This debate will pit those who advocate for operating carriers inside (carrier-in) the Persian Gulf during a time of conflict against those who advocate a more risk-averse strategy that keeps the carrier outside (carrier-out) the Gulf. The key issue separating these schools of thought centers on one of the critical decisions that has confronted naval leaders since the age of the trireme: when to hazard the Fleet.
This analysis is based on first-hand observations of tabletop war games and discussions with operational planners. Arguing against the carrier-in school of thought, the conclusion reached here is that this theory is as much a product of operational considerations as it is parochial interests of the Navy. The first flaw with the carrier-in option is that it ignores the lessons of understanding the cultural context of the region when planning military operations. Second, this plan neglects to leverage the benefits of joint operations. Finally, this course of action overlooks the history of U.S. Navy carrier operations in all conflicts since the carrier-dominant era.
‘Know The Enemy’
A decision to take a high-risk naval strategy in a potential Persian Gulf conflict seemingly ignores the cultural history of Iran. This lesson has hit home painfully and repeatedly in the past 12 years of war. It was only after protracted efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and America’s failure to achieve the predicted quick victory in Iraq that many American leaders began looking for answers. Books such as Bernard Lewis’ The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2000 Years (Scribner, 1995) and David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare (Praeger, 1964) became required reading for many leaders around 2005, but by then it was too late. Once again the history, demographics, and geography were tragically overlooked in the pre-war planning phase. In one noteworthy example in the days following the 9/11 attacks, the eminent British historian John Keegan wrote a series of editorials in the Daily Telegraph warning American leaders that Afghanistan is “unstable, fractious, and ultimately ungovernable” and to steer clear of “general war and policies designed to change society or the government.”1 Keegan offered ample historical evidence of the tragic British and Russian experiences in Afghanistan to build his case. In retrospect, his advice and warnings, like those of the mythical Cassandra, were seemingly clairvoyant but tragically ignored.
Sun Tzu’s Art of War professes the well-known tenet “know the enemy and know yourself.” A glance into America’s strategic rear-view mirror stretching back to the end of World War II reveals a few burning wrecks and miles of damaged guardrail attributed to the failure to know our enemy. First was General Douglas MacArthur’s failure to anticipate China’s reaction to our forces marching to the Yalu River in 1950. Then there was our complete failure to ever comprehend the nature of the war in Vietnam. Somalia in 1993 was a smaller disaster underscored by a failure to appreciate the cultural geography. Iraq and Afghanistan are the most recent of these examples, but are no less egregious than their historical companions strewn along the road of American strategic misadventures. Knowing the enemy has not been America’s strong suit. Accordingly, before the United States jumps head first into a conflict with Iran, only to later find ourselves reaching for books such as Michael Axworthy’s A History of Iran (Basic Books, 2008) and David Crist’s The Twilight War (Penguin Press, 2012) from our metaphorical hospital bed, we might want to take stock of Iran’s rich cultural history before we launch the first missile.
Iran has a two-and-a-half millennia maritime tradition. Its geographic position has made it a focal point for trade routes on land and sea since the dawn of civilization. One ancient proverb described the Strait of Hormuz as the world’s yolk, the wisdom of which holds as true today as it did in the days of Marco Polo.2 Iran’s merchant and battle fleets have plied the waters of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for thousands of years, but this long view of Iranian history is clouded in American eyes by the emotions generated during the last 35 years of the post-Shah era. The historical fact is, Iran’s geography and culture made it the dominant power in the region for centuries. The past 35 years of turmoil are in many respects the exception to the longer view. A more recent glimpse back to the Shah’s reign may be easier to recall. Even up to 1979 Iran was the preeminent military power in the region. That is, after all, why we courted it as our key ally in the region and provided it with some of the most advanced weapons in our inventory, like the F-14 Tomcat and Harpoon missile. Our current popular American assumptions about Iran do not take into account the deeper cultural currents that will surface in a conflict. That Iran is one of the oldest civilizations on earth matters more than we might think in the operational planning equation.
It’s Not All About the Navy
A second flaw in the carrier-in school of thought is that the plan is Navy centric at the expense of joint operations. The suggestion that the best way to achieve our national objectives in a Persian Gulf conflict is to employ the nation’s most visible capital asset in a high-risk operation—especially against an enemy so fixated on damaging or destroying an American carrier—is joint-operations deficient. Iran recently constructed a mock-up carrier it says is a set for a movie about the shoot down of the Iranian Airbus in July of 1988, but “United States officials say [the mock-up carrier barge] may be intended to be blown up for propaganda value.”3 Either conclusion about the mock-up lends evidence that the carrier is the prize target for the Iranians.
Placing the Navy in a lead position in this area of the world has some merit considering that a fight with Iran would most likely include a war at sea. However, a possible conflict with Iran would have to involve deep-strike missions intended to deter or destroy Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Best practices of joint-operations planning stress a balanced approach to the employment of sea, air, and land assets. An overemphasis on sea power seemingly ignores the potential contributions of other services and coalition partners. During naval war gaming and operational planning exercises, the most common argument for moving a carrier into the Persian Gulf during a conflict presumes that the carrier has to be inside to optimize its air wing’s reach into Iran. This begs a number of questions. Foremost is why does the Navy need to “reach” targets when U.S. Air Force assets can reach the interior of Iran? In addition to the often demonstrated inter-theater reach of B-52 and B-1 bombers, the global reach of the U.S.–based B-2 was first demonstrated in the 1999 campaign against Serbia (reportedly, the bomber was also used in Afghanistan and Iraq). Clearly, the shorter reaction time of a close-in asset, coupled with the potential improved survivability of a mobile carrier strike platform, offers important tactical advantages. But is it worth the possible loss of a carrier?
Ron Oard and I noted in our May 2013 Proceedings article titled “Bomb Iran?” that that country “possesses 632,000 square miles of territory and more than 1,500 miles of coastline . . . a conflict with Iran would represent the largest theater of battle the United States has fought in since the World War II European campaign (Afghanistan, the current claimholder, is 60 percent smaller than Iran).”4 With this in mind, when laid on a map of the Persian Gulf the range rings for an unrefueled F-18 seem very limited. The tyranny of geography may lend credence to the carrier-in argument; however, it seems to overlook the fact that carrier-based aviation has been supporting combat operations in Afghanistan from the safe sanctuary of the Indian Ocean since October 2001. The distances from a carrier there to targets in Afghanistan are in most cases even greater, and getting there is a challenge, but it is one that can be managed with acceptable risk.
Even when leveraging the best practices of joint operations there are some circumstances where moving a carrier into the Persian Gulf makes sense. If that happens because of a lack of regional allied support for our operations against Iran, thereby limiting the ability to employ some joint forces, then in this Navy-go-it-alone scenario the carrier and inter-theater assets would be the only option for striking Iran. In such a hypothetical circumstance, where the United States has no regional allies willing to grant airfield or port access, one has to wonder why it would accept such a high-risk scenario. The cost to the country—including the post-conflict requirements—for keeping the world’s access to the vast energy reserves of the region open without any regional allied sacrifice or commitment to the effort should be a non-starter. In this situation, a low-risk, over-the-horizon attack is the most appropriate response.
There are two contingencies where the carrier-in argument has merit. If access to friendly airfields in the region were limited because they had all been cratered by Iranian attacks or if the conflict escalated and elevated U.S. objectives beyond a limited war, accepting more risk may be warranted. Outside of these conditions, the threat level and the potential for an incident that leaves a high-value symbol of American power burning or sunk does not warrant the potential cost.
Risk Management
The third flaw with the carrier-in argument is that it runs counter to all past precedence for carrier operations. The aircraft carrier is best employed when and where its capabilities of reach and mobility give the commander operational advantages. The age of the aircraft carrier has borne this out. From the Battle of Midway to Operation Praying Mantis and even the Falkland Islands, carriers were given space to maneuver and a clean escape route if the environment grew too risky.
Since the end of World War II the most dangerous area for the U.S. Navy has been the Persian Gulf. It was here that the USS Stark (FFG-31), Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), Princeton (CG-59), and Tripoli (LPH-10) all encountered lethal dangers. In fact, the U.S. Navy’s one and only surface engagement of any significance since World War II was Operation Praying Mantis (OPM), the one-day punitive strike against Iran’s petroleum and naval assets in the Persian Gulf on 18 April 1988. During this operation the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) remained in the Gulf of Oman, with room to maneuver and the entire Indian Ocean as an escape route. Iran at this time was embroiled in a costly war with Iraq. Coincidentally, the day before OPM the Iranians were fighting one of the largest ground battles of the eight-year war as they defended against a massive Iraqi offensive on the Al Faw peninsula.5
On that April afternoon, the U.S. Navy found an Iran that was distracted by an existential struggle with Iraq and ill prepared for a war at sea. Iran had only a few marginally capable ships and one operational Harpoon missile in its inventory. By comparison, today Iran’s fleet and array of A2/AD weapons have grown by several orders of magnitude. With that in mind, the relevant question is if it was a bad idea to put a carrier in the Persian Gulf in 1988 when Iran was weak and distracted, why is it a good idea now when it has invested a great deal of time, effort, and treasure to counter a threat from the U.S. Navy?
Admiral Raymond Spruance’s much-debated decision not to pursue the remaining ships of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s fleet following the Battle of Midway serves as an example of prudent risk management of U.S. Navy carriers in a war where the stakes were high and the objectives unlimited. There are also lessons from limited wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Kosovo, where the threat to our naval assets led to the decision to keep our carriers out of reach of potential threats. Some may note the exception to such risk aversion was the placement of four aircraft carriers inside the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm. Iran was not going to protest any U.S. actions that served to emasculate their most hated enemy, which allowed for this exception.
When considering the overwhelming evidence against operating a carrier inside a layered A2/AD network during a conflict, one has to wonder why this option is even put on the table for discussion. One can only speculate. First, there is merit to doing something that is tactically unexpected and surprising during a time of war. Leaders who adhere to this school of thought are confident that the U.S. Navy can fight and win inside the Gulf. The logic is that Iran’s A2/AD weapons can be readily defeated, and the U.S. Navy will be able to maintain an ever-increasing level of sea- and air-control for the duration of the conflict. There is also merit to the notion that no space should be yielded to the enemy, but is proving this point worth risking a $14 billion asset? Can’t we attrite the threat first from afar and then gain access when the environment is more permissible?
The second speculative motive is based on the fact that a conflict with Iran will include a war at sea. History demonstrates that sea battles are rare events. For instance, 24 years passed between the Battle of Jutland and Royal Navy operations against Germany in Norway at the start of World War II, and it has now been 69 years since the U.S. Navy last fought a hot war at sea. When considering the significant contributions of the U.S. Navy to the long list of conflicts since that time, it is noteworthy that all of these occurred in a relatively threat-free environment. This may lead some of today’s naval leaders to relish the fact that a conflict with Iran will be a Navy fight. After all, since 1945 the Fleet has not taken fire on any scale other than a few incidents, some mines, and three missiles. Thus, some may view a potential war in the region as an opportunity to justify the vast national expenditures on maintaining a powerful Navy. A more noble intent may be to demonstrate at home and abroad the continued utility of the modern U.S. Navy. While this may appear to be a cynical conclusion, it more likely stems from a warrior’s subliminal desire to demonstrate the U.S. Navy’s ability to fight and win in close combat.
Lastly, proponents for the carrier-in option believe that a high-risk strategy against Iran is one that the U.S. Navy can afford to take. While statements like U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Locklear’s recent acknowledgement that China’s burgeoning A2/AD defenses may limit our access to the near-shore regions of China, many American leaders seem reluctant to give Iran the same respect.6 The carrier-in proponents seem to believe that Iran is a place where the United States can fight and win on its own terms. Perhaps those who hold to this line of logic find some justification for maintaining the current structure of the U.S. Navy by demonstrating its ability to dominate in what is perceived to be a winnable war. While the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have spent 32 of the past 69 years engaged in ground combat, maybe being in a supporting role has left the Navy feeling the splinters from sitting on the bench too long.
Strategy: Get it Right
Rather than feeling left out, the Navy should take a few relevant lessons from our land-bound brothers in arms. Foremost among these lessons is the valuable insight on the importance of getting the strategy right. In three ground operations—Vietnam, the second Iraq war, and the war in Afghanistan—the United States entered into conflict with a flawed strategic plan and had to make costly mid-course adjustments in an effort to try and achieve desired objectives. While Korea and the first Iraq war each had a slightly more favorable outcome, both shared a messy war termination phase that resulted from poor strategic planning and flawed decisions at different phases of the war.
If these final points even brush the truth behind the carrier-in motive, then it is important to remember that the poor strategic assumptions, hubris, and biases were the common factors in the failures experienced in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and both wars with Iraq. An in-depth analysis of these examples is not necessary to underscore the key lesson for naval planners: In any future conflict on land or at sea the strategy must be correct at the outset. Getting it wrong is a mistake the Navy cannot afford to make.
In early 2014 the esteemed historian Paul Kennedy noted at a special Naval War College event, “If there is one great lesson in strategy it is that we should not go into places where geography and topography suggest we should not be. . . . If we have to go forward again [to war], it imposes upon us the duty to think about where we can go forward and where we should go forward. This is the lesson of sea power in the past and again today.”7 This analysis shows that the carrier-in school of thought is not centered on the lessons of cultural context, the synergy of joint operations, or even the best practices of carrier operations in previous conflicts. Nothing about the option seems to logically suggest that it is a good idea; thus, the very fact that it is even a subject of debate in some quarters of the U.S. Navy should be a cause for concern. If nothing else, it indicates a need for naval operational planners to take stock of all of the aforementioned flaws in this approach and apply them to any plans for employing the Fleet in a conflict involving a capable adversary. There is little doubt that operating an aircraft carrier inside the Persian Gulf is something that the Navy probably can do, but using Professor Kennedy’s logic, there are very compelling reasons why we should not.
1. John Keegan, “If America decides to take on the Afghans, this is how to do it,” The Telegraph, 20 September 2001, www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/4265748/If-America-decides-to-take-on-the-Afghans-this-is-how-to-do-it.html.
2. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010).
3. Eric Schmitt, “Iranian Ship, in Plain View but Shrouded in Mystery, Looks Very Familiar to U.S.”, The New York Times, 20 March 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/world/middleeast/a-ship-being-built-in-iran-looks-awfully-familiar-to-the-us.html?_r=1.
4. CDR Dolan, USN, and Ron Oard, “Bomb Iran?,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 139, no. 5 (May 2013), 36–41.
5. David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran, (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 338.
6. Guy Taylor and Rowan Scarborough, “Ominous warning: Admiral Concedes U.S. losing Dominance to China,” The Washington Times, 16 January 2014, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/16/us-military-dominance-pacific-decline-says-top-adm/?page=all.
7. Paul F. Kennedy, U.S. Naval War College Evening Lecture Series, 28 January 2014, “The Three Great Naval Wars of Recent History” (time 48:00–54:00), www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Bd-4NpVcJo.