In 2012 U.S. Marines significantly reduced forces in Afghanistan, transferring many security responsibilities to their Afghan partners. Concurrently, the Navy–Marine Corps team received a much-needed respite from the kind of high-tempo, amphibious, crisis-response operations that have characterized the post-Cold War era. Meanwhile, Marines looked toward new challenges, repositioning their forces and refining their capabilities for the future.
Operations in Afghanistan
Marines in Afghanistan serve in one of six categories. First are those individuals who serve in high-echelon command and staff assignments. The most prominent among them in 2012 was General John R. Allen, who served as the overall commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. The second category includes those serving in the Marine Electronic Attack (EA-6) Squadron at Bagram, which supports the ISAF command. The third comprises those from Marine Special Operations Command, who provide a special-operations task force headquarters, two Marine special-operations companies, and an individual Marine special-operations team. The fourth category includes the Marines who are part of the NATO Training Mission/Combined Security Transition Command.
The fifth, and by far the largest, category includes those who make up the forward-deployed portion of a Marine Expeditionary Force—or MEF (Fwd)—in Regional Command-Southwest (RC-SW). Sharing borders with Iran and Pakistan, RC-SW is composed of Nimroz and Helmand provinces. The majority of the Marines serve in Helmand, an area nearly as large as West Virginia. In the past, Helmand has been the scene of hard fighting, as the Taliban sought to retain control over the area that had been generating their narcotics revenue. Afghanistan used to produce 90 percent of the world’s opium, and 80 percent of that came from Helmand. At the beginning of the year there were approximately 18,000 Marines in RC-SW from II MEF (Fwd) under the command of Major General John A. Toolan. In February General James F. Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), reported to Congress, “We are seeing measurable progress along all lines of operation in the Helmand Province: security, reintegration, rule of law, governance, development, education, and health. Over the past year, violence and the level of collateral damage have decreased significantly.”1
On 12 March 2012 responsibility for RC-SW was turned over to Major General Charles M. Gurganus and I MEF (Fwd). By July General Gurganus was able to provide a positive assessment regarding the improving size and quality of Afghan security forces. The Afghan army presence in the province had grown from one over-stretched brigade to a three-brigade corps that had earned Gurganus’ confidence that “they’re going to be able to accomplish the mission.” The police force, which had been tiny only three years earlier—and powerless in preventing the Taliban from exploiting the province as its source of opium and heroin—now numbers more than 8,500. As Afghan forces assumed a greater role, the drawdown in the number of U.S. Marines got under way. General Gurganus explained: “Our mission is evolving; we’ve moved out of the lead for the counterinsurgency and moving more and more into a security force assistance role.” The Marines focused on providing advisers to the Afghan army and police, along with communications, intelligence support, and logistics.2
One of the more interesting means of providing logistics support was via two K-MAX helicopters deployed with Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 (VMU-1) from December 2011 to May 2012. During that period the two platforms flew 485 sorties, achieving a mission-capable rate of 90 percent.3 The unmanned aircraft was developed as a means of conducting resupply of widely distributed units without exposing ground convoys to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The K-MAXes continued to operate in Afghanistan when VMU-1 was succeeded by VMU-2.
By the end of July 3,000 fewer Marines were in country than had been there seven months before. The drawdown generated a sixth category of Marines in Afghanistan—those carrying out the monumental task of returning equipment to the United States. They include the 600 personnel assigned to “R4” Operations Group (R4OG)—short for Retrograde and Redeployment in support of Reset and Reconstitution—under Colonel James Clark. As units leave Afghanistan their individual equipment is being turned over to R4OG for inventory, inspection, and, if necessary, repair before being packed for shipment home by the Marine Corps Logistics Command (Fwd). In addition to those individual items, MCLC (Fwd) is managing the return of major items such as tanks and trucks to maintenance depots in the United States. Eventually, all of this matériel and rolling stock will be redistributed among the operating forces and training commands, improving equipment readiness across the board. “It belongs ultimately to the American taxpayer,” Clark said.4
Transferring Responsibility
The drawdown progressed throughout the summer. Some 4,200 more Marines departed in August, and another 2,700 left in September. While the reductions reflected the Marines’ success in defeating the Taliban and stabilizing Helmand, the surviving enemy remained dangerous. On Friday evening, 14 September, some 15 insurgents wearing U.S. Army uniforms penetrated the perimeter fence of British-run Camp Bastion and assaulted the flight line in the vicinity of Marine Attack Squadron 211. Exemplifying the credo of “every Marine a rifleman,” pilots and ground crews grabbed their small arms and counterattacked. Supported by hastily launched AH-1 Super Cobras and UH-1Y Venoms that had been parked nearby, the Marines killed 14 of the attackers and captured the survivor. Before their demise, however, the raiders managed to destroy six AV-8B Harriers and damage two more. In addition, eight coalition military personnel and one civilian were wounded and two Marines were killed, including the commanding officer of VMA-211, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Raible.
It was the worst loss for Marine aviation since the night of 27–28 October 1965, when more than 100 Viet Cong sappers conducted simultaneous attacks on the air facilities at Marble Mountain and Chu Lai, resulting in the destruction of 21 aircraft, the damaging of another 41, and the killing or wounding of 96 squadron personnel.5 The quick reaction to the Camp Bastion attack, led by Lieutenant Colonel Raible, fortunately prevented similar losses. Major General Gregg Sturdevant, commanding the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward), observed that, “Had they not done what they did, it could have been a lot worse.” He explained that in the air wing, “we focus on fixing aircraft and flying those aircraft in support of ground forces. But, when forced to, we can quickly transition to offense on the ground, and that’s exactly what happened Friday night.”6
Although this incident was costly, it had little impact on the larger events in Afghanistan. Working in tandem with Afghan and coalition forces, as well as various government agencies and non-governmental organizations, the Marines continued to make steady progress in Helmand. By the end of the year there were governors in 13 of the 14 districts and a new provincial authority in the capital of Lashkar Gah. The provincial judicial system continued to add judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. By the end of 2012 there were 57 health care facilities in Helmand, a nine-fold increase from 2006, though still only enough to serve half the population. Similarly, Marines helped open 86 schools to serve 121,000 children, including 28,000 girls. As the male-to-female ratio of students implies, there is still much work to be done. Perhaps most important, improved security is bolstering counter-narcotics initiatives such as the “perennial program,” which provides saplings, vines, and trellising to farmers in order to grow stone fruit and grapes that are high-value products capable of competing economically with poppies.7
By the end of December 2012, progress was sufficient for the Marine Corps to cut its overall strength in Afghanistan to approximately 8,200—less than half of what it had been at the start of the year. As the transition progressed, journalist Francis J. “Bing” West—a Vietnam-era former Marine officer who has frequently accompanied patrols in Afghanistan—provided this assessment of progress:
A few weeks ago, I visited Sangin District in Helmand province, the most violent district in Afghanistan, and got a taste of the challenges facing those who actually carry out these joint patrols . . . . In 95-degree heat, 10 Marines . . . slogged through the stifling cornfields, careful to stay in the footsteps of the point man sweeping for IEDs with his mine detector…. The average grunt in Bravo Company strapped on 95 pounds of armor and ammo and made 100 patrols over a seven-month deployment. Last year in this sector of Sangin, Marines cinched tourniquets around their legs before going on patrol. Expecting to step on a pressure plate, they were ready to tie off their own bloody stumps. A year later, most carry tourniquets in their pockets and say they have it easier than those who preceded them. That’s true. Throughout Helmand, the progress has been remarkable. Roads are open, markets are bustling, schools are full. The reason has been the gritty persistence of our Marines, deployment after deployment. One hundred patrols per man—one million footsteps, with tourniquets at the ready. The infantryman has done his job. It’s time for the Afghans to shovel the snow from their own doorsteps.8
Uncommon Valor
As West observed, Marines serving in Afghanistan during 2012 had it “easier than those who preceded them.” Several of those who paved the way for success received due recognition last year. These included the Navy Cross for Sergeants Clifford M. Wooldridge, Christopher B. Farias, William B. Soutra, Jr. and, posthumously, Matthew T. Abbate.
While limited space prevents telling each of their stories in detail, one in particular illustrates the timeless nature of infantry combat—even in the high-tech 21st century—as well as the moral and physical courage required of those who engage in it. On 18 June 2010 then-Corporal Wooldridge was a vehicle commander in a mounted patrol that suddenly came under intense fire. He dismounted and led a four-man fire team across open ground to flank 15 of the enemy, killing or wounding at least eight and forcing the rest to scatter. As he covered the team’s withdrawal, he heard voices from behind an adjacent wall. Rushing around the corner, Wooldridge came face-to-face with two enemy fighters, and shot them at close range. Crouching to reload, he saw the barrel of an enemy machine gun appear from around the wall. Wooldridge tore the weapon from his adversary’s grip and beat him to death with it. As was noted in his citation, Wooldridge’s “audacious and fearless actions thwarted the enemy attack on his platoon.”
Not all Marines received the recognition their peers believe was due them. On 12 December then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta disapproved a second recommendation to award Sergeant Rafael Peralta the Medal of Honor, citing forensic evidence that conflicted with eyewitness reports. While clearing houses in Fallujah, Iraq, on 15 November 2004, Sergeant Peralta was shot multiple times and fell to the floor. When an enemy grenade was thrown into the room, “Peralta took his arm out and swept it underneath his body,” said Robert Reynolds, one of the seven Marines who witnessed the event. “If he didn’t sweep it underneath his body, I would be dead, because I was five feet from him.”9 In 2008 then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had disapproved the original award recommendation because autopsy data suggested that Peralta’s action could not have been a conscious act due to his wounds. Sergeant Peralta was awarded the Navy Cross instead, but his family declined to accept it. Subsequently, Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) submitted new forensic analysis that backed up the eyewitness accounts, prompting Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus to ask Secretary Panetta to reconsider the case.
Understandably, the second rejection did not sit well with Sergeant Peralta’s family or the Marines he served with. Steve Sebby, who was with Peralta’s unit that day, questioned the rationale behind awarding the Navy Cross. “If he didn’t do any of that stuff, like the forensic evidence says, then why would he rate that medal [the Navy Cross]?” Sebby said. “It’s either the Medal of Honor or nothing…. In wars past, the amount of statements that were made by the Marines—that would have flown, that would have gotten the Medal of Honor back in World War II.”10
Crisis-Response Operations
In recent years the Navy–Marine Corps team has been the force of choice for crisis response, but the combatant commanders’ demand for amphibious forces has far exceeded capacity. Amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine expeditionary units (ARG/MEUs) have been worn thin, resulting in greatly extended deployments. The Bataan ARG/22nd MEU, for example, conducted a 322-day deployment that ended 5 February. Subsequently, the ARG/MEUs were able to return to a relatively routine schedule. The limited number of amphibious ships did not permit a continuous presence in the Mediterranean, as was once the norm.
It is unknown whether the attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, on 11 September 2012 could have been forestalled or thwarted had there been an ARG/MEU, with its attack aircraft, helicopters, and infantrymen, on station in the Mediterranean. But without that option—and with the actual chain of events surrounding the Benghazi incident still unclear—it appears that that no service or Special Operations Command assets could have been employed soon enough to prevent the deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.11 The Marine Corps response came in the form of a 50-man Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST) that arrived in Libya from Rota, Spain, to provide immediate relief after the attacks. As additional violence spread across the Middle East and North Africa, another FAST platoon was sent to Yemen to protect the U.S. diplomatic mission there.
At home, Marine Corps Forces North provided defense support to civil authorities after Hurricane Sandy devastated coastal New Jersey and New York on 29 October. Units involved included elements from II MEF at Camp Lejeune, including two KC-130J Hercules and select units of 2d Marine Logistics Group that formed Task Force Pumps, as well as elements of the 26th MEU on board the USS Wasp (LHD-1). Participating units from the Marine Corps Forces Reserve included the 6th Communications Battalion; Marine Air Group 49; 2d Battalion, 25th Marines; and 6th Motor Transport Battalion.
In December Marines from III MEF forward-based in Japan supported a disaster-relief effort in the aftermath of Typhoon Pablo in the Philippines, led by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Marine KC-130J Hercules transport planes delivered critical food packages and other supplies to Manila for distribution by the Philippine military.
Allies and Ospreys
Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced in November 2011 that her government had reached an agreement with the United States for Marines to start deploying to northern Australia for training. Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was the first unit to do so, arriving in Darwin on 4 April 2012 for a six-month assignment.
Shortly after that, on the other side of the globe, the Iwo Jima ARG/24th MEU began African Lion, a bilateral training exercise conducted with Royal Moroccan military forces. Tragedy struck on 11 April, when an MV-22 Osprey crashed in a Moroccan training area and two members of the flight crew, Corporals Robby A. Reyes and Derek A. Kerns, were killed. The official investigation revealed that the crash was a result of pilot error rather than mechanical failure. An unnamed pilot succinctly summarized the investigation’s findings: “Unfortunately they put the aircraft in a position beyond the (flight manual) limits that are advertised and that are trained to, and they made an error.”12
The mishap exacerbated political turmoil in Japan, where Okinawans demonstrated against the planned arrival of 12 Ospreys, even though the MV-22 has proved itself one of the safest aircraft in the military inventory. The Ospreys arrived in Iwakuni by sea on 23 July in preparation for the trip to Futenma on 1 October. The New York Times reported that both the United States and Japan see the basing of Ospreys on Okinawa as critical to improving their posture in the Pacific, putting the Marines “within reach of potential hot spots like Taiwan and a group of disputed islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku.”
The Times also reported that the unusually strong pushback from Okinawans may run deeper than safety concerns, noting that local observers said the issue had become a lightning rod for deeper grievances over “what islanders see as an excessive base burden” that exemplifies “the discrimination that they say Okinawa has suffered since Japan seized the once-independent kingdom in the 1870s.” Even conservative Okinawan politicians have cautioned that the Osprey could pose a threat to the U.S.-Japanese alliance.13 Given the foregoing, U.S. commanders are clearly under pressure to ensure that their forces do nothing to aggravate these tensions.
Integration and Innovation
The Marine Corps has a long history of innovation—especially in the amphibious realm—despite the skepticism of some defense experts. As was the case in the 1930s, there are those who question the relevance of amphibious capabilities in the current security era. Support for amphibious capabilities got a boost from an unexpected source on 5 January 2012, when the Secretary of Defense released Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. That defense guidance identified ten “primary missions” for the U.S. Armed Forces. While naval forces play a role in all of them, “Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges” is particularly important to Marines because the elaborating text mandates “implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept [JOAC].”14
Published a week later, the JOAC explains that maintaining and expanding operational access may require entry of forces into hostile territory for a number of reasons that might range from “limited-objective attacks, such as raids to eliminate land-based threats to friendly air and naval forces, to seizing a lodgment for a sustained land campaign. Neither of these necessarily implies the deliberate establishment of a static beachhead or airhead in the traditional sense.”15 The JOAC also states: “This is an overarching concept, under which can nest other concepts dealing with more specific aspects of anti-access/area-denial challenges, such as the Air-Sea Battle concept already under development, or concepts on entry operations or littoral operations as possible examples.”16 Subsequently, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the services, began work on the Joint Concept for Entry Operations.
All this was music to Marine ears, inasmuch as the broad ideas in the JOAC mirror the more detailed work that had been done by the Marines and sailors who made up the Amphibious Capability Working Group (ACWG) convened by General Amos in the fall of 2011. It also set the stage for the accelerated pace of Navy-Marine Corps innovation in the months to follow. This included several diverse events, beginning with the largest amphibious exercise in over ten years, Bold Alligator 2012 (BA12), conducted on the East Coast from 30 January to 12 February. A major Fleet event that included participation by several allies, the exercise was also used as a venue for experimentation with advanced seabasing capabilities, along with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s testing of the Enhanced MAGTF Operations concept.
Hot on the heels of BA12 came the culminating event of the Marine Corps’ Title 10 war game, Expeditionary Warrior 2012 (EW12), conducted in Washington the week of 4 March. It had been preceded by a series of seminars and “deep dives” the previous fall. Given the Australians’ increasing interaction with U.S. Marines, it was not surprising that they were the most prominent among the allies participating in EW12.
On 27 April the Marine Corps published the ACWG report, Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change. While the ACWG had been formed as a temporary body, on 30 May the Marine Corps formally established the “Ellis Group”—named after the “amphibious prophet,” Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. “Pete” Ellis—as a counterpart to a similar group being formed by the Navy to promote coordinated innovation.17
Rather than wait for the establishment of a formal group, the Navy joined with the Marine Corps to conduct a “proof of concept” Naval Service Game 2012 (NSG 12) at the Naval War College 11-13 September. Unlike Title 10 games, which usually include joint, multinational, and interagency participation, NSG 12 was an exclusively Navy–Marine Corps event, focused on issues of mutual interest. It appears that a more integrated innovation “pathway” is emerging to synchronize naval war-gaming and experimentation.
‘Punching Above Its Weight’
General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. was nominated on 10 October to become the sixth—and last—American commander in Afghanistan. He was named to succeed General Allen, who was the first Marine to command a theater of war and was slated to become the next Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. (General Allen elected to retire rather than accept the nomination, citing Mrs. Allen’s health.)
These moves surprised many defense-watchers, who anticipated that Army General David Rodriguez would get the nod for Afghanistan—especially since another top post would soon be going to a Marine when General John F. Kelly took over U.S. Southern Command on 19 November. With General James N. Mattis already in charge of U.S. Central Command, collectively these assignments constitute an unprecedented dominance of key joint commands by officers from the smallest service within the Department of Defense.
“The Marine Corps is clearly punching above its weight,” Peter Monsoor, a retired Army colonel and professor of military history at Ohio State University observed. “This a very unusual and singular moment in Marine Corps history.” He explained: “I think there is something about how Marines approach professional military education that produces officers with a broad view of the world and who are flexible and can deal with the very different challenges of the type of wars we’re fighting today…. With a few exceptions, the Army tends to breed good company men,” Mansoor added.18
1. GEN James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “2012 Report to the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps, 16 February 2012,” 1. www.mca-marines.org/files/16%20Feb%2012_CMC_HASC_Posture%20Statement.pdf.
2. Karen Parrish, “General, Governor Call Helmand Gains Sustainable,” Armed Forces Press Service, 11 July 2012, www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=117083.
3. Mike Hoffman, “K-MAX Cargo UAS Exceeds Expectations in Afghanistan test,” Defense Tech, 26 July 2012. http://defensetech.org/2012/07/26/k-max-cargo-uas-exceeds-expectations-in-afghanistan-test/.
4. Gidget Fuentes, “Corps Faces Logistics Challenge in Afghanistan,” Marine Corps Times, 9 April 2012, www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/04/marine-afghan-logistics-challenge-040912/.
5. Jack Shulimson and MAJ Charles M. Johnson, USMC, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Build-Up, 1965, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978) 125-127.
6. Dan Lamothe, “Harriers Destroyed in Attack to be Replaced,” Marine Corps Times, 25 September 2012, www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/09/marine-harriers-camp-bastion-attack-092512/.
7. Data obtained by author from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, January 2012-February 2013.
8. Bing West, “On Patrol with Bravo Company in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, 1 October 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443995604578004541000940114.html.
9. Stephen Dinan, “Top Medal Denied Twice to Marine,” Washington Times, December 2012, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/12/panetta-denies-medal-honor-marine-dived-grenade/.
10. Ibid.
11. Jennifer Griffin and Adam Housley, “Facts and Questions about What Happened in Benghazi,” Fox News, 22 January 2013. www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/22/facts-and-questions-about-what-happened-in-benghazi/.
12. Beth Ford Roth, KPBS, “Pilot Error Blamed For Fatal Osprey Crash,” 10 July 2012 www.kpbs.org/news/2012/jul/10/pilot-error-blamed-fatal-osprey-crash/.
13. Martin Fackler, “U.S. Sends Aircraft to Okinawa, Despite Fierce Opposition,” The New York Times, 1 October 2012 www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/world/asia/united-states-military-sends-ospreys-to-okinawa-despite-fierce-opposition.html?_r=0.
14. Leon E. Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 5 January 2012) 4-5.
15. GEN Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 12 January 2012), 5-6.
16. Ibid, 4.
17. On 13 January 2013, VADM R.W. Hunt, the Director of the Navy staff, announced the establishment of the Naval Warfare Group via a NAVADMIN message.
18. Jim Michaels, “Marine Generals Showing Rare Dominance of Top Jobs,” USA Today, 24 February 2013. www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/24/marine-generals/1934129/.