Merge DOD Organizations in U.S. Embassies
ions operate within many embassies: Defense Attaché Office (DAO), Security Cooperation Office (SCO), and Force Protection Detachment (FPD). Combining these would incorporate four of the nine principles of war: unity of command, simplicity, economy of force, and objective. Creating the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché was a step in the right direction, but significantly more would be gained by this proposed unification, improving DOD’s overall military-to-military engagement strategy with a host nation, while also reducing costs.Unity of Command and Effort
First and foremost, consolidation would result in true unity of command through the efforts of one responsible leader. As it stands, these organizations report to different agencies, each with its own objectives and priorities. For example, DAO attachés execute their functions in accordance with diplomatic missions, as specified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 16 April 1961, which includes “representing the sending State in the receiving State” and “ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State.”
Meanwhile, the SCO reports to the combatant commander and is responsible for combined operations/exercises and the theater security cooperation portfolio, particularly Foreign Military Sales, which is coordinated with DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency. On another front, FPDs, created after the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67), have certain force-protection responsibilities for visiting DOD assets and personnel; thus, they not only have responsibilities to the combatant commander but also have other reporting chains of command.
As it stands, with these myriad agencies, DOD representation abroad is convoluted. Unification would focus the military embassy teams into a single homogenous organization, resulting in increased effectiveness in the use of our elements of national power.
Simplicity
In addition to increased efficiency, both the United States and the host nation would more easily navigate our embassies if the principle of simplicity were applied. Typically, host nations, as well as U.S. interagency representatives, do not know the difference between a DAO attaché, an SCO representative, and an FPD special agent. Our proposed merger would make DOD representatives in the embassy much more user-friendly to the host nation and interagency partners.
Before and during Navy ship and Coast Guard cutter international port visits, multiple coordination issues are necessary, and confusion inevitably results. All three organizations make arrangements with a variety of host-nation and U.S. government representatives, depending on the issues. These may include diplomatic clearances, force protection, replenishment, logistics, bunkering, operations, emergency leave, and much more. Such a distribution of authority and responsibilities is perplexing to the host nation, and the U.S. military often appears disorganized as our different organizations stumble over each other to prepare for a port visit.
Because the visiting ship has to contend with three separate organizations, this can be exhausting to crew members. Seldom do they have experience navigating the interagency complex, on top of which they are already task-saturated with the operation of their ship prior to arrival in port.
Such confusion would be alleviated if we established a merged defense organization that would provide one point of contact. This scheme would enable the ship to establish a primary relationship with one person responsible for all communications, ranging from courtesy calls on host-nation military representatives to arranging morale, welfare, and recreational events, as well as community relations, Project Handclasp activities, logistics, and force protection. Should an emergent requirement develop, the ship would immediately understand whom to contact. A unified, simple organization would thus reduce tension both inside and outside the embassy.
This consolidation would also improve military-to-military communication. In particular, one organization with strong lines of internal communication would be less vulnerable to exploitation by host nations, which at times take advantage of poor transmissions among different DOD entities. The crosstalk that would result from consolidation would also ensure that the DOD stayed on message. Merging the military footprint into one group—led by an accountable person with authority—would ultimately result in a more consistent military-to-military relationship between the United States and the host nation.
Economic Considerations
Currently each organization has its own office space, administrative and information-technology support, vehicles and drivers, aircraft, housing arrangements, and so on. But in some instances, one officer would be suited to fill the roles of both an attaché and an SCO. Some may consider this unacceptable, but it has already proved successful in certain posts. And the relatively recent development of Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché attending both the attaché and security-cooperation training is already a step in that direction. The argument that one person cannot be credible in both positions is a relic of the Cold War, when some deemed it necessary to separate the DAO from the SCO.
Under today’s budget pressures, reducing expensive overseas billets can add up to real savings. The Navy’s regionalization efforts over the past 12 years provide an excellent case study in reorganizing functions to reduce footprints and manpower without degrading required services. We can do better, and there is no more efficient way to judiciously employ and distribute forces than by economizing the force structure of three organizations into one. Defense spending has been a major contributor to the debt our nation has incurred, and streamlining these types of organizations would help return taxpayer resources in light of the critical need to reduce costs DOD-wide.
Select the Best
Internally, a consolidation would bolster the foreign area officer program by creating competition among those assigned to embassies. At present, because of the disjointed nature of these DOD entities, officers are often rated as “1 of 1” within each individual organization, making it difficult for selection boards to distinguish the best performers.
Merging organizations can, in some cases, create head-to-head competition. This is healthy and sends a clear signal to promotion boards. Ideally, it would produce more diverse soldier-statesmen such as the quintessential attaché, Army Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, highly regarded for more than 40 years as a military diplomat.
Without a doubt, both individual and institutional naysayers would resist such change, citing different missions with varying training requirements, loss of credibility, fewer leadership billets, loss of budget, loss of power, and more. These concerns can all be overcome.
Growing pains would of course be involved in the transition, but the result will be a more capable workforce, as individuals are exposed to the diversity of DOD functions. Bureaucratic infighting over which organization gets the lead and budget is inevitable. But ultimately the DOD would have more multitalented personnel unified under one leader. Unity of command, unity of effort, economy of force, simplicity, and a clearly defined objective would provide U.S. agencies represented in embassies, as well as host nations, with a more coherent, efficient, and productive service at a reduced cost.
The time has come for the DOD to finish what it started in creating the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché. We must fully consolidate military embassy organizations into one unified team.
Captain Rosen, a Navy foreign-area officer, currently serves in a security cooperation office; he has also worked in the defense attaché system, three of his five years as an assistant American Legation U.S. naval attaché.
Information-Dominance Officers Need to Command
The new Information Dominance Corps (IDC), consisting of the intelligence, information warfare (IW), information professional (IP), and oceanography officer designators, is positioned to revolutionize the Navy’s warfighting capability and lead us from a platform- to an information-centric model. But traditional command still plays an integral role in this new environment.
Ironically, command opportunities have decreased over the past several years for many new IDC members, particularly in the IP community. The emphasis on operational billets there has resulted in greater respect for its members’ technical expertise, but command billets are fewer. And yet from the first day of indoctrination at commissioning sources, the Navy instructs future officers that command should be their aspiration. Left unchecked, this trend could lead to a glut of staff officers without the experience necessary to command the network, which former CNO Admiral Gary Roughead described as a new “main battery” for the Navy.
Information Professionals: A Success Story
When the IP community was established in October 2001, operational sea billets were stressed as the best path to initial success. The predecessor Fleet-support community, from the days of combat exclusion for women, had very few sea billets. IP leaders recognized that jobs at sea were the best way to legitimize the community and provide value in the command, control, communications, computers, and Intelligence (C4I) field. Categorized as “milestone billets,” they were specified for pay grades O-4–O-6.
New IPs eagerly assumed ownership of jobs such as carrier strike group staff C4I (N6) and communications officers, aircraft carrier combat systems officers, and numbered fleet N6s. Many excelled, making themselves credible and providing expertise in cases where unrestricted line officers had performed “one-and-done” tours in the C4I field. IPs afloat have rightfully made the community’s reputation.
Early senior leaders were veterans of command, both former Fleet support and unrestricted line officers who had redesignated. The hard-charging officers filling the ranks beneath them will not nearly match their predecessors’ rate of command. Although ever-increasing numbers of IPs have made their mark in the afloat C4I arena, fewer are gaining experience in command of shore C4I stations because of a decrease in both jobs and time.
The Problems
The dwindling command billets include the naval computer and telecommunications area master stations (NCTAMS, O-6 commands) and naval computer and telecommunications stations (NAVCOMTELSTA, O-5 commands), along with assorted others such as the naval communications security material system. The billet drawdown is a result of technological advances, a shift from Cold War–mission focus, and civilian outsourcing.
Since the IP community was established, the NCTAMS in Naples, Italy, was downgraded to an O-5 command; NAVCOMTELSTAs in Puerto Rico, Iceland, and Washington, and the detachment in London were closed; the Forces Surveillance Support Center transitioned to civilian management; NAVCOMTELSTA Puget Sound downgraded to a NCTAMS detachment; and the Navy Center for Tactical Systems Interoperability was absorbed by another command. Billets lost as a result were one O-6 command, six O-5 commands, and one O-4 officer-in-charge.
An additional problem is lack of time. IPs ordered to command are not necessarily doing their careers any favors. As outlined in statutory-board precepts, the keys to promotion are superior performance in milestone billets, followed by joint duty and, most recently, global war on terrorism–support assignments (GSA) and individual augmentation (IA) tours. When milestones are completed, IPs have to find time for joint professional military education, squeeze in a three-year joint tour, and often fit in a 12-month GSA or IA tour.
Few contest the value of joint and GSA/IA tours, but where is one to fit in the command tour? It has become a nice-to-have experience rather than a critical building block in senior officers’ careers. That needs to be corrected.
Command Is Essential
This experience provides a proper personal aspiration and helps guarantee the most talented people make long-term career commitments. It also gives senior officers the essential preparation for further service in which they will interact with their fellow Navy and joint peers who overwhelmingly are veterans of command. Indeed, the Navy will do a disservice to its senior officers in preparing them for roles of greater authority and responsibility if it does not afford them reasonable opportunities to command.
Command is the essence of the naval officer, connected to the independence of service at sea. But ultimately it is not for IPs or other IDC members to justify command opportunities for themselves. Rather, just as the Navy would have to justify contradicting its own ethos by not sending its best and brightest to command, so the service should justify why this integral part of its heritage is not deemed necessary for one of its critical groups.
Senior operational jobs require prior command experience. According to the Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual, the information-warfare commander (IWC) is a principal player, along with his counterparts in air defense, sea combat, and strike warfare. These roles are assigned to highly seasoned officers serving in major command billets. In a carrier strike group, the air-defense, sea-combat, and strike-warfare-commander roles are traditionally filled by the captain of the Aegis cruiser, commodore of the destroyer squadron, and commander of the air wing, respectively. The IWC, on the other hand, is typically covered by the aircraft-carrier commanding officer, who rarely has the background or expertise.
Current practice is to provide the IWC with an experienced deputy, an IW officer. As the IWC role matures, with greater exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum and expanding use of unmanned aircraft systems and remotely piloted vehicles, it will be better suited for senior IDC officers—who, like their principal warfare-commander peers, should be veterans of command.
The Solutions
Clearly there is no simple fix. In the long term, the Naval Personnel Command should closely review, for potential reclassifications, the existing unrestricted-line-officer billets not assigned to a particular officer community. More immediately, the IDC will have to actively manage its resources. A higher volume of total command billets from all four member communities will allow optimal assignment through a collective, cross-detailing approach.
OPNAV N2/N6 has already identified specific senior billets, including some command jobs, among its IP, IW, intelligence, and oceanography officers. As the IDC matures, all command billets should be considered for competitive assignment to the best and brightest IDC officers.
Additionally, time must be made available in the career pipeline. One approach is to bundle two jobs wherever possible. For example, screened commanders could simultaneously be detailed to milestone jobs and follow-up command slots, preferably in the same geographic location. The bundling approach could work in Fleet concentration areas such as Norfolk, San Diego, Jacksonville, Yokosuka, and Bahrain. An IDC commander could serve as a carrier strike group N6 and a Navy Information Operations Command commanding officer in San Diego; a numbered fleet deputy N6 could also be a NAVCOMTELSTA commanding officer in Bahrain. Tour lengths in each billet could be set at a maximum of 18 months to allow a higher rotation rate. Serving in the same location when possible would cut permanent change-of-station costs.
Finally, these strategies must be administered by an official command-screening process similar to those in unrestricted-line-officer communities. The annual IDC Command and Leadership Board, first held in 2010, is a marked improvement over earlier screening processes and is the proper mechanism to incorporate these and other modifications.
Senior IDC leaders must place appropriate emphasis on the importance of command in the professional development of the corps’ most promising officers. Officers should not haphazardly fall into these billets simply because their timing is optimal, nor should they have to balance the benefits of milestone versus command tours in making career decisions. The IDC’s future senior leaders need to have both operational and leadership experience. IDC officers are smart and motivated, representing the future of information dominance in the Navy and the Department of Defense. By no means should they be guaranteed command—but they do need a reasonable chance to compete for such opportunities.
Commander Augelli is the commanding officer of Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, Guam. He is a plank-owner IP officer and has served in various N6 assignments at the COCOM, numbered fleet, and strike-group levels and as a naval computer and telecommunications stations executive officer.
Reservists Can Meet Fleet Requirements
Joint military operations, from anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden to disaster relief in Japan, demand professional expertise at the operational level of war. In today’s Navy, this is most commonly practiced by fleet commanders and their staff. The numbered fleets’ staff determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed to influence international cooperation or an adversary’s force disposition before combat.
Through the fleet commanders, the U.S. Navy builds the major operations plans and contingency plans to achieve maritime strategic/operational objectives within a given time and space. These military actions are synchronized with those of other government and nongovernmental agencies, together with international partners, to achieve national strategic objectives.
Numbered fleets and the operational forces they employ are in constant and adaptive phase-zero or shaping operations. In addition to day-to-day fleet management, they are continually engaged in theater-security cooperation and maritime-domain awareness. They face a wide range of issues requiring flexibility and scalability, from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to an ever-increasing role in ballistic-missile defense. All these requirements will persist as the Navy’s size continues to diminish. In response, the numbered fleets are increasingly using their reserve units to much greater extents than ever before as a source for operational-level warfare (OLW) personnel. But does the Navy Reserve have the OLW capacity to meet this active component requirement?
Fleet commanders need OLW warriors who can plan and execute the operational employment of component assets and understand how to integrate and synchronize various component, joint, and coalition capabilities to meet strategic objectives. Usually they are warfare-qualified officers with tactical platform experience and professional military education, who can translate both sets of knowledge to major staff operations. Currently, the Navy Reserve force has such officers assigned to the numbered fleet reserve units, but their ranks need to grow both numerically and professionally.
Proven Track Record
Fleets count on reserve augments to be involved in nearly every aspect of operations. The reservist is part of the staff, expected to be fully integrated with the active component and ready on arrival to execute the mission.
The numbered fleets conduct numerous annual OLW exercises and operations. The reserve forces play a critical if not pivotal role in each one, typically constituting more than 70 percent of the watchstanders. When OLW reservists report on-station for an exercise, they are entrusted with great responsibility. It is not uncommon to see one as the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) chief, Navy amphibious liaison element director, or lead combat liaison officer at the headquarters of an allied maritime partner.
Additionally, fleets are finding new ways to use reservists as force multipliers. Augment roles are opening as fleets recognize the need to increase capabilities in space warfare, assessments, dynamic targeting, and ballistic-missile defense. The 7th Fleet, with the task of maintaining two operations plans, has drawn on its reserves to provide operational planners. Almost every operational-planning team or Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data conference held in the 7th Fleet area of responsibility has numerous reservists in the mix.
With the 5th Fleet fully engaged in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, its reserve units continually augment the active component’s current and future operations cells. The 6th Fleet uses reservists to train newly reported active-duty officers as staff action officers; the reserve footprint for 2011’s Operation Odyssey Dawn was very extensive. A reservist at 4th Fleet oversees Project Handclasp, which involves the collection and transportation of educational, humanitarian, and goodwill materials to countries in the area of focus. Forward-deployed fleets, having gained trust in their reserve components, often rely on reserve personnel to represent fleet interests at U.S.-based conferences, war games, advisory groups, and other meetings.
Train Reservists in Operational Warfare
With fleet commanders relying more on reserve units to provide OLW expertise for both major contingencies and day-to-day tasks, it is critical that the reserve component organize and build on its talent and capability in these areas to remain sustainable far into the future. Building a professional cadre of reservists trained in and dedicated to the operational level of war would pay the same dividends that the active component has seen from other specialized reserve communities.
This buildup would simultaneously meet a high-demand, low-supply active-component need. Reservists chosen to specialize in OLW would be rewarded with future promotions and paid billet opportunities.
When a reservist reports to a numbered fleet, there is a high probability that he or she has never been exposed to OLW. This inexperience is not limited to junior ranks but is often seen at the commander or captain levels. It takes a minimum of 9 to 12 months of training before an officer is fully qualified to stand watch in an MOC or be an active participant in a board or cell. The lag in supplying a fully ready OLW warrior is unacceptable—but can easily be remedied.
To build and maintain such a community, the Navy Reserve Force needs to follow steps that are already in place. After a slight modification of existing elements, they can be melded into an OLW pipeline to produce fully trained OLW warriors.
Use the Existing Process
Formal training. Use the results of the U.S. Fleet Forces–sponsored Capabilities-Based Competency Assessment/Mission Essential Competency MOC Project to identify the schoolhouse training a reservist must have to be successful as an OLW warrior.
Prospective warriors should be encouraged to attend many of the OLW two- to four-week joint-warfare courses. Additionally, the Maritime Staff Operations Course (MSOC) at the Naval War College is excellent for preparing these officers to serve in operational staff assignments. However, because a five-week course is not easily accommodated by reservists’ civilian schedules, this course should be tailored for distance learning such as that of Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME), with a two-week capstone in-residence seminar.
A flexible option to the current MSOC format would allow more reservists to benefit from this program. At the senior-officer level, Joint Professional Military Education Phase I is mandatory for an OLW warrior. AJPME should be mandatory for captains desiring to command reserve units focused on OLW. Only formal education can prepare an officer to lead other reservists in an OLW environment, where interaction with other military branches, government and nongovernmental agencies and organizations, and international partners is an everyday occurrence. But attendance necessitates a significant commitment from reservists, because they are usually completed on top of participation in major exercises. The payoff is extremely worthwhile for both for the individual and the supported command.
Develop OLW Navy planners. Fleet missions require an increase in the number of experienced Navy planners. The reserves must develop the ability to augment the active component. Planning skills are now gained primarily from on-the-job training, but targeting O-5 selectees to train as planners would be optimal, because this would capture officers at the point in their careers where they would be likely to serve in staff billets. Navy Reserve Forces Command should identify such officers and facilitate their attendance at MSOC, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Support and personnel courses and/or JOPES action officer courses.
Tweak the “Apply Board” system. This is the method used to screen and assign officers to command and non-command billets for two or three years. Recent board results have demonstrated an emphasis on officers from hardware-centric units, giving them the nod for command and/or assignment to OLW-focused units.
Putting a non-OLW-trained officer in command or in a leadership position in an OLW unit is not helpful to the Fleet. The learning curve is steep, and those many years in a tactical specialty do not provide the necessary experience. The Apply Board needs to acknowledge the OLW community and emphasize the slating of officers that have OLW schoolhouse training and experience with Fleet, combatant commander, or sub-unified commands into OLW-centric billets. Board members need to understand why it is critical to maintain OLW capacity by retaining these officers and rotating them between units that support an identified active-duty Navy requirement for trained OLW warriors.
Officers with Navy planner expertise should be assigned to five- to six-year billets instead of the current two- to three-year assignments. This would allow reserve planners to maintain proficiency once they are formally trained. They can then be assigned directly to Fleet staffs or a pool of experienced Navy and joint planning professionals in “Navy planning” units and can be rotated into billets on large staff units when needs arise. Planning professionals should not be relegated to unpaid drill status because they have never had an O5 command; the active component needs their skills.
The Navy Reserve does indeed have the OLW capacity—tentatively—to meet the active-duty-component requirement. Individual reserve units and OLW reservists have demonstrated they are up to the task of supporting Fleet commands, displaying their OLW knowledge, and providing OLW warriors. But their level of support can appear ad hoc to the Fleet. It ebbs and flows, depending on the personnel assigned to the Fleet reserve units.
Instead, it is essential that the U.S. Navy Reserve Force ensure the current OLW capability is built on and becomes a permanent asset in its inventory. The active and reserve component must partner in recognizing a reserve OLW community, establishing a training pipeline for OLW reservists, and appropriately assigning qualified officers to OLW billets. This will ensure the survival of the Navy Reserve OLW warrior.