Inundated by the epidemic of afloat commanding officer (CO) firings over the past few years, a common question in the surface community is “What the heck were they thinking?” Whether it is a lack of confidence in their ability to command, or fraternization, or conduct unbecoming an officer, junior sailors and senior military leaders alike have been furrowing their brows at the confounding behavior of those relieved. The trend even prompted then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead to issue a memo in June 2011 (“Charge of Command”) reminding his COs of the responsibilities of command and reiterating his expectation of professional behavior.
If it can be assumed that the surface Navy exercises a sound command screening process (which may also be open to debate), perhaps we are not setting up our COs for success. The command training pipeline is constantly tweaked for improvement, with an emphasis over the past few years on the Fleet-Up program. Similar to the longstanding practice in naval aviation, participants in this surface program serve one 18-month executive officer (XO) tour then remain on board for 18 months of command. While the program’s benefits are clear—stability, familiarity, sustained experience—does it simultaneously do a disservice to our commanding officers?
I recently conducted a qualitative survey designed to capture the challenges, successes, and lessons learned regarding command at sea. The survey was completed by close to 30 current and former commanding officers, spanning the ranks from O-4 to O-10, with periods of command between the 1950s and today. Although the survey responses provided several insightful themes, one in particular caught my eye: The time to reflect between XO and CO afloat tours was invaluable to several respondents’ professional development. This message is echoed in the Naval Academy’s plebe leadership course and has been the subject of academic study for the past 80 years. Whether conducted by famed philosopher and psychologist John Dewey in the 1930s, American philosopher David Kolb in the 1980s, or a U.S. Naval Academy plebe in 2012, research and study consistently indicate that reflection is a fundamental aspect of the learning and development process.
One may argue that officers in the Fleet-Up program are afforded time to reflect. Perhaps they keep notes in a journal at night or take five minutes each day for introspection between meetings. From my perspective at a lower rung on the totem pole, however, it seems COs and XOs move from one issue or crisis to the next at an impressive rate. This bias for action does not afford ample time for reflection. The respondents’ answers in my survey support that belief. Furthermore, even if they do take the time to reflect and perhaps catch an error in their judgment, COs and XOs may feel that “flip-flopping” on a given judgment call may cause greater harm.
Most officers and enlisted crew recognize that inconsistency at the top level can be detrimental to morale. A shore tour between CO and XO billets would allow our prospective COs to improve their style beyond the watchful eyes of the crew. The idea recalls the adage, “When taking over a new job, for the first three months you are part of the solution; after that, you are part of the problem.”
I am concerned that three straight years occupying the top-two leadership positions of a ship increase the chances that COs will develop a distorted view of reality, a perception of invincibility, or a “my way is the right way” mentality. Most COs will not fall into this trap, but the past few years indicate that some already have.
The recent high number of COs who have fallen from grace brings great discredit to others who have served, or aspire to serve, in the same role. Their behavior undermines the discipline and confidence in command on which an effective naval force is based. This trend demands a hard look at the various paths and policies leading to command at sea. The Fleet-Up program is one policy that should be reexamined. The program removes the time away from the Fleet—a prolonged period during which prospective commanding officers can truly learn from their previous mistakes—that is essential in developing effective ships’ captains.