In the coming decades, naval power is likely to grow in importance for U.S. policymakers. While recovering from two difficult land wars, the nation can be expected to shift to maritime strategy, capitalizing on its command of the seas to influence events ashore. Yet at the same time, our potential opponents have increased investment in anti-access/area-denial weapons. The Navy will continue to develop a comprehensive plan involving air, surface, subsurface, and amphibious assets to accomplish all missions in future contested littoral regions. Many other nations have already considered this problem and have adopted a type of platform that the U.S. Navy does not yet use—small, littoral-combatant craft.
Take, for example, Iran. In his book Tanker Wars, Lee Allen Zatarain describes the 1987–88 naval actions in the Persian Gulf. During several months of brinksmanship and conflict, Iran struck with many platforms, from shore-based fighter-bombers to shore-based antiship cruise missiles to mines. And they struck with large numbers of fast, nimble, gun- and missile-armed small attack craft that hid from detection in the littoral environment, attacked far larger warships, and retreated into the clutter. They took advantage of both their littoral environment and the economy of force that small craft provide.
The U.S. Navy responded not only with its large surface vessels, but also with a quickly assembled fleet of small patrol craft. Operating from rapidly converted oil barges serving as afloat staging areas, 65-foot Mk III patrol craft operated by special boat units effectively countered the Iranian Boghammars and mine-laying craft. The patrol boats defended maritime sea lines of communication, identified Iranian threats hidden among the buoys and oil facilities of the gulf, and met all threats head-on. They denied large areas to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps craft while freeing the larger surface vessels to conduct convoy duties.1
Roots of a Now-Timely Concept
While today’s U.S. Navy employs a limited number of small vessels for force protection and special operations, it needs a more capable coastal small-craft fleet designed for a broader range of offensive and defensive littoral operations. The riverine command boat, a version of the popular Swedish CB90 assault boat, is the U.S. Navy’s most recent, tentative step in this direction. It could represent the beginning of a force that devolves combat power to large numbers of affordable units capable of exploiting, rather than suffering from, a littoral environment. If integrated with existing U.S. assets, squadrons of such boats might evolve into the flexible “guerrilla-warfare ships” the United States needs in today’s complicated coastal environment.2
In 1999, Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and Captain Wayne P. Hughes put forward their thoughts on the future of the littoral Navy. Too much capital, manpower, and combat power was concentrated in each U.S. warship for commanders to risk them in littoral operations. The missile, torpedo, mine, and terrorist threats in confined waterways were deemed too severe. This created a “tactically unstable” situation that limited U.S. options in the green waters of the littorals. The solution was a small, cheap, minimally manned “Streetfighter” that policymakers would be willing to put into harm’s way.3
Officers inspired by Cebrowski’s and Hughes’ concepts expounded on the missions a littoral combatant would fulfill. In a November 1999 Proceedings article, then–Lieutenant Commander David Weeks clearly articulated the missions of what he dubbed the “guerrilla-warfare ship.” The craft had to be capable of specific tasks: interdiction, embargo enforcement, precision engagement, choke-point transit monitoring, special-operations forces (SOF) insertion/extraction, protection of amphibious-assault lines of communication, and domination of a littoral battlefield.4
The eventual product of this discussion was the littoral combat ship. Yet the LCS is still too costly and vulnerable to expose in the most confused and dangerous littoral regions. Luckily, a solution exists to solve this problem.
The Littoral Lightweights
The world’s navies have produced small-craft combatants that can accomplish the missions of the guerrilla-warfare ship. If given the right logistical and tactical support, they could add tactical flexibility to a littoral force:
Interdiction of Littoral Traffic and Maritime Embargo. Skiffs, dhows, fishing boats, and large merchant ships ply the world’s littorals. Today the U.S. Navy assigns many of its overseas maritime-interdiction operations and embargo duties to destroyers, cruisers, and other blue-water vessels. Such missions add to the burden of already overtaxed ships.5 In many instances, small craft could accomplish these missions more effectively. The U.S. Coast Guard operates such vessels as the 45-foot response boat–medium in a maritime-interdiction role. Many small craft can travel 20 to 30 knots faster than the blue-water ships, matching the speed of the “go-fast” speedboats favored by smugglers and drug runners.
Small craft can follow their targets into shallows and rivers. While large, ungainly ships must stand several hundred yards off of a boarded vessel to avoid collision, a small craft can maintain a security overwatch within a few yards. The boarding team can expect much more effective crew-served weapon coverage at that range. And if operated from an afloat forward staging base (AFSB), the small craft can remain at sea longer and range as far from the shore as required to control the maritime battlespace. Using an AFSB, small craft would be particularly useful for counterpiracy operations in such places as the Gulf of Aden. The craft would be taking a page from Somali pirates. Like the pirates, U.S. forces would be able to board ships using small craft operating from a mother ship that provided support and a haven in bad weather.
Precision Engagement. Small craft already support precision engagement. Vessels such as the CB90 have proved that a small craft can effectively employ an organic missile system against a moving target. They have successfully fired Hellfire missiles against targets at sea and are capable of mounting smaller weapons such as the Javelin and Spike missile.6 And small craft are capable of identifying targets in the jumbled littoral battlespace, ensuring aircraft and missiles are engaging the right target. The U.S. riverine force already fields joint tactical air controllers specifically trained to coordinate precision strikes while embarked from small craft. Such personnel could ensure the right targets are destroyed in crowded shallow waters.
Surface and Subsurface Surveillance/Choke-Point Transit Monitoring. With a fleet of small and fast vessels, a commander could cast a wide visual and radar net without risking larger vessels in narrow seas; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) could expand their reach. While no small-craft variant carries antisubmarine-warfare (ASW) sensors, warfare against diesel submarines is largely a non-acoustic exercise akin to a surface search.7 A squadron mobbing a small area would create a difficult problem for a diesel-submarine captain seeking a safe place to snorkel or use his periscope to acquire a target. And the sonar disadvantage will not last forever. A 12-meter ASW USV already being tested places an effective ASW suite on a platform smaller than most of the potential guerrilla-warfare ships.8
On the other side of the fight, a U.S. small-craft force could provide defense against an opponent using small craft in a similar role. Transits through the Strait of Hormuz inevitably involve Iranian small craft observing or harassing shipping. Small craft would provide high-value-asset escort to counter such activities.
SOF Delivery and Extraction. Small, fast craft have long carried SOF personnel in and out of combat. The U.S. Mark V is one of the standard SOF insertion craft, while the CB90 originally was designed to insert and extract up to 20 troops.
Protection of Amphibious-Operations Area. The enemy’s own small-craft force is one of several threats the Navy faces in its future amphibious operations. We could fight fire with fire by deploying small, well-armed littoral boats to counter the small-boat swarms and suicide vessels increasingly favored by some regional powers.9 This would become increasingly important as an assault force approached the shore. While the blue-water force would likely stand off many miles from the hazardous littorals to avoid shore based missiles and mines, the small boat squadrons could accompany an assault right up to the beachhead.
The greatest challenge would be supply and sustainment of such small-boat squadrons. The Navy is already addressing this problem with the recent recommissioning of the USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15) as the first afloat forward staging base. She can be equipped with the fuel and supplies needed to keep small craft operating for long periods.
Littoral Battlespace Domination. Littoral dominance is the ability to decisively win a battle in and then control the littoral environment. It requires a coordinated air, surface, and subsurface effort. With further development, a small-boat force composed of several squadrons could have a disproportionate impact on the littoral mission. To see the potential impact of such a force, one need only look at how seriously the U.S. Navy takes the Iranian fast-attack craft/fast-inshore-attack craft threat in the Persian Gulf.10
Unique Capabilities
Of course, small craft do have disadvantages. They normally do not field air defenses and would be severely constrained without air cover. They require regular land- or sea-based fuel and supply support. Small craft are also more affected by weather and high seas than blue-water ships. They have a limited payload and power capacity. Their small size and rough ride limit crew endurance. Finally, their greatest limitation is range. Since the ranges of most small craft do not exceed a few hundred miles, the Navy would have to dedicate scarce amphibious or auxiliary ships to serve as small-craft tenders if operating at sea, or ensure a land-based haven within patrol distance of the small craft’s area of responsibility. This would leave their logistics train vulnerable to attack.
Yet a small-craft fleet balances these disadvantages with specific advantages that larger vessels do not have. They are:
• Cost-effective: The small-boat concept is cheap. For example, the CB90 costs in the vicinity of $3 million. Even when weapons, spare parts, support equipment, and training are included, the Navy could still purchase nearly 100 for the price of one LCS.
• Minimally manned: Small boat crews are small. The manpower and combat power of a squadron would be spread across several boats. The loss of one craft would not mean the loss of the entire unit’s combat power. Tacticians would likely be more willing to place these vessels in the inherently high-risk littorals because the loss of a single platform would not be catastrophic.11
• Easily transportable: Small boats such as the RCB/CB90 provide a unique capability. They can be transported by truck, train, freighter, amphibious ship, and even aircraft. With a concerted air-transport campaign, a squadron could be lifted to global hot spots in a matter of days. Should a friendly island or coastal nation come under threat, heavily armed U.S. squadrons airlifted in to defend the littorals could buy valuable time for the rest of the Fleet to organize a response. Right now, the U.S. Navy is able to transport such boats in the well decks of amphibious ships as well as on military sealift cargo ships. It is not inconceivable that future amphibious modifications may adopt a davit-lift system similar to those of several European navies to make launch and recovery of a small craft more efficient and less subject to sea state and equipment failure.12 The small boats also can utilize a beach detachment with trailers to maneuver on land as well as at sea. No other littoral surface or subsurface combatant has this level of strategic mobility.
• Unexpected: For 50 years, potential adversaries have produced weapons specifically designed to destroy the U.S. blue-water fleet. Their stockpiles of missiles, mines, suicide boats, and torpedoes are designed with long ranges and massive warheads. A small-craft littoral fleet would create a new dimension the enemy would have to consider. Every cruise missile or torpedo launched at a small boat would be one less launched at shipping or the larger blue-water vessels. Such missiles and torpedoes would be less likely to achieve a hit on a fast, maneuverable small boat than the big ships the missile was intended to kill. And opposing fast-attack craft swarms would face a tough fight against a squadron of small, heavily armed U.S. small craft. An agile small-boat squadron with a heavy punch could throw off the adversary’s calculations and add a new, threatening dimension to his littoral battlefield.
• Proven: Small-boat navies exist all over the world for a reason. Dockstavarvet, the producer of the CB90, has sold its craft to several navies in climates ranging from subarctic Scandinavia to tropical southern Latin America. Sweden maintains roughly 200 CB90s serving as special-operations, ambulance, patrol, and command-and-control platforms. Norway has several dozen small craft, including CB90s that successfully tested the Hellfire missile system. Mexico and Greece have purchased several dozen to counter human and narcotics trafficking.13 Many other coastal nations maintain forces No extended, expensive acquisition process is needed—the boats work, and work well.
The Navy’s Small-Craft Rediscovery
This would not be the first time the U.S. Navy put guerrilla-warfare ships to sea. Historically, small-boat squadrons have carried out most of those missions. In World War II, commanders used the cheap and numerous PT boats in confined seas to insert and extract personnel, conduct surveillance, and attack far larger ships using the advantages of speed, numbers, and low visibility inherent to small craft. Again in Vietnam, a veritable fleet of green- and brown-water craft allowed the Navy to transport troops, attack enemy vessels, and provide fire support throughout the Mekong Delta.
The future force of “littoral lightweights” will evolve into a spectrum of vessels. Some of these the Navy now posseses in small numbers. On the large end, the Cyclone-class patrol craft is already a capable littoral ship. The Coast Guard includes many smaller craft for interdiction and rescue that could one day metamorphose into a heavy-weather small-boat class. Maritime security squadrons field force-protection craft for inshore defense. And now, the riverine force has entered the mix.
The U.S. Navy has already acquired one of the most popular potential guerrilla-warfare small craft for the riverine force. The aforementioned CB90 is a small, nimble craft designed to accommodate a range of alterations for specific littoral missions. It is 49 feet long with a displacement of about 18 tons and a draft of 4 feet. The crew size varies based on the mission but generally consists of around ten sailors serving as patrol officer, coxswain, engineer, and gunners. While its operating characteristics are variant-dependent, it can reach speeds greater than 50 knots and is capable of a 180-degree turn in less than a boat length. Its water jet-propulsion system allows for impressive acceleration and a total range in excess of 250 nautical miles. Well-deck operations and at-sea refueling extend that range even farther. With such capabilities, the boat has developed a following outside its native Sweden.14
The RCB, the specialized CB90 variant ordered by the U.S. Navy, is heavily armored, sacrificing some speed in favor of protection. It mounts a battery of crew-served weapons, including the M240, the Mk-44 minigun, the .50-caliber machine gun, and the Mk-19 grenade launcher. An automatically stabilized remote-operated small-arms mount above the cockpit can increase those weapons’ range and accuracy. The boat utilizes a Furuno navigation radar, a forward-looking infrared camera, and a communications suite for situational awareness. It is equipped with a bow hatch and ramp designed for quick exfiltration.
The RCB has much potential. The riverine force already has substantial experience with the craft. It would be cheap and easy to begin adapting variants of it that would fulfill the missions of a guerrilla-warfare ship. It is a proven missile boat; the Navy would only have to make the investment in existing hardware and train Hellfire or Spike missile operators and maintainers to dramatically increase its antisurface-warfare capability. The 120-mm mortar variant exists and could provide a relatively cheap naval surface-fire support capability to amphibious forces within a short period of time, without any messy acquisition process. In all, the craft is an excellent first step toward a small-boat force.
Perhaps most exciting of all, the RCB has been introduced by the aggressive, combat-oriented Riverines. Small-craft squadrons require an offensive mindset to operate effectively in the contested littorals. They must be manned by crews who thrive on aggressive action and are willing to accept the risks of an offensive fighting force. In Tanker Wars, the special-boat unit commander at one point ordered a single 65-foot patrol craft to “turn and engage” a much larger force of Iranian small craft. The patrol officer, a surface warfare junior officer, unhesitatingly turned his bow against the threat. The Riverines, trained to take the fight to the enemy in the river environment, bring that same aggressive nature to the littoral battlefield.
Only experience will allow the Navy to discover the ideal composition of a future force of guerrilla-warfare craft. Luckily, it has begun to learn those lessons.
A Balanced Green-Water Fleet
The current RCB squadron setup provides a test platform for the small-craft squadron concept. As the unit proves its ability to evolve into a flexible guerrilla-warfare force, it will become the model for future squadrons. The lessons learned will guide the acquisition of craft from domestic producers or foreign navies. The force could grow to employ different vessels tailored to specific missions. The force might adopt a more seaworthy foul-weather platform for open-water escorts, a more heavily armored flat-bottomed vessel for riverine operations, and a faster interceptor for coastal operations.
Like all mission areas, the littoral-combat mission will require a balanced force of surface, air, and subsurface assets. As Scandinavian littoral sailors know, squadrons of small, cost-effective craft are vital in the shallow-water street fight. They can provide decision makers with unique capabilities and invaluable tactical flexibility. They can be rapidly deployed by land, by sea, and by air to hot spots all over the world within a matter of days. In large numbers and with multiple design types, they can aid in accomplishing the core duties required of a green-water guerrilla ship. Such capabilities could one day prove vital as the United States continues to push into the littoral seas around the globe.
1. Lee Allen Zatarain, Tanker Wars (Drexel Hill, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2008) 125–150.
2. LCDR David Weeks, USN, “A Combatant for the Littorals,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 125, no. 11 (November 1999), 26–30.
3. VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski and CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, USN, “Rebalancing the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 125, no. 11 (November 1999), 31–34.
4. Weeks, “Combatant.”
5. CDR John Patch, USN, “The Overstated Threat,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 134, no. 12 (December 2008), 34–39.
6. See video at www.youtube.com/watch?v=iYXBvCrzbHo.
7. CAPT David T. Hart Jr. and CAPT George Galdorisi, USN, “Reorganizing for Littoral Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 123, no. 8 (August 1997), 72–75.
8. General Dynamics Robotic Systems LCS USV press release, 19 May 2008, www.generaldynamics.com/news/press-releases/detail.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1811=7132 .
9. CDR John Patch, USN, “A Thoroughbred Ship-Killer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 136, no. 4 (April 2010), 48–53.
10. LT Andre N. Tiwari, USN, “Small Boat and Swarm Defenses: A Gap Study” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2008), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA488748.
11. Cebrowski and Hughes, “Rebalancing.”
12. “Royal Marines CB90,” Think Defence: Another View of UK Defence, www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/10/royal-marine-cb90s/.
13. “CB90,” www.dockstavarvet.se/Products/Combat_patrol_boats/CB_90_H.aspx.
14. Ibid.