During the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century the United States has fought five ground wars. The record of these military efforts—all accompanied by acrimonious debates about how many ground troops were needed for “victory”—has not been impressive: One was a win, one could be considered a draw, and three were, or obviously will be, defeats.
The Gulf War (1990–91) was an unquestioned victory, due in large part to the ineptitude of the enemy, a six-month, unimpeded military buildup, nearby bases, massive air strikes and close-air support, and other factors rarely found in conflicts.
The Korean War (1950–53) was a draw—the United States and its allies stopped the conquest of South Korea by the North, directly supported by China and the Soviet Union. But North Korea was neither destroyed nor forced to surrender. And, technically, a state of war continues to exist in 2013.
The Vietnam War (1962–75) was a defeat for the United States.
Finally, the evolving situations in Iraq and Afghanistan bode ill for democracy and Western goals after the complete withdrawal of American troops. In neither country can one expect even the near-term situation to reflect American goals and hopes. Despite the brave efforts of our ground troops (Army, Marine, and special forces), sailors, and airmen, we have not—and could not—win the victories that we have sought.
These defeats and the draw came at tremendous costs in national treasure and lives, which underscore the failure of the nation’s post–World War II military strategy. In all of these situations U.S. military forces placed “boots on the ground”—tens (or hundreds) of thousands of troops. As troops came into the country, by ship or air, they required barracks, mess halls, airstrips for resupply, fuel for their vehicles and helicopters, etc. This infrastructure had to be fenced and guarded, with thousands of troops being required just for base protection. In most of these conflicts significant casualties were sustained as the enemy attacked the U.S. ground infrastructure with mortars, rockets, and satchel charges. Indeed, some 3,000 helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft were destroyed by Viet Cong guerrilla attacks in the Vietnam conflict. Of course, usable bases in nearby friendly countries are generally costly in terms of dollars, and at times politically costly, especially if the needed bases are in non-democratic countries.
Is there a viable and affordable alternative military strategy?
While no strategy is universal, the increasing U.S. reconnaissance and targeting capabilities—satellites, spyplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other “sources”—could support a new military strategy. Perhaps the most dramatic examples of this reconnaissance-and-targeting capability have been the locating of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden as well as several key terrorist leaders. Everyday examples are the continued drone strikes on militants in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, sub-Saharan Africa, and possibly elsewhere.
Combining these recon-and-targeting capabilities with U.S. naval power could provide a new strategy option. Today the United States has the world’s largest navy, by any criteria larger than the next several navies combined. U.S. ships can operate at will anywhere on the world’s oceans. Of the Navy’s 275 active surface ships and submarines, at any given time some two-thirds are under way, on exercises, in transit, or forward-deployed in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf area, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific.
Instead of building extensive ground infrastructures from which troops can operate, could U.S. troops, including special-operations forces, be based at sea on board the Navy’s 10 large (nuclear-propelled) aircraft carriers and the 11 large amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) with full flight decks? The latter ships—as large as World War II–era aircraft carriers—can carry some 40 helicopters or perhaps 20 vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft, like the current AV-8B Harrier and, in the future, F-35B Lightning fighter-attack aircraft. In addition, these vessels have built-in accommodations to house and feed more than 1,000 troops, and major medical facilities.
The LHA/LHD amphibious ships are currently in series production. They cost about one-fifth as much as the nuclear aircraft carriers that are being built at the rate of one every four or five years. More of these LHA/LHDs could enhance the nation’s afloat “strike forces.” Of course, troops can be carried on a temporary basis in the larger nuclear carriers, as was done when the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) carried 1,800 Army troops from Norfolk and landed them in Haiti in 1994.
The key factor is to base U.S. troops afloat—not ashore—in crisis areas and be prepared to quickly launch them by helicopter to take out enemy leaders, occupy key positions, support allies, or evacuate Americans caught in a crossfire—on a temporary basis. While some target areas are far from the sea, this is not a major problem. In 2001 the United States sent several hundred special-operations forces into Afghanistan, 600 miles from the sea. They were flown in by helicopters from the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) operating in the Arabian Sea. (Similarly, the unsuccessful attempt in 1980 to rescue hostages from the seized American embassy in Tehran—another inland objective—was launched from the aircraft carrier Nimitz [CVN-68].)
Also, this strategy capitalizes on the Obama administration’s “pivot” of U.S. military forces to the Pacific—an oceanic region. Thus, the United States must develop a strategy based on sending soldiers, Marines, and special-operations forces into crisis or combat areas, pinpointing targets in advance (by satellites, UAVs, and other means), and supporting them from the sea. This probably would require reorganization of some (most?) U.S. ground forces. For example, the current battalion-size Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) are ideal for forward afloat deployments, possibly with backup units stationed at available overseas bases. But that could mean the abolishing of Marine “corps”–level (Marine Expeditionary Force) and possibly division-level fire and support structures. That move would free up a few thousand personnel while not affecting the operative MEU forces.
Army restructuring of some units may similarly be beneficial for such afloat-based operations. However, the obvious troops for the sea change would be Marines and all-service special-operations forces.
Under this alternative strategy afloat forces primarily would be supported by ship-based aircraft (including helicopter gunships if within range). If more firepower is needed, ship- and submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles (with a range of 1,000 miles and the capability of being launched from about 150 U.S. surface ships and submarines) are the obvious candidates. Support would also be provided by the Air Force employing long-range B-52 and B-2 bomber aircraft for strikes, cargo aircraft for logistic support, and tankers for refueling ship-based fighters and helicopters.
Would this sea-based strategy be effective in all future crises and conflicts? Possibly not. But in some or even most combat situations envisioned for the immediate future, it offers considerable opportunities and at less cost—in people and dollars—than the current U.S. boots-on-the-ground strategy.
Looking back at U.S.-fought conflicts over the past 60 years, it becomes obvious that the United States should develop a new military strategy for the 21st century. The Secretary of Defense must give serious consideration to such a change in strategy . . . and it needs to be put in place quickly.