Reinvent the Fifth Armed Service, Quickly
(See J. Howe and J. Dolbow, p. 28, and N. Polmar, pp. 84–85, August 2013 Proceedings)
Commander Trevor A. Blow, U.S. Navy Reserve—I would like to correct a statement made in the article by Captain Howe and Lieutenant Dolbow. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) currently has two organic air components, not three. Legacy Customs Aviation and Border Patrol Aviation were combined under U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in 2005 under CBP-Air. The combined group is currently known as CBP—Office of Air and Marine (OAM). OAM trains, organizes, and equips more than 600 air-interdiction agents (AIA) and operates more than 200 aircraft.
The argument for centralizing DHS maritime aviation resources within the U.S. Coast Guard to save cost is flawed. OAM’s missions support customs enforcement and investigative support, overland and within the littorals. The Coast Guard’s expansive missions and authorities don’t allow for the focus or the capacity necessary to carry out CBP missions.
With regards to cost savings, CBP’s AIAs serve as federal agents in a lean law-enforcement construct. These AIAs join CBP as commercial pilots fully rated by the Federal Aviation Administration; they will serve the vast majority of their 20-year service in the cockpit, because CBP does not have the sea-tour/shore-tour rotations of a traditional naval organization. A Coast Guard aviator will spend about ten years in a flight station during his or her career.
It is also interesting to note that other law-enforcement organizations have distinct aviation branches. For example, the Department of Justice has three large air branches at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Experience within the Department of Defense has clearly demonstrated the need for the services to have their own air components to support their missions and not to restrict them by geography. DHS agencies are best served by several air components. Savings will not be gained by simply dividing these air branches into land and maritime groups, and most important, missions will not get done.
Remo Salta—It was stunning to read Captain Howe and Lieutenant Dolbow state that “Instead of common-sense collaboration—such as identifying a shared hull form that could be modified for the specific mission requirements of two services, and could be produced at high-volume/low-unit cost—the nation is now burdened with three highly expensive production lines (operating at relatively low volumes) and three unique maintenance-and-supply architectures, wasting billions of dollars in the process.” This is an excellent example of why many Americans never seem to care about the financial problems the U.S. Navy faces. For all the whining and carping about the horrific consequences of sequestration, it’s hard to make a case that the Navy needs more money for more ships when you have such programs as the problem-plagued littoral combat ship (LCS).
Think about how much money could have been saved if a common hull and a common ship were used for both the LCS program as well as the Coast Guard’s national-security cutter. Not only would we have produced a far more flexible and versatile fleet of ships, but through the cost savings realized by having a common hull we probably would have been able to actually build more ships. Now we literally have three different types of ships and there are still no guarantees at all that the LCS concept will work. In fact, there are a number of warning signs that the whole LCS program is a disaster. All of these points are covered by Mr. Polmar in his column.
But given all of the shortcomings of the LCS, given all of the wasted time and money with this program, the key question still is: Will she work in battle? The LCS is beginning to look a lot like the old battlecruisers the Royal Navy had going into World War I. They were supposed to be able to outfight anything smaller than a battlecruiser, and be able to run away from anything bigger than them. And how did that concept work out for the Royal Navy when so many battlecruisers were lost at Jutland? Worse, does anybody remember what happened to the then-outdated battlecruiser HMS Repulse when a technologically advanced weapon like the airplane was used against it by the Japanese in World War II? The LCS is much smaller than the old-time battlecruisers, but the idea seems to be the same, and it looks like we are doomed to repeat past mistakes already made by other navies.
And yet, nobody is held accountable for the LCS mess, and the only thing the Navy seems to want is more money to keep the program going. And to this day, nobody has made a compelling case for why we need two versions of the LCS. It’s about time the Navy stops whining about needing more money and starts getting better results with the adequate funds it already has.
A Landing Craft for the 21st Century
(See S. Altenburger, M. Bosworth, and M. Junge, pp. 60–64, July 2013 Proceedings)
Colonel David C. Fuquea, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired); professor, U.S. Naval War College—It was a pleasure to see a peripheral area like landing craft getting publication space in Proceedings. I applaud the authors for providing professional, yet serious criticism of the state of the naval services’ ability to move ship-to-shore (STS). The anachronistic nature of our current capabilities means we operate with the same speed/range as our grandfathers in 1943. Despite the incredible capability of the F4U Corsair, no one demands the next generation of fighters mirror this historic aircraft instead of the F-35. Yet, naval leaders are quite happy to advocate a replacement for the amphibious combat vehicle and landing craft, utility (LCU) that would mire the naval services’ STS capability in the same slow, short-range transit that is most vulnerable to the very threat, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), that is the major concern in the 21st century. The authors make a great case to bring this argument to the forefront of naval-procurement discussions.
I would question the authors’ hypothesis of the value of their craft, however, from the perspective of “Keep It Simple.” The “Swiss Army knife” design is incredibly complicated from both a deployment as well as an employment perspective. The requirement to unfold both bow and stern components after leaving the well deck will take time, even if it always works correctly. I question if the complicated fitting of the two sections to the hull could be accomplished in any sea state. Simple maintenance problems in retractable propeller drives would create challenges from which there would be no recovery. The authors are dismissive of the difficulties in the shift from running forward to turning around and going “stern first” to the beach. Coordinating current landing craft that do not have to spin 180 degrees to make a landing is already a serious challenge. This complicated design does offer additional speed and lift, but only of a marginal degree. The transit time gained from the increase to 20 knots would be lost by the complications of “unfolding” and spinning around to land. Finally, this one-trick pony would have little utility in any role or mission after departing the well deck beyond being a tanker.
Technology today does offer alternatives to overcome the real flaws of current STS movement identified by the authors. Air-supported-vessel (ASV) technology can provide landing craft of similar lift capability as the current LCU, speeds over 50 knots, and a two-foot draft. ASVs are employed by the Russians in the Caspian Sea, with great simplicity and bow ramps. Smaller versions can be davit-mounted, allowing landing forces to be delivered with speed in a single wave. These vessels could execute security, counter-drug, and blockade missions with no reconfiguration. Ranges of 250 nautical miles provide the necessary standoff in the A2/AD environment.
The naval services need STS capability for the 21st century. The authors clearly articulate the requirement. It is time to listen to them and procure landing craft that parallel the F-35 and not the F4U.
Hormone Treatment for PTSD
(See P. R. Martin, pp. 79–80, August 2013 Proceedings)
Captain Jonathan L. Davis, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I am quite happy to see this article addressing a very important issue. I am, however, confused as to why “the adrenal fatigue syndrome” and bio-identical hormone-treatment therapy were included. Both are highly controversial and would require tremendously large and expensive trials to prove their efficacy. Even with this I doubt either side in these controversies would ever agree on anything.