The U.S. Naval Academy Museum features an exhibit detailing the importance of submarines in the Pacific theater; its focus, however, is too narrow, concentrating almost exclusively on the role of submarines in destroying merchant shipping. While submarines played a significant part in the defeat of the Japanese Empire through guerre de course, the display does not adequately address the impact they had on the destruction of the Japanese fleet. Furthermore, the exhibit fails to elaborate on the numerous problems that had to be solved before the service became an effective combat arm of the Navy. The exhibit also inadequately portrays the cost of success, in terms of lives, that was paid by the men of the submarine service.
Following World War I, the United States recognized the presence of Japan as a major threat in the Pacific. To prepare for possible Japanese aggression, particularly in the American colony of the Philippines, the United States developed War Plan Orange, which later developed into the Rainbow Plan, and created a naval contingency strategy to prevent Japan from establishing dominance in the Pacific. Plan Rainbow called for the build-up of a force of new fleet submarines that would be stationed in Manila, Philippine Islands, and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Pacific Presence
At the outbreak of the war, the Navy had 50 commissioned submarines in the Pacific, 21 of which were stationed in Pearl Harbor. In Manila, submarine forces were alone in opposing the Japanese invasion. Due primarily to lack of experience, submarines were ineffective in repelling the Japanese fleet at Manila, destroying only three ships. It was not until 1942 that American submarines began to play a major part in the war.3
The U.S. Naval Academy Museum praises submarines for the success that they had in destroying Japanese merchant ships. The main text in the exhibit states, “These submarines focused on attacking maritime supply lines that fed Japan and its military.” The exhibit outlines the significant accomplishments of submarines in regard to guerre de course, but fails to adequately convey the overall magnitude of destruction submarines inflicted on both commercial and combat vessels. These losses were vastly disproportionate to the size of the American submarine fleet. Over the course of the war, the American submarine force reached 314 actively commissioned vessels, 52 of which were sunk. In return, submarines destroyed a total of 1,314 ships, displacing about 5.3 million tons. In comparison, American aircraft sank only 929 ships.4 While the majority of the ships destroyed were merchant vessels, submarines sank more than one-quarter of Japan’s warships, a feat overlooked and understated in the exhibit.
One of the major flaws in the exhibit is in its description of naval targets for American submarines. The exhibit maintains that “The enemy’s merchant ships were the main targets of American submarines. Nevertheless, if the opportunity arose, the submarines also attacked naval vessels.” According to records at the time, it is true that most patrols were made around major supply lines in search of Japanese commerce vessels. However, the exhibit gives the false impression that American submarines would only engage in combat with Japanese warships if they happened to stumble upon each other. In truth, submarine warfare against merchant shipping was not very effective until 1943. Until that point, most submarines were tasked with either individual hit-and-run missions or support missions for surface ships.5 Submarines continued to support surface ships throughout the war, and were critical in many major battles. The main goal for the American Fleet was to target and destroy Japanese carriers, which submarines did very effectively: By the end of the war, submarines were responsible for sinking eight.6
The exhibit does mention submarine triumphs against warships: “By war’s end, Allied submarines destroyed 5 out of 31 Japanese vessels involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor.” This comment, however, fails to do justice to the importance of submarines in naval warfare. For example, the exhibit does not provide any telling statistics to show just how effective submarine warfare was against the Japanese: In total, submarines sank 1 battleship, 8 aircraft carriers, 15 cruisers, 42 destroyers, and 25 submarines.7
Triumphs at Midway and the Philippine Sea
Submarines also played critical roles in major naval battles such as Midway and the Philippine Sea. The American victory at Midway Atoll marked a turning point in the Pacific. For the first six months of the war, Japan remained the superior naval force. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese fleet, planned an invasion of Midway to expand the Japanese defensive perimeter in the Pacific. Yamamoto recognized that Japan’s failure to destroy American carriers at Pearl Harbor gave the United States an opportunity to quickly rebuild. Because of American dominance in resources and production capabilities, Yamamoto correctly assumed that Japan had a short time-span to destroy the American Fleet before the United States overtook Japan in naval superiority. According to Yamamoto’s predictions, Japan would only have six months to gain complete control of the Pacific.8 He had hoped to lure the rest of the American Fleet to Midway and destroy it in a decisive naval battle. American intelligence, however, had intercepted Japanese codes, and the Americans were well-prepared for the engagement at Midway.
The exhibit, unfortunately, does not describe the key role played by submarines in this victory. Admiral Chester Nimitz ordered SubPac Force to give exclusive support to the American aircraft carriers. Submarines in Task Group 7.1 fanned out from Midway to screen it from the approaching Japanese fleet. The USS Cuttlefish (SS-171), a submarine patrolling 600 miles from Midway, initiated the battle by reporting an enemy tanker. As more Japanese ships approached, the Cuttlefish submerged to avoid detection. The rest of the American submarines in Task Force 7.1 were ordered by Admiral Nimitz to attack Japanese carriers.9
Early in the battle at Midway, a Japanese bomber spotted the USS Nautilus (SS-168) and forced the submarine to dive to a depth of 100 feet.10 An hour later, the commander of the submarine, Lieutenant Commander William Brockman, ordered the vessel up to periscope depth. To his surprise and horror, the submarine was surrounded by a battleship and three heavy cruisers. After being spotted by one of the Japanese cruisers, the submarine was forced to go back under and endured a heavy barrage of depth charges. The Nautilus surfaced 15 minutes later to periscope depth, where Brockman again found his submarine surrounded. Following the battle, Brockman reported on what he saw:
The picture presented on raising the periscope was one never experienced in peacetime practice. Ships were on all sides, moving across the field at high speed and circling away to avoid the submarine’s position. A cruiser had passed over us and was now astern. Flag hoists were going up, blinker lights were flashing and the battleship on our port bow was firing her whole starboard broadside at the periscope.11
Brockman fired two torpedoes at the closest battleship before diving and chasing a Japanese carrier, which at the time was identified as the Soryu but was probably the Kaga, as the Soryu was later determined to have been sunk by an SBD Dauntless dive-bomber from the USS Yorktown (CV-5).12 Brockman surfaced just long enough to fire three torpedoes at the ship before submerging once again. The Nautilus descended to 300 feet, well beyond the official safety depth, and endured depth charges for nearly two hours. When the submarine came back to the surface, the Japanese carrier was gone. The crew reported (erroneously) that the ship had been sunk by the Nautilus’ torpedoes.13
Also not mentioned is the success of the submarine forces in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, where submarines played a crucial role both in the scouting and sinking of Japanese warships. Again, it was a submarine that initiated the battle; after spotting Japanese warships commanded by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, they signaled American Admiral Raymond Spruance. The information allowed Admiral Spruance to launch his aircraft, beginning what is known as “The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” due to the lopsided victory by American pilots.
While the Philippine Sea is known as the great carrier battle of World War II, submarines played a considerable role in the destruction of Japanese carriers there. Early in the battle, the USS Albacore (SS-218) sighted the Japanese carrier Taiho and immediately launched six torpedoes. They were fired just as Vice Admiral Ozawa was launching his aircraft. One of the Japanese pilots sacrificed himself, crashing into the first of the torpedoes. Only one torpdeo reached its target, yet it delivered a devastating hit. Typically, one torpedo was not powerful enough to destroy a ship as large as a carrier, but the torpedo from the Albacore ruptured the aviation gas tanks on board the Taiho, causing her to explode and sink. Just three hours later, the USS Cavalla (SS-244) hunted down the veteran Japanese carrier, Shokaku. The Cavalla hit and sank the carrier with three torpedoes.14 By destroying two carriers, submarines contributed greatly to the decisive American victory in the Philippine Sea and badly crippled the Japanese fleet.
Among the artifacts displayed in the exhibit are the battle flags of the USS Barb (SS-220), the Trigger (SS-237), and Hammerhead (SS-364). Each has symbols that represent the accomplishments of their respective submarine. A blue star on the flag represents a Japanese merchant vessel sunk, while a rising sun represents a warship sunk. As a result of the success of these submarines in guerre de course, the flags are almost entirely filled with blue stars. The few warships that were destroyed by these submarines were destroyer escorts.15 The exhibit notes that the Barb destroyed the third highest total of Japanese commerce among any American submarine. The Barb, along with the other two boats represented, made their impact on the war effort almost exclusively through destroying merchant vessels. Submarines such as the Nautilus and the Albacore made equally important contributions by destroying enemy warships but are not mentioned in the exhibit.
The battle for the Pacific is best remembered by the significance of aircraft carriers. For both sides, the use of aircraft in naval engagements was new and effective. Without question, carriers had the most significant impact on the conduct and outcome of naval battles. For the first time in history, they allowed fleets to engage each other from great distances. Because of the distinguished role of carriers in the war, historians often overlook the contribution of submarines. This is perhaps one reason the Naval Academy museum fails to communicate their importance.
Victory Despite Challenges
While the exhibit does highlight the accomplishments of submarines, a discussion of some of the major problems they had to overcome would have enriched the presentation. Most notably, the exhibit does not mention the flaws in American torpedoes during the first two years of the war. The Mark 14 (Mk-14) torpedo used by American submarines was developed and produced by the Naval Torpedo Station (NTS) in Newport, Rhode Island.16 The torpedo used the Mark 6 exploder, designed to explode either on contact or when entering the magnetic field of a ship’s hull. The government developed the torpedo with extreme secrecy. As a result, enlisted torpedomen had no experience with the Mk-14 when the war started.
The flaws of the torpedo were due primarily to insufficient testing by NTS, which began in November 1937. The first tests were conducted with submarines that were surfaced, firing torpedoes into fishing nets. In subsequent tests, NTS fired fake warheads at actual ships. In the tests, however, the torpedoes were fired underneath the hull of the ship, so as not to damage the torpedo or the ship. The tests were also conducted only at shallow depths. No records suggest the torpedo was ever tested under realistic conditions. As a result, NTS never uncovered defects in the magnetic exploder or the depth-control mechanism. When the torpedoes reached the Fleet, it was discovered that they typically ran 10 feet deeper than target depth, and exploded less than 50 percent of the time. According to an officer on board the USS Skipjack (SS-184), “It therefore appears that these torpedoes, when fired at ranges of 500 to 800 yards, run considerably deeper than set depth and can only be depended upon to explode about 40 percent of the time, even though they pass below target.”17 Submarines continued to struggle with the Mk-14 for the first 21 months of the war until the defects were eventually fixed.18
The exhibit also does not reveal the high casualty rate of American submariners in the Pacific. The successes of the submarine force were made at the highest relative cost among any branch of the armed forces. One in every seven submariners died during World War II, a ratio even higher than that of the Marine Corps. For each surface sailor who died, six submariners were killed in action. In total, about 3,500 Americans were killed while serving on submarines in the Pacific, and 52 submarines were sunk.19
The U.S. Naval Academy Museum exhibit provides interesting insight into the contribution of American submarines in the Pacific. While it thoroughly describes the role of submarines in guerre de course, it fails to inform on their triumphs in naval engagements. The most likely cause for the narrow representation of the submarine force is that the exhibit is meant to serve as a tribute. In the minds of the historians, the destruction of merchant shipping was the most significant role of submarines in the Pacific; therefore, it received more consideration in the exhibit. The exhibit was intended to inform the viewer about the triumphs of the submarine force; however, the problems faced and resolved by World War II submariners, along with their sacrifices, are an integral and enriching part of the story. Still, it does provide a vast amount of information and inspiring artifacts, paying homage to the achievements of the American submarine force during World War II.
1. Houghston E. Lowder, The Silent Service: U.S. Submarines in World War II (Baltimore: Silent Service Books Inc., 1987), v–vii.
2. Ibid., v.
3. Edward Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 319–322.
4. Lowder, v–vi.
5. Michael Gunton, Submarines at War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 25–38.
6. Lowder, vi.
7. Ibid.
8. Kenneth Poolman, Allied Submarines of World War Two (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1990), 103–110.
9. Ibid., 108.
10. Lowder, 185–192.
11. Poolman, 109–110.
12. Department of the Navy, Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed 7 May 2013, www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-n/ss168.htm and www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-s/soryu.htm.
13. Navy, United States. “U.S. submarine war patrol reports and related documents, 1941-1945 [microform], reference documents on submarine operations and submarines.” Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1989.
14. Poolman, 122.
15. Lowder., 11–15, 145–147, 440–446.
16. David E. Cohen, “The MK-XIV Torpedo: Lessons for Today,” U.S. Naval Institute, Naval History (Winter 1994), 32–35.
17. Ibid
18. Ibid.
19. Lowder, 475.