The U.S. Navy does not operate in a fiscal utopia where all its budgetary needs are met. It operates in a demanding environment with real adversaries and challenges, complicated by severe financial constraints. Since World War II, the Navy has dominated the air, surface, and subsurface environments, and it recently added ballistic-missile-defense capabilities. This is sufficient when engaging a near-peer adversary, but the Navy’s missions since the Cold War have “evolved to include defeating terrorists, pirates, and illegal traffickers; preparing to counter mines and armed small boats; providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; and building partnership capacity to take on maritime-security missions.”2
As capable as the Navy has become, it does have significant shortcomings in the littorals where many of these missions are conducted. With its “plug and play” modularity, shallow draft, and high maneuverability, the LCS offers a capable platform that can perform multiple missions at a fraction of the cost of a large, multi-mission warship. The ship allows the Navy to accomplish today’s missions with the ability to adapt to a dynamic and uncertain strategic environment.
In the Beginning
A few years later on 27 May 2004, the Navy issued contracts to Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. The companies would lead two industry teams in the design of two versions of the LCS, with options for each team to build up to two vessels.5 The two versions developed became known as the Freedom and Independence. The Freedom variant, produced by the Lockheed Martin team, is a semi-planing, steel monohull with an aluminum superstructure. Its draft is 13.5 feet with a displacement of approximately 3,000 metric tons (full load). The Independence variant, produced by the General Dynamics team, is a slender, stabilized monohull (trimaran) all-aluminum ship. Its draft is 14 feet (19 feet with azi-thruster deployed) with a similar displacement to the Freedom variant. Both can exceed speeds of 40 knots and have a cruising range of 3,500 nautical miles at 14–16 knots. Each has self-defense capabilities tailored for its littoral operating areas and can embark an MH-60S/R helicopter along with two MQ-8B/C Fire Scouts.
The preeminent trait of an LCS is its ability to change its mission packages to match the needs of the operational commander. Both variants can carry the surface-warfare (SUW) mission package (MP) (two 36-foot boats, two Mk-46 30-mm gun systems, and a 19-person detachment), the mine-countermeasures (MCM) MP (Remote Multi -Mission Vehicle, Airborne Mine Neutralization System, Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, AN/AQS-20A sonar, and a 19-person detachment), and the antisubmarine -warfare (ASW) MP (assets still under development and expected to be delivered in 2016).
The Navy initially planned to select one industry team to continue production of the LCS. Since both variants met the key performance parameters, the Navy awarded contracts to Lockheed Martin to produce ten Freedom-variant ships and to General Dynamics/Austal USA to produce ten Independence-variant ships, with an average cost of $440 million. “The awards represent a unique and valuable opportunity to lock in the benefits of competition and provide needed ships to our fleet in a timely and extraordinarily cost effective manner,” said Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus.6 Since 2010 Austal has been the sole prime contractor for the Independence variant, although General Dynamics remains highly involved.
A High Performer
It doesn’t take much effort to find an article, blog, or opinion piece that disagrees with the Navy’s decision to invest in the LCS. Is all of this negative attention deserved? It is true that the program has seen its challenges. Since the Navy set out to develop the LCS in 2001, the program incorporated innovative manning constructs, cutting-edge technology, and a develop-and-learn philosophy. It is unrealistic to assume that there wouldn’t be any problems or additional costs. Even with the unplanned incurred costs, the ship is still relatively affordable. The question remains: Does the LCS meet the needs of the U.S. Navy and the nation? Based on the 2012 Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense, the vessel is capable of performing many of the missions the President and Secretary of Defense have delineated for the military.7
In January 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta released a new strategic guidance to “articulate priorities for a 21st century defense that sustains U.S. global leadership.”8 As specified in this guidance and as implemented by the Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, the primary missions of the U.S. armed forces are to counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; project power despite anti-access/area-denial challenges; counter weapons of mass destruction; operate effectively in cyberspace and space; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities; provide a stabilizing presence; conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; and conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.9 The Navy’s, specifically the surface Navy’s, ability to execute these missions will further our national objectives and sustain the Navy as a vital instrument of national power.
Counter terrorism, irregular warfare, and weapons of mass destruction. The LCS’s high speed, shallow draft, and large flight deck make it an ideal naval platform for these missions. The SUW MP with its 30-mm guns capable of firing 200 rounds per minute and two 36-foot rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) make it even more effective. The ship can insert special operations forces (SOF) or Marine units close to the beach in areas inaccessible to deep-draft destroyers or frigates. With a RHIB or SOF RHIB on the stern ramp, the LCS can close the beach at high speed, launch a small boat off its stern ramp, and depart the area quickly. With its formidable gun weapon systems, the LCS is also ideally suited for counterpiracy and maritime-interdiction operations. The Mk-110 57-mm gun can fire up to 220 rounds per minute of programmable, pre-fragmented, proximity-fused ammunition. Even though it is smaller than the Mk-45 5”/54 gun system, its ability to fire ten times faster is ideally suited for engaging small, swarming boats. With a flight deck larger than any other surface combatant, it can accommodate a variety of helicopters such as the MH/AH-6M Little Bird. An expeditionary-warfare module is being developed to expand the ability of the LCS to operate with Marine Corps teams, naval special-warfare personnel, and Naval Expeditionary Combat Command personnel.10
Deter and defeat aggression, project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges, and provide a stabilizing presence. LCSs not only complement the capabilities of a carrier strike group (CSG) or expeditionary strike group (ESG) but can enhance them in the littorals. The boat brings mine countermeasures, counter-swarm defense, and enhanced ASW capabilities to a CSG or ESG. Additionally, LCSs can scout and patrol coastal and confined waters in advance of a strike group. As an intra-theater asset, the ship would join CSGs or ESGs from their forward operating bases or stations to become force multipliers with mission-tailored packages.
When not with a CSG or ESG, LCSs would be a formidable force operating in a pack and executing a combination of mission packages. This pack could simultaneously neutralize mines, attack surface combatants, and in the near future, hunt submarines. When integrated with an Arleigh Burke–class destroyer or Ticonderoga–class cruiser, the pack would still be able to perform all of these missions while in a high-saturation antiship cruise missile environment. An LCS pack or single vessel operating within a CSG or ESG would reassure American allies and partners of our resolve and commitment by showing them a proportioned force with overwhelming capabilities operating from the shallows to the deep oceans. LCSs bridge a warfighting gap and have the ability to provide a stabilizing presence as a premier theater-security-cooperation platform.
The LCS is poised to engage with our allies and friends in the Western Pacific at a level not experienced since World War II. For example, Lumat, Malaysia, is considered the home of the Royal Malaysian Navy but is only accessible by frigate during high tide. An LCS can engage with these partners on a routine basis that would otherwise not be possible. This sends a strong message to our allies and partners of our commitment to them and further strengthens ties between nations. This effort by the U.S. Navy would be in concert with those of other instruments of national power, such as the State Department. In August 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the Pacific Islands Forum held on the Cook Islands, which was the first time the United States attended the forum.11 The major port on the Cook Islands is accessible only by a ship with a draft of less than 20 feet or an LCS. A visit by the U.S. Secretary of State followed by one or several visits by an LCS would reinforce our efforts to improve our influence in the region.
Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other missions; defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities. Compared to other surface combatants, the LCS excels in these missions. The frequency of humanitarian and disaster-relief operations is increasing, especially in the Western Pacific region, and the Navy can anticipate performing more of these missions. LCSs forward stationed in Singapore and throughout the region can utilize their speed and proximity to respond during the initial stages of a disaster when assistance is desperately needed. The large flight deck and hangar are suited for noncombatant evacuation or relief operations since a variety of aircraft can land; the area can also serve as a staging area for large groups of people. Its shallow draft allows the LCS to enter ports that are inaccessible to many ships. With its large reconfigurable spaces, large flight deck, and RHIBs with the SUW MP embarked, the LCS can store and transport a significant quantity of humanitarian aid via helos and small boats, providing a versatility that is well suited for these types of unplanned operations.
Operate effectively in cyberspace and space, maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations. Currently the LCS can’t perform these missions, but neither can any surface platform. Whether or not the LCS performs such operations will be determined by the Navy’s needs and the service’s ability to develop corresponding capabilities. In the future, a mission package may exist that addresses these missions.
Rough Seas
The Navy has had its share of controversial programs. The F/A-18 Hornet was controversial in its time because of its limited range and reduced armament capacity compared with older aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat or A-6 Intruder. Naval nuclear propulsion for surface ships was just as controversial, with many arguing that it didn’t increase a ship’s warfighting capability and added a significant cost. The development of the MV-22 Osprey for the Marine Corps was surrounded by controversy throughout most of its development, but it has emerged from its checkered past and incorporates an innovative and complex tiltrotor system. Today, F/A-18s, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and MV-22s are integral to the effectiveness of the Navy–Marine Corps combat team. Just as these programs had challenges in the early stages of development, the LCS has had its share of problems, too.
Given the short time the ship spent in research, design, and development, the LCS has been unfairly judged. The USS Freedom, Independence (LCS-2), and Fort Worth (LCS-3) have already been delivered to the Navy, and the Coronado (LCS-4) and Milwaukee (LCS-5) are under construction. In comparison, it took 14 years before the first Arleigh Burke–class destroyer was delivered to the Fleet. The LCS program will have delivered five ships in less time than it took to deliver one Arleigh Burke. The LCS program should be given credit for the progress made in such a short time. The majority of issues that occurred on LCS-1 and LCS-2 have been corrected in the follow-on hulls. There are nearly 300 design changes from LCS-1 to LCS-3 and a similar number from LCS-2 to LCS-4.12 LCS-3 is improved from LCS-1 just as the succession of F/A-18 and V-22 variants are more capable than the original. The LCS of the future may possess a vertical-launch system, advanced radars, and more robust mission packages with off-board sensors and unmanned vehicles.
Limited Only by Our Imagination
In 2012, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert issued his Navigation Plan 2013–2017, which highlights the investments the Navy is making to support the missions outlined in the 2012 Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense and mentions the LCS numerous times. While the document was not written to justify the LCS program, it serves to identify the needs of the Navy and how the ship can meet them.13
There is an old adage that “generals always prepare for the last war.” Throughout history, this mistake has been made time and time again, from Mahanian engagements with battleships to the domination of air power and the aircraft carrier over the last century. As British military historian Sir Michael Howard observed, “In these circumstances when everybody starts wrong, the advantage goes to the side which can most quickly adjust itself to the new and unfamiliar environment and learn from its mistakes.”14 The Navy must be ready and have the ability to influence instead of react to its environment. The LCS is the weapon system that will close our littoral shortfalls and bridge the gap from conventional naval tactics to the future conflict. The future of the Navy is focused on payloads instead of platforms, and the service has designed and built the right ship at the right time. Vice Admiral Richard W. Hunt, director of Navy Staff and chair of the LCS council, said there is one word for the LCS program: opportunity.15
1. John Patch, “The Wrong Ship at the Wrong Time,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2011, 16–19.
2. Jonathan W. Greenert, “Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2012, 16–23.
3. Robert C. Powers, “Birth of the Littoral Combat Ship,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2012, 42–47; For more on the development of the LCS see Robert O. Work, “The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why,” Naval War College, Unpublished Working Paper, Newport, RI, www.aviationweek.com/Portals/AWeek/Ares/work%20white%20paper.PDF.
4. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” 10 August 2012.
5. Ibid.
6. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Information. “Littoral Combat Ship Contract Award Announced,” Washington, D.C., 29 December 2010.
7. U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,”Washington, D.C., 2012.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, Washington, D.C., 2012.
10. O’Rourke, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program.”
11. “US-Sino war of diplomacy moves to South Pacific,” Financial Times, 31 August 2012.
12. Work, “The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why.”
13. U.S. Department of the Navy, CNO’s Sailing Directions and CNO’s Navigation Plan 2013–2017, Washington, D.C., 2012.
14. Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” RUSI Journal, March 1974.
15. “High-powered Navy board eyes controversial warship,” San Diego Union Tribune, 27 September 2012.
Commander Miller is the former Chief Staff Officer of Littoral Combat Ship Squadron One. He is currently assigned to surface operations for Commander, Carrier Strike Group One.