Comment and Discussion

(Over)protecting the Navy’s Secrets?

(See N. Polmar, pp. 86–87, September 2014 Proceedings)

Alex J. Daverede III, Director, Production Division, National Declassification Center, National Archives and Records Administration—Having been a declassification professional in the Initial Processing and Declassification Division and the successor National Declassification Center at the National Archives for over 17 years, I can certainly empathize with Mr. Polmar’s declassification experiences. Part of the frustration in dealing with the declassification of records concerning military/naval technology is the fact that subject-matter expertise for legacy systems is rapidly disappearing from the ranks of federal workers and even their contractors. With little expertise to depend upon, federal-agency declassification-program managers are frequently conservative in their decisions whether to declassify or not. Mr. Polmar’s example of the FFG-7 class plans highlights the dilemma, which is compounded by the fact that the FFGs are still in service both in the U.S. Navy and abroad. Navy declassification guidance is to protect data about ships/systems in current service, no matter how old those systems may be.

The second issue Mr. Polmar raises is more intractable. The declassification of Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data (RD/FRD) is problematic in that the information has its own law (the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended) to provide protections outside the realm of national-security information that is governed by executive order (currently E.O. 13526). There is a move afoot to reform the RD/FRD declassification process and to declassify FRD concerning legacy nuclear weapons and systems; however, that effort will be a slow one given the fact that the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, and, in some cases, the Department of State have to agree to the declassification of proposed topics. There is no question, though, that declassification issues do hold hostage wide swaths of American military and foreign-policy histories. Happily, there are those in the declassification bureaucracy who do understand the need for change and do their best to make that change happen.

The Great COD Debate

(See D. Goure, pp. 36–41, September 2014 Proceedings)

Jerrold Reynolds—Rarely has a choice between proposed hardware systems been so obvious and so clear to me as the best choice among the three proposed carrier onboard-delivery aircraft. The proposed Lockheed Martin KC-3 is the only logical choice, based on its features:

• It is the only candidate that can accommodate the F-135 engine.

• It has the fastest speed, which will reduce trip duration, and therefore flying hours.

• It has the longest range, giving the carrier strike group greater operational freedom.

• It has proven tanker capability, sorely needed in the air groups.

• It will have an advanced cargo-handling system based on the C-130.

• It is based on an existing carrier-based asset with a large balance of available hours.

• There are enough airframes available to cover the needs—twice!

I appreciate and admire the capabilities and the long valuable service of the C-2A, but it cannot accommodate the F-135, and there is no apparent option for it to function as a tanker.

The V-22 has a shorter range than the C-2A, and even shorter compared to the KC-3. Do we really want to tie carrier strike-group operations to land-based tankers to refuel V-22s? The V-22 also cannot accommodate the F-135.

I realize that not selecting the V-22 will eliminate the capability of delivering loads directly to ships other than carriers, but that is not a capability we’ve ever had, and the KC-3’s capability for handling palletized cargo could ameliorate that in some cases.

There may be an issue with the proposed South Korean acquisition of S-3Bs. With the available quantity, that will probably not be a problem. In any event, Korea could purchase Boeing P-8s or Kawasaki P-1s.

I will even propose a name for the KC-3A: the “Whale,” after the nickname of an earlier multipurpose carrier-based aircraft, the EKA-3B Skywarrior.

Stop the Revolution

(See D. Cope, pp. 56–61, August 2014 Proceedings)

Sherman N. Mullin, retired president, Lockheed Advanced Development Company, the Skunk Works—Lieutenant Cope has made a strong case for the Navy focusing incessantly on the evolution of new weapon systems, as opposed to the introduction of revolutionary new technology. His compilation of the many system-acquisition debacles in recent decades certainly supports his bluntly stated thesis and conclusions.

However, he ignores the fact that today’s Navy is based on the success of several revolutionary developments of the last eight decades: jet engines, nuclear propulsion, rocket engines, guided missiles, satellites, integrated circuits, and numerous others. Despite his strong plea, the revolution will not stop. It will simply run in parallel with his beloved evolutionary approach. His revulsion toward the current defense-acquisition system is clearly justified. No human with the guts and persistence to tackle that monster has emerged.

Return of the Gunline

(See S. Paschal, pp. 50–54, August 2014; and R. O. Strange and A. J. Daverede, pp. 9, 84, September 2014 Proceedings)

Stanley Kalemaris—Congratulations to Mr. Paschal for finding a way to use “awesome” and “amazing” in an article about technology. His article includes a few mistakes, glosses over serious technical challenges, and, most importantly, fails to match kill mechanisms to target sets.

The most significant mistake is to assume that the kinetic energy at impact will equal the energy supplied to the railgun. The article states that it will take six minutes to reach maximum range; during that time, aerodynamic drag will slow the projectile considerably, with a consequent reduction in energy.Technical issues, which can be solved given enough time and money, include maintaining the shape and structural integrity of the projectile when subjected to aerodynamic heating. Deformation or ablation of the projectile will make its trajectory unpredictable and targeting impossible without onboard guidance and control, and heat-induced reduction in hardness will reduce effectiveness against hard targets. The stated time-of-flight is long enough to require some sort of terminal guidance against mobile targets.A kinetic-energy weapon must hit its target to achieve a kill; it is most effective against hardened point targets such as armor, reinforced concrete bunkers, and steel blast doors. A hit will kill one target and a near miss will kill nothing. In contrast, the same amount of energy when used in a blast/fragmentation munition will kill multiple softer targets (e.g., infantry, gun crews, trucks) and will inflict mission kills on lightly armored vehicles. Even a near miss with a blast/fragmentation munition will inflict casualties.

Railguns may find a place in the Navy arsenal, but they lack the versatility of current weapons. The Navy learned that it was a mistake to take guns out of its fighters and that Talos/Terrier/Tartar and Standard Missiles did not eliminate the need for guns on ships; it would be an equally large mistake to assume that railguns will eliminate the need for guns, bombs, and missiles.

Richard Thompson—Mr. Paschal has provided an illuminating look at the potential of the electromagnetic railgun for naval fire support. While this is a fascinating new technology, there is little hope it can be used for this and other missions.

An unavoidable consequence of using unguided solid shot is the accuracy and precision with which it hits (or misses) the target are limited by the dispersion of the projectile as it travels through the air and how well you point the tube; each in turn is a function of several other factors (see Norman Friedman’s excellent Naval Firepower [Naval Institute Press, 2008] for a summary). If the dispersion and pointing of the railgun are as good as the best long-range artillery we know, it will still be unsatisfactory at long ranges. Even taking into account that many naval fire missions would attack area targets, and that at long range the railgun projectiles spend part of their flight outside the atmosphere (improving dispersion), clearly a quantum improvement would be necessary for adequate long-range accuracy and precision.

A second unavoidable consequence of using solid shot is that the destructive capacity of the projectile resides solely in its kinetic energy, which is proportional to the square of its velocity, and is further limited by how efficiently that energy is conveyed to the target (terminal ballistics). A 44-pound projectile leaving the railgun muzzle at Mach 7 (about 5,000 mph) has a kinetic energy of 28 megajoules. Aerodynamic drag on the projectile will slow it down, reducing its energy; when it has lost half its muzzle velocity at long range its energy is ¼, or 7 megajoules, or the equivalent energy of less than 3 pounds of PETN. The efficacy of the hypervelocity railgun projectile can be inferred from the performance of the outstanding APFSDS M829 antitank round fired from the 120-mm smoothbore cannon of the M1A1 Abrams tank: The 22-pound depleted-uranium projectile launched at 1,700 m/sec is accurate and effective at penetrating armored vehicles at ranges beyond 2 nautical miles. However, much of the efficacy of the round comes from spalling of metal inside the hull of the tank and secondary explosions of ammunition caused by the pyrophoric properties of the depleted uranium. Against unarmored targets, such projectiles merely penetrate with much more limited effect, since the “blast radius” is essentially zero.

We may expect that the hypervelocity projectile from the railgun would have only modest efficacy against most fortifications, buildings, or even exposed troops owing to its lack of an explosive warhead. The limited tactical and psychological impact of many small projectiles compared with large, exploding ones is axiomatic: Positions being bombarded by railguns might not even realize they are under attack. For all these reasons, the railgun does not look to offer a solution to the problem of naval fire support for the foreseeable future.

Millennials Bring a New Mentality: Does it Fit?

(See D. Cunningham, p. 10, August 2014; and R. J. Brown, M. R. Hipple, N. Zieser, and H. Schramm, pp. 8–9, September 2014 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin T. McEnery, U.S. Army (Retired)—I am a retired U.S. Army combat-arms officer, commissioned into the Stripes-generation Army. I am also the proud father of a serving U.S. Coast Guard petty officer, a member of the millennial generation.

Today’s youth may not be what we believe we used to be, but then, we weren’t either. Sixteen American millennials have earned the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Half a million Americans have served in those combat theaters. They didn’t choose their generation’s conditions, but they hardly reflect a generation that does not respect duty and sacrifice. In the same era, some American flag officers, members of an older generation, have quite publicly violated our expectations of military character and trust. Humans are neither generic nor perfect.

Leadership determines unit behaviors. No one likes to have their time wasted by indecisive superiors or unproductive work. Soldiers and sailors will ask for time off when there is no clear purpose for being at work. They understand that their duty is 24/7, so they expect that they will either do productive work or be given liberty. Those who sense that their superiors truly value subordinates’ time will work long hours without complaining to meet clear mission requirements.

Professionals should never confuse longevity with indisputable experience. It is not for the young to be patient with our generation’s contextual struggles, it is for us to develop their talents. In 1940, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall circumvented the Army’s seniority rules to allow rapid promotion of younger talent, including Dwight D. Eisenhower, over more senior officers with very long service and experience. Somehow, the youngsters did just fine.

Senior professionals have a moral obligation to develop subordinates for the future, not entitlement to demand fealty in the present. Junior members ask senior members of their profession “why” because they really do want to learn and understand. They may be inexact in their articulation, but they are not inherently insubordinate. The superior who is offended by juniors asking for explanations should expect to find them “waiting on orders” when a crisis occurs.

It is not the youth who have changed. The young of every generation pursue their dreams and aspirations within the context of their times. They see their elders as we present ourselves to them, not as we imagine our younger selves. We all like to believe we pursued our own military aspirations in an era of greater character and discipline, yet historical evidence is often to the contrary.

Young servicemen and women of every American generation ask only to be treated with dignity and respect by highly competent leaders in return for unreserved respect for professional customs and traditions.

As citizens we owe them more resources, but as for the millennial generation, the U.S. Coast Guard’s future is in very good hands.

A New Era in Naval Warfare

Equipping Commanders in the Information Age

Know the Environment, Know the Enemy, Know the Target

Integrated Fires

Naval Constraints in a Joint Environment

(See T. N. Branch, pp. 18–23; M. Swartz and C. Page, pp. 24–29; J. White and S. Filipowski, pp. 30–35; M. Palmieri, pp. 36–40, and P. Price, pp. 42–45, July 2014; and J. Adams, pp. 8–9, August 2014 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Sean Filipowski, U.S. Navy, Director, Warfare Integration, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N2/N6F)—In his letter, Captain Adams was on the mark in emphasizing the importance of spectrum management across all mission areas, including the prevention and deconfliction of electromagnetic interference (EMI). The Navy has learned the operational lessons of not addressing EMI up front in our acquisition and development processes, and today we have a range of spectrum-related capabilities to provide the Fleet with the systems it needs to fight and win in a crowded and contested electromagnetic-spectrum (EMS) environment.

Underpinning our development processes at each Systems Command is an Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) team that looks at factors such as EMI and resistance to electrostatic discharge, and their impact on system performance and interoperability. One of the four goals of our Information Dominance Roadmap for EMS Usage v2.0 focuses specifically on E3 and strategic-acquisition engineering with the intent of addressing E3 and spectrum engineering at the earliest stages of the acquisition process to ensure that systems can operate as intended.

We are also investing in science and technology (S&T) initiatives at the Office of Naval Research, as well as at Navy Warfare Centers and labs, to develop more sophisticated EMS-related capabilities that use common architectures, execute multiple functions, and are interoperable across platforms. Real-time spectrum operations (RTSO), for example, will provide spectrum awareness, advanced spectrum-usage planning, emission-control verification, and recommendations for spectrum usage—all in real time. Systems like RTSO complement other S&T investments in electromagnetic battle management, which provides a unified, coherent approach to use and control the EMS.

Finally, fundamental to our dominance in the EMS is how we evolve our concepts of operations and tactics, techniques, and procedures. U.S. Fleet Forces Command has focused a planning team on developing recommendations for enhancing and improving our ability to fight as a naval force in and through the EMS, to include preparing deployable units and strike groups to respond to the inherent challenges of operating in a contested electromagnetic and cyber environment. These efforts are part of the Navy’s electromagnetic maneuver warfare concept, which includes all actions that create combat advantages in and through the EMS by disrupting the adversary’s kill chain while optimizing our own.

Captain Adams is absolutely correct in asserting that we must train and operate with consideration for the spectrum from the seabed to space. While our articles in the July issue captured a wide range of considerations and drivers for Navy information dominance, it should be clear that we view spectrum operations as a critical element of all aspects of Fleet and joint operations. A combination of increased acknowledgment of E3 in the acquisition process, improved spectrum-related technologies, and innovative doctrine will allow us to gain and maintain the spectrum advantages we need.