Fundamental to mission accomplishment is a commander’s ability to command and control assigned forces. Effective C2 enables prompt and unambiguous communication of the commander’s intent and direction to subordinates, so they may execute assigned missions and be held accountable for the results. Because a breakdown in C2 puts lives and mission at risk, its effectiveness must be a focus for every commander. When competing priorities overshadow that, commanders must make timely course corrections or risk mission failure.
Throughout the past decade, the Navy implemented a series of initiatives designed to improve organizational coordination and collaboration across administrative and operational lines. As a key component of these, the Chief of Naval Operations established Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CUSFFC) to serve as the Navy’s single unified Fleet Commander responsible for manning, training, and equipping Atlantic and Pacific Fleet units. To assist CUSFFC in achieving this, Fleet type commanders (TYCOMs) were designated under its administrative control (ADCON) to establish and implement uniform policies, procedures, and requirements for their respective operating forces on the East and West coasts.
With the initial organizational blueprint in place, the next logical step would have been to align the operating forces on both coasts under the ADCON of CUSFFC. This would have placed responsibility and accountability for the Fleet’s “man, train, and equip” mission squarely on the shoulders of CUSFFC, leaving the operational employment of fully trained and combat-ready forces to the Navy component commanders around the globe. But before that step could be taken, legal obstacles arose preventing the shift of ADCON for West Coast units to CUSFFC.
The result was a hybrid chain of command and a mismatch of authority and responsibility. CUSFFC and Fleet TYCOMs were structurally poised to exercise unified ADCON of units on both coasts, but the actual ADCON of units devolved through two separate Echelon 2 chains of command headed by Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) and CUSFFC.
Problem and Solutions: In a Nutshell
Although unable to proceed to the desired unified Fleet commander end state, the hybrid Fleet C2 structure persisted. Over time the overlapping roles of the TYCOM and the Fleet TYCOM blurred lines of authority and responsibility, making accountability more difficult. At the same time, the need for coordinated action between the Pacific Fleet and U.S. Fleet Forces to produce fully interoperable combat-ready forces remained intact. But straying from tried-and-true core C2 principles made such action more difficult to achieve, particularly as important decisions migrated to amorphous, “behavior-focused” enterprise constructs rather than being made by the ADCON chain of command.
In his final days as COMPACFLT, Admiral Bob Willard called attention to the blurred lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability in a September 2009 message to his Echelon 3 commanders. Among other things, he directed Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific and Commander Naval Air Force Pacific to clearly distinguish between actions ordered in their capacities as TYCOMs and enterprise “business” conducted using their enterprise titles. In short, Willard recognized the need for corrective action and the scope of the effort required.
Against this backdrop, I assumed command of USFFC in June 2009, and Admiral Pat Walsh took command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet that September. Our immediate observations were consistent with those of Admiral Willard. That is, as the Navy pursued well-intentioned initiatives over the past decade to reduce the cost of manning, training, equipping, and maintaining the Fleet, lines of authority had become dangerously imprecise. So much so that shipboard commanding officers expressed uncertainty as to their ADCON chain of command. The confusion affected the full range of TYCOM Title 10 activities, from performing effective Fleet maintenance to ensuring the safety of units operating at sea.
Because of the risk posed to Fleet operations, Admiral Walsh and I set out as one of our first orders of business to work together to clarify Fleet C2. We began by identifying the core principles that must be followed in forging the way ahead. We then issued coordinated, specific direction to our respective Fleets to eliminate ambiguity and reestablish clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability, while maintaining the benefits of the positive collaborative environment achieved over the past decade. The following description of our efforts focuses on the results, but work remains to be done.
A Closer Look
Admiral Vern Clark assumed duties as the 27th CNO on 21 July 2000. One month later, he implemented sweeping changes as a first step to improving Navy-wide alignment. Of most relevance to this discussion, he restructured the OPNAV staff and simultaneously created Lead and Follow TYCOMs by designating Commander Submarine Force Atlantic, Commander Naval Air Force Pacific, and Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific as Lead TYCOMs in 3-star billets and their counterparts on the opposite coast as 2-star Follow TYCOMs. The Lead TYCOM designations represented a major shift in the center of gravity from Washington, D.C., to the Fleets, as the 3-star Lead TYCOMs also served as their respective warfare-community leaders, a role previously filled by the OPNAV “barons” in N76, N77 and N78.
Admiral Clark envisioned a single unified Fleet commander as the most effective and efficient means for manning, training, and equipping the Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. To accomplish this, he directed Commander U.S. Atlantic Fleet to assume concurrent duties as CUSFFC effective 1 October 2001. CUSFFC was given the responsibility to coordinate, establish, and implement integrated requirements and policies for both Atlantic and Pacific Fleet units during the inter-deployment training cycle. Admiral Clark’s alignment message identified the desired result as “a highly unified fleet that, although deploying from different coasts, draws upon a shared and streamlined organization to complete the same training; executes common tactics, techniques, and procedures; and operates seamlessly around the world.”
To assist CUSFFC with the standardization efforts, Lead TYCOMs were assigned concurrent duty as Fleet TYCOMs with the titles Commander Submarine Forces, Commander Naval Air Forces, and Commander Naval Surface Forces. The Fleet TYCOMs had no subordinate units and exercised no ADCON authority. Their mission was to lead their communities; advise on vital issues such as modernization needs, training initiatives, and operational concept development; and provide guidance to their respective forces via the existing Lead-Follow arrangement. Fleet TYCOMs were also empowered to establish and implement policies and requirements for the inter-deployment training cycle and were assigned ADCON to CUSFFC for those purposes.
As a result, Commander Naval Air Forces and Commander Naval Surface Forces reported ADCON to CUSFFC in their Fleet TYCOM hat, but to COMPACFLT in their traditional TYCOM role. Commander Submarine Forces reported to CUSFFC in both hats. To further advance the standardization effort, CUSFFC assumed ADCON of Commander U.S Third Fleet for issues pertaining to the development and implementation of the inter-deployment training cycle requirements and policies.
At the time, these actions were considered an interim step before consolidating into a unified Fleet manning, training, and equipping commander supported by unified Fleet TYCOMs. However, in November 2003 a barrier arose blocking further developments in that direction. Prompted by concerns in some quarters that the movement toward a unified Fleet commander would shift resources and focus from PACFLT to USFFC, a provision was placed in the Fiscal Year 2004 DOD Appropriations Act prohibiting the expenditure of funds to transfer ADCON or operational control of Navy forces from COMPACFLT to CUSFFC. Although this provision, which has appeared in every DOD Appropriations Act since then, essentially took the unified Fleet commander option off the table, the organizational constructs established to achieve the goal remained in place.
In parallel with the movement toward a unified Fleet commander and unified Fleet TYCOMs was the increased focus on enterprise behavior. In June 2002, Admiral Clark formally introduced the Sea Power 21 paradigm at the Naval War College’s 53rd Annual Current Strategy Forum. Critical to the overall success of the construct was the business-efficiencies component, or Sea Enterprise, under which the Navy would take advantage of improvements in organizational alignment and other efficiencies by harvesting savings and reinvesting them in the systems and platforms that would take the Navy into the 21st century.
In 2004, the Naval Aviation Enterprise was established and became the model of successful enterprise behavior, realizing cost savings and increasing effectiveness across the naval-aviation domain. In 2005, the Surface Warfare Enterprise and the Undersea Warfare Enterprise followed suit for their respective communities.
In July 2006, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Willard sought to capitalize on enterprise benefits by adding structure to the concept. He expanded Sea Enterprise to become the Fleet Readiness Enterprise, with the individual warfare enterprises formally led by their respective 3-star Fleet TYCOMs. The Fleet Readiness Enterprise served as an integration forum to address cross-Fleet operational and maintenance issues and to articulate joint Fleet requirements to the CNO. It was intended to optimize the cost-effective delivery of operational forces ready for tasking across five warfare enterprises.
Although Vice Admiral Willard made it clear the warfare enterprises were intended to serve purely as behavioral models to facilitate cooperation and integration, the absence of clearly defined boundaries allowed them to expand their influence beyond collaborative behavior. When coupled with the lack of specific roles and responsibilities for the Fleet TYCOMs, the latters’ authority to “establish and implement” policy across Fleet boundaries, and the partially consolidated TYCOM staffs, decisions that should have been made by the traditional TYCOMs in the chain of command started to migrate to the Fleet TYCOMs and their respective warfare enterprises.
Over time, the erosion of the chain of command affected all warfare communities. Fleet TYCOMs and surface class squadrons began to direct action and grant waivers in their warfare-enterprise and Fleet TYCOM hats, removing those issues from the purview and visibility of the accountable Fleet commanders. Class squadrons and Fleet TYCOM instructions were issued that appeared to direct action or convey policy to units under the ADCON of other commanders. Regular fitness reports were issued by commanders to purported subordinates where no ADCON or operational control chain of command relationship existed. The ambiguity was epitomized on the East Coast, where the name for the traditional TYCOM Submarine Force Atlantic was changed to the Fleet TYCOM name Commander Submarine Forces, with both traditional TYCOM and Fleet TYCOM business executed under the Commander Submarine Forces title.
Implementing the Course Correction
Recognizing the exigency, and to build on the work Admiral Willard had begun in the Pacific Fleet in September 2009, Admiral Walsh and I jointly directed actions in January 2010 to clarify the ADCON chain of command within our respective Fleets. To guide development and implementation of the required corrective actions, we first established the core tenets of C2 by which our efforts would be measured. Not only are these time-tested and battle-proven, but strict adherence to them inherently resolves C2 ambiguities.
The core tenets were jointly promulgated by CUSFFC and COMPACFLT by message in January 2010 and are codified in NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War.
The corrective actions directed in January 2010 targeted two primary concerns relevant to the ADCON chain of command. First, it had to be clearly delineated so that commanders and commanding officers knew whom they worked for and who worked for them. Second, clear lanes of responsibility had to be established for TYCOMs and Fleet TYCOMs, and for enterprise behavior.
Clearly delineating ADCON authority was straightforward. At the time, the Navy lacked an accurate and authoritative document publishing the chain of command, which was the root cause of much of the confusion in the Fleet. Although on its face the Standard Naval Distribution List (SNDL) was no more than a mailing list, it was generally understood to reflect official Fleet ADCON assignments. However, it had not kept up with ADCON changes over the years and required significant review and correction.
To rectify these issues and give the SNDL official sanction, the foreword to the March 2010 and subsequent versions was amended to state that it was “presented as the authoritative source displaying the administrative chain of command and [is] designed to emphasize clarity, simplicity, and reinforce unity of command.” As unit assignments change due to deployment or maintenance cycles, the SNDL is now regularly updated through submission of Organizational Change Requests. USFF and PACFLT also implemented an annual review mechanism to ensure the SNDL’s continued accuracy. As a result, Fleet commanding officers now have an accurate, accessible, authoritative reference depicting the ADCON chain of command.
The remaining focus was on reinforcing the decision-making authority and accountability of the ADCON chain of command extending from the Fleets, through the TYCOMs, to assigned units. Accomplishing this required a clear distinction between the responsibilities of the TYCOMs and those of the Fleet TYCOMs. For the former, this involved reiterating their traditional Title 10 responsibilities: organizing, manning, training, and equipping assigned Navy forces; submitting budgets and executing readiness and personnel accounts; and serving as the ADCON immediate superior in the chain of command for subordinate units. TYCOMs are also responsible for implementing policy and directing compliance by subordinates in the ADCON chain of command. In short, TYCOMs make decisions, direct action, and are held accountable for results.
Revamping Fleet TYCOM responsibilities was less subtle. To begin with, the term “Force commander,” which connotes the 3-star warfare-community “baron” role, replaced the Fleet TYCOM title. In addition, the ADCON relationship between CUSFFC and Commander Naval Air Forces and Commander Naval Surface Forces was eliminated, terminating the parallel chain of command that had those officers reporting to both CUSFFC and COMPACFLT. Consistent with the unity-of-command principle, COMPACFLT now serves as the sole reporting senior for both Commander Naval Air Force Pacific/Commander Naval Air Forces and Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific/Commander Naval Surface Forces, just as CUSFFC serves as the sole reporting senior for Commander Submarine Forces Atlantic/Commander Submarine Forces.
As a dual hat of a traditional TYCOM, force commanders have no subordinate units or staffs— those belong to the traditional TYCOMs. Instead, they are leadership positions designed to capitalize on the operational experience and community expertise of the designated flag officer. The responsibilities of the force commanders were tailored to exploit those community leadership attributes. Specifically, force commanders are responsible for leading the development and coordination of force-wide matters including assessments of current and future readiness; plans, concepts, and policies to generate ready forces; and readiness, warfighting, and personnel requirements.
These force-wide responsibilities allow force commanders to develop and coordinate common policies and standards in their respective warfare areas across Fleet boundaries, but actual implementation of the policy and standards is done strictly through the traditional TYCOMs in their ADCON role. This construct promotes warfighting effectiveness through the development of common practices and procedures, preserves both decision-making authority and accountability for the traditional TYCOMs, and provides both CUSFFC and COMPACFLT with visibility on policies and decisions affecting units in their respective chains of command.
Force commanders also retain their role as the community representatives, or barons, to advocate warfighting, platform, and community wholeness up and down the chain of command. In so doing, it is incumbent upon them to ensure alignment with their respective Fleet commanders. Finally, Force commanders are the Navy’s single process owners for their respective communities and continue to shape their warfare enterprise frameworks as required. However, these are still behavioral models; decision-making authority remains vested in the chain of command.
Bringing It All Together
Recognizing the continued importance and utility of enterprise activity, a robust Fleet Integration Executive Panel replaced the cumbersome Fleet Readiness Enterprise. This new panel, co-chaired by CUSFFC and COMPACFLT, reduces the scope of executive effort from integrating across five warfare enterprises to doing so across two Fleets. The panel also keeps the Fleet’s integration mechanism separate and distinct from the chain of command.
The scope and impact of establishing the proper roles and responsibilities for TYCOMs and Fleet TYCOMs required Echelon 1 approval. Accordingly, CUSFFC and COMPACFLT submitted to the CNO proposed revisions to their respective Fleet Mission, Functions, and Tasks instructions, incorporating not only the changes directly applicable to the Echelon 2 Fleets, but also the specific responsibilities of the force commanders. The CNO approved the instructions for both Fleets on 24 September 2010, thereby implementing the changes charted by the two Fleet commanders and sending a clear signal Navy-wide that the course corrections had his full support.
Focused efforts on both coasts over the past two years have significantly improved Fleet C2. As a result of the application of core C2 principles across a wide range of issues, the Fleet ADCON chain of command is now characterized by clarity and certainty rather than ambiguous accountability. Despite this success, more work needs to be done. While senior Fleet and TYCOM leadership are well-versed in the course corrections, leadership at all levels must drive actions to execute them effectively. Command relationships and practices inconsistent with core C2 principles must be identified and corrected, and outdated instructions aligned with the way ahead. In sum, commanders must keep clear and unambiguous C2 on their radar at all times, scanning the horizon for paradigms or practices that blur effective communication of intent and direction. Commanders owe that much to their subordinates, especially if they expect to hold them accountable for mission success.
Captain Grogan is the Fleet Judge Advocate at U.S. Fleet Forces Command.
Commander Mazzeo is a former member of the Fleet legal office and is currently employed by EXN Inc. as a member of the Commander’s Action Group at U.S. Fleet Forces Command.