As a statement loosely attributed to the notebook of an unnamed Soviet junior lieutenant says, “One of the serious problems in planning to fight against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.” While likely apocryphal, it contains more than a kernel of truth about prevalent U.S. Navy attitudes toward doctrine. Today it is considered a vaguely foreign concept, avoided when possible, ignored when not, and best left to the Army or Marine Corps. Captain Wayne Hughes’ assertion that “American naval officers today are . . . wary of doctrine” is right on target.1
The U.S. Navy’s interest in doctrine of all types has faded over the past decades. Discussing strategies and formulating operational concepts enjoys a certain cachet, but there is no similar enthusiasm for the sustained effort and difficult work necessary to develop, maintain, and spread doctrine. But the distaste and consequent disregard is more than just unfortunate. Doctrine has historically played a major role in naval combat and will continue to do so. If the Navy is forced in the future to confront a sea-control challenge posed by a competent near-peer competitor, the need for sound doctrine executed by indoctrinated sailors will reemerge. With this in mind, it is high time for a doctrine renaissance.
Meaning and Purpose
In joint lexicon, “doctrine” is defined as “fundamental principles by which military forces or elements guide their actions.”2 The Navy Warfare Library expanded this definition to include “the overarching guidance that allows collections of Navy units to operate effectively as a Navy force.”3 Together the principles and guidance are intended to provide forces with a shared notion of how to think about combat and a common foundation for behavior during combat.
To use an older term, doctrines collectively are the “fighting instructions” that “enunciate policies and procedures that govern action.4 This definition is hardly new. In 1915 Lieutenant Commander Dudley Knox captured these points when he stated that military doctrine is the collection of beliefs and teachings “intended to be general guides to the application of mutually accepted principles, and thus furnish a practical basis for coordination under the extremely difficult conditions governing contact between hostile forces.”5
Doctrine exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and there is no shortage of publications that are referred to as such. The term is applied to joint publications, Navy doctrine publications, Navy warfare publications, Tactics-Techniques and Procedures or TTPs (in joint, multiservice, and Navy varieties), allied tactical publications, and others. Each of these has a different focus, ranging from the defining warfighting philosophy to prescribing the operations of individual units. Together these publications make up what is known as the “doctrine hierarchy.” While some would choose to define doctrine more narrowly, it could also be described as any document that conveys combat principles or common guidance to fighting forces.
In military writings, authors categorize doctrine in formal and informal categories. In his book Command at Sea, Michael Palmer distinguished between formal doctrine such the “Royal Navy’s fighting instructions or U.S. Navy’s Sound Military Decisions of 1942” and the “informal, personal doctrine formulated by commanders in times of war.”6 Both formal and informal doctrines have played important roles. Historically, informal doctrine has been conveyed directly by the commander to subordinates. Lord Horatio Nelson, or more recently, Admiral Arleigh Burke, had the opportunity to share their visions of the battle with subordinate captains and discuss how they expected subordinates to react in relation to unexpected threats or opportunities and to each other. Informal doctrine remains as important today as it has throughout history.
However, when war is conducted by joint forces dispersed over thousands of miles, joining and departing as necessary and operating in the air, surface, subsurface, and cyber domains, there is a need for something that can extend beyond the reach of the commander. As it has historically, formal doctrine can function as the basis for training and provide forces with common skills and standards for conducting and coordinating operations.7 These skills and standards permit dispersed, dissimilar, and unfamiliar forces to operate effectively together. In a fluid maritime campaign, doctrine provides another key benefit: Commonly indoctrinated forces provide commanders with the confidence that forces that are beyond his or her personal reach will react to orders or plans in an effective and predictable manner.
It is also important to understand what doctrine is not: It’s neither a plan that defines operational objectives and the commanders’ intended method to achieve those objectives nor an order that directs a specific action. It supports plans and orders by providing forces with a common playbook. Doctrine is authoritative but not directive, and rather than a restriction on the creativity of the commander, common understanding provides a baseline from which the commander can deviate without fearing that chaos will ensue. When it is present and understood, plans can be developed with the understanding that forces currently attached (or will join later) will interpret orders and plans in the same manner and understand the actions of other units without extensive communications or direction.
What We Risk Without It
Before addressing why doctrine is so important today, it may be worth considering the alternative. In the extreme, its absence would force commanders to direct all actions of the force, either by plan or specific orders. This would necessitate the development of plans and concepts of operations detailing each subordinate’s actions and responses to the largest number of potential situations. Since it would be impossible for any commander to correctly anticipate all circumstances that may arise during combat, plans would have to be augmented with reliable and secure communications. This would permit centralized direction should a subordinate encounter an event for which a response had not been previously planned. It would also require a commander with sufficient knowledge of local conditions and the ability to overcome the temporal and spatial difficulties inherent in directing tactical actions far from the scene of an event. Historically, this sort of centralized direction has not met with success.
Beyond the imposing technical requirements, reliance on centralized direction and control also imparts a psychological cost. The late Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski stated (to paraphrase), “It is much easier to centralize the operations of forces used to operating in decentralized fashion, than to decentralize the operations of those used to centralized control.”8 His point was that forbidding a specific set of actions was easily understandable (“don’t do the following”), while subordinates used to detailed direction would struggle to determine the extent of their authority in the absence of direction.
History supports his thesis. Nelson succeeded in large part because his captains knew how to act in accordance with his intent, understood their roles (i.e., were indoctrinated), and the extent of their authority to deviate from established plans. Conversely, French admiral Pierre André de Suffren suffered in the Indian Ocean because his captains, not used to showing initiative, could not operate in the absence of specific instruction.9 This is admittedly an oversimplification, but the underlying point is germane.
Beyond the historical precedents against centralized command and control (C2), the nature of future conflict will likely not permit it. While our ability to communicate has increased to an extent that would have amazed previous generations, our reliance on instantaneous, globally networked communications has introduced an exploitable vulnerability. U.S. forces have developed a way of war that relies on the uninterrupted transmission of massive amounts of digital data across cyberspace. For the last 70 years we have operated across the electromagnetic spectrum with relative impunity. Given our well-known reliance on digital data and demonstrated capability when allowed unfettered communications, an adversary would be remiss in not attacking these networks. When a potential competitor includes a technologically advanced country or one with access to sophisticated equipment and personnel, the U.S. Navy should anticipate the degradation or denial of the radio-frequency spectrum and the contamination and alteration of digital messages.
Doctrine’s Role in War
In a future war against a peer or near-peer adversary, doctrine will be essential to permit distributed forces to operate in a decentralized manner. In this type of conflict, the United States will be challenged by a range of sea- and land-based threats, and the Navy will fight at a quantitative—and at times, qualitative—disadvantage. Success in this environment will necessitate a fluid command and organizational structure in which friendly forces will temporarily combine to accomplish tasks and then disperse to enhance their survivability. Battle damage, equipment casualties—and, more positively, the desire to tailor force packages—will impact the integrity of individual strike groups. In this type of scenario, a commander will not have the opportunity enjoyed by Lord Nelson to personally transmit his “doctrine” to his captains over many months. Therefore the commander will have to find an alternative means to communicate principles and guidance to assigned forces. Formal doctrine can fill this void by ensuring that forces share a common set of principles and guidance that can then be expanded and modified by the commander’s specific plans and concepts of operation.
Doctrine can assist in building this common understanding between senior and subordinate. At the operational level of war, doctrine should provide a common terminology and define standard organizational relationships, functions, and responsibilities. At the tactical level, it should provide common “combat skills needed by the commander.”10 Doctrine does not constrain the commander’s creativity and flexibility but rather provides a clearly understood point of departure should local conditions make deviation necessary or desirable. In a chaotic combat situation, sound doctrine permits indoctrinated subordinate commanders to exercise initiative in the face of unforeseen opportunities or problems and equips them with the tools to act when either time or direction is unavailable. Likewise, if a commander is confident that subordinates know how they are supposed to act, they will be more likely to trust in what Admiral Ernest J. King referred to as the “initiative of the subordinate.”11
There is also an inherent value in the process of developing doctrine, which should involve contemplation, competing ideas, testing, heated discussion, and even disagreement. Naval professionals should think about and have an opinion regarding the fighting instructions under development. But outside of a few isolated pockets, naval professionals currently have precious little time to think abstractly about the instructions that will guide future war. A process of doctrine development could provide a forum in which warfighters address the fundamental questions of how we will fight. This is not without cost. Nearly all naval personnel would love to think about the bigger picture but are too busy with each day’s demands and requirements. Therefore, the Navy can accrue the benefits of doctrine development only if it determines that doctrine is important and commits the time, money, and personnel to make the process worthwhile.
The Challenges
If there are indeed compelling reasons to develop and internalize doctrine, it is reasonable to ask, “If it is so beneficial, why don’t we use it?” Building good doctrine is hard, and we haven’t needed to go through the difficult process. In the nearly 70 years since the end of World War II, only in the late 1970s and 1980s did the U.S. Navy face an existential challenge on the high seas. But the challenge posed by the Soviet Union was conducted against the backdrop of a nuclear threat and the subsequent need to carefully manage escalation. As a result, C2 during the Cold War deemphasized decentralized operations based on doctrine in favor of centralized control. While tight control may have been appropriate to avoid conflict, it is doubtful it would have sufficed if the Cold War had gone hot. This recognition may have been what prompted Vice Admiral James “Ace” Lyons and later Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf to publish the Commander 2nd Fleet Fighting Instructions, which detailed future combat with the Soviet Navy.
In other conflicts during this period, the Navy has acted with relative impunity. Consider that the last U.S. Navy ships sunk in combat were struck by mines during the Korean War! Since then, the Navy has been involved in operations in Vietnam and Lebanon and against the naval forces of Iraq and Iran. In none of those conflicts did the United States face an adversary remotely capable of defeating it. In the absence of a compelling need to embark on the difficult and time-consuming act of producing and integrating effective doctrine, doctrine development fell victim to other priorities.
The second problem, arguably, is that the quality of Navy doctrine as a whole has not been up to standards. This is not the fault of the Navy Warfare Development Command, which has battled valiantly against apathy and uncertain budgets. But the truth is that existing doctrine is sometimes inconsistent, uneven, and often outdated. Unfortunately its quality reflects the Navy’s level (or lack) of interest. This has been reflected in funding decisions such as the decommissioning or downsizing of doctrine-development organizations, the removal of doctrine billets at the numbered fleets, and inconsistent funding for the tactical development and evaluation program. Doctrine’s low priority is also reflected in the manner in which many Navy commands treat the staffing of individual doctrine publications. Rather than enjoying a high command priority, the staffing of developmental doctrine is typically foisted on an overworked junior officer who is asked to make an acceptable number of comments that are then submitted often without serious command review. If the Navy is to have better doctrine, it will have to make the proper investment of time and money.
How Can We Strengthen Doctrine?
The first step in improving the quality and usefulness of doctrine is to accept that we need better doctrine. This requires acknowledging that our combat experiences gained over past decades will have little relevance in a future conflict. Against a near-peer competitor we will face formidable threats in an environment where the Navy may not be able to rely on the global reach of instantaneous communications. To prevail, naval forces will have to make tactical decisions based on their training and understanding of the commander’s intentions interpreted through the lens of doctrine. Accepted doctrine will provide unit commanding officers with guidance for the conduct of operations and higher commands with the assurance that all forces assigned, or joining later, will act in a predictable fashion.12 But this can only occur if forces become “indoctrinated.”
The necessary indoctrination of the Fleet will not happen automatically. It is not a simple matter of writing good doctrine (though that would help). Doctrine will not provide any benefit if it sits unread and unabsorbed in the digital equivalent of a dusty bookshelf. To be effective, it must be taught and discussed during formal education and training. Doctrine should play a role in the design and development of war games, and examining it should be a key objective in Fleet exercises. When problems are found as a result of these events they should be fixed. Finally, naval personnel should be familiar enough with doctrine to frequently challenge its validity and not shy away from demanding that it needs to be updated or changed.
In the future, the numbered fleets must drive doctrine development to a greater degree than is possible today. In current practice, numbered fleets nominate potential doctrinal topics, which are then prioritized and funded to the extent possible. This is not sufficient. This is not to suggest that doctrine development should be dumped on the already overworked fleet staffs. But the closer that doctrine development exists to the “customer,” the better and more relevant its content will be. Involving the Fleet requires more than just periodically requesting inputs, accepting a few, and then staffing a draft document. Each fleet should be provided the resources (financial, personnel, and access to expertise) to determine what they really need (not just what is affordable) and get it produced quickly. To accomplish this, doctrine-development commands should be provided with the financial and personnel resources to determine Fleet requirements, produce documents in a timely fashion, and perhaps train personnel on their contents. This will cost money. But spending a little to determine how to best employ forces is a bargain considering the billions spent procuring them.
In 1915 Lieutenant Commander Dudley Knox wrote:
The object of military doctrine is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force, in accordance with the intentions of the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken.13
This remains its purpose today. Sound doctrine applied by well-trained and indoctrinated personnel can provide the tools that will permit Navy forces to face the challenges it will face in the 21st century. In a world where U.S. access is being increasingly challenged, a renewed focus on doctrine is a necessity.
1. CAPT Wayne Hughes, USN, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 31.
2. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
3. The Navy Warfare Library, Navy Tactics Techniques and Procedures (NTTP) 1-01, April 2005, 1-1.
4. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 29.
5. LCDR Dudley Knox, USN, “The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 41, no. 2, March/April 1915.
6. Michael A. Palmer, Command at Sea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 262–263.
7. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 32.
8. Discussions between author and VADM Arthur Cebrowski, USN, President Naval War College, 1999.
9. Palmer, Command at Sea, 159–162.
10. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 32.
11. CINCLANT Serial #043, 21 January 1941, quoted in Naval Warfare Publication 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual, September 2010.
12. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 30–32.
13. Knox, “The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare.”