China Is Protecting North Korea’s Nukes
(See J. A. Bosco, p. 10, December 2011 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired) and Daniel Yoon—The late-December death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il adds urgency to the rebuttal of Mr. Bosco’s intemperate assertion that China wants North Korea to have nukes. We find the author’s facts anachronistic at best, his arguments flawed, and his conclusions unsupported, including the assertion of pervasive Chinese duplicity. A more balanced interpretation of China–North Korea relations than Mr. Bosco presented is needed as a baseline for possible progress in dealing with North Korea under its new ruler, Kim Jong-il’s son Kim Jong-un.
Mr. Bosco blames hapless bipartisan American “credulity” for allowing China to enable North Korea’s nuclear emergence, indicting American irresponsibility or incompetence. Belief that China, today, surreptitiously supports a nuclear North Korea, despite public statements to the contrary and concerns about spread to Japan and Taiwan, epitomizes over-the-top credulity. Does Beijing’s refusal to join in condemnation of Pyongyang for the sinking of thr Cheonan and shelling of the Yeonpyeongdo imply tacit support for nukes for North Korea? Does Chinese wariness about severe sanctions following the nuclear tests equate to support for the nuclear program? Mr. Bosco’s reasoning falls both to the stroke of Occam’s razor and to the laws of logic, as he substitutes novel constructs for credible explanations.
While Beijing admits early inadequate concern about North Korean nuclear programs, the author asserts that Beijing never “restrained Pyongyang,” “consistently deflected international efforts to curtail the programs,” and “indisputably kept Pyongyang in the WMD business.” Are Beijing’s repeated scoldings, rebukes, and full-throated ire over Pyongyang’s misconduct all feigned? China has warned North Korea that another invasion of the South would not draw Chinese support this time and would be tantamount to suicide. Is China’s lead in the Six-Party Talks a huge hoax? Beijing now bites its lip over Pyongyang and has not described the China–North Korea relationship “as close as lips and teeth” for years. There is no love lost between the two neighbors.
Interaction with the Americans and Chinese involved—or any reasonable assessment of the North Korea–China saga—would illuminate the flaws in Mr. Bosco’s conclusions. Tellingly, he mentions no exchanges with Chinese—no direct evidence of the big lie. We, in many conversations with Chinese, have not detected the alleged subterfuge—despite new Chinese openness. Perhaps all our contacts are duped— or are puppets. They assert that Beijing most of all values stability on the Korean Peninsula and also fears its lever will snap or lose purchase if it applies excessive force (e.g., cutting off food and fuel). Are we to assess these arguments as just more duplicity?
According to Mr. Bosco, a perceptive Pyongyang and a gullible Washington both rely “on Beijing as an indispensable partner in their competing national security objectives,” and North Korea has gotten the best of it. The prospect of a better outcome lies not in blaming China but working imaginatively with China and others to transform North Korea under new leadership. We are in the same boat—Beijing the coxswain, the United States the stroke, along with Seoul and Tokyo. North Korea is an urgent problem for all; it behooves us to quit pointing fingers and begin rowing together toward a common destination.
Why Don’t More People Join the Military?
(See J. L. Horton, p. 12, December 2011 Proceedings)
Robert N. Kroeger—I can certainly empathize with Sergeant Major Horton’s frustration with recruitment among the “privileged” classes, especially considering the moral climate in regard to the current conflicts, but there are two other angles that I believe bear examination. First, what percentage of high-school and college students had contact with a recruiter? Second, of the people who spoke to a recruiter, how many came away with a positive impression?
I made forays into becoming a military officer and was greatly impressed by the honesty and professionalism of the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) Blue & Gold officer who interviewed me, as well as that of his counterpart from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). Unfortunately, my interaction with Marine Corps recruiters was the complete opposite.
I received my education at a major university in New York City, only a short run from one of the local recruiting stations. Not once during my college experience did I engage, or even see, a uniformed representative of the armed forces on campus. (There is no ban on military personnel recruiting at this particular school. In fact, the university has an Army ROTC program at another campus.) This perceived lack of interest may not have been lost on the students.
The young adults coming out of school face a roulette wheel of possibilities when dealing with the military, if they’re even exposed to it at all. In my case, I had three different experiences with the military: positive (the USNA and USMMA representatives) negative (the Marine recruiters), and a “non-experience” (a noticeable lack of a military presence in college). Even in predominantly liberal major cities, recruiters must resist the idea that there’s no interest among certain groups (i.e., college students) and therefore simply avoid them. There are still many idealistic young Americans who desire to live the structured life that the armed forces offer. Transgress their ideals, whether through ignorance or willfully, and they’ll take notice. People from the so-called “lower class” may be willing to put up with the crude tactics of recruiters just to get the work, but to woo the educated imagined “upper class,” perhaps a change of strategy is in order.
Robert M. Rosenthal, president, Spirit of America Tour—The opinion piece by Sergeant Major Horton deserves a response that, regrettably, will offend nearly everyone.
First of all let’s put to bed the misstatement of facts about upper-class enlistments put forth by Sergeant Major Horton. The true fact is that 50 percent of the all enlistments tend to come from middle- and upper-class households (Center for Data Analysis research paper, “Who Serves in the Military,” 2008).
That being said, another statement from the author is the one I really must comment on. He talks about the lack of military volunteers from “the rich, famous, and powerful.” Most of the children of this category go on to college and ROTC, if interested.
As to enlisting, this is not the fault of the children of these demographics, it is the fault of the military. Simply stated, the military hasn’t a clue as to how to recruit the children of these families. By “military” I am actually referring to the civilian leadership and not the uniformed military.
When I was bringing headline entertainers to military bases, I found that most of these “rich, famous, and powerful” were extremely enthusiastic about the military and would do anything to help it. This includes most in the Hollywood entertainment community, not just the “thank you for your service” crowd, but the real “power in the industry” crowd.
The problem with recruiting the sons and daughters of the “rich, famous, and powerful” rests with civilians in the recruiting administration. They are supposed to be reasonably well qualified to aid the uniformed commanders. They aren’t. They simply do not understand how to reach out to the sons, daughters, and parents who comprise the “rich, famous, and powerful.”
In my experience I have found that the uniformed people had no problem mingling with major stars, while the civilian Morale, Welfare, and Recreation executives were, at most bases, embarrassed and arrogant toward the celebrities who were volunteering to appear at their base. I found this lack of self-confidence and ineptitude by civilian military administrators increased the closer you got to the Pentagon.
To recruit in the category of rich and famous, you must understand the rich and famous, and you must make the military interesting and viable as a career. Primarily, you must counter the “you must be crazy” that comes from the parents. Until the civilian administrators of the recruiting commands make an effort to understand these people, the military will not recruit them. Unfortunately, those civilian administrators will never make such an effort because to do so they must admit their own inadequacies. Yeah, fat chance of that.
Russia Fires Back on Missile Defense
(See N. Friedman, pp. 88–89, December 2011 Proceedings)
Daniel Goure, Ph.D., vice president, the Lexington Institute—Dr. Friedman’s assessment of Russia’s response to the initial deployment of U.S. missile defenses to Europe is a tour de force. The author rightly sets the Kremlin’s response to the European-phased adaptive architecture (EPAA) in the larger context of Russia’s parlous economic and political situation and its evolving nuclear strategy. Recent events in that country, notably the demonstrably fraudulent elections and growing domestic protests, underscore the fragile position of the Vladimir Putin regime. It is not surprising that Moscow chooses this point in time to pick a fight with NATO. How old is the story of an authoritarian power, when faced with an increasingly disaffected populace, casting about for an external threat to solidify its domestic political support?
The Kremlin’s reaction to the initial deployment of advanced missile defenses to Europe has been surprisingly bellicose. Russian President Dimitri Medvedev warned that unless a binding legal agreement is concluded that defines the limits of U.S. missile capabilities, Russia could respond to deployment of defenses in Europe under the EPAA with offensive moves or even by withdrawing from the New START treaty.
It is not as if the deployment of the first phase of the EPAA comes as any surprise to Moscow. U.S. government officials have briefed their Russian counterparts repeatedly. Russia and NATO have been in negotiations over ways of cooperating on missile defense. The United States and its NATO allies have proposed informational exchanges at the NATO-Russia Council, Russian observation of missile defense tests, joint NATO-Russian missile-defense exercises, and joint missile-defense centers.
The fact is that no NATO missile defense based on the proposed technologies and architecture could pose a threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent. This is not just a matter of technology but of geography and kinematics. Defensive systems deployed on or near NATO territory could not even engage Russian ICBMs or SLBMs launched against anyplace but Europe itself, and even then only in the terminal phase of their trajectories.
Dr. Friedman is correct when he connects the Kremlin’s hostile response to a limited missile defense in Europe to Russia’s inability to rebuild the non-nuclear portions of its military machine. As a consequence, Moscow increasingly must rely on its nuclear arsenal not only for strategic deterrence but also for any measure of intra-war control and for political influence along its periphery. An integrated regional missile-defense system for Europe strikes at the heart of Russia’s political strategy vis-à-vis the West. As Dr. Friedman states, “It is a threat against what the Russians would like to use to cow the breakaway parts of their former empire.”
To date, the Obama administration has been remarkably resistant to Russian demands and threats. A senior State Department official recently declared before a NATO audience that “the United States has made it clear that no nation or group of nations will have veto power over U.S. missile-defense efforts because missile defense is a critical capability needed to counter a growing 21st-century threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and our deployed forces.” The stage appears to be set for a serious confrontation between Washington and Moscow.
Sail Ho or Sail No?
(See A. Pine, pp. 66–70, October 2011; and B. Boland and K. B. Barton, pp. 8–9, November 2011 Proceedings)
Colonel Todd Fredricks, U.S. Army—As a pilot and never having sailed anything on the water, I can only speculate about the merits of training sailors to handle a boat under sail. What I can attest to is that without other discriminators, a pilot trained to fly sailplanes prior to operating a powered aircraft will outfly a non-sailplane-trained aviator in terms of basic stick-and-rudder skills and energy management. A sailplane pilot becomes very comfortable with the limitations of this most basic form of flight, and when I was pursuing sailplanes and trikes I became very familiar on a visceral level with the wing and how it flies.
From this perspective, it seems to make perfect sense that a sailor who is trained to manage a craft while at the mercy of the vagaries of the wind would necessarily be a more refined handler of those vessels under power.