2014 Naval History Essay Contest Winner
Transformational leadership at the Battle of Vella Gulf changed the course of the Pacific War—and molded U.S. destroyer developments to this day.
Leading transformative change is always difficult and generally requires the drive from those at the top of an organization. Doing so from more junior positions inside an organization such as the U.S. Navy requires a special type of leader. The late Vice Admiral Frederick Moosbrugger was just such a leader. Today, he is best known as namesake for the USS Moosbrugger (DD-980), a Spruance-class destroyer in service from 1978 to 2000. However, in mid-1943 he was neither high-ranking nor well known, but just one of hundreds of obscure commanders serving across the vast Pacific. That summer, the South Pacific was a tough time and place for the U.S. military. World War II’s final outcome was far from certain, the triumphant conclusion still over two years of hard fighting away.
Today, with the “Greatest Generation” passing and the decades increasing since the war’s end, the history and the battles recede ever further from the public conscience. Among the oft-forgotten battle sites are the Solomon Islands. Some may recall two famous stories—the fierce fighting of U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal and future President John F. Kennedy’s saga as captain of PT-109—not realizing they both occurred within the Solomons. However, other U.S. Navy efforts in the Solomons had farther-reaching consequences for the battle for the Pacific, the Navy overall, and its future warfighting capabilities seen today. Just five nights after, and less than 20 miles to the north of PT-109’s sinking, one of those events was a small battle in Vella Gulf, where Moosbrugger delivered a victory that was an incubator for, and still serves today as a model of, transformative leadership.
It has been said that transformation comes in the furnace of affliction.1 Destroyermen in the South Pacific in mid-1943 were certainly afflicted by many tribulations—not the least of which were the Navy’s dogmatic doctrine and existing notions of destroyer warfare. As their training, tactics, and weapons improved, the destroyer crews grew increasingly frustrated with the heavy attrition and seemingly wasted capabilities. A group of these destroyermen knew there had to be a better way. New leadership, new technologies, new ideas, and new circumstances were about to combine into a destroyer renaissance. The chorus of voices calling for this change grew louder, but the commander who brought the choir into harmony for the first time was Frederick Moosbrugger.
'Their Capabilities Had Been Wasted'
The Solomons total over 900 islands, atolls, and coral reefs, with the largest islands stretching roughly 700 miles in two parallel lines of volcanic, jungle-covered terrain. Averaging 30–60 miles in width, New Georgia Sound is the main body of water separating these island chains. The sea offered maneuver alternatives around difficult landscapes to support one’s own forces as well as outflank enemies. The attraction did not go unnoticed. The sound was referred to as “the Slot” and was the avenue for the Tokyo Express—the nickname given to Japanese efforts to provide resupply to their troops and island garrisons via ships.
In the opening months from August–December 1942, five major naval engagements occurred in a small area north of Guadalcanal. The resulting fighting at sea was fierce. Battles at Savo Island, Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal (twice), and Tassafaronga totaled roughly only 188 minutes of actual combat. But coupled with other isolated sinkings, a total of more than 100 ships and nearly 1,500 aircraft were lost by the U.S. Navy, its allies, and the Imperial Japanese Navy. This collective total of over half a million tons of military hardware coming to rest on the sea floor in an area approximately the size of metropolitan Savannah, Georgia, earned Skylark Channel, the area just north of Guadalcanal, a new name from U.S. sailors—Iron Bottom Sound. The human cost was staggering, with Iron Bottom Sound also the watery grave to 15,000–20,000 sailors and airmen of both sides.2 Destroyers had taken a terrible beating during this period, comprising nearly half the ships sunk in total. Many others had been severely damaged, finding shelter at nearby islands for immediate repairs, or sent back home for more extensive work.
Doctrine dictated the destroyers’ main function as screening formations of larger ships—cruisers, battleships, and aircraft carriers. In this role, the destroyers were often the first to come in contact with the enemy. They also often found themselves in unglamorous but vital support missions, such as performing escort duty for merchant and supply ships. However, these duties inherently tied the destroyer to either larger formations or to slow cargo vessels.
Destroyers of this era were also in the early wave of several technological advancements. Radar was going to sea for both target detection and fire control to guide guns and the targeting of torpedoes. Sonar was providing rudimentary underwater-tracking capability. The addition of a combat information center (CIC) to fuse together all information provided by sensors and communications systems was a third critical component in how destroyers were evolving. Coupled with improved weapons, these technologies were rapidly giving destroyers an ability to “punch above their weight” if given the freedom to maneuver and engage. However, whether destroyers were screening formations or escorting cargo vessels, their inherent agility and extended “reach” of new radars and weapons were underutilized in these classic supporting roles. Commenting on the ever growing frustration, one officer later remarked, “destroyer captains felt their capabilities had been wasted when they were locked into columns with cruisers. . . .”3
Commander Frederick Moosbrugger set out to transform independent-destroyer night tactics. He had the blessing of his immediate commander, Rear Admiral T. S. “Ping” Wilkinson, himself a former captain of four different destroyers and a World War I Medal of Honor recipient who was facing the Tokyo Express with few other options. Moosbrugger also inherited battle ideas from a kindred soul, Commander Arleigh Burke, from whom Moosbrugger assumed command just days before the battle. The idea was to end the practice of keeping destroyers tethered to formations of larger ships. Instead, they would utilize the destroyers’ speed and combined combat punch of guns and torpedoes in night attacks that could capitalize on surprise as well.
Moosbrugger planned with exacting detail. Ship-column assignments were based on weapon configurations and likelihood of targets to be encountered (enemy destroyers or barges). Speeds and geographic positions for columns were defined to minimize the chance of detection by the Japanese. As destroyers’ torpedoes were known for faulty depth fuses, Moosbrugger ordered changes to the depth settings to improve the chances for hits. He added another twist to create simultaneous surprises by changing the maneuvering plan to have both columns open up gunfire from different directions just as the torpedoes found their mark.
Moosbrugger inherited Burke’s team of ship captains and knew that open two-way communications and rapid trust-building with them would be critical. He first met with Rodger Simpson, who would lead the second column of ships in the battle. The two discussed the entire operation from every angle and achieved mutual understanding regarding actions necessary in any circumstance. Moosbrugger next convened a conference of his six destroyer captains, reviewing plans in detail to ensure full understanding of the commander’s intent during actions to come in Vella Gulf. Moosbrugger felt “mutual understanding between commanders and commanding officers is requisite to complete and coordinated destruction of the enemy.”4 With the benefit of hindsight, Moosbrugger later commented that “this conference was of great value as it enabled any doubtful points to be cleared up. There was complete mutual understanding of all possible situations to be encountered.”5
The Battle is Joined
The first column of ships—the Dunlap, Craven (DD-382), and Maury (DD-401)—reached firing positions and launched salvos of eight torpedoes each. Moosbrugger pressed his ships, whose torpedoes were designed for longer-range attacks of over seven nautical miles, in to less than three miles for higher probability of success. The extreme darkness and shadow of the nearby mountains on Kolombangara Island helped mask their approach. The 24 “fish” began their runs, accelerating to over 40 knots and stretching their deadly tracks toward the still unsuspecting Japanese. Both columns of American ships began to maneuver in case of a Japanese torpedo counterattack, and to position for subsequent gun engagements.
At 2346, only 13 minutes after initial contact, and almost 4 minutes after the torpedo spread was fired, sonar operators heard a loud underwater explosion rapidly followed by visual confirmations of explosions on the horizon. Within seconds, the second column—the USS Lang (DD-399), Sterett (DD-407), and Stack (DD-406)—began hammering away with 5-inch guns. The first column immediately turned back in and quickly joined in on the gunfire. Over the next 30 minutes, the six destroyers poured more than 800 rounds of 5-inch gunfire into the four-ship Japanese formation. The deafening roar of multiple guns from different directions echoed like powerful thunder across the gulf. The superbly timed triple blow crippled then sank three enemy destroyers, the explosions so loud that PT boat sailors over 30 miles away thought a volcano had erupted on Kolombangara.6 The fourth Japanese destroyer was only spared due to torpedoes that failed to detonate (a dent was later found in the rudder of this ship where the torpedo impacted but did not explode). The U.S. Navy had no battle casualties, and not a single Japanese bullet or torpedo found its mark.
Innovations Forged in Combat
Unfortunately, CIC setups in these destroyers were afterthoughts, added well after construction. Moosbrugger and his team’s after-action report’s CIC-improvement recommendations began to find their way back to the United States and eventually into the building designs of destroyers that were coming to join the fight.10 The focus on CIC layout and design as the central hub of shipboard C2 has remained a preeminent consideration in the design of every U.S. Navy destroyer since. More than 70 years after Vella Gulf, the CIC remains a key shipboard location from where C2 is exercised. It first fully coalesced for victory with Moosbrugger and his team, and that early triumph showed the way to a better future for C2 systems, battle tactics, and innovations we are still benefiting from today.
Several ships also saw the transition of the executive officer from the traditional bridge location to the CIC to provide senior leadership with this critical new capability. Effectively a forerunner to the modern tactical action officer, the executive officers at Vella Gulf were coordinating with the bridge, gun control, radar plot, torpedo control, and other ships while identifying navigation landmarks, evaluating contacts, disseminating information to control stations, and keeping the captains advised and therefore focused on maneuvering ships within tight formations at night.11
In less than an hour, the men of TG 31.2 changed the momentum of the fight against the Tokyo Express and signaled a sea change in the course of destroyer development. Their victory would have lasting impacts that Commodore Moosbrugger and his men could not imagine as they sailed into Vella Gulf that fateful night. It was the first time destroyers were handled solely—and successfully—as a tactical offensive force, but it would not be the last. It was the first decisive U.S. victory in a torpedo duel—the Tokyo Express could be stopped. The speed and surprise Moosbrugger put to the test created the desired effects. The battle was a significant defeat for the Japanese, who lost three ships (with a fourth damaged) and roughly 1,200 sailors and troops. Perhaps more important was the humiliation to the Japanese destroyermen, who had intense pride in their service record and previously undisputed mastery of night torpedo duels.12 The U.S. destroyers proved that, when given the latitude to fight on their own terms, they too could decisively win night fights using the new technologies, weapons, and tactics together. The Battle of Vella Gulf was a breakthrough event, a disruptive rejection of the decades-old conception of destroyer warfare. The tactical innovations became the foundation for subsequent destroyer victories in the Solomons, where Arleigh Burke would gain fame, and in continued destroyer successes with their new battle doctrines in the final two years of war in the Pacific.
Continuing Relevance
Destroyers have over 70 years of accelerated development tracing back to Vella Gulf. Setting aside niche capabilities providing particular dominance in a select few navies, in practical application, multimission destroyers have become today’s capital ships with more than 190 in service across more than a dozen navies. Although considerably larger than their World War II counterparts, destroyers have found a “sweet spot” for combat, endurance, sea-keeping ability, and cost for those desiring an open-ocean, blue-water naval capability.
The continuing transformation of the destroyer has seen significant innovations, including propulsion and power technology, weapons, sensors, and even entirely new missions like long-range strike and ballistic-missile defense. This was highlighted a year ago when five Arleigh Burke–class destroyers formed the main striking force in the eastern Mediterranean poised to conduct Tomahawk missile strikes against the Assad regime’s chemical weapons in Syria, as well as using their Aegis combat system to provide defense against ballistic missiles potentially launched from Syria and elsewhere. The Burkes formed the sole U.S. show of force in close proximity to the Syrian coastline.13 This is a long evolution from the days of destroyers providing only screening actions for larger naval formations. Here, five destroyers were the centerpiece of military diplomacy for an entire nation in an international event with global implications. Destroyers have truly become multimission platforms able to adapt and transform over their service lives. Paragons of naval innovation, destroyers are at the vanguard of U.S. forward defense in warfare both at and from the sea. And these past 70 years of successful evolution began at Vella Gulf.
'Classic of Naval Warfare'
For his efforts, Moosbrugger earned both the Navy Cross and the sobriquet “a little classic of naval warfare” for the battle.14 Just days later, Arleigh Burke wrote, “Dear Moose . . . your battle the other night will go down in history as one of the most successful actions ever fought. It was splendidly conceived and marvelously executed.” Burke also wrote to Moosbrugger’s subordinate commander, Rodger Simpson, “[the battle] was perfect in every respect . . . an attack . . . every destroyer sailor dreams about.” Tameichi Hara, captain of the sole surviving Japanese ship at Vella Gulf, the destroyer Shigure, summed it up even more succinctly: “a perfect American victory.”15
The U.S. Navy holds its history and heroes close. Doing so fosters living legacies to remind today’s sailors of the accomplishments of those who have gone before them. The destroyer successes at Vella Gulf are no exception. In addition to the USS Moosbrugger, there’s the USS Simpson (FFG-56), named for Rodger Simpson. A cruiser carries the name USS Vella Gulf (CG-72). And the modern destroyer USS Sterett (DDG-104), perpetuating the name of her Vella Gulf forerunner, was commissioned on the battle’s 65th anniversary in August 2008, with numerous battle veterans in attendance as guests of honor.
2. Russell Maharaj, Contamination Risk Assessment From WWII Armoury in Iron Bottom Sound Solomon Islands, Final Technical Report prepared by the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), SOPAC Technical Report 280, May 1999, 10, 15, 18–21, ict.sopac.org/VirLib/TR0280.pdf.
3. Russell S. Crenshaw Jr., South Pacific Destroyer: The Battle for the Solomons from Savo Island to Vella Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 26.
4. Department of the Navy, Commander, Destroyer Division 15 (CDR DesDiv 15), Action Report for Night of 6–7 August 1943, FB4-15/A16-3/clh Serial 005 (12 August 1943), 1.
5. Department of the Navy, Commander, Destroyer Division 12 (CDR DesDiv 12), Action Report for Night of August 6–7, 1943—Battle of Vella Gulf, FB12/A16-3 Serial 10 (16 August 1943), Enclosure (C), 12.
6. E. B. Potter, Seapower: A Naval History, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 313.
7. Ibid.
8. CDR DesDiv 12, Action Report.
9. Most prevalently highlighted in: Department of the Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Stack, Action Report for Night of 6–7 August, 1943, DD406/A16-1 Serial 008 (14 August 1943), 4; Commanding Officer, USS Craven, Vella Gulf Night Action of August 6–7, 1943—Report of, DD382/A16-3, Serial 081 (8 August 1943), 6; Commanding Officer, USS Dunlap, Action Report of USS Dunlap (384), Battle of Vella Gulf 6–7 August 1943, DD384/A16-3 Serial 012 (18 August 1943), Enclosure (A), 19.
10. Department of the Navy, Commander in Chief United States Fleet, Battle Experience, Naval Operations, Solomon Islands Area, 12 July–10 August 1943, Information Bulletin No. 11 (6 December 1943), 58-27.
11. CO Craven, Vella Gulf Night Action, 5. Department of the Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Maury, Report of Night Destroyer Attack Against Japanese Surface Ships in Vella Gulf, Night of August 6, 1943, DD401/A16-3 Serial 012 (15 August 1943), 6.
12. Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 279.
13. Michel Chossudovsky, “US and Allied Warships off the Syrian Coastline: Naval Deployment Was Decided ‘Before’ the August 21 Chemical Weapons Attack,” Global Research, 2 September 2013, www.globalresearch.ca/massive-naval-deployment-us-and-allied-warships-deployed-to-syrian-coastline-before-the-august-21-chemical-weapons-attack.
14. Potter, Seapower, 313.
15. E. B. Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke: A Biography (New York: Random House, 1990), 84–85. Personal correspondence between Commodore Arleigh Burke and Commodore Rodger Simpson, 9 August 1943, quoted in Stephen Davis, “Perfect in Every Respect,” Naval History, vol. 22, no. 4 (August 2008), 33. Tameichi Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 190.
Captain Miller is the former commanding officer of the destroyer USS Mahan (DDG-72) and was executive officer of the USS Vella Gulf (CG-72). He employed many of Moosbrugger’s leadership concepts while spearheading development of a total transformation plan for U.S. Southern Command. He is the author of Funding Extended Conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, and the War on Terror (Praeger Security International, 2007).