Professional Notes

Renewable Energy from the Ocean

) technology promises to play a major part in the Navy’s renewable-energy program. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command OTEC program is structured to promote developing the technology for Navy applications and facilitating Department of Defense use of commercial-scale power plants through renewable-energy purchase agreements.

Long-Overdue Timelines

The DOD is pursuing aggressive energy policies, including independence and security and on-site generation and consumption. The department’s energy mandates include the following deadlines:

• 2013 and beyond: 7.5 percent renewable-energy use (Energy Policy Act of 2005)

• 2015: reduce non-tactical Fleet petroleum use by 50 percent (Presidential Executive Order 13423)

• 2020: at least 50 percent of shore-based energy requirements to come from alternative sources; 50 percent of Navy installations to be net-zero; 50 percent of total Navy energy consumption must come from alternative sources (Secretary of the Navy Targets, October 2009)

• 2025: Produce or procure 25 percent of all DOD energy from renewable energy sources (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007)

The well-known OTEC operating principles date to the original concept proposed by Jacques-Arsène d’Arsonval in 1881. OTEC recovers solar energy using a thermodynamic cycle that operates across the temperature difference between warm surface water and cold deep water. In the tropics, surface waters are above 80 degrees Fahrenheit, while at depths of about 1,000 meters water temperatures are just above freezing. This gradient provides a differential that can be used to transfer energy from the warm surface waters and generate electricity.

For a system operating between 85 and 35 degrees Fahrenheit, the temperature differential yields a maximum thermodynamic Carnot cycle efficiency of 9.2 percent. Although this is considered low efficiency for a power plant, the “fuel” is free. Hence, the real challenge is to build commercial-scale plants that yield competitively priced electricity.

Overcoming Barriers

Previous attempts to develop a viable and practical OTEC commercial power system suffered from several challenges. The low temperature delta requires large seawater flows to yield utility scale outputs. Therefore, OTEC plants must be large. Thus, they will also be capital-intensive. As plant capacity increases, the unit outlay becomes more cost-effective due to economy of scale.

Survivable cold-water pipes, cost-efficient heat exchangers, and to a lesser extent offshore structures and deep-water moorings represent key technical challenges. However, developments in offshore technologies, new materials, and fabrication and construction processes that were not available when the first serious experimental platforms were developed in the 1970s now provide solutions. When located close to shore, an OTEC plant can transmit power directly to the local grid via undersea cable. Plants farther from shore can also produce power in the form of energy carriers like hydrogen or ammonia, which can be used both as fuel for transportation and to generate power ashore. In agricultural markets, reasonably priced, renewable-based ammonia can displace natural gas in fertilizer production.

Combined with marine algae aquaculture programs, OTEC plants can also produce carbon-based synthetic fuels. OTEC facilities can be configured to produce fresh water, and, from a military perspective, system platforms can also serve as supply bases and surveillance sites.

Facing Reality

Availability of relatively “cheap” fossil fuels limits societal incentives to change and makes energy markets difficult to penetrate. However, the realization of “peak oil” (the theoretical upper limit of global oil production based on known reserves), ongoing instability in Middle East political conditions, adversarial oil-supply partners, and concerns over greenhouse-gas buildup and global warming all contribute to the need for renewable energy solutions.

An assessment of OTEC technical readiness by experts at a 2009 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration workshop indicated that a 10 megawatt (MW) floating OTEC facility is technically feasible today, using current design, manufacturing, and installation technologies.

While readiness and scalability for a 100 MW facility were less clear, the conclusion was that experience gained during the construction, deployment, and operation of a smaller pilot plant would be a necessary step in OTEC commercialization. The Navy now supports the development of OTEC, with the goal of reducing technical risks associated with commercialization.

Planning and Execution

Because OTEC technology applications exist where the ocean thermal resource is close to shore and, thus, power can be transmitted to shore via an undersea cable, for the Navy the most attractive initial sites include Hawaii, Guam, and Diego Garcia. OTEC has a relatively long history of development and testing, but only recently have key technologies matured to the level needed for commercially viable facilities, as discussed earlier.

Advancing OTEC technology to a commercially viable level is expected to require several interim steps. At this point, both industry and the Departments of the Navy and Energy are engaged in testing and demonstration of subsystems to validate critical component designs. An efficient and well-defined path is needed to complement and align these ongoing efforts. To that end, the Navy created an OTEC development roadmap to visualize, support, and implement the necessary steps leading to commercialization.

The near-term objective for OTEC is to support technical efforts that reduce overall system-development risks with respect to critical components and subsystems. The Navy program addresses vulnerable areas such as the cold-water pipe and heat-exchanger designs. It is the ocean environment itself that drives most of the technical challenges: problems involved with mechanical/electrical operation in a corrosive and biologically active medium, survival in adverse weather and ocean environments (access to tropical-sea surface temperatures also exposes platforms and pipes to cyclone systems and storm surge), and the need to minimize impact to the environment. Fortunately, recent advances in the offshore petroleum and related industries address these challenges.

Since 2003, the Navy’s interest and participation in these projects has expanded from initial feasibility studies for their use at military installations to preliminary designs and economic analysis for systems at the most attractive sites noted previously. Additional studies include evaluation of OTEC-generated hydrogen and ammonia. Currently, Navy OTEC projects include:

• Assessment of potential sites in Hawaii, funded by the Office of Naval Research

• Preliminary design, including system engineering, for a 5-10 MW OTEC pilot plant, funded by Congress and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command

• Design and demonstration of heat-exchanger modules for a pilot plant, funded by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and the Office of Naval Research

• Heat-exchanger test facility, funded by Congress

• OTEC critical-component and system design, also funded by Congress

Other continuing research includes the Department of Energy–funded cold-water pipe-fabrication methodology and the development of grouted anchor technology (meaning the anchors are inserted in holes drilled into the seafloor and fixed in place with cement or other grouting material) for OTEC plants on the steep seafloor bathymetry typical of tropical islands. Together, these projects address key technical challenges in designing and deploying a megawatt-scale OTEC pilot plant, forming a path to a cost-effective commercial facility. Thus, with help from the DOD and others, the Navy continues to support a megawatt-scale demonstration pilot plant and eventual commercial-scale installations for DOD applications.

 

Learning Operational Planning

In the Naval Forces Central Command area of responsibility, each day brings myriad challenges such as regional state actions, maritime-security issues (including counter-proliferation, piracy, counter-narcotics, and weapons smuggling), violent extremists, and continuing support to Operation Enduring Freedom. The ability to assimilate the daily operational-information deluge, assess import and potential impacts, and plan a way ahead requires educated operational-level planners who have the mental agility to grasp and solve complex problems.

As the Future Plans Director of U.S. Navy Central Command (USNAVCENT), I have seen the benefits of having planners who can think critically. With the ability to frame a complicated problem and distill a chaotic situation into viable options, the most effective among them, in my experience, are the Maritime Advanced War-fighting School (MAWS) graduates.

Schooled in Operational Warfare

MAWS resides at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Until 2009 it was known as the Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC), similar in purpose to the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, the Marine Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting, and the Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. NOPC was established in 1999 to create a cadre of officers skilled in joint and naval operational planning, with the intent that they would carry these abilities as they advanced to positions of increasingly greater responsibility and leadership in their respective warfare communities.

In the words of then-CNO Admiral Jay Johnson when he founded the program:

Navy operational staffs increasingly require officers who are not only expert in their own platforms, but also properly skilled in the planning and execution of joint and naval operations. Such skills . . . must be developed through practical experience layered upon a solid educational foundation.

Over the past ten years NOPC has grown, now graduating 22 Navy and 8 other service officers annually.

Today, MAWS students form a comprehensive understanding of the operational level of war, operational art, and campaign design that enables them to address the complex, ill-structured problems faced by numbered fleets and even the combatant-command levels. Their education continues when assigned as planners on those Fleet maritime operations centers (MOC) staffs. The true value of this education will no doubt be in evidence as these officers become the actual commanders making the critical decisions.

Education Versus Training

If producing process-trained planners were MAWS’ primary objective, it could be accomplished significantly faster and more cheaply by training, but such is not the MAWS goal. Because the program aims to develop warfighters at the operational level, students must understand the purpose of each aspect of the solution, which requires a longer-term educational strategy. Currently this means a time investment of 13 months in each student in residence at the Naval War College.

The goal is for MAWS students to understand and deal effectively with the inherently chaotic business of war. They develop the mental capacity to analyze problems and synthesize appropriate solutions that use all levels of national power. Students are taught how to think at the commander’s level, recommend effective solutions, and craft commander’s guidance and intent in terms that subordinates can clearly understand. Perhaps the most significant benefit is that MAWS not only produces skilled planners, it provides tactically proficient warfighters with a basis for understanding and applying the operational level of war as future leaders.

Of course, the graduates are only as good as their contribution to operational success. Results count, and MAWS graduates have fared well. Over the past decade they have repeatedly demonstrated their value to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Navy components, and numbered fleets. They have done this by direct-support planning as part of their education, temporary planning duty between MAWS graduation and their next warfare community billet, and permanent assignment to Joint and Navy operational commands. USNAVCENT has been the beneficiary of all three.

Results Count

During the past four summers, MAWS students formed operational planning teams that, with USNAVCENT commander and staff guidance, engaged pressing problems that were resident in numbered plans or posed by current events, developed and delivered proposed solutions, incorporated the commander’s feedback, and provided a detailed finished product to the operational staff. Graduates also have augmented the NAVCENT staff on temporary assignments of 30 to 120 days for specific tasks. As a result, their value is well recognized, and they are assigned to the most challenging of our operational plans.

But this education pays its most visible dividends when graduates are assigned permanently to numbered fleet staffs. They become lead planners in teams as part of the fleet MOCs. The value of a MAWS graduate to a fleet staff far eclipses the addition of one more action officer. This person should be considered a “planning multiplier” who elevates the staff’s overall effectiveness.

He or she can coalesce and lead staff planners of diverse service and warfare-community backgrounds, including graduates of resident- or distance-education Joint Professional Military Education, of the Navy’s Maritime Staff Operators Course, or others who simply have on-the-job planner experience. In addition to leading, MAWS graduates concurrently educate their operational-planning teammates by passing on knowledge they acquired during the 13-month resident curriculum. Thus, their critical-thinking and problem-solving skills resonate throughout the team.

MAWS graduates bring other resources to a numbered fleet staff, including their active relationship with Naval War College faculty and curricula. This ensures they remain current and can access a repository of wisdom. Professors devote significant time responding to former student requests and incorporating their real-world lessons learned into their courses. The relationship guarantees that material taught adapts to modern operational realities, and that graduates remain armed with the latest best practices across all joint theaters.

Managing the Skills

The Navy must ensure that MAWS investment is not lost at the commander level or at the 20-year timeframe. The value and contribution of this education to future command leadership must be prominently represented in the precepts of statutory and administrative selection boards, so that board members recognize the tremendous stock the Navy has placed in these officers. MAWS graduates will have great potential for success in higher pay grades and command because of their education and subsequent planning experience at the operational level of war.

Given the value of this education, warfare-community managers and detailers should ensure they nominate the highest-quality officers for the program. Officers selected should be intelligent, have superior records, be proven technical and tactical leaders in their warfare area, and have high potential for command. Ideally, a MAWS graduate would be assigned to an operational-planner billet following graduation, screen for tactical-level O-5 command, conduct an O-6 operational-planner tour, and then screen for O-6 command. It is through the cycle of planning and advising the operational commander, then gaining command experience, that the Navy’s successful future operational leaders should be developed. Failure to carefully manage matriculation of MAWS program students and assignment of its graduates will significantly degrade the true value to the Navy of this education.

One might conclude that the Navy should create a community of primary-designator planners, much as it did for foreign-area officers. But this would be a mistake, because full benefit of these planners comes from warfighters who remain well-rounded—which can only result from alternating tours between communities where tactical expertise is honed and operational staff tours where more sophisticated warfighting competencies can be harnessed to produce strategic- and operational-level plans. Assigning officers to consecutive planning tours without the potential for command would distance planners from the operators who must execute the plans.

From my perspective of having benefited from the MAWS graduates assigned to me, I believe the program provides rigorous intellectual development to produce officers who solve problems and implement decisions effectively. Historically, the other services have emphasized education to a greater degree than the Navy. This is evidenced by the comparatively few Navy flag officers who have attended intermediate- or senior-level colleges. It is time for the Navy to recognize the value of an education in the study of war, and substantially invest in its future leaders.

Studying war is key, and the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School provides it. Elevating Navy officers to equal footing with their peers in other services in developing and executing plans in joint and maritime venues prepares them for future leadership roles. Throughout warfare history, mission success has always demanded agile adaptation to rapidly changing operating environments—being faster than the adversary and out-thinking him. To ensure this continuing success, we must effectively employ the greatest weapon in the U.S. military arsenal: the individual and collective intellect of our future leaders. There is no better investment we can make than education at MAWS and its peer schools.

Supplements: The Whole Truth

Today’s armed forces are stretched thin indeed. As ship crews are “optimized” and ground and air units sent on multiple rotations to Operation Enduring Freedom, service members must find a balance between increased competition for promotion or advancement, familial demands, and requirements to meet fitness standards. They are stressed.

Over the past decade, command cadre have become more aware of the benefits of dietary supplements that could directly affect personnel’s health, well-being, and readiness. As a way to deal with increased demands, these supplements could help military service members gain an advantage quickly.

Natural Does Not Mean Safe

The term “dietary supplements” is wide-ranging. It includes multivitamins, which, taken as directed, may be safe and offer benefits. However, others can be of concern, especially with the lack of regulation and oversight by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In 2005, for example, the Texas Heart Institute noted that a patient’s use of Xenadrine RFA, which contains the over-the-counter product ma huang, resulted in death from a coronary-artery blood clot that precipitated a heart attack.

The amount of peer-reviewed literature raising concern has grown, as has correspondency. The Institute of Medicine’s 2008 Use of Dietary Supplements by Military Personnel, which studied U.S. Army soldiers’ usage patterns, is a classic example of the academic rigor now directed at the issue. The authors surmise that military members use more than do civilians of comparable demographic factors, to meet their demands or to gain an advantage over an adversary.

Was the effect of over-usage ever considered by those commanding these members? Consumer Reports’ September 2010 article “Dangerous Supplements: What You Don’t Know about These 12 Ingredients Could Hurt You” spotlights components such as germanium, which causes possible damage to the kidneys; and bitter orange (also known as aurantil fructus, Citrus aurantium, or zhi shi), which may cause heart-rhythm disorders. Noting that bitter orange “contains synephrine, which is similar to ephedrine, banned by the FDA in 2004,” the article concluded: “Risks may be higher when taken with herbs that contain caffeine.”

Concerns for Everyone

The most commonly used performance enhancers and stimulants include caffeine, creatine (for increased recycling of energy substrate for muscle function), protein and amino acids (building blocks for the muscle), Ephedra and related substances, vasodilators (which increase nitric oxide to enlarge blood vessels and deliver a greater blood supply), and combination products typically stacking stimulants with vasodilators and amino acids.

Weight-loss ingredients often combine a stimulant, aspirin or aspirin derivative, and an Ephedra-like herb (the FDA banned Ephedra/Ephedrine in 2004). This combination was shown to be one of the few groupings that can truly increase the metabolic rate, resulting in higher caloric expenditure and weight loss.¹ This combination is also found in many over-the-counter weight-loss and performance-enhancing supplements despite the potential health risks of increased heart rate, blood pressure, and perspiration associated with double-dosing stimulants, as well as the increased bleeding risk associated with aspirin, even when taken in recommended doses.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health Statistics noted in April 2011 that the “use of dietary supplements is common among the U.S. adult population. Over 40 percent [of U.S. adults] used supplements in 1988–1994, and over 50 percent in 2003–2006.”² The growth has continued, as a 2009 Nutrition Business Journal report emphasized the $26.7 billion spent on such products supplements that year.

Package inserts for dietary supplements—which are often ignored—typically include a disclaimer that “natural” does not mean free from potential harm, and that the manufacturer’s claims have not been evaluated by the FDA. Mayo Clinic nutritionists say that the FDA “has discovered chemicals, prescription drugs, and steroids in some supplements.”³ Additionally, even ingredients derived completely from natural sources might react with one other (in a process called incorrect stacking) or with prescription medications, causing potentially dangerous situations.

The lack of FDA oversight continues to be a significant issue. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 requires the manufacturer to ensure safety prior to marketing, but does not call for FDA regulation. According to its website: “FDA is responsible for taking action against any unsafe dietary supplement product after it reaches market. Generally, manufacturers do not need to register their products with FDA nor get FDA approval before producing or selling dietary supplements.”⁴ This means that, like many other consumers, the warfighter, unaware of the implications, could potentially self-inflict harm.

The risk is compounded when armed forces medical officers prescribe FDA-approved medications to patients who do not inform them about their dietary supplements. Medical officers may sometimes recommend such measures themselves, but they routinely weigh risks and benefits and potential interactions. The dangers of self-use are compounded by the absence of oversight, potential lack of user knowledge, and interactions.

Military-Specific Concerns

Command cadre and their unit members need to understand the difference between nutritive and performance-enhancing products. The former are substances taken by mouth and containing one or more “dietary ingredients,” which include vitamins, minerals, herbs or other botanicals, amino acids, and substances such as enzymes, organ tissues, glandulars, and metabolites that may supplement insufficient nutritive intake. They may be extracts or concentrates, and can be found in many forms such as tablets, capsules, softgels, gelcaps, liquids, powders, or bars.⁵

Performance-enhancing supplements, on the other hand, contain stimulants such as caffeine, guarana, amphetamine analogues; anabolic steroid (testosterone-like) precursors or stimulators (for example, androstenedione and dehydroepiandrosterone, or DHEA); or cognitive enhancers to sharpen the senses (gingko biloba or ginseng). They are not consumed to replace or supplement a dietary deficiency.

Use of Dietary Supplements by Military Personnel listed the top nine consumed across all category types: multivitamin, sport drink, protein powder, vitamin C, calcium, vitamin E, vitamin D, vitamin A, and caffeine. Most of these pose little health risk when taken in recommended doses. However, performance-enhancing products may pose substantial health risk and could impact both readiness and mission execution. Even in recommended dose ranges, these are not subject to review for contraindication by a medical officer, since they are often obtained over the counter and not reported during medical encounters.

Of particular concern are performance enhancers that may pose a risk related to either their direct mechanism of action (such as overstimulation from excessive caffeine: jitters or impulsive decision-making) or to indirect effects (for example, liver injury or decreased blood clotting that may impair function or reduce survivability of injuries).

The Department of Defense’s 2008 Survey of Health-Related Behaviors among Active-Duty Military Personnel indicated that between 0.8 and 2.7 percent of service members reported use of anabolic steroids, despite each service having policies prohibiting said use. The survey also found that 1.2–3.8 percent reported stimulant/amphetamine use, but it did not differentiate between prescribed and over-the-counter. This means that among members who believed the question pertained to prescriptions or illegal drugs, commercially available stimulants, including caffeine, may not have been reported.

An earlier 2005 Health-Related Behaviors survey found that among service members using supplements other than multivitamins or minerals, “21 percent used body-building supplements, 18 percent used weight-loss products . . . [and] 8 percent used performance-enhancing products.” While anonymity in such surveys is associated with increased volume of responses, under-reporting may also occur due to lack of knowledge about ingredients, failure to recognize what is a supplement (e.g., caffeine in coffee), or lack of trust in the anonymity. Therefore, rates of usage are predicted to be higher than those in the surveys.⁶

Command cadre should also be exposed to another perspective when evaluating action: Dr. Evan DeRenzo and Richard Szafranski argued in 1997 that what may be ethically unacceptable in a sports environment is perfectly acceptable on the battlefield. In sports, they maintained, performance enhancers provide an unfair advantage, whereas warfighting does not involve playing on an even field.⁷

So how should military personnel be informed and supported?

Recommendations for Warriors

Warfighters should familiarize themselves with the difference between nutritive and performance-enhancing supplements. There is a big difference between Vitamin D and Country Mallow or sida cordifolia, which may cause a stroke. They should review ingredients that may be of real concern. The 2010 Consumer Reports article mentioned earlier provides an easy-to-read chart and discusses purported uses and dangers. Similar articles are available online from reputable medical sources such as WebMD. Supporting medical facilities, including doctors, pharmacists, and health-promotion managers, should be invited to provide speakers for General Mandated Training to underscore the serious nature of some of these products. Commanders should promote one-on-one discussions with these medical professionals.

Finally, a command discussion on this issue should be ongoing throughout the year. Ideally, this would begin a few months before weigh-ins and performance-readiness tests. Members who have not embraced a comprehensive approach to wellness may look to potentially dangerous methods to cut weight or “grow endurance to max out.”

For the good of the member, command cadre need to continue or reinvigorate their collective efforts on encouraging a healthy long-term lifestyle. This involves exercise, high-quality nutrition, sufficient sleep, and stress control through various forms (which might include meditation or yoga). The effort needs to be supported at every level in the chain of command for the concept of balanced living to catch on and grow.

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1. A. G. Dulloo and D. S. Miller, “Ephedrine, Caffeine and Aspirin: ‘Over-the-Counter’ Drugs That Interact to Stimulate Thermogenesis in the Obese,” Nutrition 5, no. 1 (1989): pp. 7–9.

2. J. Gahche, R. Bailey, V. Burt, et al. “Dietary Supplement Use among U.S. Adults Has Increased since NHANES III (1988–1994),” NCHS data brief, no 61 (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 2011).

3. J. Nelson and K. Zeratsky, “Dietary Supplements Not without Risks,” Mayo Clinic, August 2010, www.mayoclinic.com/health/dietary-supplements/MY01408.

4. FDA, “Dietary Supplements,” www.fda.gov/Food/DietarySupplements/default.htm.

5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Overview of Dietary Supplements,” www.fda.gov/Food/DietarySupplements/ConsumerInformation/ucm110417.htm.

6. Use of Dietary Supplements by Military Personnel Washington, DC: (National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine, 2008).

7. E. DeRenzo and R. Szafranski, “Fooling Mother Nature: An Ethical Analysis of and Recommendations for Oversight of Human-Performance Enhancements in the Armed Forces,” Airpower Journal (summer 1997), pp. 25–26.