Clearing the Smoke
(See H. H. Mauz Jr., pp. 45–49, February 2013 Proceedings)
Admiral Stan Arthur, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I applaud Proceedings for publishing Admiral Mauz’s discussion of the events at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) precipitated by the Navy Inspector General (IG) investigation. I found the article very balanced and a constructive framework for plotting the course forward for this fine institution.
First, I must express my complete support for the dedication and forward-leaning leadership that Vice Admiral Dan Oliver and Dr. Leonard Ferrari provided. I find the Postgraduate School to be far advanced from the time I was a student there in the early 1960s. I can honestly say that I was provided a technical education that changed the course of my career. I can only add my “Amen” to Admiral Mauz’s statement that “the Naval Postgraduate School makes a very significant (if undervalued) contribution to national security, and it does so in a very cost-effective way.”
Having spent several years in Washington attempting to properly resource this institution, I can attest that our Navy has never fully appreciated the value added by an education provided by NPS. In my follow-on career in private industry, we actively sought out retired military that had attended NPS. That means this nation not only received the value from the investment while the graduate served on active duty, but also when that individual went on to a second career in the private sector. I urge that the negativity of the IG’s report not be accepted as a condemnation on the quality and value of the NPS educational experience.
Elizabeth R. Hatcher, MD, PhD—I read with interest and no small nostalgia Admiral Mauz’s article about the impact on NPS of a recent IG investigation, which evidently included fault-finding about the school’s budget. I was astounded to learn that budget (operating budget? Academic programs budget?) was a mere $101 million. That sounds mighty cheap to me.
The Navy and the Monterey Peninsula have grown together over the years; much would be lost were that relationship to be sundered. The article alludes to the older opinions that military officer-students should go to civilian schools to familiarize civilians with what dedicated military officers are like. Maybe the time is right now for NPS to open its classes to civilians and give them a test of how rigorous the work really is.
Semper Huh?
(See M. Junge, pp. 26–31, February 2013 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas A. Davis, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Junge observes that the U.S. Navy is searching for an identity and should develop some sort of mantra similar to the Marine Corps’ “Every Marine is a rifleman.” That is a nice idea, except this kind of thing is the product of leaders in the command structure and is not a remote possibility unless the top organizational leadership establishes the core values and shapes philosophy on which the structure of the organization is to function. Said differently, leadership happens from the front, not the rear.
The people of the Navy have the skills and drive necessary for a top-rated fighting force. All one has to do is watch flight-deck operations on board an aircraft carrier to see how personnel are consistantly doing hard, dangerous jobs—night and day, over long periods of time, and in distant parts of the world—and to appreciate what Navy people-power is capable of accomplishing. The ability to perform such duties must be shaped and directed by supportive, understanding leaders.
What undermines the service is higher-level leadership more interested in imposing programs generated by political concerns, without consideration for good order and discipline, or combat readiness.
Another leg that supports organizational cohesiveness is a management structure that selects competent leaders at all levels and is objective enough to support those chosen to lead. Every time a report appears in the media that yet another commanding officer has been relieved because superiors “have lost confidence in the officer’s abilities,” I can only think that it is the superiors who have failed and wonder why those who have “lost confidence” are not the real culprits. The superiors appointed and had supervision over the COs, and if they selected incompetent ones and then allowed those unable to command to continue to occupy positions of authority, the blame lies at the feet of the superiors for choosing badly and then not properly monitoring performances.
Another weakness is the relentless trend toward service egalitarianism, in which all personnel are considered equal. The old, hard-won realization that a military organization is not particularly democratic applies to the Navy unequivocally. In the “modern” Navy, personnel appear to be civilians who fill military jobs when they report for work. They rarely leave their duty stations in uniform and do their best to lose their military bearing and appearance once ashore, giving the impression they would not like to reveal their status; this undermines pride in the Navy.
If the Navy hopes to adopt the equivalent of the Marine Corps’ Semper Fi attitude, the change has to first occur at the top, not the bottom of the organizational ladder.
Mario F. Romagnoli, MD—I found Captain Junge’s article very interesting. I am not a military man, but I have had a deep interest in the Navy since my son entered the U.S. Naval Academy in 2003, and in the Marine Corps since he was commissioned in 2007. Add to that my daughter’s entry into the Army Medical Corps, and I believe I can offer some insights into why the Marines are different and what lessons can be learned by the larger armed services.
First, there is no lack of being steeped in the cauldron of Navy tradition at Annapolis. However, do officers from other commissioning sources and enlisted sailors receive draughts from the same heady brew?
In contrast, all Marines are schooled in Marine Corps history and tradition, officer and enlisted alike. All Marine officers go through the same training at the Basic School and are inculcated with the same philosophy: “In every war, Marines have borne a heavy burden far out of proportion to their limited numbers. This fact stands as a silent tribute to the individual Marine. Our present basic-school student will soon be leading Marines. It is your mission to educate this young officer and thereby make him worthy of this privilege.”
There is no hesitation for an officer of Marines to call himself “Marine” or the Army officer to call himself “soldier.” Why then does the Navy officer not call himself “sailor”?
When my Army daughter went through officer basic in San Antonio, the class full of medical students, doctors, and dentists were told that they would be taking a page from the Marines Corps training manual, and that they expected these young officers to be “soldiers first, officers second, and doctors third.”
That’s quite a compliment coming from the Army. Does the Navy do the same?
The Navy seems to have lost its way: The “Global Force for Good” advertising campaign is but an embarrassing symptom of this loss of identity, and is as ridiculous as the ill-fated “Army of One.”
Looking for a motto? Let’s shelve “All of us are smarter than one of us”—strikingly similar to the meaning of the collectivist “Gung Ho,” but without the characteristic panache of the Marine Corps.
This civilian thinks the Navy need look no further than its own rich and illustrious history: “Ship, Shipmate, Self,” or the iconic “Don’t give up the ship!”
Bring Historic Ships Back into the Fleet
(See D. F. Winkler, pp. 62–67, February 2013 Proceedings)
Richard S. Elkin—Dr. Winkler makes some valid points in his article suggesting that the Navy would be very wise to include historic museum ships in its bid to keep the American people aware of the nation’s naval heritage. With the difficult economic times we are currently experiencing, I am sure the Navy would get a great public-relations boost by supporting the many historic vessels scattered around the country. What a wonderful way to tie in naval history with the current missions of today’s Navy and Marine Corps, and at the same time provide venues for the active-duty Navy to have meetings, events, dinners, and even training for current personnel.There are certainly more than enough visitors to these ships every year to make a difference in how the American people perceive our Navy and its glorious history of honor, valor, and sacrifice for the sake of our liberty. And there are more than enough famous ships that the Navy could use in media campaigns to remind the public of a rich and important legacy.
A Farewell to Pins
(See B. LeFebvre, p. 12, February 2013 Proceedings)
Major Patrick McGinn, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—I found it ironic to read Commander LeFebvre’s essay in he which calls for eliminating the wearing of specialty insignia and ribbons because of the divisive wedges they drive between various operational subcultures and the preconceived judgments and stereotypes associated with them. But at the same time, our service secretaries and chiefs are aggressively promoting a host of diversity initiatives that, unsurprisingly, highlight and promote subcultures and result in preconceived judgments and stereotypes.
The commander feels that not wearing insignia and ribbons might be more meaningful, helping us to embrace the all-missions nature of a team working together as one to serve the country. He comments on the natural tendency to size people up based on their ribbon bars and specialty insignia, like dogs who when they first meet start sniffing each other out. He states that ribbons don’t necessarily denote a person’s background or experience, and that insignia are merely symbolic nowadays.
As a retired Marine officer I have to wonder what criteria are used in the Coast Guard when ribbons are awarded and insignia earned if they do not denote background or experience, or if they are merely symbolic in nature. Every ribbon, medal, and insignia I ever wore on my uniform was specifically tied to my background, experience, knowledge, and skills. And I could look at a fellow Marine’s uniform and quickly surmise background, experience, knowledge, and skills.
Napoleon Bonaparte is purported to have said to the captain of HMS Bellerophon in 1815 that “a soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon.” Would our servicemen and women serve more or less valiantly if we eliminated ribbons? Would esprit de corps, which Merriam-Webster’s defines as “the common spirit existing in the members of a group and inspiring enthusiasm, devotion, and strong regard for the honor of the group,” be stronger or weaker if we eliminated the recognition of operational subcultures within a branch of service via their unique specialty insignia?
If we were to carry Commander LeFebvre’s idea to its logical conclusion, we should eliminate the separate branches of military service and simply have a monolithic Department of Defense with one common uniform, sans ribbons or insignia, to be worn by all members. I think it’s quite obvious that such a course of action would not work for the American military, nor will “A Farewell to Pins.”
From Enterprise to Enterprise
(See J. T. Manvel, pp. 20–25, February 2013 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—The electronically scanned, fixed radar antennas in the carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65) referred to by Captain Manvel, but not identified by him, were the AN/SPS-32 long-range 2-D radar for scanning in azimuth, and the AN/SPS-33 3-D multiple-target tracking radar that searched in azimuth and elevation. The term used for these radars was FRESCAN (for “frequency scanning”) as well as SCANFAR.
These “billboard” radars were highly touted but installed in only two ships—the “Big E” and the nuclear-propelled cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9). They were not successful and were a nightmare to maintain. They were removed from both ships and replaced by conventional (rotating) radars.
Finally, Captain Manvel’s treatise on the advantage of nuclear-propelled carriers over oil-burning ships fails to take into account the additional costs of recruiting, training, and retaining nuclear personnel; the Department of Energy costs; the nuclear ship-disposal costs; etc. A truly objective analysis of these issues is still wanting.
Study War Much More
(See M. Vego. pp 58–63, January 2013, Proceedings)
Captain Ivan T. Luke, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Dr. Vego argues passionately that the U.S. Navy needs to focus more on warfighting and less on peacetime activities. He explains that the Navy lost its warfighting focus after the Cold War, and more recently has become overly enamored with counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance, and myriad other operations short of war. In other words, he believes the Navy is trying too hard to be a “global force for good” and not hard enough to be a global force for winning wars.
I agree wholeheartedly that the Navy’s top priority should be preparing to prevail in a high-intensity conflict against a strong enemy. Winning our nation’s wars at sea is the Navy’s raison d’être, and the current lack of a serious naval peer-competitor is no guarantee that we won’t face one in the future. It would be strategic folly to allow our high-end naval warfighting capability to wither.
Where I take issue with Dr. Vego is his implication that modern-day peacetime naval tasks are not strategically important, or even very difficult. They most certainly are both important and challenging, now more than ever. Changes in the global maritime domain have radically altered both the character and the importance of the things navies do in peacetime. One big change has been the globalization of maritime commerce. The free flow of goods is increasingly vital to our interconnected world economy, but intermodal shipping containers and flags of convenience have vastly complicated the job of protecting one’s economic interests at sea. Today you have to protect the entire global system to protect your own interests. Threats have evolved as well. Sub-national groups today are capable of a level of disruptions that only nation-states could accomplish before. Transnational crime and terrorism, counter-proliferation, and protection of marine resources are other areas where navies have a strategic role to play outside of a warfighting context.
The things navies are doing in peacetime today are not just something to tide them over until war starts, and they are not just subsets of wartime tasks. Our Navy absolutely should not lose its edge in high-end warfighting, but it should not take peacetime missions for granted, either. Dr. Vego is wrong when he axiomatically suggests that a navy capable of winning a war at sea is intrinsically capable of meeting today’s peacetime challenges. The operating environment, objectives, and principles are very different in peacetime. Peacetime naval operations deserve their own focus, dedicated theory, and carefully written doctrine.
It should not be an either-or choice between being prepared for war and being good at peace. In today’s complex geostrategic environment, the Navy has to do both.