Freedom is estimated to have a service life of 25 years compared to 17 years for the aluminum-hull Independence)
• Superior launch/recovery system for 36-foot rigid-hull inflatable boats.
Independence
• Larger mission payload (i.e., can accommodate more mission modules/containers and still operate aircraft)
• Superior mission-module loading system
• Significantly larger flight deck and hangar
• Greater cruising range.
The Freedom frigate concept also benefits from Lockheed Martin having developed several detailed designs for up-gunned LCS platforms for potential foreign sales—some lengthened from the current 387 feet to either 410 or 459 feet. Accordingly, so far as is publicly known, there are several advanced variants of the Freedom that can be readily adapted for some of the hulls now on the building ways at Marinette Marine in Wisconsin, as well as for new-construction ships. Beyond combat systems, these variants include enhanced survivability features and extended range.
Regardless of which LCS design is adapted for the new small surface combatant, a decision should be made soon and followed through with high priority. The U.S. Navy needs frigate-like warships.6 Secretary Hagel’s guidance will help to build a better Navy—if the Navy’s leadership makes the correct decisions and soon.
1. Norman Polmar, “Royal Danish Navy: An Operational LCS,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 135, no. 9 (September 2009), 86–87.
2. Scott C. Truver, “Payloads over Platforms: Designing the ‘Flexible Frigate,’” Naval Engineers Journal, vol. 125, no. 3 (September 2013), 51–58.
3. The Osprey-class ships were in commission from 8½ to 12½ years.
4. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Tests and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments, GAO-14-749 (Washington, DC: July 2014), Overview. See also see GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost, GAO-13-530 (Washington, DC: 22 July 2013).
5. GAO, Littoral Combat Ship, 19.
6. Norman Polmar, “‘Where Are the Frigates?’” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 139, no. 6 (June 2013), 86–87.
LCS Personnel
Original core crew: 8 officers, 32 enlisted
Reinforced core crew: 11–12 officers*, 42 enlisted
Mission crew: approx. 20
Aviation detachment: 20–25**
* Includes three or four ensigns assigned to most ships.
** Varies based on one or two MH-60 Seahawk helicopters being embarked (plus unmanned aerial vehicles).