The Strategic Imperative and Naval Energy Strategy
(See E. S. Briggs and D. K. Forbes, p. 10, July 2012 Proceedings)
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Chief of Naval Operations—I wish to voice my strong concurrence with the opinions expressed by Vice Admiral Briggs and Captain Forbes regarding the need for a comprehensive national energy policy that embodies a practical naval energy strategy. It is dismaying, to say the least, to watch the current national leadership fail to appreciate the extraordinary opportunity now available to exploit our domestic fossil-fuel resources that provide a revolutionary opportunity to achieve real “strategic independence” from foreign oil sources while simultaneously impacting positively our national economic posture.
Mel Luter—Bravo Zulu for a job well done to Vice Admiral Briggs and Captain Forbes in their excellent article on the need for a realistic Navy energy policy. Thank you for showing it is more important to base an energy policy on known facts than to be politically correct.
Scientific American even published an article titled “The False Promise of Biofuels” in August 2011 citing the Navy paying a ridiculous price for fuel. When 40 cents on the dollar is borrowed money in the federal budget, it is no wonder this type spending by the Navy should draw an angry response from the taxpaying public. A sound energy policy implementing known efficiencies, which lets the American people know the Navy spends their money wisely, would go a long way to restoring the Navy’s credibility in this area.
Commander James J. Coogan, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Vice Admiral Briggs and Captain Forbes deliver a one-sided condemnation of Pentagon efforts to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, claiming that alternatives are too costly and that they cannot benefit the armed forces. In their complaint about restrictions on drilling permits, both writers come off as shills for big oil. Even if one acknowledges that the Rand study does indeed support many of their conclusions, the authors’ statement that “there is no universally accepted scientific evidence that anthropogenic atmospheric CO2 is the predominant cause of past global warming” is false. Scientists at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, as well as the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and thousands of scientists in the international community, have conclusively linked greenhouse gases—CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons to a steady rise in the earth’s temperature over the past century.
Concentrations of atmospheric CO2 have risen 25 percent since 1955. Over 90 percent of these gases come from fossil fuels. America’s armed forces are a significant contributor to the release of those harmful gases into the atmosphere. Continued research by the military into alternative fuels could very well lead to viable commercial development, as the Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects Agency did with the Internet. Rather than dismissing efforts to investigate fuel alternatives as some kind of global-warming frenzy advanced by politically motivated scientists, the search for “green” energy sources should be applauded by everyone concerned with the overall human impact on the Earth’s climate.
Keeping Our Amphibious Edge
(See J. C. Harvey Jr. and P. J. Ridderhof, pp. 36–40, July 2012 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Douglas R. Peterson, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Both the authors—one Navy, one Marine Corps—have totally ignored the obvious “amphibious edge” solution in their article, as aptly illustrated by the photo on page 36—with a Coast Guard unit in the foreground.
The U.S. Coast Guard (and its predecessor, the Revenue Cutter Service) regularly, effectively, and efficiently performed amphibious operations in the Civil War, the War with Mexico, the Spanish-American War, and all theaters of World War II. The Coast Guard has never been limited to the stereotyped duties of search-and-rescue in “little white boats,” as many perceive, but is a separate, fully functional military armed force. We have been Semper Paratus (“always ready”) and have participated in all our conflicts since the founding of our nation.
Whether it was putting other services on the beach and supporting them (name the war, we’ve been there) or protecting our own shores, the U.S. Coast Guard has been and continues to remain the primary coastal (littoral?) guardian of our nation.
Maybe the authors (and others) might wake up and consider the already capable skills of this country’s oldest continuously operating sea service.
Being There Still Matters
(See N. Friedman, pp. 90–91, July 2012 Proceedings)
Colonel Ross J. Hieb, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Dr. Friedman makes an eloquent argument for why the Marine Corps needs a short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft to support its roles and missions. In response to the query posed in his final sentence, I would refer him and readers to a 6 July article in The New York Times, “Afghan Conflict Losing Air Power as U.S. Pulls Out,” by C. J. Chivers. Mr. Chivers’ observations make a very compelling argument for why the man in the loop, on scene, is vital not only to the prosecution of modern military operations in urban terrain but in remote areas where the fog of war and the sensitivities of standoff attack against specific high-value human targets can reign supreme.
I would note, too, that the Marine Harrier has been in frontline U.S military service for 41 years, longer than any other tactical fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft in U.S. military-aviation history. There is every indication that it will continue to serve for another 15–20 years. It has successfully, though not without a painful learning curve, fulfilled the goal of an all-STOVL aviation force as set out by General/Commandant Clifton Cates in 1950.
It has accomplished this feat because the role it fills is so vital and germane to what we as Marines do. Also, the Harrier has evolved through technological innovation, often being the lead platform for any number of systems that have then become integral to other Fleet aircraft (the Litening Pod comes to mind first and foremost).
When one considers these facts, it should soften the stress over the time and cost it has taken to get the F-35 right. There is no telling how long it will need to serve.
Needed: A Sub Change
(See N. Polmar, pp. 88–89, July 2012 Proceedings)
Richard Butrovich—Mr. Polmar writes, “But most experts agree that the initial event that caused the loss of the Thresher was the reactor scram.”
I disagree completely with this statement. After graduating from sub school I reported aboard the USS Tinosa (SSN-606) in the weeks following the tragic loss of the Thresher (SSN-593). The Tinosa spent the next 18 months going through extensive modifications to the ballast-blow system as well as finding and correcting deficient joints in the seawater systems. She also tested new scram-recovery methods.
The reactor scram contributed to the sub’s inability to recover from the flooding but did not cause the flooding. At that time, it was standard procedure to close the main turbine throttles on receipt of a scram and not use the stored energy in the reactor to provide reduced propulsion capability. The new scram-recovery procedures did permit keeping the main turbine throttles open at a reduced demand while pulling control rods to restart the reactor. Mr. Polmar neglected to mention that the Thresher also transmitted the message “attempting to blow.” Testing on board the Tinosa found that the ballast-tank blow valves in the ballast-control panel froze and restricted air flow to the tanks. All these factors contributed to the loss of the Thresher. However, to state that the reactor scram was the initial event that caused the loss is not correct.
Navy Disputes LCS Criticisms
(See E. Walsh, p. 86, June 2012 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Aviation Ordnanceman John Cataldi, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) originally was conceived as a low-cost warship that could be procured in large numbers to go places and handle missions where larger, high-tech combatants were not needed. Since the concept was first proposed more than ten years ago, the ships have grown in size and cost. What is worse is that after all the time and treasure spent on this program, the Navy only has two of the planned 55 LCS ships it wants. With the dismal outlook for defense budgets, it is questionable whether the Navy will ever build all 55.
Meanwhile, in less time than the U.S. Navy has spent dithering with the LCS program, the Chinese have built more than 80 fast missile boats for their navy. While experts will posture that the cheap Chinese missile boats are no match for our few high-tech warships, I say the numbers do matter. When will our naval leaders realize that our few high-tech warships can still only be in one place at a time? The Navy’s procurement practices are sacrificing numbers of warships on the altar of technology. Our Navy’s commitments are growing while our Fleet is shrinking. Something has to give.
I propose that the Navy embark on a truly affordable shipbuilding program. The ship should be approximately 1,000 tons displacement (between a patrol boat and a corvette) and contain only proven technologies that are currently in the Fleet. This ship needs to do four things that will give it the versatility needed to be used in a number of mission areas.
First, it must be able to launch Tomahawk and other Navy missiles from an eight-cell Mk-41 vertical-launch system mounted in the superstructure behind the bridge. Targeting can be handled by high-tech Fleet units.
Second, it must be able to defend itself from short-range threats with a 76-mm deck gun and a rolling-airframe missile launcher. Third, it must be able to stern-launch and recover two boats to support visit/board/search/seizure, naval special-warfare, or Marine reconnaissance missions. Finally, it must have a small flight deck for launch and recovery of unmanned aerial vehicles. The hull and power plant should be of proven designs. Ship speed need only be fast enough to keep up with a carrier when it is assigned plane-guard duty.
The crew would be about 30 officers and sailors. The ship would have additional troop berthing for when boarding teams, SEALS, or Marines are embarked.
In order to keep costs down, once a design is chosen, two shipyards should be awarded contracts to build an even number of ships and then let them compete for the “extra” ship to be built each year.
While not a “star player,” this light warship will fill a supporting role in the Fleet and be especially useful in missions that do not require a major warship.
Lieutenant Commander Larry Parker, U.S. Navy (Retired)—People continue to criticize the LCS because it is a destroyer designed by a committee—i.e., a camel. It is slower than a World War II patrol torpedo boat and outgunned by a Panzer Mark IV of the same era. Its ability to carry a variety of weapon modules dependent on assigned mission is touted as flexibility. So what happens if an LCS gets under way with an antisubmarine-warfare package and encounters a surface or aintiair-warfare threat? In order to engage the most common enemy threats you would have to sortie at least three LCSs—or one Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigate.
In 1807, as tension mounted between the fledgling United States and the British Empire, for diplomatic, economic, and political reasons President Thomas Jefferson proposed, and Congress authorized, construction of a fleet of 200 gunboats. At the time, one heard many of the same arguments you hear today in favor of the LCS: lower construction costs, lower maintenance costs, reduced manning, etc. To further avoid provoking England, Jefferson also curtailed major shipbuilding. In such an environment our blue-water navy languished, and sovereignty came to rest upon the decks of a green-water navy. This costly and ultimately futile policy proved disastrous in 1812. The LCS is false economy and will follow the same historical path as Jefferson’s gunboats.
I cannot fathom why the Navy would chart the same course 200 years later.
Winning the Battle, Losing the War
(See S. Cohen, pp. 50–54, June 2012 Proceedings)
John J. O’Neill—Mr. Cohen is dead-on with his critique of the Navy’s marketing efforts. Every time I see an ad for the Marines, I want to sign up. Every time I see the “Global Force for Good” ad, I want to throw up. The Marines’ pitch, especially the latest (“Which Way Will You Run”), tugs at the desire to serve our great country and to be part of an organization dedicated to courage and honor. The Marines are aiming at the top three elements of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs—belonging/esteem/self-actualization. On the other hand, the statistics shown about how much of the world is covered by water and how much commerce moves by water are aiming at the lower end of Maslow’s hierarchy—physiological and safety—hardly the inspirational or aspirational side of life.
The odd thing is, an effective campaign could be developed just by looking through back issues of Proceedings. Take a few “Lest We Forget” articles and turn them into commercials. Thomas Cutler’s brief on the battle off Samar is brilliant material. Especially the last line—a signalman saying “Goddamit, they’re getting away!” as the Japanese fleet turns away. That’s inspirational! Get our history across to today’s youth, and you won’t need a slogan—just the word “NAVY” will do.
The U.S. Senate Should Ratify UNCLOS
(See B. May, p. 10, June 2012, and R. Salta, p. 8, July 2012 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Victor Allen, U.S. Navy—Mr. Salta’s claims of the lack of an adjudication and enforcement mechanism in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are illustrative of the pervasive lack of understanding of all of the provisions in that treaty.
Specifically, UNCLOS provides for the International Tribune on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), responsible for “adjudicat[ing] disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Convention.” Much like the World Trade Organization’s enforcement mechanisms, the carrot is access to the international body—here, ITLOS—allowing for economy of effort in resolving conflicts, rather than taking on each dispute bilaterally. Where UNCLOS lacks in comparison with the relatively forceful enforcement mechanisms available to the World Trade Organization is the inability of ITLOS to coerce convention-compliant behavior through sanctions other than access.
Effectively, there is no option available to ITLOS other than to exclude non-compliant states from access to the body, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of the body. That being said, the Spratly Islands scenario presented in Mr. Salta’s commentary can easily be resolved through other bodies that use any ITLOS decision regarding China’s activities as justification for a wide range of actions, from multilateral diplomatic pressure to actual military operations. Regardless, ratification of UNCLOS would be necessary to provide the United States with access to the tribunal and its dispute-resolution procedures, allowing a direct challenge of Chinese activities in a less tense atmosphere than bilateral or military confrontation.